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THE

DOCTRINE

OF THE

RESURRECTION OF THE BODY

ASSERTED AND DEFENDED;

IN ANSWER TO THE EXCEPTIONS RECENTLY PRESENTED BY

REV. GEORGE BUSH,

PROFESSOR OF HEBREW, NEW YORK CITY UNIVERSITY.

By ROBERT W. LANDIS.

Ἐκτρεπου τὰς βεβήλους κενοφωνίας, καὶ ἀντιθέσεις τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως· ἣν τινες ἐπαγγελλόμενοι, περὶ τὴν πίστιν ἐστόχησαν. PAUL.

Quidnam oblæsa cavalla,
Quid pulchra volunt monumenta,
Nisi quod res creditur illis
Non mortua, sed data somno.—PRUDENTIUS.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

The work here submitted to the public, was ready for the press in March last. But soon after preparing it, the author learned from Professor Bush that he was about to issue other works in defence of the positions assumed in the *Anastasis:* and therefore concluded to delay the publication until he should have an opportunity to consider them. In consequence, however, of a severe and protracted illness, he could not do this until late in the fall: when, upon perusing the works referred to, he found nothing that required any formal distinct notice whatever. They contain little else than repetitions of what is asserted in the *Anastasis.*

With regard to the style of the present work, the author would say that he has aimed only at clearness and brevity: for he cannot see that in the estimation of thinking minds, his argument would derive any advantage from being expressed in a strain of fervid declamation, and in beautifully rounded and polished periods. In aiming at clearness, however, he has endeavoured to express himself not only so as to be understood, but so as not to be misunderstood. In doing this, he is aware that he has sometimes repeated the same word or phrase (even in close connexion) rather oftener than either the Roman or Scottish rhetorician would have sanctioned.

In consequence of the author's distance from Philadelphia, (and the uncertainty of the transmission by mail, especially in the winter,) his friend, Dr. E. S. Ely, kindly consented to assist him in the labour of revising the proofs, for which favour he would take the present opportunity of expressing his obligations and gratitude. And in looking over the sheets (which are printed with singular accuracy), the author has discovered no *errata* which need be specified, save that on p. 59, in stating a hypothetical case he remarked that רחף in Gen. i. 2, was used in the *hithpael*, when he should have said *piel:* and on p. 184, ψυχὴ is used for ψυχικὸς in one instance, and ψυχικὸς also for ψυχικὸν. Other *errata* will doubtless be discovered; but he is assured that those (at least) of his brethren

who are engaged in the arduous duties of the gospel ministry, will know how to palliate them.

The author hopes that the reader will excuse the appearance of the Hebrew character, as also the absence of the points in the quotations from the Old Testament. The Hebrew and Greek originals have been also generally excluded, as well as those of the Latin and German, from a desire that the present volume should not in bulk exceed that of Professor Bush.

The author, in justice to himself, ought also, perhaps, here to state why he has not noticed more specifically the construction of Job xix. 25–27, which is presented in the late excellent work of Mr. Barnes. He had endeavoured, by sending to New York soon after the work was announced, to procure a copy of it, but in vain; and was therefore compelled to proceed without it. But he finds, however, that he has anticipated and replied to every thing offered by Mr. Barnes against the ordinary rendering of that celebrated passage.

While the *Anastasis* was passing through the press, Professor Bush politely transmitted to the author the sheets containing the more important branches of the argument. These he perused with deep interest, and with a strong impression that the Professor's book required to be promptly met and answered. And being satisfied that its principles, if received, would be most pernicious in their influence upon American theology, he concluded to put down his thoughts upon the subject while it was fully before his mind; and if, in the meantime, no reply should appear, to give them to the public. The labour of doing so, taken in connexion with the arduous duties of an extensive pastoral charge, has been greater than he anticipated; but as no reply to the Professor has appeared, occupying the ground herein occupied, he hopes that his labour has not been altogether in vain.

Having prepared his little volume in the humble hope that it may tend somewhat to counteract the errors which it controverts, the author, in submitting it to the public, earnestly commends it to the blessing of the Great Head of the Church, (without whose favour all our efforts are vain!) with the fervent prayer also that both the writer and reader may be guided into the saving knowledge of all essential truth.

Sidney, New Jersey, *March* 13, 1846.

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INTRODUCTION.

The importance of the doctrine discussed in the ensuing work can scarcely be over-estimated; and in reference to his *Anastasis*, Professor Bush therefore truly remarks, "that the results which it announces are of very momentous import to the interests of revealed truth."—*Preface*, p. v. They are indeed. Nor does this arise alone from the intrinsic importance of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body in itself considered; but also from its relative importance as viewed in connexion with the great *system of truth* announced in the Word of God. And hence the Professor has correctly observed also, that "a course of reasoning, or a theory of interpretation which goes essentially to change the established view of the doctrine of the resurrection, *must necessarily work a correspondent change* in our estimate of a whole class of subjects bearing upon the theme of human destiny in another life."—*Ibid.* Such being the fact, it may of course be rationally expected, that when the received doctrine on this subject is assailed from any respectable source, its advocates will either attempt to defend it, or, by their silence, leave it to be inferred that they deem it incapable of defence. Such an alternative has been presented by Professor Bush. We cheerfully accept it: and only ask of the Christian public patiently to hear our defence of the doctrine which he has assailed.

It is conceded by all that the theme itself is sacred. But the individual who asserts that because it involves consequences so momentous, it should therefore not be subjected to a rigid scrutiny, has altogether misapprehended the spirit of the age and country in which we live. Mere human authority is losing its power to lead, and must in turn expect its own claims to be rigidly tested. And while an adventurer, who, like Professor Bush, boldly assumes to call an established doctrine or usage in question, need have little apprehension of being condemned by intelligent men, merely for thus venturing, he himself has made a wretchedly mistaken calculation if he does not in turn expect to have his own theory or pretensions as rigidly scrutinized. If right, he may therefore reasonably hope to receive the support of the candid and intelligent: but if such an attempt be made on insufficient grounds, or should be based upon crude conceptions, or a total misapprehension of the subject; or should prove to be a mere effort to revive old exploded objections; he will find that the public, to whose verdict he professes to appeal, will not be slow in awarding him the full meed of such ill-timed temerity.

In the ensuing pages we have entered into a thorough investigation of the "Theory of the Resurrection" propounded by Professor Bush; and also of the exceptions which he has taken to the doctrine of *the Resurrection of the Body*. Our views of both are expressed freely and unambiguously. The Professor, in his work, has spoken plainly, and in some parts of it with a good deal of asperity, of the doctrines he impugns, and of those who entertain them. The writer of the present work has likewise "used great plainness of speech;" but he hopes that no unkind expression has escaped him in reference to the Professor personally, for whom he has long entertained, and still does entertain a sincere and affectionate regard. Theological controversy in the time of the Reformation, abounded in the fiercest and most proscriptive denunciations of individuals as well as of opinions; this, to some extent, subsequently gave place to a tone of discussion so excessively mild, even where the most important interests were concerned,* that many were strongly inclined to infer that after all nothing of real importance was involved in the controversy: both alike have proved extremely prejudicial to the interests of truth, and both have now in great measure given place to a frank and manly expression of thought, in the interchange of which it is mutually conceded that things should be spoken of *as they are*. Such a course it was the aim of the author to pursue in the work now submitted to the reader.

Professor Bush remarks that the doctrine of the resurrection has been but "seldom *interrogated;*" by which he means that it has been but seldom subjected to a close and rigid examination. In this, however, he is mistaken: for not only from the earliest ages until now has it been bitterly opposed by pagans and infidels, but it is this very opposition itself which has from age to age originated the efforts (of which his own work is the latest) that have been made to reconcile it with reason and philosophy. At the commencement of our work, we have given a succinct history of the Professor's theory as respects the development of its more prominent features, which is itself sufficient to evince that the doctrine of the resurrection had in our own day ceased to be a subject of radical investigation simply because all that could be offered against it had been offered in vain. No doctrine of the Christian system has been more thoroughly scrutinized by friend and foe, (from the fact of its plain connexion with the resurrection of our Saviour,) and none more fully established as a clear announcement of revelation, than the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. Nothing therefore can be more out of place than an attempt to justify any assumed impeachment of that doctrine by intimating that so far from having been made the subject of profound investigation, the origin of its universal reception in the Jewish and Christian Church is a mere unsupported tradition. And we assert emphatically, that any intimation to this effect, from whatever source it may come, is not only wholly destitute of historical support, but directly contradicted by fact.

As to the *Anastasis* itself of Professor Bush, the reader will doubt-

* See, for example, the controversial writings of Dr. John Pye Smith.

less make up his own mind respecting it. To us, however, it does appear to present a singularly striking contrast to those expectations which the loud and confident professions of its author at the outset, had led us to entertain. As to arrangement, it is any thing but lucid. The "Argument from Reason" is, throughout, the most singular specimen of repetition of the same idea, and of the intermixture of Scripture and hermeneutics with exploded fancies, and "odds and ends" of pretended scientific principles, with which it has been our fortune to meet for a long time. Such a mass of confusion may astound the undiscriminating reader, and make him believe, perhaps, that there must be some flame where there is so much smoke; but no thinking mind can be at any loss to know what estimate should be put upon an argument of such a character. And as to prefacing his work with an attempt to prove that "*the knowledge of revelation is progressive*," and intimating that his theory furnishes an illustration of the truth of this proposition, it has, as we have shown, something of the appearance of the ludicrous: for the Professor has not, in his whole book, advanced a solitary fact which has been developed or established by the modern improvements either in science or biblical hermeneutics. His so-called "argument from reason," has been for centuries advanced by skeptics and Socinians against the doctrine which he assails; his notions of "spiritualized bodies" are wholly visionary, and lack all support from reason or any thing else; and his principles of hermeneutics are the old exploded principles of the neological school of Germany: and in his whole book he has not evinced any acquaintance with the really advanced state of criticism, at the head of which school Winer stands confessedly pre-eminent.* On the contrary, the Professor's criticisms are all of the older species, in which the *sense* of a word is perpetually confounded with its *signification*.† If, therefore, it be a fact, that "the knowledge of revelation is progressive," it is a fact with which his theory has no more to do than with the discovery of the North Pole. And this branch of the argument, (upon which he professes to lay very great stress,) is met, not only by a distinct and direct denial that it has any thing to do with the subject in support of which he has adduced it, but by showing that it is wholly irrelevant.

The reader will also perceive that we have very carefully dissected

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* "Winer is the first who broke up the arbitrary methods of preceding critics. Among the excellencies of this grammarian, is especially to be noticed and extolled his sound judgment and discretion. He has made the following remarkable confession in reference to the new method, as compared to the old, of interpreting the Scriptures: 'The controversies among interpreters have ordinarily led back to the admission, that the old Protestant views of the meaning of the sacred text, are the correct views;' see *Leips. Litteratur. Zeitung*, 1833, No. 44." Tholuck—see his "Lectures" in Biblioth. Sac. for 1844. And see also the preface to his commentary on John.

† "The *signification* of a term," says Tholuck, "is the meaning which it has in itself originally; the *sense* of it is the meaning which it acquires in a certain connexion."

"the argument from reason," and have demonstrated that even if its premises and conclusions were all granted, it would support but the merest fraction of the theory which our author professes to have erected upon it: and in addition to this we have shown that both its premises and conclusions are unsound and unphilosophical, and that the argument can by no means be relied on. We have also replied at length to the Professor's "objections from reason" to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, and have devoted a chapter to a consideration of "the true office of reason in respect to Revelation."

The *first* part of our volume is occupied with the foregoing considerations;* and as the *second* is devoted to an investigation of the scriptural argument, we commence it with a discussion of Professor Bush's principles of interpretation; and have shown them to be neological in their nature, and wholly subversive of Revelation in their tendency. In his development and illustration of these principles, he not only has adopted the theory of hermeneutics which transformed Germany into a nation of infidels, but has actually sought to recommend it to our American churches! The writer has thought it his duty to discuss this principle somewhat thoroughly; for, after all, it is the most dangerous feature of the Professor's performance. If the principle be correct, little can be said against his attempt to make Revelation subservient to reason and philosophy; or, in other words, to show from reason and science what Revelation *ought to teach.* But at the very outset of our discussion of the Scripture argument, we have affirmed the principle that *the announcements of the Word of God are to be fearlessly followed, lead where they may;* and that in all such discussions as the present, they are to be assumed as first principles, even should reason or science appear to array itself against them. This principle, so happily presented in the following quotations, is that by which we are content to abide, and in support of which the great names of Bacon, Ernesti, and Hahn, as well as of Stuart and Hodge, and others in our own country, stand pre-eminent. "All creeds, systems, theories, sciences," says Dr. Skinner,† "are to be tried by the Bible, and to be rejected as falsifying the Divine veracity, if they cannot abide the trial. To a man who understands the literary character of the Bible, and remembers the fallibility of the human mind, and the influence of depravity in obscuring evidence and per-

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* I have not formally discussed in this work the Professor's doctrine of "*natural laws;*" respecting which he says—"The idea maintained throughout" the *Anastasis* "is that the resurrection is effected by *natural laws*," Pref. p. xi.; and on p. 35—"It is by no means impossible that the most signal miracles on record may ultimately resolve themselves into the operation of some higher law, which may never have been previously known except to its Author." It would be a reflection upon a Christian community to attempt a serious refutation of a notion so perfectly extravagant. The miraculous conception of our blessed Redeemer, is one among the "miracles on record," and what can transcend the perfect atrocity of the principle which would even intimate that it was "effected by natural laws!"

† "Aids to Preaching and Hearing," pp. 53–54.

verting reason, this is a motive of resistless power to the utmost diligence, candor, and seriousness in searching out the real doctrine of the sacred text." In like manner also, says Robert Hall—"In our apprehension, the true way of contemplating the peculiar doctrines of Christianity is to consider them as *facts* believed on the authority of the Supreme Being, not to be proved by reason; since their truth does not result from any perceptible relations in our ideas, but they owe their existence entirely to the will and counsel of the Almighty Potentate. On this account we never consider it safe to rest their truth on a philosophical basis, nor imagine it is possible to add to their evidence by an elaborate train of reasoning. Let the fair grammatical import of Scripture language be investigated; and whatever propositions are, by an easy and natural interpretation, deducible from thence, let them be received as the dictates of Infinite Wisdom, whatever aspect they bear, or whatever difficulties they present."* These principles have ever been dear to our American Zion, and long may they continue to be so!

The next topic of the Professor's treatise, is *the Old Testament argument*. In this we have carefully followed him step by step, and have shown that he has not only failed to find therein any support for his own theory, but has entirely failed to meet the argument from the Old Testament for the resurrection of the body. Preparatory also to entering into a discussion of the New Testament argument, we have devoted a section to a definition of the terms ἀνάστασις and σῶμα πνευματικόν; the latter of which, Professor Bush employs with a latitude of signification which is certainly in advance of all preceding lexicography.

We have also followed the Professor patiently through his long array of New Testament citations, and have, we think, shown the irrelevancy of his every attempt to obviate their overpowering testimony in favour of the doctrine which he assails. The reader may, however, suppose that too much space is occupied in refuting the Professor's criticism on σπείρω in 1 Cor. xv. 42—44; but a moment's reflection will evince that if "*sow*" there refers to *burial*, the Professor's notion of the resurrection taking place *at* death is false. He himself felt this, and therefore adopts the Socinian exegesis.

At the close of this examination, we have adduced a large number of passages (entirely unnoticed by Professor Bush,) teaching the resurrection of the body. This is followed by a chapter exposing our author's statements respecting the resurrection of Christ; and this is likewise followed by another on the Judgment, which concludes the argument.

When this work was commenced, it was the writer's intention to prepare a *third part*, in which it was designed to present a view of the direct and positive argument in favour of the resurrection; containing a view also of the doctrine as held by the ancient Jews and the primitive Christian church, as well as an inquiry into the sentiments entertained by Chrysippus, Democritus, and others of the ancient philosophical heathen, respecting the possibility of a resurrection. But the work has increased to such a bulk that this design

* Works, Vol. II. p. 309.

was abandoned by the author, lest he should incur the censure of the old proverb—*μέγα βιβλίον μέγα κακόν*. There are many points which, for the same reason, we have been compelled to omit, but which have no little weight in this discussion: *e. g.*, the very ancient custom of embalming the body, plainly owes its origin to the expectation of reviviscence, according to the statement of Democritus, as mentioned by Pliny and Varro. So also, the very *design* of burial under the circumstances referred to by Prudentius, in a passage which we have placed on our title page,* furnishes of itself a complete off-set to the so-called "argument from reason" against the resurrection of the body. So also, the fact that man was created immortal, is a consideration of great weight to prove the same doctrine.

We had intended also in a distinct chapter to consider the resurrection of the wicked, (a point denied by Professor Bush,) and the reason why our Saviour speaks of the righteous as emphatically the "children of the resurrection." But though we have not (for the reason above stated) treated these and several other subjects in the form of distinct topics, we hope that all has been said in relation to them that the discussion itself required.

And, finally, as the writer has, in no way, throughout his book, sought to influence the mind of the reader by an appeal to his passions or prejudices, he has said nothing concerning the violence which the theory of Professor Bush does to all those tender and endearing associations which cluster around the grave of a father or mother, a sister, or child, &c., and to those hallowed feelings which awaken within the breast as we gaze upon the resting-place of departed piety, genius, worth, or patriotism. These emotions can be neither superstitious nor wrong; (witness the weeping Jesus at the tomb of his friend!) and the man is not to be envied who has, by any means whatever, succeeded in quenching them within his breast.

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* Why do they wish for the hollowed-out rocks?
Or wherefore the beautiful monuments crave?
Unless 'tis believ'd that the body but slumbers
And is not abandoned to death in the grave.

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THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY

ASSERTED AND DEFENDED.

PART I.

CONTAINING A STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION, AND OF PROFESSOR BUSH'S THEORY; TOGETHER WITH A CONSIDERATION OF HIS ARGUMENT FROM REASON.

CHAPTER I.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY STATED.

THE work of Professor Bush on the Resurrection would have exhibited an appearance of greater candour, if he had, at the outset, presented from some acknowledged symbol, a fair and full statement of the doctrine which he has attempted to refute. Instead of this frank and scholar-like course, he contents himself with some vague references to "the common *theory*," and ventures to insinuate repeatedly through his work, that the views entertained on this subject by the Christian church are inconsistent and indeterminate.* That such is their character, he is welcome to prove, if he is able. But alongside of such intimations, it would, doubtless, have been the more candid course to state the doctrine clearly and plainly in the acknowledged terms of those who entertain it. He might then have also spared himself much of the labour which he has put forth in demolishing mere men of straw;

*See pp. 36—39, 45, 48, 54, 55, and 187, &c.

and in discussing how bodies that were never in graves could come out of them, (see pp. 49, 50,) with a multitude of other, and not less irrelevant matters.

There is no doctrine respecting which the views of the church of God have, in every age, been more perfectly harmonious than the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. She has ever regarded it as a doctrine of pure revelation, and as fundamental to the Christian system. And the πιστεύω εἰς σαρκὸς ἀναστάσιν of the first symbol, has expressed unambiguously the faith of the whole Christian church ever since the hour in which it was penned.

Professor Bush had doubtless reasons which were satisfactory to his own mind for the course which he has pursued. But, that we may not be like those who "beat the air," it will be proper to present here a view of the doctrine under discussion. The reader will then at once be enabled to judge of the force of the arguments which, in this discussion, are alleged both for and against it: as well as of the relevancy of many things which Professor Bush has offered with the intention of refuting it. Our citations will be somewhat extended; but not more so, perhaps, than is necessary to show with what little reason the doctrine has been impugned on the score that the views of those who profess to entertain it are vague and indefinite.

We shall not *here* go back to the Jewish or primitive Christian church, for a delineation of the doctrine; as we shall have occasion hereafter to refer to their views. But we shall present a definition of it as entertained by the Protestant church at large; and in contrast thereto, shall, in the following chapter, present the theory of Professor Bush. The Professor has connected with his theory, and has consequently discussed, many doctrines which need not be fully discussed in this connexion. And though we shall refer to these in the sequel, the single point which we have now before us, and from which we must not suffer our attention to be diverted, is *the Resurrection of the Body.*

SECTION I.

The testimony of the Lutheran Church.

The first great division of the Protestant church, whose testimony we shall summon, is the Lutheran church. In her Augsburg symbol, Art. XVII., she thus speaks: "Our

churches teach, that at the end of the world Christ will appear for judgment, and will raise all the dead; and that he will bestow eternal life and perpetual happiness upon his pious elect; and condemn wicked men and devils to unending torment.

"Our churches also condemn the Anabaptists, who think that the future punishment of men and devils will have an end. They condemn also those who now circulate the Jewish notion, that the pious are to possess the kingdom of the world, and the wicked to be every where put down before the resurrection of the dead."*

The Herrnhútters, or Moravians, adopt also the Augsburg Confession, and may therefore be properly classed with the Lutheran church, at least on this subject. See *Spangenberg's Exposition*, Preface, p. vi., and pp. 461—470.

SECTION II.

Testimony of the Calvinistic Church.

The *Heidelberg Catechism* is the first symbol to which it is necessary to refer under this discussion. Its language is very explicit: "How doth the resurrection of the body (*Fleisches,*) afford thee comfort? *Ans.* Because not only my soul shall, after this life, be immediately taken up to Christ its head; but this my body also, (sondern auch, dass diess mein *Fleisch,*) being raised by the power of Christ, shall be again united with my soul, and be like the glorious body of Christ." See *Quest.* 57.†

* Item docent, quòd Christus apparebit in consummatione mundi ad judicandum, et mortuos omnes resuscitabit, piis et electis dabit vitam æternam et perpetua gaudia, impios autem homines ac diabolos condemnabit, ut sine fine crucientur.

Damnant Anabaptistas, qui sentiunt hominibus damnatis ac diabolis finem poenarum futurum esse. Damnant et alios, qui nunc spargunt Judaicas opiniones, quod ante resurrectionem mortuorum, pii regnum mundi occupaturi sint, ubique oppressis impiis.

† Was tröstet dich die Auferstehung des Fleisches? Antw. Dass nicht allein meine Seele nach diesem Leben alsbald zu Christo ihrem Haupt genommen wird, sondern auch, dass diess mein Fleisch durch die Kraft Christi auferwecket, wieder mit meiner Seele vereiniget und dem herrlichen Leib Christi gleichförmig werden soll.

The Latin copy is singularly expressive. *Quid te consolatur resurrectio* CARNIS? RESP. Quod *non tantum anima* mea, postquam *è corpore* excesserit, etc., quod hæc quoque CARO MEA potentia Christi excitata, *rursus animæ meæ unictur*, et glorioso corpori Christi conformabitur.

The *Reformed Churches* at the National Synod of Dort, (anno 1618 and 1619,) adopted the following language as expressive of their views: "Finally, we believe, according to the word of God, when the time appointed by the Lord (which is unknown to all creatures,) is come, and the number of the elect complete, that our Lord Jesus Christ will come from heaven, *corporeally* and visibly, to declare himself judge of the quick and the dead; burning this old world with fire and flame to cleanse it. And then all will personally appear before this great Judge, both men, and women, and children, that have been from the beginning of the world to the end thereof, being summoned by the voice of the archangel, and by the sound of the trumpet of God. For *all the dead shall be raised out of the earth, and their souls joined and united with their proper bodies, in which they formerly lived.* As for those who shall be then living, they shall not die as the others, but be changed in the twinkling of an eye, and from corruptible, become incorruptible," &c. *Conf. of Faith*, Art. 37.

The *Westminster* symbols speak the same unequivocal language. See *Larger Catechism*, Questions 87 and 88. See also *Conf. of Faith*, chapter 32.

The *Baptist Church* adopts the language of the Westminster Confession.

The *English Church* bears a like testimony. And in Article 4th, also, she says, "Christ did truly rise again from death, *and took again his body, with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature, wherewith he ascended into heaven*, and there sitteth, until he return to judge all men at the last day." The doctrine of this article is alike entertained by every branch of the Christian church. See *Westminster Conf.*, chap. 8, sect. 4, and *Larger Catechism*, Quest. 52. *Heidelberg Catechism*, Quest. 47, 48, 49 and 52. *Dordrecht Confession*, Art. 19, and *Augsburg Conf.*, Art. 3.

SECTION III.

Testimony of the Arminian Church.

In Article 19, of the Confession, the Remonstrants say, that "The resuscitation of the dead shall take place when Jesus Christ comes to judge all men at his second and glorious advent; at which time, all the dead, the just as well

as the unjust, being recalled to life, shall, together with those who are alive and remain, be judged at the tribunal of his Father. Then his faithful and holy followers who were dead, *shall be raised from the dust of the earth* into eternal life and blessedness; and shall be endowed with a glorious and incorruptible body: while those who are then living shall be changed," &c.

The Methodist Church, adopts substantially the ARTICLE of the Church of England, above quoted.

Such then is the testimony of the Christian church, respecting this cardinal doctrine. And I cannot but think that the intellect which can discover any ambiguity in these announcements of a future resurrection of the body, and a judgment to come, must be endowed with a degree of acuteness to which few can pretend without an equal degree of presumption. And though there have been men who have speculated on the subject, and who have entertained views somewhat diverse from these, yet this no more proves that the views of the Christian church, respecting the resurrection, have been unsettled and indefinite, than the fact that Professor Bush entertains a different view from his brethren, proves the views to be unsettled of the community to which he belongs.

CHAPTER II.

A BRIEF VIEW OF PROFESSOR BUSH'S THEORY OF THE RESURRECTION, AND OF ITS CORRELATIVE DOCTRINES AS STATED BY HIMSELF.

In delineating the theory of Professor Bush, it is only fair and proper to let him speak for himself. "After all," says he, "I know not that a mainly *deprecatory* tone is that which the true character of my work most properly warrants. If I could deem myself to have come forth as an opponent to the great truth involved in the doctrine of the resurrection—if I had invaded in a ruthless way the faith of a future life, of immortality, of retribution—I might have stronger motives for seeking to soften the sentence which I could not hope to avoid. But it is not in this character that I claim to appear before the tribunal of the Christian public. There is nothing *destructive* in the bearings of the theory

here presented. I have advanced nothing that is intrinsically calculated to weaken the force of the great moral sanctions of the gospel. I leave the sublime announcements of the resurrection—the judgment—heaven—hell—clothed with all their essential practical potency, as doctrines of revelation, though placed, as I trust, upon their true foundation, and eliminated from the mixtures of long-adhering error. I may venture then to say, that whatever sentiments of repugnance the views here broached may encounter *in limine*, it will arise rather from the *hearsay results* which I have announced, than from a calm and candid scanning of the entire argument. The issue of this I am confident will be a far more elevated and satisfying view of man's ulterior destiny, than that which is afforded by the common construction of the subjects I have treated. The theory here announced of the Resurrection, while it perfectly obviates the objections from reason, clothes the Scripture statements with a new interest, from the bare fact that they are seen to be capable of uttering their oracles in harmony with the dicta of science and philosophy." *Preface*, pp. vii. and viii.

Such is the view which he entertains of his theory, and of the results which it announces. Whether his estimate is not a partial one, the reader will have an opportunity to determine from the theory itself, (which is here subjoined,) and the examination which follows.

1. In respect *to the resurrection of the body* he uses the following language. "The resurrection of the body, if my reasonings and expositions are well founded, is not a doctrine of revelation." *Preface*, p. v. And on page x., he denies "the reconstruction of the future body out of the dissolved and dissipated remains of the present one," and asserts that "the prevalent views of the resurrection, when *once submitted to the ordeal of the understanding*, are seen to involve *ideas at war with each other, and therefore cannot be intelligently received.*"*

Again, "What then becomes of the scriptural evidence of *the resurrection of the body?* Does it not evaporate in

* Surely this is highly complimentary language! And Professor Bush's book contains many such unkind and most unwarrantable insinuations. See pp. 62, 117, 152, 153, 155, 162, 263, &c. &c. Professor Bush surely ought to know that to mingle such expressions in a religious controversy, is calculated only to excite, in minds influenced by them, the embittered feelings of the *odium theologicum*.

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the crucible of logical and philological induction? And is it not inevitable that a great change must come over our estimate of the doctrine, viewed as a disclosure of holy writ? Can it hereafter present the same aspect to the *reflecting mind* as formerly, when conceived to involve the averment of the requickening of the inhumed relics of the corporeal structure? Especially, are we not presented with a new and all important view of the central fact, our Saviour's resurrection?—Can the evidence be resisted?" &c. &c., p. 347. One can hardly read this without being reminded of the language of Milton: "I began," says he, "thus far to assent both to them and divers of my friends here at home, *and not less to an inward prompting* which now grew daily upon me, that by labour and intense study, (which I take to be my portion in this life,) *joined by the strong propensity of nature*, I might perhaps leave something so written to after-times, as they should not willingly let die."* Surely the self-confidence in these two passages is the same; only that Milton employs the word "*perhaps*" which Professor Bush does not think it at all necessary to use. And we might say of the Professor what Dr. Johnson says with reference to Milton, "It appears, in all his writings, that he had the usual concomitant of great abilities, a lofty and steady confidence in himself, perhaps not without some contempt of others."† For he seems to entertain not the shadow of a doubt that his book will evaporate "the doctrine of the resurrection of the body," and *inevitably* produce "a great change in our estimate of the doctrine," so that "hereafter" it cannot "present to the reflecting mind the same aspect as *formerly*," when Bacon, Boyle, Newton, Calvin, Luther, Augustin, and others examined it and thought it to be true.

Professor Bush thus denies and discards the doctrine of the resurrection of the body; and yet, as we have seen, professes to believe in "*the resurrection of the dead.*" We shall therefore next proceed to inquire what is the import which he attaches to this expression.

2. Professor Bush's theory of the resurrection does not, therefore, either include or infer the doctrine of the resurrection of the body: and ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν does not in his

* See "The Reason of Church Government urged against Prelacy." Introduction to Book II. Milton's Prose writings, p. 43. London, 1835.

† Lives of the Poets, vol. i. p. 144. London, 1795.

view "strictly imply *the resurrection of a decomposed bodily fabric*, nor *the restoration of a suspended bodily life*." p. 390. In defining, then, what he means by the "resurrection of the dead," we shall be obliged to specify and illustrate several particulars.

(1.) He asserts that a spiritual body is "*eliminated*"* from the corporeal body at death. "If the fair construction of his (Paul's) language," says Professor Bush, "does not imply that there is something developed *out of the dead body*, which forms the link of connexion between it and the resurrection body, then it would be hard to show that it teaches any thing on the subject, an alternative to which, with the qualifications and explanations that follow, we readily subscribe. We cannot understand the apostle's reasoning, unless he means to affirm that there is something of the nature of a germ which *emanates from the defunct body*, and forms either the substance or the nucleus of the future resurrection body.† But this principle we contend to be what the apostle calls *spiritual*, that is, invisible, impalpable, refined, ethereal—something that is essentially connected with vital operations—*something that is exhaled with the dying breath, or, in other words, that goes forth from the body before it is consigned to the dust*—for after the body has mouldered away in the grave, we perceive not how any germ or embryo is ever to emanate from it." p. 178. See also pp. 179, 240, 241, &c.

(2.) He asserts also that this elimination of a spiritual body from the corporeal, is by natural laws, and not by the miraculous operation of almighty power.

His language on this subject is peculiar. He pointedly denies that the resurrection is effected by the "purely miraculous agency of God." Preface, p. xii. And in opposition to this sentiment, maintains continually that it is effected by "natural laws," though he nowhere tells what these laws are: but on the contrary says that we know little or nothing about them. *Ibid.* See also pp. x. and xi., and 82, 84, 179, 180, 345, 346, 347, 394, &c.

* *Eliminate*, to expel, to throw off, to discharge, &c. It comes from the Latin *elimino*.

† In our discussion of the apostle's language, here referred to, we have shown that this notion of "*a germ*," is neither asserted nor implied in any thing which he has said. It is a mere figment of the imagination, which originated in a total misapprehension of the true point of his argument. Vide infra, Part II. chap. iii. § 3. sub-section iv.

(3.) The state of this spiritual body when first eliminated. On this subject the Professor speaks as follows:

"We may perhaps admit, as some are disposed to maintain, that this spiritual body does not attain to its perfection at once; that as it enters the spiritual world *as* a germ, so, as the vital principle, under appropriate laws, forms for itself—or, as the Germans say, *builds up* for itself—a material body, out of material elements; in like manner it may *elaborate for itself a spiritual corporeity, from the spiritual elements by which it is surrounded.* This, we say, may possibly be so. We can at present neither gainsay nor affirm it, &c." p. 181. Yet several pages back he seemed to have very little hesitation to affirm it. He says, "We *cannot understand* the apostle's reasoning, *unless he means to affirm that there is something of the nature of a germ* which emanates from the defunct body, *and forms either the substance or the* NUCLEUS *of the future resurrection body.*" p. 178.

(4.) This spiritual body enters into the composition of man during his present terrene life.

On this point the Professor's language cannot be misunderstood. He says: "Even in the present life, *it is the spiritual body* which feels the sensations of pleasure or pain. How much more in the life to come." p. 264. See also the foregoing extracts.

(5.) Wherein does this spiritual body differ from the soul or spirit of man? On this point I am much in the dark, though I have closely studied the Professor's book in order to obtain light on the subject. His theory sadly labours here from the fact that he both admits the immortality of the wicked and denies their resurrection. See pp. 70, 71, 72, 73, 76, &c. But of this more in the sequel.

3. Professor Bush's theory as to the relative condition of the righteous and the wicked in the resurrection state.

(1.) He maintains that the righteous alone enter upon the resurrection state.

He plainly and unequivocally asserts that "the resurrection *is* the same with the future life of the righteous." p. 191. "It is unquestionable that our Lord speaks in this passage, (John v. 28, 29,) in stronger terms than he usually adopts in regard to the resurrection of the dead. However it may be accounted for, the fact is nevertheless certain, that he for the most part speaks of it as the distinguishing privilege and prerogative of the righteous. Thus Luke xx. 35, 36; 'But

they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, *and the resurrection from the dead* neither marry, nor are given in marriage; neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels, and are the children (sons) of God, *being the children (sons) of the resurrection.* Here it is clear that the 'children of God' are identified as the same with 'the children of the resurrection.' Again, Luke xiv. 12—14, when commanding his disciples to call the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind, to their feasts, he adds, 'And thou shalt be blessed; for they cannot recompense thee; for thou shalt be recompensed *at the resurrection of the just;*' as if the resurrection belonged emphatically to the just." pp. 234, 5. "The true resurrection takes place at the death of every individual *believer*, when he emerges from a material into a spiritual body." p. 190.

(2.) The state of the wicked.

In regard to this part of the theory, I am likewise not a little puzzled, and am left wholly in the dark. For,

First. Professor Bush denies that a purely disembodied spirit is capable of subsisting in another world. "It is common to speak on this subject," says he, "as if the soul were mere abstract thought—pure intellection—capable of subsisting in another world in the most absolute and isolated state, *without any kind of connexion with any kind of body.* But is thought substance? In order to thought must there not be something that thinks?—something of which thought is the attribute, and not the essence? Granted it may be, and must be, that we are unable to detect or define this mysterious substance; but we may still affirm that it must exist, and that no error is greater than to suppose that at death the soul goes forth from the body as a *bare power of thought*—bodiless and formless *mens*—which is indeed in our present constitution lodged in a body, but to which a body is not necessary, and to which a body is in fact rather an incumbrance. Now to all this we do not hesitate to reply, that it is nothing more than sheer hypothesis." p. 72.

Secondly. Then the Professor avers also that the wicked still exist, and are punished in eternity; and

Thirdly. That they are in no sense partakers of the resurrection. The proof of both these propositions is subjoined. His language is as follows: "The idea that the *present body* must necessarily share in the punishment of the sins which

it was instrumental in committing, is one that receives no countenance from the decisions of sound reason." p. 263. "We have already seen that in the former case a resurrection, in the true sense, is not really affirmed of the wicked. They remain unawakened." p. 232. It might be in place here to ask where are the "*natural* laws" of which we have just heard so much? Do not *natural* laws concern the wicked? Again, he says, "Into this vast assembly, therefore, of departed spirits, represented as being in *hades*, or the *underworld*, his own spirit (Christ's) descended; and though *the immense majority of them were spirits of wicked men*, &c." p. 220. Of course then the wicked *live* in a future state. See also pp. 254, 277, 312, 313, 332, 392—3.

Fourthly. Professor Bush teaches, that *the wicked are, notwithstanding, to have a spiritual body in their future state.* He asserts, as we have seen, that the mortal body does not arise; and also, that our spiritual bodies are included in our corporeal, and are dismissed therefrom at death; then that the wicked exist hereafter, and that they are not partakers of a resurrection; and yet, finally, that they have their future bodies eliminated at death, as well as the righteous. "*Their* bodies," says he, "may become a perpetual source of corroding pain, and of an anguish that knows no mitigation."—"Entire justice to the subject seems to demand the intimation of the probability, that *the spiritual tenements of wicked men* will be moulded by their inward character." p. 395. See also p. 393. If any person can reconcile all these statements, he can do what I cannot.

4. Professor Bush's theory as it respects those who died in faith before the time of Christ.

From the foregoing considerations, it would appear, that "*natural laws*," or "the operation of the vital principle," would require that they rise from the dead, and enter upon the resurrection state immediately *at* death. If this were not so, then, on Professor Bush's theory, they did not arise till the time of Christ. And if they could lie in the grave till then before they were raised, surely we may, without absurdity, suppose that bodies may be dead till the end of time, and then be raised.

(1.) But Professor Bush is not to be found tripping in this way; and therefore, in respect to those who died before Christ, he speaks as follows: "If there is a palpable, we had almost said unmistakable, averment in the compass of holy writ,

it is, that the true doctrine of the resurrection is proved from the fact, that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were living when Christ spake these words, (Matt. xxii. 31, 32,) and, consequently, must *have been raised, and must be living in resurrection bodies.*"—"What kind of resurrection is that in which nothing is *raised?* But their *bodies* certainly had not been raised, and can the sun in the heavens be more obvious to the senses than the conclusion to the mind, that the 'resurrection of the dead,' as here affirmed by the Saviour, has no reference whatever to the *resuscitation of dead bodies?* And are we not justified in maintaining, that *the only resurrection of the dead ever to be experienced by man, is that of which these patriarchs have long since been the subjects?* Is there more than one resurrection?" &c. pp. 207, 208. See also pp. 164, 218, 224, 226, 247.

(2.) And yet, though those who died *before* Christ, arose from the dead also before him, they nevertheless did not rise until after he had arisen. His words are, "Then indeed was the proper hour [when Christ expired on the cross] for the visible effect which was wrought upon their *bodies*, [those in Matt. xxvii. 50–53,] in connexion with his dying groan, the rending of the rocks, the darkening of the sun, and the throes of nature convulsed; but not then was the time *for their true and invisible resurrection, for it was designed that 'in all things he should have the pre-eminence;'* he was to be raised as 'the first fruits of them that slept;' he was to be 'the first-begotten from the dead;' AND IT BEHOVED NOT THAT THE RESURRECTION OF THE MEMBERS SHOULD PRECEDE THAT OF THE HEAD. Accordingly, the interval of three days elapsed before they came forth, (the mere bodies were not *they*,) and went into the holy city and appeared in spiritual vision to many of their brethren." p. 217. "It was, in the main, an invisible resurrection of a multitude of saints." p. 218. On pages 218, 219, Professor Bush makes a vain attempt to show that these views are not contradictory to the foregoing; but to reconcile them is as difficult as to mingle into a mass fire and powder. We shall have occasion to refer to this matter again hereafter.

(3.) Hence Christ's precedence as the "first-born from the dead," and "the first fruits of them that slept," is frittered away, and resolved into a comparatively unmeaning ceremony. The Old Testament saints had arisen before him, but "had not entered into the full fruition of celestial joys,

but were held, or, as it were, *detained*, in a state of expectancy, awaiting the death and resurrection of Christ, as an event which was to usher in to them a signal epoch of enlargement and consummation, while, at the same time, it secured to him the prerogative of having in all things the pre-eminence, and especially of being the 'first-fruits of them that slept.'" pp. 222, 223. See also 218, 219. This, then, is the *pre-eminence* of Christ! thus is he "the first-born from the dead!" and thus is he "*the first that should rise from the dead!*" Acts xxvi. 22, 23.

5. Professor Bush's theory touching the resurrection of Christ.

We have seen that Professor Bush teaches, that, both under the Old Testament dispensation as well as under the New, a spiritual body is eliminated, or separated from the corporeal *at death*. He appears to make an exception in the case of Christ, but offers no reason for the exception. But I shall endeavour to present an analysis of what he advances on the whole subject, in a chapter by itself hereafter.

6. Professor Bush's theory touching the Day of Judgment.

As the received doctrine of a judgment to come, plainly infers the simultaneousness of the resurrection, Professor Bush has found it necessary to modify his views of this subject.

In the first place he announces, and attempts to establish the position that the apostles were mistaken in their views of "the last day," or "judgment to come," pp. 191–202. 265 and 269. He then enters into a formal discussion of the doctrine on pp. 274—344. But we shall consider this also in a chapter by itself.

Here, then, is the theory of Professor Bush, touching the resurrection and some of its correlative doctrines. We have endeavoured to present his views fairly, that the reader might have them before him in our subsequent investigation. There are some other topics which the Professor has introduced into the discussion, but not being really connected with the one before us, we shall omit any reference to them for the present. The doctrine of the resurrection of the body is the great point to the consideration of which we shall primarily confine ourself in this discussion—though we shall not, without remark, pass over the other topics which Professor Bush has involved in the controversy.

We shall close this chapter with a brief history of the theory of the resurrection adopted by Professor Bush. He challenges for it the merit of being new, and that as such, it must modify essentially the common view of this doctrine. And as we dispute and deny this assumption, so far as the *novelty* of the doctrine is concerned, it is not from a desire to present Professor Bush in an invidious light, that we refer to its history, but merely in order to sustain the position we assume.

With respect to this theory, the Professor acknowledges that it is the same substantially as that which was entertained by Swedenborg, though he claims to have arrived at his conclusions by an independent process. But the theory is much older than Swedenborg, as the following facts demonstrate.

SECTION II.

History of Professor Bush's Theory.

(1.) Perhaps as a faithful and impartial historian, we ought to begin with primitive times, and with the record found in 1 Cor. xv. 12, and 2 Tim. ii. 16-19, "of whom is Hymeneus and Philetus. Who concerning the truth have erred, saying that the resurrection is past already;" as it is evident that they could have predicated this resurrection of those only who had already lived, and not of those who were to live; and that their theory, therefore, must have borne a striking resemblance to that of Professor Bush: but as this might appear invidious, and as we shall have occasion to consider these passages hereafter, we shall pass it by for the present.

(2.) The next prominent advocate of this theory is Avicen, the Mohammedan philosopher. In his *Almahad* he advances the doctrine of Professor Bush precisely, and employs some of his arguments to sustain it. He says that "*the meaning of the resurrection of the body is nothing else but this,* to persuade vulgar people, that, though they seem to perish, when they die, and their bodies rot in the grave; yet, notwithstanding, they shall have a real subsistence after death, by which they shall be made capable either of future happiness or misery. But because the apprehensions of the vulgar are so gross, that the permanency and immortality of the soul is too subtile a notion for them, who commonly

count their bodies for themselves, and cannot conceive, how they should have any being after death, unless their very bodies should be raised up again; therefore, by way of condescension to vulgar understandings, the future permanency and subsistence of the soul, in prophetical writings, is expressed under this scheme of the resurrection of the body, which yet is meant κατὰ δόξαν only, and not κατ' αλήθειαν." See *Cudworth's Second Sermon*, at the end of his Intellectual System, vol. ii., p. 605.

Now this doctrine of the Mohammedan philosopher Avicen, and which his *philosophy taught him* so many centuries ago, is the very doctrine which Professor Bush has, as he professes, by the great advance of scientific investigation in the nineteenth century evolved by his philosophy, and by means of which he would correct the views of the *Christian* church on the subject of the resurrection. But let us see what Cudworth himself thinks of this theory of Avicen. After making the foregoing quotation from the *Almahad*, he remarks as follows: "*Which conceit, how well soever it may befit a Mahometan philosopher, I am sure it in no way agrees with the principles of Christianity;* the Scripture here (Rom. viii. 11,) and elsewhere assuring us, that the resurrection of the body is to be understood plainly and without a figure; and that the saints, departed this life in the faith and fear of Christ, shall not be mere souls without bodies to all eternity, as Avicen, Maimonides, and other philosophers dreamed, but consist of *soul and body* united together. Which bodies, though, as the doctrine of the church instructeth us, they shall be both specifically and numerically the same, with what they were here; yet, notwithstanding, the Scripture tells us, they shall be so changed and altered, in respect of their qualities and conditions, *that in that sense* they shall not be the same." *Cudworth*, ii., p. 605, 606.

(3.) *Nihusius*, who was born in the latter part of the sixteenth century, and was titular bishop of Mysia and suffragan archbishop of Metz, was a zealous Papist; and was very desirous to establish the doctrines of the Romish Church on philosophical principles. Among others he thus endeavoured to defend the doctrine of the *invocation of the Saints;* and in doing this he, by an "independent process," arrived at the very theory of Professor Bush. He said that "the Saints who have departed this life, are not dead, but still live in respect of their bodies and ought therefore to be adored in their

relics." This thought he called "a divine oracle and a clear light into a profound mystery." And says, "that the fact that the saints in paradise still live in their bodies, developes a sublimer philosophy in respect of sleeping and waking, than that of Aristotle and the other philosophers." And not only so but he charged those with atheism who would not assent to his theory, and pretended that they who deny that the bodies of the saints are living in paradise, destroy at the bottom the doctrine of the resurrection. "Quoniam itaque Sancti suis in corporibus adhuc vivunt, certatim nos illuc agglomeremur, et adoremus amorosissimè, spem resurrectionis nostræ simul quasi satiantes, et mortis metum puerilem abjicientes, nequaquam verò superbè quicquam ejus respuentes; hæreseos ac atheismi pars est, opinio illa feralis et luctuosa, de mortuis ac non viventibus Sanctorum corporibus, utpote resurrectionem impiè negans in recessu."*

Bayle (to whom I am indebted for this quotation,) adds the following remark, with reference to the foregoing sentiment: "From what I have set forth in this remark, we may conclude, that Nihusius was one of those lively, presumptuous men, who easily suffer themselves to be dazzled by the false lustre of a paradox, and labour with eagerness to communicate to all the world their impressions. They magnify the ideas of small things," &c.†

(4.) The Anabaptists of the 16th century, also denied, as Professor Bush does, that Christ ascended to heaven with his material body; and, like him, asserted that the New Testament does not teach this doctrine: "Verum quæ quantitate, aut qualitate, et quo modo, in illo corpore sedeat ad dexteram Patris, quandoquidem de eo nobis non liquet testimonium in scriptura sacra, malumus hic ignorantiam nostram profiteri, quam incerta divinatione uti extra Dei verbum." *Confes.* Art. IX. And their philosophy, like that of Professor Bush, led them to confound the *abolishing of hunger, and thirst, and weariness, and sorrow, and susceptibility of suffering, and mortality*, with the abolition of corporeal properties,—"proprietatum corporearum."

(5.) The Polish Socinians also were advocates of the more prominent parts of Professor Bush's theory. In their

* Andreas Carolus, Memor. Ecclesiast. Sæculi XVII. Lib. II. cap. 18, pag. 352.

† See Bayle, Art. *Nihusius, sub fine.*

"*Compendiolum Socinianismi*," or "Confession of the Socinian Churches," Amst. 1598, they speak as follows: "Concerning the resurrection of the dead, our churches teach, *in the first place*, that the faithful, who have died from the beginning of the world, shall be raised from the dead at the last day; *but not the wicked*. And they prove it from 1 Thess. iv., and 1 Cor. xv., John vi., and Luke xx., where the resurrection is asserted only of Christians or the faithful: *whether they have been just*, that is, have lived righteously all their life, as, for example, John the Baptist and his parents: *or unjust;* that is, have lived wickedly all their life, and were at length converted, as the publican and the thief on the cross. Luke xxiii. *Secondly*. Then they deny the resurrection of the body, (carnis,) that is, of this body itself which is constituted of flesh and blood. But they admit that bodies will be raised again; that is, that those faithful men will be raised, and shall then be clothed with new heavenly bodies: which is proved by 1 Cor. xv., where it is said, that it is not the same body which was sown, that is, *per seminis traducem generatur*, which is raised; but another, to wit, an immortal, glorious, and spiritual body. Such is the antithesis in 2 Cor. v., (in the beginning of the chapter,) between the earthly tabernacle, and the celestial building. For God will make us "*like the angels*," (Luke xx.,) and will abolish the belly, with all things which appertain to this animal life, (1 Cor. vi.,) for then there shall be no use for them. *Thirdly*. They teach also that the faithful who are alive, shall then suddenly be changed; *in the twinkling of an eye*, (1 Cor. xv.,) lest the changing of their bodies, *or the abolishing of the flesh*, should give them pain. Then man shall no more be a living soul, (Gen. ii.,) but a quickened spirit; that is, his life thereafter shall not be animal, but spiritual. So that it may be in his power to have eternal life, as Christ himself, who shall conform our bodies to his glorious body." See *Compend. Socinianismi*, cap. VIII.

(6.) The next prominent advocates of a part of this theory were some Arminians of the 17th century. They profess, however, only to entertain doubts, whether the resurrection body was identically the same with the body that died. Their views may be seen in their "Apologia pro Confess. Remonstrantium," cap. XIX., p. 219, or in Opp. Episcopii, tom. i., part II., pag. 219. Mr. Locke also appears to have entertained the same view. He believed in the resurrection

of a material body, (which, however, Professor Bush denies,) but doubted its identity with the body that had died. The same philosophical notions entertained by Avicen, the Mohammedan, on this subject, seem to have been adopted by these writers, though with some modification.

(7.) But in Emanuel Swedenborg, we find a strong advocate of the theory of Professor Bush in its most important features. In his *Treatise Concerning Heaven and Hell*, from § 432 to § 461, may be found a pretty full statement and illustration of his theory. See also his "Universal Theology of the New Church," vol. i., p. 238, § 156. But the fact that Professor Bush, since the publication of his "*Anastasis*," has become an avowed Swedenborgian, renders it unnecessary for us to confirm this statement by quotations. See also "*Anastasis*," p. 76.

(8.) The next conspicuous advocates of Professor Bush's theory are the *Shakers*. And in their "*Summary View of the Millennial Church or United Society of Believers, commonly called Shakers*," Albany, 1823, we have not only the theory of Professor Bush, almost entire, but we have his very arguments, illustrations, and criticisms upon Scripture passages. There is an astonishing resemblance throughout. We can give but an abstract here, and must refer to the book itself for full proof of the truth of this assertion.

The following are a few extracts: "The resurrection is a doctrine generally believed by all who profess a belief in the Christian religion. But what constitutes the real nature and substance of the resurrection, seems to be a dispute among many. The most general and popular belief is, that the natural body of man, consisting of flesh, and blood, and bones, after being divested of the spirit or living soul, and consigned to the grave, will, at a certain future period of time, be raised from the dust of the earth, with which it has been blended by dissolution, and be reanimated with the same living spirit, and arraigned before the judgment-seat of Christ, there to be judged and consigned to a state of everlasting happiness or misery. This doctrine is generally believed to accord strictly with the testimony of the Scriptures, and therefore supposed to be well founded. To eradicate these long established impressions, and convince mankind that they are erroneous and antichristian, and not taught by divine revelation, is a task of no small magnitude." p. 302. Then after quoting John v. 28, 29, it is said

"many other passages might be added *in proof of the resurrection of the soul*; *but all this has no reference to the natural body, except as a figure.*" p. 303. And after quoting John xi. 25, 26, it is added, "If then, Christ is the resurrection and the life, it necessarily follows, that all who are in Christ, are in the resurrection, whether their bodies be dead or living. And also, if he that believeth in Christ, shall live, though his body be dead; then it must be the soul to which Christ had reference: for the dead body of a man cannot believe, any more than the dead carcass of any other animal." *Ibid.*

"Hence it is clearly evident that the resurrection of the natural body, after its return to the dust, is not necessary to constitute that kind of resurrection to which Christ alluded." *Ibid.* "The natural body of man is corruptible. If then, as some say, it is to be so transformed as to become incorruptible, then corruption must inherit incorruption; which is contrary to the apostle's express declaration." pp. 303, 304.

Then in respect to *the resurrection of Christ*, they advance precisely the theory of Professor Bush. "The resurrection of the natural body of man, is strongly argued from the supposed resurrection of the natural body of Jesus Christ, which is thought to be established beyond dispute, by the fact that it was not found in the sepulchre where it was laid, and by several particular circumstances connected with his appearance to his disciples after his resurrection." Then after quoting Matt. xxviii. 9, Luke xxiv. 39, 40, John xx. 26, 27, they add, "These passages have been carefully examined and fully answered by brother John Dunlavy, of Kentucky,* and therefore it is less necessary to enlarge upon the subject here. But it may not be improper to make a few remarks for the reader's consideration."

The conclusion of this chapter is as follows, and one might easily take it for an extract from Professor Bush's work: "Thus we may see that the true resurrection consists in the rising again of the spiritual part of man *from* the terrestrial elements, into which it has been sown by genera-

* This "Examination" and "*answer*" *to the apostles* (!) is styled "*Dunlavy's Manifesto*," printed at Pleasant Hill, Kentucky, 1818. A reference to it will show that Professor Bush's late "*results*" of scientific investigation, and his *new* criticisms, have been *anticipated* by a Kentuckian, nearly thirty years ago; to say nothing of Avicen, Nihusius, &c.

tion,* *to* the celestial. By the operation of the spirit of Christ, in the work of regeneration, it is formed into a celestial and heavenly body, endowed with immortality and eternal life, and thus it becomes an everlasting inhabitant of the celestial world; and thus it is that 'this corruptible puts on incorruption, and this mortal immortality.' " &c., &c. p. 313.

There is the same substantial agreement between their views and those of Professor Bush respecting the judgment. "But what is this day of judgment? and in what manner is it to be brought about? These are questions of no small concern to mankind, and especially to those who profess the Christian religion. Many who call themselves Christians, are firm and confident in the belief, that the day of judgment is a certain appointed day, yet future, when the Lord Jesus will suddenly descend, and personally appear," &c., &c. "But, we would ask, how these ideas of the day of judgment can be reconciled with the opinion generally entertained by these same sort of Christians, that the final and everlasting fate of the soul is decided at the hour of death?" "If the day of probation ends at death, and the fate of the soul is then unalterably fixed, according to the opinion of these Christians, what can be the object of a day of judgment of the preceding description?"†—"But we view the

* "'It is sown a *natural* body, it is raised a *spiritual* body.'" Here he refers to the origin of these two bodies.—"The *sowing* is our birth in Adam, or in the *nature* of Adam," &c. "So far is the apostle from teaching that the body is 'sown' by being deposited in the grave. It is sown at its *birth*, and not at its death." *Anastasis*, pp. 185, 186.

† "No article of any creed in Christendom is more universally or unhesitatingly held, than that each individual enters at death upon an eternal state of retribution. According to the prevailing moral character in which he makes his exit from the body, he either soars an angel or sinks a fiend. Lazarus died, and was carried by angels to Abraham's bosom. The rich man also died, and in hell he lifted up his eyes, being in torment. *This is a virtual judgment.*" *Anastasis*, p. 277. And the author proceeds to say, that "an act of the divine adjudication, which seals to the joys of heaven or the woes of hell a departing spirit, is as truly an award of eternal judgment, as if it were pronounced from the great white throne." *Ibid.* But it seems not to have occurred to these gentlemen, that, unless the soul's existence is suspended between death and the resurrection, it must of *necessity* be either in happiness or misery. Again: Professor Bush remarks, "the judgment runs parallel with the kingdom" of Christ. p. 280. "The inference is certainly strong from all this," says he, "that the 'sitting at the Father's right hand,' and the 'judgment,' are synchronical, *and*

day of judgment in a very different light from all this. We view it as a work which has already commenced."—"And though gradual and progressive in its operations, it is certain and effectual; and will continue to increase in power, till a full and final separation shall be made between good and evil." pp. 314, 315.—"The judgment is already set, and the books are opening, and all flesh shall be judged according to the deeds done in the body." p. 316. Compare also *Anastasis*, pp. 320–323.

(9.) The next leading advocates of Professor Bush's theory, are the Neologists or Rationalists of Germany.

One of the fairest representatives of this school, is Wegscheider; a man, who, to such a degree entertains the idea that "*the knowledge of revelation is progressive*," that he has not only arrived at the same conclusions as Professor Bush, with respect to the resurrection, but, as Tholuck remarks, thinks that "all wisdom has come into the world since 1780."*

After presenting a fair statement of the doctrine of the resurrection as advanced in the New Testament, he proceeds with his objections to it. He remarks that there are many very great difficulties in the way of reconciling it with sound reason. He then asserts that the idea of the resurrection owes its origin to the lame and imperfect notions of rude men, who were destitute of any right idea of God, and who imagined that because they exist in this world, they should also exist hereafter. This notion, says he, was held by many barbarous nations, and was taught by Zoroaster, from whom the Jews appear to have obtained it. Then, as the apostles obtained it from the Jews, it is so interwoven with the Jewish opinions respecting the Messiah, and with the narrative concerning Jesus being restored to life, that it can neither be rightly understood nor explained, except from

refer to the administration of an earthly kingdom, and that a personal and visible manifestation is not to be understood in regard to either." pp. 294, 295.

Thus singularly harmonious, even in their minutiæ, is the theory of the Shakers and that of Professor Bush, though, no doubt, each arrived at it by "*a purely independent process.*" See *Anastasis*, Preface, p. viii.

* See Am. Biblic. Repository, vol. II., p. 208, for 1832. Professor Stuart speaks of Wegscheider as follows; "Wegscheider and Röhr, each in a different way, may be considered as the present Coryphæi of the Neological party in Germany." Biblic. Repos. I., p. 60.

an acquaintance with the literature of that age; on which account the later defenders of the more ancient formula have hesitated to receive, in their literal or proper sense, all the words of the Scriptures pertaining to the subject. Then, again, it is not possible to understand how the particles of this body can be collected and restored, after having been changed into so many other forms, and scattered into other human bodies," &c., &c. Thus he proceeds with his preposterous farrago, and thinks he is writing like Pliny the naturalist. The original in full will be found in the margin.*

* Tantum vero abest, ut *resurrectio* corporum cum sanæ rationes præceptis bene conciliari possit, ut plurimis gravissimisque impediatur difficultatibus. *Primum* enim dubitari nequit, quin hæc opinio e notionibus mancis et imperfectis hominum incultiorum originem traxerit, quippe qui, justa numenis divini idea destituti, vitam post mortem futuram e sola vitæ terrestris natura fingere soleant; quo fit, ut apud complures gentes barbaras, itemque in Zoroastrica disciplina, e cujus fonte Judaei ipsi hausisse videntur, eadem illa deprehendatur. *Deinde* resurrectio corporum in ll. N. T. tradita, quæ inde ab ipsa apostolica ætate (1 Cor. xv. 12; 2 Tim. ii. 17,) haud paucis improbata fuit, tam arte conjuncta cernitur cum opinionibus de Messia Judaicis et cum narratione de Jesu in vitam restituto, (1 Cor. xv. 12,) ut nisi ex ingenio seculi illius recte judicari et explicari non possit; quamobrem ipsi antiquioris formulæ defensores recentiores, parum quidem constanter, omnium scripturæ s. dictorum huc pertinentium, (v. c. 1 Thess. iv. 16, ubi κέλευσμα καὶ φωνὴ ἀρχαγγέλου, σάλπιγξ Θεοῦ commemorantur,) sensum proprium admittere dubitarunt. *Tum* non intelligitur, quomodo particulæ hujus corporis in tot alia et ipsa humana corpora dispersæ et mutatæ colligi possint ac restitui, etc. *Wegscheider's* Dog. Theol. §. 195, p. 675. Halæ, 1833.

Then again he says, in almost the very language of Professor Bush, "His et aliis ducti rationibus haud fere levioribus, vel Jesum, ubi doctrinam de resurrectione proposuisse perhibetur, popularium consuetudinem loquendi esse secutum, vel potius discipulos ipsi tanquam Messiæ, cujus provinciam e vulgaribus Judaeorum commentis et quibusdam ejus dictis allegoricis atque obscurioribus perperam judicarent, ejusmodi sententiam ex suis subjecisse censemus; neque dubitamus, doctrina de resurrectione corporum tanquam imagine reviviscendi post mortem proposita eademque ad sententiam universalem ei substratam de novo aliquo vitæ stadio eoque perfectiore post mortem homini ineundo revocata, in simpliciore illa N. T. de immortalitate institutione acquiescere, qua animum post mortem statim novam in alio rerum initurum esse vitam eandemque veram et actuosam edocemur." p. 676. And he quotes *Kant* (whose philosophy has filled Germany with infidelity,) as saying, "*A resurrection of the body is neither possible nor necessary: what do we want with these calcareous earths in the next world?*" Kantius alicubi dixit: "Eine Auferstehung des leibes ist weder möglich, noch nöthig; was soll diese Kalkerde in der andern welt?" This is Professor Bush's "Argument from Reason" in a nutshell.

I had intended to quote Ammon, *Summa*, §. 196, and 201, in which Professor Bush's theory is stated and assserted, but think sufficient has been said on this topic.

The Rationalists present the same view of the day of judgment as Professor Bush does in his "Anastasis." Take an instance from Wegscheider. He says, that "the doctrine originated in Jewish maxims and allegories respecting the advent of the Messiah, and the resuscitation of the dead; and is also *accommodated* to the style and method of a human judiciary. Hence it is, that the clouds in which the Messiah is conveyed are mentioned, and the archangel with the trumpet and full attendance of angels, the convocation of all mankind, both of the dead and of those who are then living, (who shall be changed as well as those who have been a long time dead,) the tribunal of the Judge, the books opened and examined, the examination of every one, and the sentence pronounced," &c. See p. 680, §. 196.

Again he says that "this doctrine which seems to be conveyed in the words of the holy Scriptures, though it may exert a salutary influence upon uncultivated minds, it yet labours under the same, and almost greater difficulties than the doctrine of the resurrection." And after stating some of these "*weighty* difficulties," (which a Sabbath school scholar could easily obviate,) he proceeds to suggest that this "symbolic language" should be applied to the prevalence of Christ's kingdom and truth on earth. That is, as Professor Bush remarks, "the judgment runs parallel with the kingdom." *Anastasis*, p. 280. See also *Bretschneider's, Handbuch der Dogmatik*, vol. II. pp. 427, 429, §. 171.

I could easily extend this historical disquisition to almost any length, but it certainly is not necessary. From the brief abstract here given, however, every reader will see with what little reason Professor Bush has calculated upon presenting the doctrines of the resurrection and judgment in such an aspect, as must result in an ultimate and entire remodification of our views in reference to them. Thus did the Jesuit Nihusius more than two hundred years ago calculate; and so with the Anabaptists and Socinians; so too with the Shakers and Rationalists, to say nothing of Swedenborg and his followers; but *their* calculations hitherto have been too sanguine, whatever may be the result of Professor Bush's adoption of *their* theory.

I feel, however, imperiously called upon by a sense of

duty, before leaving this topic to ask, why has Professor Bush, without giving any notice of it, come forward with this bold advocacy of the old exploded theories of the Polish Socinians and German Rationalists? Why has he done it? I cannot for a moment suspect that a man of his respectable attainments in literature, and who has for I know not how long, been reading the later German writers as well as those of the sixteenth century, should be ignorant of the fact that his theory was but a cast-off garment of skeptics and semi-infidels. Why then should he pass it off as a new and independent discovery? And if he has discovered that the Reformed Church was in error when it opposed the Anabaptists and Socinians, and that the evangelical party in Germany is wrong in its oppositions to the neologists, why has he not stated this fact, and presented his refutation of their arguments? But if he were not aware of the paternity of his theory and principles of interpretation, let him learn hereafter not to press his speculations upon the public with such pertinacity and high claims to originality.

But having now presented the *Historia Dogmatis*, as the German theologians say, we shall in the next place proceed to the *Epicrisis*.

CHAPTER III.

PROFESSOR BUSH'S ARGUMENT FROM REASON CONSIDERED.

SECTION I.

Introduction.

I SHALL thoroughly review Professor Bush's "argument from reason," for it is the foundation upon which he has based his whole theory. And it is by the *light* elicited from this argument that he proposes to dissipate the *darkness* which is supposed to envelope those passages of Scripture, which inculcate rather obviously the doctrine of the resurrection of the body.

From the flourish of trumpets and the clangor of arms with which this argument makes its appearance in the

"Anastasis," one might, not unreasonably suppose that valiant deeds were about to be achieved; and that both rank and file of the opposing columns were to be as utterly demolished as the "missing regiment" of Napoleon at the battle of Preuss-Eylau. For seldom have we met with a more splendid array of argumentation and illustration, than that which composes the advance-guard of this argument, and by which the Professor has undertaken to demonstrate that *the knowledge of revelation is progressive.*

In discussing the *argument from reason*, therefore, it is proper that we should begin by a thorough analysis and consideration of this its "*Introduction.*" It is found in the first chapter of Professor Bush's work; and in the following extracts therefrom, the Professor will speak for himself, and present the incipient steps of his argument in his own forcible language.

After laying down the proposition that "the knowledge of revelation is progressive," he proceeds as follows:

"The proposition which is virtually embodied in the heading of the present section, flows by natural sequence from the general and universally admitted truth, that the human race itself is progressive, not merely in physical continuity, but in mental development. That our collective humanity, like each individual that composes it, passes through a childhood, a youth, and a meridian manhood, can scarcely be a question with any one who casts his eye at the page of history or the universal analogies of nature. We should be far from doing violence to truth, should we slightly alter the poetic aphorism, and read—'Progress is heaven's first law.' If so, the thesis may stand unassailable, that the knowledge of Revelation, like that of Nature, is destined to be continually on the advance So far as the latter is concerned it will not be denied by the reflecting mind, that even at this period of the world man has arrived but at the threshold of that august temple of Truth into which he is called to enter, and to become a worshipper at its inmost shrines. He is now in the scene of his pupilage—in the lowest forms of that school in which he has been set to learn the lessons of the universe.

"In this capacity he has two great volumes placed before him which are to be the theme of his perpetual pondering—the volume of *Nature* and the volume of *Revelation.* In regard to both these volumes we know not how to resist the

belief that the same great law holds good, viz: of *gradual development.*"

Then after furnishing several brief illustrations of this proposition, he proceeds as follows:

"We repeat, then, our main position, that our knowledge of the contents of revelation is destined to be *progressive;* and in support of this position we certainly have the advantage of the argument drawn from the general analogy of Nature and of Providence. Throughout the whole range of creation we recognise the perpetual presence and operation of this great law. The principle of progressive advance from the imperfect to the finished—from the rude to the refined—from the infantile to the mature—from primordial elements to elaborate formations—from tender germs to ripened fruits—from initial workings to ultimate consummations—is every where apparent; and why should it not hold here also? If progress is heaven's law in every other sphere of observation, the *presumption* certainly is that there is no exception here; and we are at liberty to affirm the fact, unless some adequate reason can be previously assigned for questioning or denying it."

He then proposes and discusses the question, "whether it is probable that obscurities will always remain to *cloud* the lustre of the word of God?" Whether they do really "cloud its lustre," is a point which he does not discuss; but he comes very properly to the conclusion that the Hebrew language will be yet better understood than it is, as progress is made in the investigation of its cognate dialects, and of oriental manners and customs. And he asks, "was not revelation given to be understood? And is there any more harm in the theologian's interrogating Scripture, than in the chemist's, the geologist's, and the astronomer's interrogating nature?" p. 24.

On the next page or two, he proceeds as follows: "Does divine authority require a *blind* deference, an *unintelligent* assent, to its dicta, merely because they emanate from the supreme will in the universe? Does not God deal with men *as men*, and is not reason a constituent part of man's nature, which in no circumstances he can be called to forego? Does not the Most High himself make his appeal to this principle when he says, 'Come, let us *reason* together?' And how far does any man's religion differ from enthusiasm that is

not regulated by the balance-wheel of a sound and enlightened reason?

"The truth is, as the human mind is constituted, it is utterly impossible to refrain from asking the questions to which we have referred, and which bear upon the apparent conflict between the revelations of Scripture and the revelations of science. If, for instance, the obvious literal and grammatical sense of the sacred record leads me to believe that the material globe, with the various orders of its inhabitants, was first spoken into existence six thousand years ago, and geology at the same time brings to my mind absolute demonstrations, which I cannot possibly resist without doing violence to the fundamental laws of belief, that it has existed thousands and myriads of years before that time, what am I to think? I am brought to a stand at once. I must pause and ponder on this discrepancy. I must cast about for some adequate mode of harmonizing these various views. What will it avail to tell me, when I am assured to the contrary, that, as geology is merely in its infancy, its asserted results are not to be depended upon, and that it is altogether too early to build such sweeping conclusions upon such a slender induction of facts. I *know* that this is what no one will affirm who is *acquainted* with the facts. And what should we think of the asseverations of a stage-driver who should affirm, in opposition to Lyell, or Silliman, or Hitchcock, that he had travelled for years over a particular section of country, and had never seen the least evidence of such strata and formations as the geologists affirmed to exist there?" p. 26.

He concludes the consideration of his proposition with the following remarks. Referring to the position that "the Bible is *moral*, and not *scientific*, and that no important interest of revelation is jeoparded by admitting that, on a multitude of subjects which come within the range of man's unassisted powers, the Spirit of inspiration professes nothing more than to speak according to visible appearances and popular notions," he says, "This fact is now beginning to be very generally recognized, and no enlightened mind dreams that what is gained to science is necessarily lost to Scripture. Still we have no idea that the extent to which this principle is to be applied, is at this day at all adequately appreciated, and therefore we shall not be in the least surprised if the present attempt to make the ascertained results

of *physiology* a test by which to try many of the literal declarations of the sacred writers, should be regarded as a bold and hazardous coming in collision with its sacred verities. But, as we have well pondered the ground on which we adventure to tread, we advance with great confidence to our conclusions, and shall tranquilly abide the issue. It is possible, indeed, that we may have erred in the specific results which we announce, and if so, this may be shown on satisfactory grounds; but we have no fear of being convicted, before an enlightened tribunal, of having periled the weal of the sacred oracles by the advocacy of a false principle of interpretation. We cannot conceive that the homage due to a revelation from God requires us to forego the inevitable deductions of that reason with which he has endowed us, nor do we think it possible that that word will ever achieve its predicted triumphs over the human mind till its teachings, on all points that come within the sphere of a *true* philosophy, shall be seen to harmonize with its legitimate deductions. This, however, will still leave a hallowed province of purely *moral* announcements, in which revelation utters its oracles as speaking out of an eternal silence which no voice of reason could ever break." pp. 28, 29.

In regard to the "principle of interpretation," above referred to, we shall say nothing *here*, as that subject will come up for consideration in the sequel. Nor is the question to be now discussed, whether what Professor Bush here says respecting the knowledge of revelation being progressive, is true or false. It may all be true; and, for the sake of the argument, I am willing to concede that it is. I most cheerfully admit that truth is not to be despised because it is new. No generous or manly soul will be angry or out of humour to see his old notions and doctrines necessarily exploded by his becoming acquainted with clearly ascertained truths, of which he was previously ignorant. Such minds will not reject truth because they knew it not before. *Augustin* and *Lactantius* were perfectly astounded at the idea that there were antipodes, "men walking with their feet upward, and their head downward;" and so too with *Lucretius* the poet. And their amazement has its counterpart in many cases in our own day; where there is a stern refusal to investigate the evidence of announced results, the proof of which is well ascertained, and amounts to absolute moral demonstration. It is unnecessary here to particularize.

But we again say, that *this* is not the point to be considered here. The proposition of Professor Bush, referred to above, may be susceptible of demonstration that will demolish cavil. But he announces it, together with its long array of proof, for the purpose of justifying his attempt to prove from reason that the doctrine of the resurrection of the body cannot be true. The question must therefore very naturally present itself, *Whether all this has any real application to the subject? Whether it bears at all on the matter?* Does the analogy hold good between the results which he professes to announce, and the recent results of chemical, astronomical, and geological investigation? Because, if there is no analogy, it will be seen at once that all this introductory parade is mere *vox et præterea nihil.*

In answer to this inquiry, I assert plainly and unequivocally, that, in his "*argument from reason*," he has not advanced a solitary idea, either in its statement or application, which was not advanced against the doctrine under consideration ages before Professor Bush was born. We have presented pretty full proof of this in section II. of the preceding chapter. And so far is Professor Bush from being entitled to claim the merit of having either made or announced any new discovery in respect to his own theory, that the very argument upon which it is based, and upon which he claims to have gone beyond all preceding writers on the resurrection, (Swedenborgians excepted,) has been answered by *Baxter*, (*Works*, vol. XXI. p. 331,) two hundred years ago; and *Tilenus*, (*Syntag.* p. 968,) two hundred and fifty years ago; and by *Vanderkemp*, (*Expos. Heid. Cat.* I., p. 445,) by *Baumgarten*, (*Theol. Streitig.* III., 457,) by *Watson*, (*Theol. Instit.* p. 380,) and by theologians without number; while it has been repeatedly advanced by the Socinians, Shakers, and Rationalists. And in reference to the Professor's whole book, I say, without fear of contradiction, that he has therein advanced,

1. Not one new, and plausibly sustained exposition of any portion of Scripture;
2. Not one new principle in hermeneutics;
3. Not one new application of the old principles;
4. Not one new discovery in science;
5. Nor one new application of any scientific discovery.

Nothing that the world had not fully known for ages.

How utterly out of place is it, therefore, to begin his dis-

cussion with such a parade of proof, to show that the knowledge of Scripture must be progressive? Suppose it is progressive; and what has this to do with his argument, or book? JUST NOTHING AT ALL. But we shall, in the next place, proceed to state his *argument from reason.* And as so much depends upon it, in Professor Bush's estimation, and as he refers to it so continually all through his book, professing to rely upon it as nothing short of absolute demonstration, we shall state it somewhat at large; for we shall undertake to give it a thorough refutation.

SECTION II.

Professor Bush's Argument from Reason stated.

In the first paragraph of this argument, Professor Bush endeavours to establish a connexion between the proposition above referred to, respecting the progressive development of the import of revelation, and the argument which he proceeds to state. His language is the following:

"If the position maintained in our preceding pages be well founded—that there is to be an onward progress in our knowledge of Revelation, as there confessedly is in the knowledge of Nature—it follows, of course, that we have no more reason to be surprised at the announcement, we will not say of *new truths*, but of *new views of old truths*, in biblical science, than at the announcement of new discoveries in physical science. There may be a difference of opinion as to the *possible extent* of this progress, but none, we think, as to the fact itself. It is impossible to assign a reason why the outgoings of the human intellect should confine themselves to the limits of purely scientific research. They will certainly aim, at least, to penetrate the central abysses of Revelation." p. 31.

This connexion is still more unambiguously asserted on the next page or two. The Professor says:

"We see, beyond question, that in other departments the progress of scientific truth has enabled us to put a more correct interpretation upon many points of Scripture; and why is it not possible it may be so here? Does any one now think of understanding the command of Joshua to the sun and moon, precisely as he would before the true system of astronomy was ascertained? Does any one, acquainted with the demonstrated results of geology, gather precisely the same

ideas from the first chapter of Genesis that he did before that science was fixed upon its present firm basis?

"If, then, in these departments we are conscious that the discoveries of science have given us clearer information relative to the true sense of revelation, why is it not conceivable that, from the same source, we may obtain a clew to conduct us somewhat nearer the truth on the great theme before us? Certainly, the more perfectly we understand the inward structure and functions of our own frames—the more completely we become masters of that wondrous economy which constitutes us what we *now* are, the nearer doubtless shall we approach to a knowledge of what we shall *hereafter* be. Nothing is better known to intelligent men than that immense advances have actually been made, within the last half century, in the physiology of the human system; and though the grand agency by which the animal functions are carried on has eluded research—*the vital principle*—yet approximations have continually been made towards it, and we see not why we should abandon, as utterly hopeless, the prospect of one day compassing the grand central truth of our being."

This attempt of Professor Bush to forge a connecting link between his "*Argument from Reason*," and the argument in which he attempts to prove the "Knowledge of Revelation to be Progressive," is but a tale "signifying nothing:" and this for the reason before stated, to wit: *there is no analogy whatever between the hypothesis of Professor Bush, and the hypothesis which he adduces for illustration.* His effort, therefore, to make the impression, that, in order fairly to refute his theory, it is necessary to refute his introductory chapter, is an utter failure. For there is no connexion whatever between that part of the argument and the theory which it is brought to support.

I am sorry to be compelled to repeat this asseveration so directly in the face of the Professor's assertions contained in the last of the above quoted paragraphs; and yet, if such be the recent advancement in scientific discovery, the results of which are so applicable both to the illustration and support of his theory, is it not an unparalleled humility which has led him to forego all the advantages which might accrue from availing himself of such discoveries, and meekly to take his place at the feet of old Avicen and Nihusius, of the Anabaptists and Socinians, of the Shakers and Rationalists, and

to satisfy himself with what they had advanced on the same subject so long before?

But let us hear this much lauded argument itself.

"No fact in physiological science," says Professor Bush, "is better ascertained, than that the human body, in regard to its constituent particles, is in a state of constant flux. It is perpetually undergoing a process of waste and reparation. Strictly speaking, no man has the same body now that he had seven years ago, as it is in about this period that a complete change is held to take place in the bodily structure, by which we may be said to be corporeally renovated. This is a fact established by physiology, and the proof of it, we believe, is entirely beyond question, and must form an indispensable element in any judgment which we pronounce upon the subject. The phrase, *the body*, does not accurately represent the object intended, if the idea conveyed by it be restricted to the body as existing at any one moment. The idea of existence in continuity is indispensable to it. The question then again recurs—What body is to be raised? A person who dies at the age of seventy has had ten different bodies. Which of these is to be the body of the resurrection? Is it the body of infancy, of childhood, of youth, of manhood, or old age? Or is it the aggregate of all these? If we go back to the days of the Antediluvians and apportion the number of the bodies of Methusaleh, for instance, to the length of his life, and then suppose the whole to be collected into one vast corporeity, we should indeed be reminded that, as 'there *were* giants in those days,' so there *will be* giants in the day of the resurrection!

"It is obvious that a very grave difficulty from this source pertains to the prevalent theory of the resurrection of the body, and one which we discover no mode of obviating on that theory."

Then on pp. 42, 43, he presents these same considerations as follows: "The objection which constitutes the burden of our present argument obviously resolves itself into the difficulty of conceiving of any fixed *relation* between the body that dies and the body that is raised. So far as we are able to apprehend the prevalent sentiments of the Christian world in regard to this subject, they suppose that the same body which is consigned to its native dust is at some distant day, and in some unknown manner, to be raised again and reconstructed, and the disembodied spirit, after a

long exile, to be restored to its primitive habitation, newly fashioned and furnished by the hand of Omnipotence. To this view we urge the objection, that, by the law of the animal economy, the body in this life is continually changing, and consequently that it conveys no definite conception to the mind to say that the body will be raised, unless it is clearly specified what particular body is meant. Nothing is clearer than that the principle above stated enforces the necessary admission of a *succession* of bodies; and if so, we are at liberty to demand which one of the series is to be raised. If a man retained precisely the same body unchanged from his natal to his dying day, the difficulty would not be so glaringly insurmountable; but even in that case, as the resurrection body is to be a spiritual body, it confounds our faculties to attempt to imagine of what use the former material and fleshly particles are to be in the formation of a purely spiritual body. Is it not as easy for Omnipotence to form a spiritual body entirely new, without reference to any pre-existing materials, as to elaborate one out of the gross component parts of a previous body? And is not Mr. Locke's remark, in his letter to Stillingfleet, perfectly well founded, that 'it would be hard to determine, if that were demanded, what greater congruity the soul hath with any particles of matter which were once united to it, but are now so no longer, than it hath with particles of matter that were never united to it.'

"We repeat, then, that the common view of the resurrection labours, in our opinion, fatally on the score of a conceivable *relation* between the present and the future body."

This is the sum and substance of Professor Bush's *argument from reason.* And the rest of the chapter is a mere expansion of these considerations.

Along with these remarks Professor Bush has interspersed some observation on *hermeneutics*, (nor is it easy to imagine any thing to be more perfectly out of place,) to which we shall pay all due attention hereafter. He has also dwelt with particular emphasis upon the "*objection*" to the doctrine under consideration, that it infers that all bodies must necessarily come out of their graves whether they ever were in graves or not. And he is even *serious* in such an attempt at the *reductio ad absurdum.* This matter will likewise come up again hereafter.

Such then is Professor Bush's *argument from reason*, de-

veloped by the recent prodigious advance in scientific discovery! and yet perfectly known, and urged against the doctrine of the resurrection, centuries before he existed. We have stated it fully, and the reader, we doubt not, will allow it all the consideration it deserves. Summed up in brief it is this: the body through life is constantly undergoing changes, and is in fact wholly renewed about once in seven years. After death also, the body becomes resolved into its elements, and oftentimes the particles which composed it form new combinations with other human bodies; and hence it is impossible that the same body that died should be raised and restored to its first proprietor without depriving other persons of the bodies which they possessed.

Professor Bush has not announced this conclusion formally, and in regular sequence from the premises; for he could not but have seen a great *hiatus* between the two. And with the skill of a practiced disputant he has left the reader to draw the conclusion which he himself would not formally announce. For who does not see that to predicate impossibility upon such grounds is sheer absurdity. For even allowing a human body to be devoured by cannibals, does not Professor Bush know that but a small part of it becomes really incorporated with their bodies? And would he venture to affirm that any part or particle of it, which is really essential to its integrity, is ever thus incorporated.

But this is not the ground upon which we shall meet and refute this argument, as will be seen presently. Yet before proceeding to do so formally, there are two or three things which call for a preliminary remark. And *first* I cannot but refer once more to Professor Bush's claim to *recent* scientific investigation, as furnishing results upon which this argument is based. I have said that it was employed by others before he existed, and in the latter part of Chapter I., I have furnished several proofs of this asseveration, and will here refer to another. Nearly a century ago, the noted infidel Voltaire, reasoned against the doctrine of the resurrection as follows, announcing the very results of "*scientific investigation*," to which Professor Bush appeals: "To make a dead man rise again after some days, it is necessary that all the imperceptible parts of his body, which had been exhaled in the air, and which the winds had carried off, should return to their proper places; that the worms, birds and animals that have fed on the corpse, should restore each

what it took away. The worms which have fattened upon the entrails of this man, have been eaten by swallows, these swallows have been devoured by other birds, and these again by hawks, these hawks again by vultures; each of these must restore precisely what belonged to the dead man, otherwise he cannot be the same person."* I am willing that the reader should determine whether the objection by Voltaire and that propounded by Professor Bush, are not substantially the same. And if they are, then, what are we to think of the Professor's "*Knowledge of Revelation Progressive*," as applied by him to sustain this very objection?

Another point which should not be passed over here, is the fact that Professor Bush, perpetually, through his whole book places the most implicit reliance upon the conclusions of this argument—conclusions, however, which he skilfully induces the reader to draw. In almost innumerable places, where he finds the obvious sense of a passage of Scripture to conflict with his theory, he refers to this argument with some such remark as the following: "No two truths in the universe can conflict with each other." Or thus, "If our previous train of reasoning be sound, the drift of which is to evince that the future resurrection of the same body is intrinsically inconceivable and incredible," &c., or, "We have undoubtedly made our previous inductions a criterion by which the *absolute truth* of the scriptural dicta on the subject are to be judged," &c. "If our rational results are sound and impregnable," &c., &c. pp. 97, 273, &c., &c. These things are surely more than sufficient to justify us in stating this argument so fully as we have done, and also in replying to it at the length which we propose.†

Another point which should be here referred to, is that many of the most acute, and learned, and discriminating minds the world has ever seen, and who have bestowed upon the subject as much attention, to say the least, as Professor Bush has ever done, have, with a perfect knowledge of every thing which he has alleged against it, still adhered to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. Take bishop Butler, for an example. In his *Analogy*, (one of the most splendid monuments of human genius,) published more than

* See "Letters of Certain Jews to Monsieur Voltaire," p. 484.

† For other references to this argument as perfectly conclusive, see pp. 71, 81, 82, 191, 235, 236, 385, 386, 390, &c., &c. His book actually teems with such references.

a century ago, he has repeatedly affirmed the then well known fact, of the never-ceasing attrition and replacement of the particles which compose the human structure. A fact which composes the sole basis of Professor Bush's argument from reason—and a fact, the knowledge of which, he pretends to ascribe to the recent results of scientific investigation. And besides, he himself incidentally admits that the same objection was substantially known, and replied to by Augustin fifteen hundred years ago. See *Anastasis*, p. 41, and *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 22, cap. 13 and 20. And yet these men, and the great body of the church of God, learned as well as unlearned, who have been aware of all that Professor Bush has advanced, have ever held to the doctrine which he impugns. Dr. Bentley would have told Professor Bush, (if he had collected and urged these old stale cavils and objections in the Doctor's time,) as he told a certain noted character of his own day, that "it filled him with disdain to see such common stuff brought in with an air of importance." *Phileleuth. Lipsiensis*, Part I. p. 92–114.

SECTION III.

The condition of Professor Bush's Argument from Reason.

But for the sake of doing full justice to the subject, we shall, in replying to this objection, proceed as though the assumption of Professor Bush respecting the nature and recent origin of his argument were unquestionable. He may have all the advantage which the argument of his adoption can yield him.

Now the whole argument resolves itself simply into this: a deduction of reason arrays itself against a declaration of the Bible. But "no two truths in the universe can really conflict with each other;" and therefore revelation must be so explained as to agree with the "irrefragable deduction" of reason. See *Anastasis*, pp. 71, and 81, 82, &c.

But this statement is not perfectly clear. For it assumes that we may rest with implicit confidence upon the deductions of science and reason as true, even where they plainly conflict with the testimony of God. And why, I would ask, should we not as readily suspect the truth of our scientific deductions, as the testimony of revelation in respect to any given subject? That there is the best of reasons for this shall be shown in another section.

But again. This statement of Professor Bush, though so often repeated, is at best not clear. If he means by it, that when God declares *positively* that a thing is thus or so, and our reason infers the contrary, that we should take the verdict of reason instead of the testimony of God, I protest wholly against it. But if he means that in a case where the import of Scripture is not clear and positive; reason and science may properly lend a hand to explain and illustrate the passage, surely, there is nothing in this that need be presented so continually as it is by Professor Bush, and in such a controversial attitude. It is what is universally admitted by the Christian church.

But though Professor Bush seems to have substantially adopted the views of Leibnitz and Wolf "on the agreement of Faith and Reason,"* yet in other parts of his book he appears to have conceded on this subject every thing that we could require. Take, for example, the following from pp. 84, 85, "If the teachings of that divine volume array themselves so unequivocally and inexorably against the conclusions to which we are brought by the argument from reason, that we can by no process of conciliation harmonize the two, undoubtedly we are required to abide by the scriptural decision, whatever violence it may seem to do to our rational deductions." See also pp. 26, 27. Now if this be so, then the whole matter resolves itself into a question of exegesis: viz. Has the Bible asserted the doctrine of the resurrection of the body clearly and unequivocally? And this is the question with which we think Professor Bush should have commenced his discussion. And if he had found the doctrine to be ambiguously asserted, or expressed, then it would have been proper and timely to call reason and science to his assistance.

SECTION IV.

How much of Professor Bush's Theory would be established by his Argument from Reason, admitting both its premises and conclusion to be correct.

Professor Bush has attempted to make this argument the basis of his theory: and before we proceed further with our

* "Logical necessity," said they, "cannot be altered by God himself, and therefore it cannot contradict revelation." See Tholuck's *Historical Sketch of German Rationalism.* And compare *Anastasis*, pp. 45, 47, 57, &c.

discussion of it, it may be well to inquire how much of his theory it will support, admitting both its premises and conclusion to be sound. How much would the received doctrine of the resurrection, and judgment, &c. &c., require to be modified supposing this argument to be truly unanswerable and conclusive?

In answer to this I remark, that this argument would establish but the smallest and most unimportant fraction of his theory. IT WOULD ONLY PROVE THAT THE SAME BODY THAT DIED WOULD NOT ARISE IN THE RESURRECTION. *But it would not prove*, 1. That a spiritual body is, at death, eliminated from the corporeal; or 2. That there is not to be a day of future resurrection; or 3. That there is not to be a future day of judgment; or 4. That Christ's material body did not arise and ascend to heaven; or 5. That the resurrection is effected by natural laws; or 6. That the righteous alone are partakers of the resurrection; or 7. That the spiritual germ or body is perfected in the spiritual world, as the animal body is in this.

His argument from reason therefore, is of but little service to the Professor after all. It does not establish but a single feature of his whole theory. He could have lost but little therefore, if he had left it in the undisturbed possession of Mohammedans, Socinians, and skeptics.

But we refer to these considerations only *en passant;* and shall now proceed to a full refutation of the argument on philosophical principles; or at least to show on such principles that it cannot be fully depended upon. And though Professor Bush has not and cannot prove that what is necessary to the true identity of the body that dies ever becomes incorporated with other human bodies, but has assumed it without proof, we shall not dwell upon the unwarrantableness of such an assumption, but proceed at once to show the inconclusiveness of the argument even as he has stated it.

SECTION V.

Professor Bush's Argument from Reason cannot be safely relied on.

Reason itself, as Swift correctly remarks,* "is true and just; but the reason of every particular man is weak and

* See his Sermon on the Trinity, Works, Vol. II.

wavering, and is perpetually liable to be swayed or influenced by his interests, his prejudices or his vices." And it is in consequence of losing sight of this obvious distinction, that the so-called *reason* has assumed a Protean form, and utters oracles in one age, which the better information of the next sweeps away as the winds did the inscribed leaves of the Sybil. France could laud reason to the skies, and even worship her as in fancy embodied in the form of an insane strumpet: while other nations regarded her proceedings as utterly at war with reason. Bacon, and Boyle, and Newton, and Butler, could see nothing *unreasonable* in the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, though they were acquainted with every thing that Professor Bush has urged against it; but the Professor himself sees it to be wholly unreasonable, and that "it involves ideas at war with each other, *and therefore cannot be intelligently received.*" *Anastasis*, Preface, p. x.

If Professor Bush had told us what reason is, in the sense in which he uses the term, and had laid down the canons by which we might be able to determine when she uttered her infallible decrees, we should not have so much wondered at the confidence which he professes to repose in her decisions. For as we have been accustomed to contemplate the subject, what is called *reason*, has certainly played many singular antics with the minds of her implicit worshippers. And I have long supposed that among reflecting men, it was an admitted fact that the greatest mistakes may be easily made in our conception of things and inferences therefrom; and that the judgment may be easily imposed upon. Lord Bacon, I thought, had long ago settled this matter, in his "*Table of the Colours of Good and Evil*," (Works, vol. II., p. 254, seq. London, 1838,) wherein he so clearly demonstrates that the intellectual faculty is at best but weak, and is in almost all our pursuits perpetually liable to be abused and led astray.

A wise heathen, when he remarked that *the soul is infected by the phantasms which surround it*,* shrewdly intimated that men often guess at truth rather than discover it: a sentiment which Du Pin† has, (without formally referring to it,) thus strikingly expanded: "We speak and write mostly,

* Βάπτεται ἀπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ ψυχή. Marc. Aurel. Antoninus Lib. iii.

† See his Bibl. Patr. Prefatione.

according to the different emotions and passions which agitate us. And those objects which strike us most forcibly, represent themselves in a lively manner to our imagination, and thus determine us to that side." This certainly must command the assent of every reflecting mind. And we might complete the trio also by referring to the well known remark of Cicero, that "there is nothing, however preposterous and unreasonable, which has not been maintained by some philosopher or other as his opinion, and asserted with great confidence."

We mean not by these remarks to intimate that in our view, reason is to be discarded in interpreting the revelation which God has made to man; but simply to enter our decided protest against any and every man setting up his views as a fair and unbiassed representation of what reason teaches. True and right reason can never conflict with revelation. But there is much less of right reason among men than is commonly imagined. Professor Bush speaks of men as if they were pure intelligences, to whom the exercise of unbiassed reason is perfectly connatural. But who can pretend to estimate the influence of the fall in obscuring man's moral and intellectual powers? His thoughts, words, desires, inclinations, and actions all bear testimony to the fact that man is not what he was when he left the forming hand of his Creator. And if these things be so, then we may say that he has no more adequate idea of that right reason, which was his own glorious attribute when he was first created, (the broken and defaced remains of which alone he now inherits,) than he has of the paradisaical state from which he fell. And hence the everlasting disputes on the subject of what is reasonable or unreasonable. Had man still inherited in all its glory this godlike attribute, he would not so much have needed the revelation which mercy has made. But it has been defaced and almost obliterated; and therefore Heaven interposes to tell us what we otherwise never should have known. Hence, the appropriate position of reason is at the feet of revelation; and hence when the deductions of our reason plainly conflict with the clearly ascertained testimony of God's word, the duty of the Christian is not, (as Professor Bush pretends,) to take God's declaration "as type, figure, allegory, metaphor, symbol, accommodation, anthropomorphism—ANY THING, RATHER THAN THE DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE VERITY," (see *Anastasis*, Pre-

face p. xi.) but remembering how easy it is, with all his care, and assistance from logic and philosophy, to reason himself into error and falsehood, and employ reason itself in their defence, he will rather suspect that his deductions are wrong, even though his premises appear impregnable; or he will suspect that there is some imperceptible error in the construction of his argument, or some flaw in his logic which he has not been able to discover. And though he may still be unable to ascertain this flaw, if he can do no better he will at the expense of what the world calls consistency, still maintain that both the verdict of revelation and of reason may be true, and reconcileable, though he be unable to reconcile them. In a word, he will do any thing rather than sanction the preposterous absurdity of supposing that even though God *has* revealed his will to man for the purpose of assisting our reason, which has been so bruised and weakened by the fall, yet, after all, God may be wrong and our reason may be right: for to this conclusion the principles of such men as Professor Bush, (notwithstanding a few unavailing and most inconsistent disclaimers,) must inevitably lead.

But before Professor Bush and other advocates of the pre-eminence of reason, should have ventured to array its decisions against the dicta of revelation; and then try to adapt the latter to the former, "because" forsooth "no two truths in the universe can be inconsistent with one another," it would have been well for them to have harmonized the decisions of reason herself, and to have shown *them* to be consistent. For if, with all our powers and resources, we are not able to harmonize and reconcile the plainest decisions of reason and science, one with the other, how absolutely vain is it to insist upon the necessity of harmonizing reason and revelation? And how utterly unjustifiable to *insist* upon adapting Scripture to reason in all cases where some plodding philosopher supposes that he has discovered an "inconsistency?" And yet this is precisely the position of Professor Bush's *argument from reason.* He *cannot* possibly understand how the same body which died and has been resolved into its primitive elements, some of which may have been incorporated with other human bodies, should be raised again from the dead; and therefore Scripture must be wrested from its obvious signification until it asserts something that he *can* understand. The idea of incorporation

with other human bodies is so utterly inconsistent in the Professor's view, with the idea of resurrection and restoration to its first proprietor, that he even doubts whether God himself can accomplish it.* And therefore if the Scripture asserts any thing so utterly incomprehensible to the Professor, he can have no other resource ("as *no two truths* can conflict with each other,") but so to pervert it, as to make it speak what he can comprehend.

But is this course itself reasonable? Are the deductions of science and reason, under such circumstances, to be reposed in thus implicitly? If not, Professor Bush has committed an egregious error in demanding so much for his argument. But an appeal to a few facts will enable us to place this matter in its proper light.

The doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter is susceptible of fuller and more perfect demonstration than the hypothesis upon which Professor Bush rests his argument: for it rests upon a chain of actual mathematical demonstration. The acutest and mightiest intellects have bowed before the argument, and have conceded that its conclusions are irresistible. May it not then be taken as a fair and honest *ipse dixit* of reason and science? Even Professor Bush will admit that it may. According then to this mathematical demonstration a line of an inch in length has an infinite number of parts. Now, Professor Bush himself will admit that it must of necessity take some portion of time to pass any portion of space. Hence, as this line of an inch long, has an infinite number of parts, it requires an infinite number of portions of time for a moving point to pass by this infinite number of parts. But an infinite number of portions of time is an eternity! Consequently it must require a whole eternity to move an inch!

Now, human ingenuity has never been able to detect a flaw in this argument. The premises appear to be perfectly sound, and the conclusion perfectly legitimate. And thus reason and mathematical science (the most certain of all

* "While we would not dare to limit the Holy One of Israel, or to deny that any thing is possible to him which is possible in itself, yet, as we apprehend the subject before us, the ideas involved in the proposition of the resurrection of the same body are incompatible *per se*. THE REAL QUESTION IS, HOW OMNIPOTENCE ITSELF CAN ESTABLISH THE RELATION OF WHICH WE ARE IN QUEST—how, not as to the *manner*, but as to the *fact*." *Anastasis*, pp. 56, 57.

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sciences,) conduct us irresistibly to a conclusion which no man in his senses could believe.

Equally conclusive is the demonstration which proves the world to be merely ideal. The opinion of the ablest judges seems to be, as Dr. Reid himself admits, that the arguments which sustain this position neither have been nor can be answered. And yet no man in his senses can believe the conclusion to which those arguments lead. And Dr. Reid himself could only rebut these arguments (not really refute them,) by maintaining that the great masters of reason, Des Cartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkley, and Hume, had wholly misunderstood the dicta of science and reason. And if this be so, surely we may ask, What are the dicta of reason and philosophy? How are we to ascertain what they are? And who will give us a fair representation of them?

But take another well known instance. It is mathematically demonstrated that a straight line, called the asymptote of the hyperbola may *eternally approach* the curve of the hyperbola, *and yet can never meet it.* This demonstration Professor Bush will admit to be sound and impregnable, and he will receive the conclusion as irrefragably true and certain, on the evidence produced, though it does *appear* self-contradictory.

Now suppose, for illustration, that the Bible contained the first enunciation of the axiom, that two lines which continually approach, must meet, or intersect one another, (a truth which so soon as announced, the common sense of every man admits to be self-evident,) and that some learned, prying philosopher like Professor Bush should have, in the course of his inquiries, discovered the demonstration of the asymptote. He then, laying down the proposition that "no two truths in the universe can be inconsistent, or clash with each other," proceeds to display his actually *mathematical demonstration*, and to exhibit his right line, and his curve, and convinces every one who can understand the language of mathematical science that this right line may continually approach nearer the curve to all eternity and yet can never meet it. No flaw can be discovered in the argument, no *non sequitur* in the conclusion. And then with the full assurance that no two truths in the universe can possibly clash with each other, this learned philosopher proceeds to show that the announcements of revelation and those of science can be reconciled. He first starts with the propo-

sition that the knowledge of Revelation is progressive; and then lays down his principles of accommodation, and finally so explains the Bible announcement as to make it utter the very reverse of what it did before.

Would such a course be warrantable? and would it be too much to say to that philosopher, "Sir, you are proceeding too fast, and your principles are unsound. It is true that two truths cannot be inconsistent with each other; but truth itself, and your view of truth may be very different things." Professor Bush, I have no doubt, would address this philosopher in some such language as this. And would it be too much to say to Professor Bush, who has pursued a course somewhat similar, "Sir, your procedure in this matter is very unreasonable and unphilosophical. The proposition which you advance respecting the incorporation of a part of the human body with other substances *may* be strictly demonstrable: and yet the announcement of Revelation respecting the resurrection of the same body that dies may be literally true. Your mind can take in but a single point of the vast plain which lies before you.* That plain, sir, is so extensive (as you would know if you could see the whole of it,) that it fills up the whole space between the point which your eye is fixed upon, and that point, the existence of which God has announced to man." In other words, both of these propositions may be true, and we should see them to be so, had God made the subject fully known to us in all its parts.

Thus also God is a sovereign—in the strictest sense of the word *the* sovereign of the universe, controlling all things after the counsel of his own will. *And yet man is free*, and is the originator of his own actions. But who has ever been able to reconcile the sovereignty of God with the free agency of man? It never has been done; and perhaps never can be in this world. They *appear* to be wholly subversive of each other, and to "clash" much more than the facts which Professor Bush has arrayed against each other. And yet both are received as true; and both *are* unquestionably true. And the reputation of the philosopher who should now doubt of either, simply because he could not reconcile the two,

* See an excellent illustration of the thought here presented, in Isaac Taylor's "INTRODUCTORY ESSAY *to Edwards on the Will.*" pp. 49—52.

would soon become any thing but enviable among intelligent men.

It is hardly necessary to pursue this subject, yet there is one more point which we shall refer to before concluding. Even so plain a subject as the existence of motion, presents difficulties which to reason are absolutely insuperable. Zeno, the stoic, argued strenuously against its very existence. His objections (one of which we have already referred to when speaking of the infinite divisibility of matter,) are substantially preserved by Aristotle, who has attempted to answer them in his Physics, lib. vi. cap. ix. But his answers only show the utter imbecility of reason to remove even the simplest difficulties which itself may suggest; for they are eminently sophistical and have done nothing to increase the world's admiration of his prodigious powers. I will state one or more of these objections, after first premising that it is certain that no part of *time* can co-exist with another part. Each must exist alone, whether it be a day, or a moment, or a second, or the smallest conceivable instant. One moment or instant must cease to exist before another can exist. Each moment or second is therefore simple and indivisible, and perfectly distinct from time past, and time to come, and contains no more than present time. This will not be disputed. Nor will it be questioned that a body cannot be in two places at once.

Now if an arrow, which tends towards a certain place, should *move* (as it is called,) it must move and rest at the same time. But this is a plain contradiction, and therefore the arrow does not move. The reason is plain; for the arrow is every instant of time in a space equal to itself. It is therefore in that instant of time at rest, for a thing is not in a space when it leaves it. And therefore there can be no instant of time in which it moves: for if it moved at any supposable instant, it would be at once in motion and at rest; and this, as before remarked, is a contradiction.

Then again: If there is motion, the thing that moves must pass from one place to another; for all motion must comprehend two extremes, the *terminus à quo* and *terminus ad quem*, the place from which it departs, and that to which it comes. Suppose, then, the distance which it is asserted to move, is a foot. The first inch of this distance is separated from the twelfth by an infinity of parts, since matter (as above remarked) is divisible *in infinitum*. How then

can the object which is said to move, proceed from one extremity to the other? The intermediate space is composed of an infinite number of parts through which it must run successively, one after the other, and each particle of matter must require a particle of time in passing it. But an infinity of particles of time is an unending duration. And, therefore, unless the object which moves, can be in several places at the same time, it cannot to all eternity pass from the first inch to the twelfth.

To these objections Aristotle replies, by asserting that time is infinitely divisible. The falseness of this, however, has been demonstrated above. And a child can see that if there were an infinity of parts in an hour, it could never either begin or end.

But again, if there is such a thing as motion, then the swiftest body in motion pursuing the slowest, can never overtake it. Suppose, for instance, that the "swift-footed Achilles" and a tortoise should run a race, and the tortoise has twenty yards the start of Achilles. We will suppose also that Achilles moves twenty times faster than the tortoise. Now it is perfectly obvious that while Achilles moves twenty yards, the tortoise advances one; and therefore she is before him still. And while he proceeds to the twenty-first pace, she will gain the twentieth part of the twenty-second; and while he gains this twentieth part, she will go through the twentieth part of the twenty-first part, and so on *in infinitum*. He will never be able to overtake the tortoise, but there will always be some distance between them.

Whole volumes have been written in answer to this objection with no better success than the above reply of Aristotle. We might mention other objections, and others also, equally invincible, against the very existence of extension.* But the foregoing are sufficient for illustration, and may serve to teach us the limits of our understanding, and the folly of thus reposing implicit confidence in the deductions of reason, when there are so many things connected with the plainest matters with which we are conversant, which effectually baffle all our efforts to comprehend them. Surely, then, it is both rational and proper for such weak, erring, short-sighted mortals to confide implicitly in the testimony of an

* The reader may find in Bayle, (Crit. Dict. V., p. 609, seq.,) from whom I have taken some of the foregoing remarks, a brief statement of a few of these objections.

All-Wise God, even though it should appear to conflict with the deductions of our reason.

It is hardly necessary to *apply* these illustrations, though we shall do so briefly. Suppose then that some diligent student had for the first time arrived at the foregoing "irrefragable deductions of reason." He becomes at once fully satisfied that the world and the church are all wrong on the subject of motion, for "no two truths can be inconsistent with each other," and he has clearly demonstrated that the very idea of motion involves the most irreconcilable inconsistencies and contradictions. Yet he is a firm believer of the Bible. And as he finds the idea there asserted, both positively and by implication, that motion does exist, he thinks it necessary to investigate the matter philologically. He is satisfied, moreover, that the knowledge of revelation is progressive, and he is not to be deterred by such passages as Gen. i. 2, Levit. xi. 10, Deut. xxiii. 35, Rev. vi. 14, Ps. xix. 5, Eccles. i. 7, Dan. xii. 4, &c. &c., which seem to assert or imply the existence of that which he is satisfied has no existence. He then girds himself to the encounter, and after presenting the "argument from reason," he gives a view of the Scripture argument. First comes the plain declaration in Gen. i. 2: "And the Spirit of God *moved* upon the face of the waters." He looks critically at the word *moved*, רחף; and though he finds it in the Hithpael, having the force of a reflexive verb, *motitans se*, he finds also that it will bear the rendering of *incubans*. "The Spirit of God *brooded* over the abyss." Hence this does not prove that there is such a thing as *motion*. And thus he disposes of all the positive declarations, one after another; by maintaining that the inspired writers "accommodated" themselves to the stupidity of the age in which they lived, and did not think about the generations to come, and in other parts of the world. And then he begins with the passages which simply *imply* the existence of motion. Ps. xix. 5, 6, is produced. "The sun is as a strong man to run a race; His going forth is from the end of heaven," &c. This certainly seems to *imply* the existence of motion. But our philosopher has ascertained that the sun is stationary. Then he inquires, "Must not this be figure? It is ascertained that the sun *absolutely does not move*." And thus the other series of passages is disposed of. For he is determined to take them "as type, figure, allegory, metaphor, symbol,

accommodation, anthropomorphism—*any thing* rather than the declaration of absolute verity," because they plainly conflict with the "dicta of reason;" and "*all truth must be consistent.*" And finally having laboured through his argument, and surveying it with no small degree of satisfaction, he asks, "what then becomes of the scriptural evidence of motion? Does it not evaporate in the crucible of logical and philological induction? And is it not inevitable that a great change must come over our estimate of the doctrine viewed as a disclosure of Holy Writ? Can it hereafter present the same aspect to the reflecting mind as formerly," &c. See *Anastasis*, Preface, p. xi. and p. 347.

Professor Bush, will scarcely need that I tell him

——— mutato nomine
De te fabula narratur;

for with a trifling qualification, here is a case perfectly analogous to his own. The *argument from reason* to disprove the existence of motion, is much more invincible and impregnable than Professor Bush's argument from reason, to disprove the resurrection of the body; and Professor Bush's argument is an old, stale, often refuted argument, while that in the illustration is unanswerable, so far as reason is concerned; and we have supposed it to be just discovered by the philosopher who uses it. With these differences the analogy is complete and perfect. One supposition may be more obviously absurd than the other, but the real absurdity and unreasonableness in both cases are equal.

In order to sustain the conclusion of his worthless argument, Professor Bush has done the most revolting violence to the word of God, and has openly sanctioned the Bible-subverting, and atheistic neology of Germany. We shall have occasion to refer to this hereafter, when we come to speak of his principles of interpretation. He does not *know* that the same body that dies will not be raised again as a *spiritual body*, though his whole book proceeds upon the assumption of such knowledge, and the argument upon which this conclusion is based, is as perfect a *non sequitur*, as the argument against the existence of motion.

Such then is Professor Bush's argument from reason. It has no connexion with the advancement of our knowledge of Revelation; it proves but a small portion of his theory even if it were what it purports to be, and thirdly, it is based upon a sophism unworthy of Professor Bush, and of the Christian name.

CHAPTER IV.

A CONSIDERATION OF THE SECOND AND THIRD CHAPTERS OF PART I., OF THE WORK OF PROFESSOR BUSH.

THE titles of these chapters are as follows:—"*Distinction of Personal and Bodily Identity,*" and "*The True Body of the Resurrection as inferred by Reason:*" and as they contain little other than repetitions of what we have already remarked upon, we propose to consider them here, in order to dispose of all that he has offered on this whole subject before we proceed to remark on the appropriate office of reason in the interpretation of the Scriptures.

On the first of these subjects, Professor Bush remarks as follows:—"The position that the scriptural doctrine of the resurrection necessitates the belief of the resurrection of the same body, enforces upon us the consideration of the subject of *identity*. We are at once arrested by the inquiry, whether the *identity of the person* implies the *identity of the body:*" (p. 58,) and he proceeds with a great deal of speculation, (upon which we shall remark presently,) to show that the identity of the human body does not continue to be the same for any two moments of time. But it must not be lost sight of here, that there is no dispute between Professor Bush, and ourselves in respect to the "identity of the person." I am not aware that any who believe in a resurrection, have ever questioned, whether the person who rises from the dead in a spiritual body, is identically the same person who previously had lived and died. The question is simply whether the body that is raised a spiritual body, is the same body that died? Professor Bush *denies*, and we *affirm*, that it is. And as Chapter II. of his book is professedly designed to bear upon this point, we shall proceed to ascertain whether he has offered any thing which really has any relation to it.

The following is a continuance of the remark above quoted:—"In strictness of speech a body which is undergoing a constant change in its constituent particles cannot be said to be the same in any two successive moments of its duration. This of course applies to the human body, the component atoms of which are in a state of ceaseless fluc-

tuation. A precise use of language will not warrant the assertion, that our bodies are the same this hour that they were the last. The paring of a nail, the clipping of a hair, leaves the body a different body from what it was before this subduction from its integrity took place. It is true indeed that for all the purposes of ordinary and popular discourse it is perhaps an unexceptionable mode of diction to say, that we have in mature life the same bodies that we had in childhood. But when we subject the phraseology to a rigid test, it is obvious that it cannot be true. That cannot be the same through a given lapse of time which is constantly changing its constituent parts during that time.

"How then is it possible to affirm, with philosophical accuracy, that I have the same body to-day that I had twenty years ago? And it would certainly be hard to show that that which is philosophically false is theologically true. The point before us is one on which we are at liberty to insist upon the most punctilious exactness of definition."

These speculations, (and they are continued through the chapter,) it is plain would prove that a man of seventy years, has had, not only "ten different bodies," as Professor Bush asserts, but ten thousand, or ten hundred thousand. But how do these things bear upon the point really before us? Professor Bush has taken them mainly from Locke's Commentator, (see Locke's Essay, Part II., pp. 247—252, and 300—328, *Harper's Edition*, 1824,) and seems to suppose that therefore they must of necessity bear upon the subject which he professes to be discussing. But suppose a man has a different body every moment that he lives, what has that to do with the question? We have never denied the fact that there is a never-ceasing attrition of the parts of the human body while we live, and admitting it to be true, how does it affect the question as to the resurrection of the body which dies? And what would Professor Bush have us to define with such "punctilious exactness of definition?" We hold that the same body which dies, is to be raised a spiritual body at the last day; this is our definition of the resurrection, and this definition Professor Bush might have found in every Christian symbol in the universe.

But the *application* of all this speculation appears on page 62. Professor Bush after making a long extract from Bishop Butler "on the identity of plants," (which contains nothing but what every one admits,) and another from the worthless

treatise of Mr. Drew, proceeds to exhibit the *bearing* of these remarks as follows, in replying to Mr. Drew:

"But this river of ratiocination soon loses itself in the sands when followed down into the region of clear physiological and psychological induction. Here we learn that the identity of the *body* is one thing, and the identity of the *person* another. Without a clear perception of this distinction, the true doctrine of the resurrection will fail to be grasped. When once apprehended, we are immediately freed from all embarrassment on the score of the unceasing succession of particles. Affixing the seat of identity to the seat of personality, we can see the body wasting by exhalation and repairing itself by new accretions, and still perceive the central substratum of our being remaining unmoved, indestructible, and eternal, in the midst of all cycles of change. Something assuredly there is, which lives abiding and untouched in the midst of, and in spite of, the incessant flux of our corporeal existence. In that something our personality inheres, and to it our true identity cleaves. Of the body we cannot predicate identity at all in any two successive moments of its being; much less after centurial intervals and unknown transmutations. It is a mere centre of centripetal and centrifugal particles continually arriving and departing without any permanent stay."

Here we have it,—the precious germ which is to expand and develope itself from the congenial elements furnished by Professor Bush's book, into the goodly theory which he has sketched out. Man is not a compound being, the body is no part of him whatever. It is rather a *state* of being than a part of himself. He uses it as an old man does his spectacles, only till he gets his second sight. Then it is laid by as useless and an encumbrance. And in order to perfect this *precious germ* of thought, we must hold that Adam would have been divested of his body whether he sinned or not; that Enoch and Elijah were divested of theirs, and our Saviour of his—for the body is no part of the person of any descendant of Adam. And then to complete the idea in the foregoing paragraph Professor Bush continues as follows:

"What can any man make of the unmodified averment that the same body is to rise at some indefinitely future day? If a man rises in the morning with a different body from that with which he lay down—though he still remains the same person—with what propriety can he be said to rise from his

grave with the same body with which he entered it?" pp. 62, 63. Not reflecting how easy it would be to return the question by asking, "With what propriety can a spiritual body be said by Professor Bush to arise from the grave or the sea, &c., when according to his own averment it never was in the grave or the sea?" But surely the question based upon the analogy between sleep and death, is to say the least, trivial: and Professor Bush could not even propound it without contradicting himself. For how does "*he*," the person, enter the grave "with the body," when the spiritual body, as the Professor so repeatedly avers, "*is eliminated* AT *death?*"

In view of this whole paragraph, I remark, however, that Professor Bush knows nothing about "*personal identity*," nor is he able in any wise to define it. And he must not think to draw the advocates of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, away from the true issue, into a vague and endless dispute on that subject. The Professor supposes personal identity to be seated in "*the spiritual body* which is in every man, and is at death eliminated from the corporeal." And yet that this spiritual body "enters the spiritual world *as a germ*, and does not attain to its perfection at once, but that under appropriate laws it may gradually elaborate for itself a spiritual corporeity, from the spiritual elements by which it is surrounded." See *Anastasis*, p. 181. Where, then, is this personal identity? If the bodily identity of the infant is destroyed by the changes which take place in "the elaborating of a body for maturer age," what becomes of the identity of Professor Bush's spiritual body (in which he says personal identity itself is seated,) when "similar changes" take place in it? If his objections against corporeal identity are valid, therefore, they destroy his theory of personal identity entirely: if they are not valid, surely he has here said nothing which calls for an answer.

Then as to the bearing of all this on the real point under discussion, to wit: *whether the body that is raised a spiritual body is the same body that had previously died:* Where is it? Suppose that the body should not be the same any two moments *while the man lives*, how does this prove that the body which dies will not be raised again? Professor Bush has not told us, and neither can I tell how such a conclusion can be arrived at from such premises.

In the sense in which Professor Bush employs the term

identity, in the foregoing passages, I cheerfully concede the truth of what he advances with so much learning, that our bodies even after the paring of a nail are not identically the same that they were before. I demur not at the premises, but only at the conclusion. For how does all this go to prove that the resurrection of the body that dies is impossible, and inconsistent with reason? On the supposition that God has announced the fact of its resurrection also, (and this presents, as Professor Bush admits, the true issue after all,) is he not competent to preserve its substantial integrity whatever other forms its elements may assume? To talk of its being dissolved into gases, and of those gases being "lost in the immensity of the atmosphere," is about as reasonable as it would be for a mite, whom we may suppose to be one of millions which inhabit a grain of sand, to speak of the body of a fellow mite being dissolved and lost in the immensity of the atmosphere of the grain of sand, supposing it to extend in height to about the one hundred and fiftieth part of the extent of its diameter. Does not Professor Bush know, that "the immensity of our atmosphere" and the immensity of a grain of sand are, so far as respects the point under consideration, one and the same with God?

And then, as to identity, it is a matter of very little account to the argument what may be the decision of the question, whether or not *personal* identity *implies corporeal identity?* The issue is not to be determined by any such implication. Yet before Professor Bush had availed himself of such an implication to strengthen his theory, it would have been better for him to have shown *what is actually necessary to the identity of which he speaks.* It is plain that there can be a distinction made between two or more objects, only in respect to the things concerning which there is a difference between them. If they are perfectly alike *in* themselves, still they must be distinguished by those things called *circumstances*, as time, place, &c. For it is difference only that constitutes distinction.* And with Professor Bush entire sameness must be predicated of any thing before perfect identity can be predicated of it. Hence man's body cannot be identically the same this moment that it was the last, on account of the wearing away and replacement of particles. Such is his doctrine. And as he appears

* See Edwards on the Will, Part IV., § VIII. Works, Vol. II. p. 237. New York, 1830.

to be fond of philosophy, will he tell us, on these principles, how a man's spirit (whether *thought* be its essence or not; See *Anastasis*, p. 72,) can be philosophically the same after the reception of knowledge that it was before? Was the spirit of Sir Isaac Newton the same when he was a puling infant, as when conducting him step by step to the grand results of his Principia? And will the Professor tell us whether the spiritual body which he avers is in the corporeal, and in which identity is seated, is the same in infancy as in mature age? Does not the spiritual body expand or keep pace with the growth of the corporeal? and if so, is it not different at different intervals? And when it leaves the body "*as a germ*," and subsequently elaborates for itself a spiritual corporeity, is not its identity destroyed according to our author? And then does not the acquisition of a new thought render the mind truly different from what it was before, in its views, feelings, and pursuits? Is it not correctly said to *modify* it? And if there be this difference in the mind at any given interval, where is its identity? How can it be, on the Professor's principles, the same mind that it was before? Difference is destructive of identity, says Professor Bush. But what a prodigious difference is there between the mind of Sir Isaac Newton (as above remarked) in infancy and in mature age? Where then is its identity? But Professor Bush will probably say, "we know too little about the essence of mind to enter fully into such a discussion." But then, how much more do we know of the essence of matter than we do of the essence of mind? Professor Bush himself will answer: "The truth is, we know but little of the true nature of what we term *matter*, when we come to its more refined and subtle forms. Our ideas of it are derived mostly from its grosser conditions, of which we do not scruple to predicate *inertness* as one. But the moment we turn our eyes to the process of vegetation, we see the so-called *inert* mass of matter putting forth quickening powers and evincing qualities entirely at variance with our previous definitions. And so when we resolve solid substances into gases, we are confounded to find that which before answered all our ideas of matter, apparently assuming other attributes and coming under other laws. *Our knowledge is here nonplussed*, and still the facts are palpable to our senses." *Anastasis*, pp. 76, 77. How then is the identity of the spirit (upon which he predicates his

idea of personal identity,) to be preserved? When principles are applied to a subject which is confessedly incomprehensible, for the purpose of educing an inference in support of a groundless theory, it will not do to put in a plea of ignorance in order to save the inference, when that inference is shown to be absurd by an application of the principles to another subject which is admitted to be equally incomprehensible. And Professor Bush knows not but that the resurrection of the body that dies, will be a resurrection of the *material* that composed it, and which shall be adapted to the spirit by being changed into the sublimest form of which matter is susceptible. In his whole book he has not attempted to show that such a supposition is either unscriptural, unphilosophical, or absurd.

The subject of *identity* as presented by Professor Bush has therefore nothing to do with the true issue before us, except by implication. And then the proper question to be discussed in reference to it is not whether a man's body *while he lives*, remains the same in all its constituent particles; but whether its identity is so destroyed between death and the resurrection as to be incompatible with a recall to life, and restoration to its spirit. This is the question which Professor Bush should have discussed in the chapter now under consideration, if he wished to offer any thing on the subject of corporeal identity; but instead of this he has not even referred to it. And what he has offered in regard to the identity of the living body, is equally destructive of the identity of the soul, and, by consequence, of his whole theory of personal identity. And here we leave it, in order to take up his next topic.

SECTION II.

A consideration of Professor Bush's Chapter III.

The title of this chapter is as above remarked, "*The True Body of the Resurrection as inferred by Reason;*" and he commences the chapter itself with these remarks: "We trust it may not be forgotten that we are prosecuting exclusively the *rational* argument* in respect to the resurrection.

* This is true in more senses than the one intended by the Professor; as a reference to Wegscheider and others, above referred to, will evince.

The conclusions derived from the scriptural view of the subject will be matter of subsequent consideration. At present we take philosophy for our guide, just as the geologist takes the earth for his theme, and from its own phenomena endeavours to ascertain its past and future history. There is doubtless a science pertaining to each—a science yielding truths in which the reason, by the very laws of its actings, must rest with absolute assurance. These results of the reason, when rightly established, *must* agree with the sense of revelation, when rightly understood. As both reason and revelation acknowledge the same Divine Author, it is impossible that there should be any conflict in their genuine teachings. In regard to the point in question, we have shown, if we mistake not, that a sound and strict philosophy does encounter difficulties in the resurrection of the *same body* which may be pronounced insuperable, while it perceives none in the resurrection of the *same person*. The nature of these difficulties we may develope a little more at length, and under somewhat of a new aspect, with a view to come somewhat nearer to a conception of the true theory of the future life." p. 67, 68.

I should have been glad if Professor Bush himself had "not forgotten" that he was professedly "prosecuting exclusively the *rational* argument in respect to the resurrection;" for throughout this whole chapter there is a most uncalled for and improper intermingling of his "argument from reason" with the principles of Biblical hermeneutics: an attempt to interweave them with no small degree of skill, so that the reader may imperceptibly be led to conclude that these principles themselves are in this country recognized as unquestionably correct, and as based upon reason and common sense. And under this cover he scruples not to advance the broad and revolting principles of Semler's "Accommodation" system. To call such a procedure unfair, is speaking of it quite too lightly. It is most uncandid, and can admit of no justification whatever. Professor Bush *knows* that American theologians no more recognize these principles as correct or consonant with reason, than they do the atheistic ribaldry of Toland or Voltaire. But we shall consider his whole procedure in respect to this matter in our chapter on Interpretation.

Instead also of confining himself to the illustration of the proposition announced at the head of this chapter, he has

filled it with objections to the commonly received doctrine of the resurrection. And this want of system and logical precision is glaringly apparent in every part of his book. Hence the difficulty of replying to each of his chapters consecutively; and the necessity of a thorough analysis and rearrangement of what he does offer, in order to ascertain its intended bearing upon the true issue. Some writers after exhibiting their theories, adopt such a method to involve themselves in obscurity like the scuttle-fish, and prevent an opponent from following them; others, in order to leave for themselves apparent good reason for saying that their book has not been thoroughly answered. I impute neither of these designs to Professor Bush; but I cannot but wish most heartily that his arrangement had been more lucid. The "objections," &c., referred to, we shall pass by for the present, and hereafter consider them in a chapter by themselves.

The point, then, which Professor Bush proposes to discuss, is "The true body of the resurrection, as inferred by reason;" and we shall proceed to analyze the chapter in order to learn what he has offered on this subject. After propounding a further illustration of his leading objection against the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, and also a suicidal illustration of his notion of identity, (which need not be here specified,) he thus proceeds to develope the "true resurrection body as inferred by reason." "The resurrection body is that part of our present being to which the *essential life* of the man pertains. We may not be able to see it, to handle it, to analyze it, or to describe it. But we know that it exists, because we know that we ourselves exist. It constitutes the inner essential vitality of our present bodies, and it lives again in another state *because it never dies.* It is immortal in its own nature, and it is called a *body*—a spiritual body—because the poverty of human language, or perhaps the weakness of the human mind, forbids the adoption of any more fitting term by which to express it. It is, however, a body which has nothing to do with the gross material particles which enter into the composition of our present earthly tenements. Still we reaffirm our former position, that the truth of our conclusion on this head does not depend upon our ability to define the internal nature or constitution of this substratum of our being. We know that it *is*, whatever be its essence, and we

are at liberty to reason to it and from it, as a positive existence, the negation of which would land us in interminable absurdities." p. 70.

Then after discussing the inquiry, whether this view does not resolve the doctrine of the resurrection into that of immortality, he thus continues on p. 78. "It would seem then, on the whole, from a collation of all the grounds on which an opinion is to be formed, that the judgment of reason would be, *that a spiritual body is developed at death.* By *spiritual*, in this connexion, we mean refined, subtle, etherial, sublimated. By the development of a spiritual body, we mean the disengagement—the extrication—of that psychical part of our nature with which vital and animal functions are, in the present life, intimately connected, and which differs from the pure spirit, the intellectual principle, as the Greek ψύχη, or *sensitive principle*, differs from νοῦς, the *self-conscious intelligence.* It is a *tertium quid*—an intermediate something between the cogitative faculty and the gross body. It is indeed invisible; but so are many of the mightiest agents in nature, and so are many of the noblest entities in the ranks of created beings." And in closing the chapter, he remarks, (p. 84,) "It will have been seen, from the tenor of the preceding pages, that the argument from reason leads by fair and unforced inference to the conclusion, that the true doctrine of the resurrection is the doctrine of the development of a spiritual body at death from the bodies which we now inhabit."

Such is the sum total of "*the doctrine of the resurrection body as inferred by reason*;" and it will be an interesting inquiry, *How much concern pure reason has with these inferences.* But before we proceed with it, I should like to ask a question or two concerning this "*tertium quid*," or ψύχη, or "*sensitive principle*," or "intermediate something between the cogitative faculty and the gross body." Professor Bush seems inclined to think that it is *material* in its essence, though not grossly so; but as forming the connecting link between the grosser body, and the pure spirit; and says that it is "eliminated" from our *corporeal* structure. This, too, he affirms to be the seat of identity as we have remarked in our former section. Now Professor Bush repeatedly affirms that the human body is *entirely renewed* every seven years; so that a man of seventy years, has had ten entirely distinct bodies. And with much as-

surance he asks which of these bodies will be raised at the last day? intimating that there is as much *reason* to suppose that any one will be raised as another. pp. 54, 56. This point we need not discuss here; but it is perfectly proper to inquire "From which of these ten perfectly distinct bodies, will this *tertium quid* be eliminated?" As it is not pure spirit, it is perfectly plain that the man who has lived seventy years has had no less than ten of these "*tertium quids*." Which then shall be the "resurrection body?" and if the last, then what has become of the other nine? And is this the theory by which Professor Bush is to obviate all objections to the doctrine of the resurrection, by showing it to be perfectly harmonious with reason? It is plain that this "*sensitive principle*" is either *material*, or purely *spiritual*, i. e. "bodiless and formless *mens*:" but that it is not purely spiritual, Professor Bush positively asserts. See p. 72. And if it be *material*, (no matter how refined and sublimated,) it is of course a part of the material body with which the spirit is clothed. In other words it must be *matter*. If then it be matter, and if the *material* of man's body is perfectly changed, or renewed every seven years, this *tertium quid* must be also renewed. And if it is renewed, then (not only is its identity gone as we have shown in § 1, but) the man has had as many "*spiritual bodies*" as he has had grossly material. This is the argument: plain and palpable in its premises, and legitimate in its conclusion. And we repeat the inquiry, which of the ten "tertium quids" of a man of seventy, does *reason teach us*, will be the resurrection body? Each one was perfect; and why therefore should "the preference be given to the last of the series?" And where are the nine others? Have they been "dissolved and lost in the immensity of the atmosphere?" or are they all assembled at death, and then by "natural laws" enter into the formation of the resurrection body? Or do they simply form that *spiritual* substance, or those "*spiritual elements*" from which the resurrection "*germ*" will "gradually elaborate for itself a spiritual body?" See p. 181. As Professor Bush has propounded questions similar to these in respect to the resurrection of the body; and at the same time professes to have shown that his own theory is not liable to the objections which he urges from reason against the received doctrine, but on the contrary, perfectly harmonizes with reason, we think that he ought by all means, to reply to these inter-

rogatories. And we think that on this subject we are "at liberty to insist on *the most punctilious exactness of definition.*"

But how does *reason* arrive at the conclusion that such is the resurrection body? Does Professor Bush mean *pure reason?* And pray what does *reason* teach of any resurrection-state whatever? Has she uttered an unquestionable and unequivocal *dictum* that man will live again? If so, where shall we go to learn it? To the French philosophers of the last century, who abolished Christianity, burnt the Bible by the hands of the executioner, and placed at the entrance of their grave yards the inscription that "*Death is an eternal sleep?*" Or shall we go to Priestley and others who taught that the existence of the soul is suspended between death and the resurrection? Reason, they say, led them to this conclusion. Or shall we go to the fond expectation of *Cicero*, who, after repeating the reasoning of Plato and Socrates, says, "But if I err, in believing the souls of men to be immortal, I am willing to err; nor while I live would I wish this delightful error removed. And if I shall feel nothing when dead (as is thought by some minute philosophers,) I am not afraid that dead philosophers shall laugh at me for the error."* This certainly is very beautiful: but even in the very expression itself, it is perfectly clear that Cicero did not regard the sentiment as an "*irrefragable deduction of reason.*" He views it in the light only of a pleasing probability. Where, then, shall we go to find the dictum of reason that man *will* live again? Professor Bush has neither told, nor can he tell.† How then can

* Quòd si in hoc erro, quòd animos hominum immortales esse credam: libenter erro: nec mihi hunc errorem, quo delector, dum vivo, extorqueri volo. Sin mortuus (ut quidam minuti Philosophi censent) nihil sentiam: non vereor ne hunc errorem meum mortui Philosophi irrideant. *Cato major sub fine.*

† Mr. Locke, who is Professor Bush's oracle, asserts that natural reason cannot demonstrate the doctrine of the soul's immortality. The schoolmen also, have investigated this whole subject with wonderful acuteness. Aquinas attempted to demonstrate the doctrine from reason; but Duns Scotus, (endowed with one of the most profound and subtle intellects which ever fell to the lot of humanity,) examined all his arguments, and shows that they utterly fail to prove the point, and can only render it credible, *rem non esse demonstratam sed creditam.* He himself propounds twenty-one probable reasons for the immortality of the soul, and asserts that reason can prove it to be only probable. The celebrated Cajetan at first indignantly rejected

what he announces, be "the true body of the resurrection, *as inferred by reason?*" Surely there is a singular medley here.

Yet perhaps Professor Bush means no more than that as the Bible has revealed the fact of a resurrection, he has taken that point *for granted* in the argument. But he has admitted virtually (as we shall show hereafter,) that he has resolved the doctrine of the resurrection into that of immortality, which Homer, Plato, Cicero, &c. entertained, (and which Professor Bush supposes is taught by reason;) and the Bible announcement of a resurrection, therefore, is with him, nothing more than an announcement of the same doctrine of immortality. Admitting then that he has, on the authority of scripture and reason, taken this first great principle for granted, we come next to inquire how Professor Bush has arrived at his conclusions respecting this *elimination* of which he speaks so much? How has he learned the *modus eliminandi* of which he speaks so largely? How does reason teach him any thing of the *nature* of this *tertium quid?* or of the *germ* which elaborates for itself a spiritual corporeity from the spiritual elements which surround it? How does the "prosecution exclusively of the *rational* argument" lead to any such inferences? And yet he asserts "that the argument from reason leads *by fair and unforced inference to the conclusion*, that the true doctrine of the resurrection is the doctrine of the developement of a spiritual body at death from the bodies which we now inhabit." See p. 84. And as it is on these assumptions that Professor Bush has attempted to unsettle the minds of men on the subject of the received doctrine of the resurrection, and arraigns that doctrine itself as irreconcilably inconsistent and absurd, it would be pardonable were we to remark with severity upon such a grave procedure, based upon such shallow and utterly fanciful hypotheses. The "*conclusions*" of his argument are mere baseless assumptions: and reason has never uttered what he has so pompously announced as the dicta of reason.

Man is immortal, says Professor Bush; and therefore he

this opinion, but after a thorough examination embraced it, and asserted that "he *believed*, indeed, that the soul is immortal, but did not *know* that it is so." *Credo quidem animam rationalem incorruptibilem esse, at nescio tamen.* But Professor Bush appears to have no difficulty whatever in conducting reason to any conclusion which his theory may stand in need of.

does not all die when the body dies. And if so, his spiritual or psychical nature must survive the death of the body. Hence at death, there is a separation of the *tertium quid*, and of the spirit from the gross corporeal structure. And THEREFORE the developement of this spiritual body at death, is *the true resurrection.* Here is the argument and the "*inference;*" and this is the true body of the resurrection *inferred* by reason! Never was there a more perfect *non sequitur*— or a greater *hiatus* between premises and conclusion. Reason knows nothing of this *tertium quid;* and knows not but that the *pure spirit* is separated from the body at death; it knows nothing as to the nature of spiritual existence; and it knows nothing as to the time, nature, mode, or any thing else belonging to the resurrection; much less does it know that this "*developement* AT *death*" is "THE *resurrection.*" And yet Professor Bush scruples not to aver that reason has conducted him to these *inferences.* And it is to these "*inferences*" that he proposes to "accommodate" the unambiguous declarations of God's word, in order that they may utter a sentiment consonant herewith. It is on the strength of such notions of mere fancy that the doctrine of a judgment to come, must be virtually explained away, and Christ's resurrection in the flesh utterly discarded!

Other subjects introduced into this chapter, will be attended to in their proper order. But before we proceed to the remaining parts of Professor Bush's book, (we have now arrived at the end of Part I.,) we shall proceed to consider the objections to the received doctrine of the resurrection, which he has suggested in the chapters which we have examined; and which we could not notice as they occurred without deviating too widely from the true issue involved in the discussion of the *argument from reason.*

CHAPTER V.

PROFESSOR BUSH'S "OBJECTIONS FROM REASON" TO THE RECEIVED DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION CONSIDERED.

HIS repeated denial (in the Preface, and throughout the *first part* of his book,) that the doctrine of the resurrection of the body is taught in the Bible, cannot of course be considered here. The proper place for remarking upon it will

be when we discuss the *scriptural* argument. But we shall now proceed to a consideration of the objections which he professes to found upon reason itself.

Objection I. The first objection is in the following language: "Should it be replied, in general terms, to our question, that the truth claiming credence is, that the body which we consign to the dust is again to be raised and reanimated at some future day; we rejoin at once, that this reply does not cover the ground of the difficulty. The simple assertion that the dead body is to be raised does not constitute an intelligible proposition, for the reason that it leaves it utterly uncertain *what body is meant.* A resurrection is indeed predicated of *a* body, but this is a very different thing from the resurrection of *the* body, and our inquiry cannot possibly be satisfied without a more minute specification. No fact in physiological science is better ascertained, than that the human body, in regard to its constituent particles, is in a state of constant flux." And then after stating thus his *argument from reason*, he continues his objection as follows: "The phrase, *the body*, does not accurately represent the object intended, if the idea conveyed by it be restricted to the body as existing *at any one moment. The idea of existence in continuity is indispensable to it.* The question then again recurs—what body is to be raised? A person who dies at the age of seventy has had ten different bodies," &c. &c. See the rest of this objection quoted in our statement of his Argument from Reason.

In reply to this objection I remark that "the truth claiming credence" is that *the* body which dies shall be raised from the dead, and re-united to the spirit. And *how* does the foregoing objection militate against this truth? The objection is, that while a man *lives* the particles of his body are in a continual flux. But the point is not respecting the body of the *living* man but of the *dead.* The attrition and replacement of the particles, to which Professor Bush refers, *cease at death*, and therefore the reply of the Professor is entirely aside from the question. He will not deny that whatever change may take place in the body *after* death, its *constituent particles* remain the same.

And then again, as we have remarked a page or two back, by this mode of reasoning Professor Bush has raised a spectre which he cannot lay without abandoning his position altogether, and admitting the objection to be unsound.

If the *gross* material body thus changes, the *refined* material *tertium quid* must likewise change. And if the fact of such a change in the *gross* body, furnishes ground for the question, "which of these bodies shall be the resurrection body?" it furnishes ground also for the question, "which of these *tertium quids* shall be the *tertium quid* of the resurrection?" Nor will it do for Professor Bush to say that the gross body dies, while the *tertium quid* remains alive; and that therefore the question does not apply to it, with the same force as to the gross body which actually dies and becomes dissolved: For 1. We have seen that this *tertium quid* is material; (Professor Bush admits that it is not pure spirit, and it cannot of course be a *mixture* of each;) and if so, it is properly *a part of the material body, refined* or *unrefined.* Now how does Professor Bush know that all which is *material* in man, does not die at death? If the *tertium quid* is *spirit*, then there are two pure spirits in man, the one united to the other, (which the Professor would not believe;) but if it be *material*, then it is a part of our material or corporeal structure: and if so, *why should it not die?* Where is Professor Bush's *proof* that it does not die? The baseless *assumption* of such an idea in a discussion where so much depends upon that idea, is rather too grave a procedure to be allowed. *We ask for the proof* that any part of man except his spirit, (wholly disengaged from matter,) survives the death of the body. But 2. "Why should the preference be given to the last *tertium quid* in the series" of an old man of seventy or eighty, instead of the full and vigorous one which he possessed at the age of twenty-eight, or thirty-five, or forty-two? for at each of these periods it was entirely renewed according to Professor Bush. And certainly it is as easy for God to give him such an one, as to give him the feeble one of seventy or eighty years. And God who established the laws of nature, could just as easily have ordered that the one which the man had at the age of forty-five, should be "by natural laws eliminated," as the one which he has at eighty. Whatever other persons may think of the relevancy of these queries, Professor Bush will see their relevancy, and the necessity of replying to them, inasmuch as he has propounded similar ones respecting the resurrection of the body. Then 3. The fact of this seven year's renewal of the corporeal structure of man, (upon which the Professor has based not only this

objection, but his entire argument from reason,) is but a mere hypothesis. It by no means possesses that full amount of demonstrative evidence which Professor Bush claims for it. I have all along consented to take it for granted; lest I should appear to be captious. But I repeat, that there is no such overwhelming evidence of its truth as Professor Bush pretends. It has been taken for granted by great and good men for centuries; but this, with the Professor, is no evidence of its truth. For on such evidence we can soon establish "irrefragably" the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. It is true that this hypothesis of the seven years renewal of our bodies has been "seldom *interrogated*," and it is not my intention to "interrogate" it now; but I hope Professor Bush will fully establish it before he builds so much upon it as he does. For upon this mere assumed idea the whole received doctrine of the resurrection of the body, and of the resurrection of Christ, &c., must be changed. Then in the next place this hypothesis is uncertain. Professor Bush knows that physiologists have never been able to ascertain *the time* of this supposed renewal. It has varied from one year to twenty and upwards. Some contend that the renewal is completed in one year, and others not until twenty times one—some more and others less. Where then is the absurdity of supposing that a little longer time may be requisite, or that an entire change does not take place through life. The assertion of Professor Bush, that an entire change takes place every seven years, he can therefore never prove. The idea is a mere hypothesis; and even admitting that the particles of the body *may* entirely change, it is not known how long a time is requisite in order to make the change complete.

Objection II. On p. 40, the Professor, after quoting Pearson on the Creed, remarks as follows: "Can any one *believe* in opposition to his positive knowledge? Now we *know* that the bodies deposited in the graves are not the same bodies with those that previously existed in the order of physical succession. If the language above quoted be construed in the utmost strictness of its import, it forces upon us the conclusion, that the identical body from which the soul took its departure at the hour of death, is the body the particles of which are to be re-collected and re-constructed at the era of the resurrection. But why shall the preference be given to these particular bodies, when, as is well known,

they are often withered and wasted by consumptions, swollen by dropsies, mangled by wounds, made hideous by deformities, curtailed of limbs, or become partially putrid by gangrenes? If the material particles of the body are to be reassembled at all, why not rather suppose that it will be those which composed it in the period of its prime, in its utmost vigour and beauty?"

To this objection several things may be said. 1. Professor Bush does *not* possess the knowledge which he here so boldly arrogates to himself. He does *not know* that the body deposited in the grave is not the body which had previously existed for ten or twenty years. The fact is generally conceded, but Professor Bush does not *know* it to be as he assumes. 2. As to the question, "Why should the preference be given to the body that died, rather than to that which the man had in his greatest beauty and vigour?" I remark *first*, that it proceeds upon the same assumption. *Secondly*. If the assumption be incorrect and unfounded, the query needs no answer: but if it be well-founded, then let Professor Bush tell us why the preference should be given to the last *tertium quid* of the series, and we will tell him why the preference is given to the last body of the series. *Thirdly*. On the supposition that God has announced the resurrection of the body that dies, it is of not the least consequence whether we can or cannot tell why he prefers it. The question therefore presents no true issue, and involves no principle that has any bearing on the subject. For suppose we could not tell *why* he prefers it, would this prove that he did not prefer it? *Fourthly*. Why was the preference given to the body of Christ, "which was the last of the series;" or to those of Enoch and Elijah? or those mentioned in Matt. xxvii. 52, 53? In a discussion of so much importance as the present, Professor Bush ought not to endeavour to perplex it by propounding such irrelevant questions. But let us hear his

Objection III. The passage quoted above continues thus: "But the truth is, the whole theory proceeds upon a fundamental fallacy which a single glance of the mental eye detects. The resurrection body is to be a *spiritual* and not a material body. The reassemblage of material particles can result only in the reconstruction of a material body, and a material body cannot be at the same time spiritual; at least we may confidently affirm that the *same material* body

cannot be at the same time *spiritual*, although we are aware that Paul's expression, 'a spiritual body,' is understood by some to denote a body *adapted to spiritual uses*, instead of implying one that is metaphysically *spiritual* in contradistinction from *material*. But, taken in either sense, the assertion above quoted involves contradictory ideas. A material body is a body of flesh and blood; but 'flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God.'" p. 40.

It certainly is not usual for controvertists to refute their own objections; yet such is the fact in the case before us. The "fundamental *fallacy* which a single glance of the mental eye detects," is that the reconstruction of the body that dies, would necessarily infer that the resurrection body would be *a material body*, when the word of God declares that it will be a *spiritual body*—using *material* as the antithesis of *spiritual*. And then after pointing out this "fallacy," Professor Bush very obligingly remarks, that "spiritual body" may mean "a body *adapted to spiritual uses;*" and of course, therefore, it may be material. Where then is this "fallacy?" Professor Bush has thoroughly neutralized his own objection. And I shall show in its proper place, that *the true scriptural import of "spiritual body," is a body adapted to spiritual uses.*

But again: Professor Bush plainly *affirms* above that "the resurrection body is to be a *spiritual* and NOT *a material body.*" Now light and darkness, cannot be more opposite than spirit and matter. If, therefore, the resurrection body is spirit, then we have a spirit joined to a spirit. And further—If it be *spirit*, what has become of Professor Bush's *tertium quid?* or something between matter and spirit, so to speak? And further still, what becomes of his definition of "spiritual," on p. 78? "By *spiritual*, in this connexion, we mean refined, subtle, ethereal, sublimated." If the Professor cannot write without thus contradicting himself, he must not think it strange that others contradict him.

And again—He remarks in the concluding part of the foregoing objection that "a material body is a body of flesh and blood: but 'flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God.'" But we have proved, on Professor Bush's own principles, that the *tertium quid* which constitutes his resurrection body, is itself material: and therefore, if this objection be valid, how can such a body enter the kingdom of God? But the Professor does not here explain what is

meant by "flesh and blood:" this we shall do when we come to investigate the scriptural argument.

Objection IV. The next objection is based upon the alleged difficulty arising from the supposed assimilation of the dead body with other bodies, after it is resolved into its first elements. The *inferences* from this objection, which Professor Bush so firmly relies on, we have fully considered in a former chapter; and we shall therefore dismiss it here with but a few remarks.

If God has announced that the body which dies shall be raised again, few will doubt that he is fully able to verify his announcement. *How* he *will* do it, or *can* do it, are questions of no importance whatever. The question, therefore resolves itself into one of pure exegesis—*Has he so declared?* And the proper place for the discussion of this question is of course not *here*. It is scarcely a justifiable method for an intelligent Christian to pursue, in explaining the word of God, first to try to prove that a thing *cannot* be done; and then to infer that God could not have promised to perform it. And yet this is the course which Professor Bush has not scrupled to adopt throughout the work before us.

But no advocate of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, known to me, has ever supposed that any thing more of the body is preserved than is essential to its substantial integrity; or than is sufficient to identify substantially the body that is raised with the body that died. But few bodies comparatively have been "devoured by cannibals;" and of those few, only a small portion of the devoured body has become incorporated with the bodies of the cannibals. And suppose, for the sake of the argument, that this small portion is never restored, it would not affect the integrity of the body so much, perhaps, as the loss of twelve or fifteen ounces of blood, would that of Professor Bush. And it does seem to me utterly unworthy of a man of Professor Bush's attainments, to dwell upon this point as he does, and to attempt to make so much out of a matter so perfectly trivial.

Objection V. "What *relation* exists between the original, putrefied, decomposed, and dissipated body, and the sublimated, glorious, incorruptible fabric which is to succeed;—what the relation in virtue of which I can call such a body *mine*, and say, 'Behold *my* body raised from the tomb and animated anew.'" p. 44. And the Professor does not

hesitate to aver that no such relationship exists. On this score, says he, "the common view of the resurrection *labours fatally*." p. 43.

This query also resolves itself into one of exegesis. If God has said that the body which dies shall be raised, it is of but little consequence, whether *we* can or cannot "conceive" how or wherein this relation subsists. But Professor Bush would have done well to have told what he meant precisely by the term *relation* as thus applied. It is very easy to propound a query and represent it as to the point, and difficult to be answered, by employing an abstract term in an undefined sense. Suppose I should ask Professor Bush what was the *relation* that existed between the glorified body of Elias, and the body in which he endured hunger and thirst and suffering on earth? or what was the *relation* between the glorious transfigured body of Jesus on Tabor, and his poor, suffering, scourged and afflicted body? How can we *conceive* of human flesh becoming thus glorious? Could Professor Bush explain it? Charcoal is the same as the diamond in substance: and yet one is the hardest and most glittering substance that we know, and the other as black and crumbling also as any thing known to us. And the difference consists simply *in a different arrangement of the particles.* But suppose that some acute genius should imagine that they are not the same? And suppose he should write a book on the subject against Professor Bush, and in discussing the subject should ask him, by way of justifying the denial of the proposition, "What conceivable *relation* can exist between charcoal and the diamond? The theory labours *fatally* here." Would Professor Bush think such a question worthy of a reply? and if he did, what answer would he make to it?

But again. On the principle of the attrition and renewal of the body once a year, or once in seven years, during life, (which Professor Bush asserts is so clearly proved,) the Professor has never had a body which has not been collected from the four quarters of the earth. Whence are our rice, sugar, waterfowl, fish, &c. &c.? Vegetation too is fed by the showers, and whence is the rain collected? Now the assimilation of all these diverse particles with our bodies *is altogether the work of God.* And will Professor Bush say that it is more difficult for God to reconstruct our bodies, than thus to construct them at first?

Our body which dies, therefore, was once OURS: and by virtue of this relation, it shall, according to the word of God, be ours again.

Objection VI. The next objection contains a reference to, and a slight discussion of, our Saviour's remarks in John v. 28, 29. Professor Bush speaks as follows: "In the present instance it is unquestionable, that the words quoted from our Saviour's address to the Jews do encounter a very formidable difficulty arising from the indubitable fact, that thousands and millions of human bodies that were once deposited in graves are not there now, and never will be again. Their tombs are *cenotaphs*, or *empty monuments*, in every sense of the word. Where now are the tenants of hundreds of the cemeteries of Egypt, whose mummy-remains have been from age to age consumed for fuel, or transferred, in the form of medicine, to the jars upon the apothecaries' shelves? They certainly are no longer to be found in the rocky repositories in which they were piously bestowed by the hands of survivors. When our Lord's language, therefore, is applied to cases like these, and it is affirmed that these bodies are to be raised out of their graves at the last day, how is it to be reconciled with the fact now adverted to? Let it not be said that this is an infidel objection, prompted by a proud preference of human reason to the teachings of inspired wisdom. The question is, Is it a *valid* objection? If so, it is entitled to regard, by whomsoever proposed. Nothing is gained by blinking or blackening the allegation of real difficulties in any part of the sacred writings." pp. 45, 46.

But it is peculiarly unfortunate for this objection, that our Saviour does not use any such words as are here attributed to him. How then can his words "encounter a very formidable difficulty?" Jesus does not say that "all *are* in their graves," as the objection throughout represents him as saying; but simply that "all *who are in their graves* shall hear his voice and come forth." And if Professor Bush had turned to Rev. xx., he would have found that not only the graves will give up their dead, but "the sea" also, at the great day of account. I doubt whether any one can peruse the foregoing futile objection of Professor Bush, without feeling assured that he must have been hard pressed for something to say against the doctrine which he was opposing. And though it would not be speaking of

it at all too severely to call it *puerile*, the Professor even descends to insist upon it through one or two pages more; and asks again, "How can a body come out of the grave that is not there?" &c. &c., pp. 46–48.

He then returns to his old objections (which we replied to above,) and clothing them anew, presents them with other illustrations. I will notice one or more of them. He says, "Again then we ask, What is meant by the resurrection of the body, and what the *relation* which the body that dies bears to the body that is raised? We cannot convict ourselves of irreverence in proposing these questions. They are forced upon us by the very laws of that reason with which the Creator has endowed us, and with which the dicta of revelation, when rightly understood, *must*, by inevitable necessity, accord. If the announcements of that holy volume can only be received by the surrender of our intelligence, and by a violent suppression of the voice which it utters, how is it ever to command the assent of any but minds of the lowest order?

"But suppose that a kernel of corn were planted to-day in the valley of the Mississippi, where it undergoes the usual process of decomposition, and a century hence, without any removal of the dust, a stalk of corn should spring up on the plains of Hindostan, and we should be told that that was the product of the seed dropped in the soil of the Western continent, could we comprehend the possibility of the fact? Could we perceive the relation of the two? Now this presents very fairly the difficulty in regard to the resurrection of the body. The difficulty arises from the break in the continuity of the vital operations." &c. &c. pp. 50, 51.

1. But once for all, I may be permitted here to remark, that the intimation in the first paragraph of this extract, that the doctrine of the resurrection of the body can only be entertained by a surrender of our reason, (an intimation which is repeated perpetually through Professor Bush's whole book,) is as unbecoming in its author, as it is unkind and offensive to the advocates of the doctrine referred to. I meet it with a broad denial, and a challenge of the proof on which it is based. To assume such a proposition, and repeat it as Professor Bush does, without attempting its proof, is not the way to conduct a discussion in the present age.

2. There is one point, also, which Professor Bush, in this, and in all his objections constantly loses sight of. It

is referred to in the latter part of the above quotation, and refers to the kernel of corn supposed to be planted in the valley of the Mississippi. As presented by Professer Bush, it does not exhibit the true issue. The question is not whether "we could *comprehend* the possibility of the fact," should we "be *told*" that the stalk of corn "springing up on the plains of Hindostan was the product of that seed;" but whether we should *believe* it if God were to assure us that such was really the fact? We might not be able to comprehend the manner of its transfer; but would Professor Bush refuse to believe the assurance of God that it was really the same? If he would not, let him fearlessly assert it: but if he would, where is the propriety or the force of his objection?

3. But in regard to the *relation* of the resurrection body to the body that died; it exists in the deathless spirit itself. And why need Professor Bush endeavour to perplex a question so plain? Let him answer this question; Does the soul or spirit sustain no relation to the constituent particles of the body that dies? or if he please, to that body itself? Even Professor Bush must admit that it does. We then inquire when can this relation to those particles cease? Suppose the body to be burned to ashes, or dissolved in any way, and unless the particles themselves are annihilated, how can this relationship be lost? It is true the particles which constituted the body may have changed while the body lived; but the question now, is not in reference to the body under such circumstances, but in reference to the body when deserted by the spirit.

But the Professor presents still another illustration of this imagined difficulty. His words are as follows:—"Let us now turn for a moment from the vegetable to the animal kingdom, and note the organisms in that world of wonders. The result we shall find to be the same. We see the grovelling and unsightly caterpillar or silkworm cast off its gross exuviæ, and forth issues, after certain ordained transformations, the brisk and beautiful winged insect, soaring upwards in an element entirely new, and with a body curiously adapted to the sphere into which its existence is transferred. Though it has not the *same body*, yet we have no hesitation in saying it is the *same creature* which we beheld creeping in peristaltic movement along the ground. And we say it is the same, because we perceive here also the unbroken continuity of the vital principle, the true seat

and subject of animal identity. We have no difficulty in recognizing the *relation* between the primitive and the ultimate organism. The one is visibly developed out of the other without one moment's cessation of the functions of life. But let us suppose, for a moment, that the caterpillar should die and moulder to dust before this transformation, according to the laws of nature, had taken place; should we look for the emergence, at any future time, of the butterfly from the relics of the grub? Or, if we allow ourselves to imagine that one hundred or five hundred years after the worm had passed away, an insect should appear flapping its gilded wings over the very spot where the preceding structure was decomposed, and we should be told that that butterfly was the same being, transformed, with the caterpillar that had perished there ages before, could we by any possibility grasp the ideas involved in the affirmation? All the *relation* that we could discern between the one and the other would be that of *priority and posteriority of time.*

"Now this, we contend, is precisely the difficulty that weighs upon the common theory of the resurrection of the body. According to this theory there is just that break—that huge interruption—in the continuous agency of the vital principle which makes it so impossible to discover or define the *relation* between the buried and the beatified body. The latent link which connects the two entirely escapes detection, and yet it is upon the presence of this link alone that we can predicate *identity* of the two structures."

I cheerfully accord to the objection as here presented all that it can logically claim. It certainly does exhibit most clearly and forcibly that there is a difficulty in the way of explaining and proving the doctrine of the resurrection of the body on principles furnished by reason and the light of nature alone. And were it not that I regard the doctrine as a revelation from heaven, I should be tempted to unite with Professor Bush, and the Athenians on Mar's Hill, in the time of Paul, in rejecting it as absolutely impossible. Unassisted reason can teach us but little on the subject, though it is true that some of the ancient philosophers before Christ, believed that the dead might arise. Yet when the fact is once announced by God, it is not difficult to find something like analogies to illustrate and confirm its truth. For philosophically speaking, it cannot be more difficult for God to collect and reconstruct the constituent particles of our dead

bodies, though dispersed into the four quarters of earth, than it is to establish natural laws, by which our present bodies receive their particles now from every part of the world; as remarked on a former page. This analogy, and others which may be mentioned, can be taken to illustrate the doctrine after it is announced in the word of God; but it is very doubtful whether, independent of revelation, they would ever have led to a supposition that the doctrine is true.

If, therefore, the foregoing illustration of Professor Bush, is designed to show that the *modus operandi* of God in the resurrection of the body, is incomprehensible on the supposition that the doctrine is true, we cheerfully concede all that it demands. But if its design is to show that *because* it is incomprehensible, it must *therefore* be untrue; we must in that case remind Professor Bush that his inference is false and absurd. This is a sufficient answer to the exception; but there are two or three points referred to therein, by the Professor, which call for a remark or two before dismissing it entirely.

The illustration egregiously fails in several of its most important features. 1. Professor Bush asserts that the butterfly "has not the same body" which it possessed when a crawling caterpillar. But in what respect is it not the same? Are not the *particles* which compose the body of the butterfly clearly those which constituted the body of the caterpillar? Truly, they are the very same; only they are fewer in number and differently arranged, or have taken another form. So far, therefore, as this illustration applies, it establishes the doctrine of the resurrection of the same body that died: for we have conceded that the arrangement of the particles of the resurrection body, will be different from that of the body which died. But who before has ever imagined that a variation in the arrangement of particles is destructive of their identity? Are not the particles of gold in the bullion the same as they were when it existed in the form of ore? 2. The reason here given by Professor Bush, and upon which he avers that we predicate the declaration that the butterfly is the same creature as the caterpillar, is not the true reason. We do not say that the creature is the same, merely "because we perceive here also the unbroken continuity of the *vital principle;*" but because we see that the *body itself is the same*, though its configuration has changed. Is a change of configuration destructive of iden-

tity? Was our Saviour's body when transfigured not the same in its constituent particles that it was before? And then,—3. Let us, with Professor Bush, "suppose that the caterpillar should die and moulder to dust before its transformation,"—"and allow ourselves to imagine that one hundred or five hundred years after the worm had passed away, an insect should appear flapping its gilded wings over the very spot where the preceding structure was decomposed;" and most assuredly we should never imagine *à priori* that this insect could be the same that had died, and was decomposed. But *suppose that God should affirm to us* that it was the same, and that he had revived it? I ask Professor Bush whether he would refuse to believe God, merely because he could not perceive how the *relation* could have been preserved? Most certainly he would believe him. And if so, where is the point of this illustration? or the propriety of Professor Bush arguing as he does? The true question is not what we can comprehend; but *what God has said* in reference to the matter.

The same fallacy is discoverable likewise in the following exception, which is in fact a part of the foregoing: "Supposing that Omnipotence should adjust this difficulty, will the re-construction of the original materials of the fleshly body form the spiritual body which we conceive to be that of the resurrection? And if a change take place virtually equivalent to a new creation, how can this be termed the resurrection of the *same* body? On any ground, therefore, we perceive the immense difficulty of establishing a definite or conceivable *relation* between the body that dies and the body that is raised." p. 52.

I reply, 1. That a body *adapted to spiritual uses* is a "spiritual body." Professor Bush must admit that the *tertium quid* of which he speaks must be *material;* though it may be *matter* (if such a thing could possibly exist as he supposes,) *highly refined.* Where, then, is the difficulty of supposing that the materials which compose the body that dies, may be also thus refined, and adapted to the uses of the spirit? But 2. "If a change take place *virtually equivalent to a new creation*, how can this be termed the resurrection of the *same* body?" There is, however, an equivocation here, in the phrase "*equivalent* to a new creation." I would ask Professor Bush what he means by it? "Virtually equivalent to a new creation" *of the par-*

ticles which composed the body that died? Is then a new arrangement of particles "virtually equivalent to a new creation" of those particles? Whenever Professor Bush casts the sand from the sand-box over his paper, he newly arranges the particles of sand. Is this, then, "*virtually equivalent* to a new creation" of those particles of sand? But perhaps he merely means "equivalent to a new creation" of the body itself. A new creation of the body, however, out of the particles or relics of the former body, is itself only a new arrangement of the material composing that body, and such is the change for which we contend. But on what principle is it that a new arrangement of the particles of one body into another body of like configuration, (only far more glorious,) is destructive of the identity for which we plead? *Professor Bush does not tell us.* If the constituent particles of Professor Bush's body to-day were newly arranged, by his body being transformed into a perfect resemblance to the glorious body of Elijah on Tabor, would it be philosophical or reasonable to question the identity of the body merely because of this change? If such a change *is* destructive of its identity, then I say that we do not plead for any such identity as can be thus destroyed. The identity which the doctrine we contend for demands, is simply this: that the constituent particles of the resurrection body be substantially the same with those of the body that died. But, on the other hand, if such a change as that referred to above, *is not* destructive of corporeal identity, then the objection of Professor Bush is, confessedly, vain and nugatory.

The foregoing objections are followed by a repetition of the objection noticed above, and relating to the "escape and replacement of the particles" of our bodies in this world. This objection the Professor is so pleased with that he repeats it some three or four times more. See pp. 55, 56, and 68–70, &c. He, also, presents again his "*grand objection*," "founded upon the lack of a conceivable *relation*," (see pp. 56, 57,) which "grand objection" we have already had up several times, and think it hardly necessary to refute it again. Such repetition, and re-repetition of these old objections, certainly evinces that the Professor had not at hand a very copious store. Yet as the following professes to be his *reply* to an argument, it may be proper to refer to it before leaving the subject. After expressing his doubts

whether God himself can establish the relation referred to, he remarks:

"We are aware it is easily replied, that it is no more difficult to conceive of the future body being built up out of the dispersed particles of the old one, than it is to conceive of the *creation* of the body in the first instance. But this reply loses sight of one important consideration which destroys the parallelism of the two cases. In the original creation there is the production of something by the simple fiat of Omnipotence that has no relation to any thing going before. But in the case of the resurrection there is the production of something out of a pre-existing substance, and, consequently, involving a *relation* of the former and the latter fabric to each other, which is of such a nature as utterly to confound and overwhelm our faculties, even when Omnipotence is called in to solve the problem. We may illustrate the difficulty that cleaves to the hypothesis by a fresh supposition."

And this "fresh supposition" is simply this: "A human body, the body of a horse, and the wheel of a war-chariot may have been buried together" beneath the surface of a field of battle. These substances finally "become commingled in one indiscriminate mass of dust." And no one *can conceive* of any essential difference in the material thus reduced to dust, or of one part being better adapted than another for the construction of a glorified body. p. 57.

But this objection is likewise based upon the *inconceivableness* of the thing, and, therefore, merits no further notice here. We know that if God has announced the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, he is well able to take care of our dust, and adapt it to the return of our spirit. Yet the former part of this paragraph calls for a remark. Professor Bush there says, that when we affirm it to be no more difficult to conceive of the re-construction of the resurrection body out of the dispersed particles of the old one, than it is to conceive of the creation of the body in the first instance, we "lose sight of one important consideration, which destroys the *parallelism* in the two cases." What, then, is this "important consideration" which is effectually to neutralize the force of this replication of ours? Why it is this: that in the first creation something is produced which has "no relation to *any thing going before;*" but in the case supposed there is a thing produced with such a

relation! Let the reader refer to the verbiage of Professor Bush on this subject, as quoted above, and see if he can apprehend the cogency of this "*important consideration.*" Is it then *more difficult* for God to reproduce a body that once existed and has become dissolved, than to create a body entirely new? Or is it only more difficult *for us to conceive* of his doing the latter than the former? If Professor Bush means the *latter* I cheerfully concede that it *may* be more difficult *to conceive* of such a thing, (though in verity the difficulty of *conceiving* is equally great in both cases,) and yet what does it prove? That God *cannot* do it *because* we cannot tell *how* he will do it? Such an objection is puerile. But perhaps the Professor does not mean this; but that it is really *more difficult* for God to reproduce such a body than to create a new one. If such be his meaning, however, it would have been well if he had backed the assertion with some little proof: for it is quite as difficult for me to conceive how Professor Bush attained to this extraordinary degree of knowledge, as it is to conceive how the dead are to be raised. Until the proof is furnished, therefore, I meet the assertion with a plain denial of its truth. And with the counter declaration, that the one is no more difficult for God to accomplish than the other.

Objection VII. The next objection of Professor Bush is of the *cui bono* kind. It is presented in the form of an illustration and its application. "Look at that gorgeous variegated tenant of the air," (says he, pp. 79, 80,) "winging its easy and joyous way over the flowery garden, or the grassy mead, or along the course of the babbling brook. It has left its pristine grovelling body in the dust, into which it is mouldering away. It can even look down from its ærial flight, and see the unsightly tenement which it has forsaken resolving itself into its original elements. Does it need it any more? Of what conceivable use can that earthly casement be to it now that it has received another body, developed out of the old one, adapted to the sphere in which it moves? Could any thing be gained by attaching the burdensome incumbrance of the former structure to the splendid apparatus of the latter? Is not the original fabric turned to much better account by being resolved back into dust, and so going to form the *material* of other worms, which shall in their turn give rise to other butterflies? So may we justly propose the question of the *cui bono* in relation to the resurrection of

our former bodies. What purpose can they be supposed to answer, provided we have, as all reasoning and analogy tends to establish, spiritual bodies that have emanated from the material—bodies wisely adapted to a spiritual world? What desirable accession will they bring to the conditions of that being upon which we enter when mortality is swallowed up of life? The elements of our corporeal frames may eventually find their way into the construction of bodies that shall enshrine some of the brightest, purest, noblest spirits that ever adorned the creation of God. Will they not thus be better employed than in being brought into conjunction with spiritual bodies that are as perfect without them as the butterfly is without its caterpillar fabric?"

With respect to the butterfly, its "earthly casement" can, in its present state, be of no use to it that we can imagine; and yet if the word of God expressly affirmed that in some way unknown to us it would again put on its cast off *exuviæ*, would Professor Bush refuse to believe it, simply because he could not *conceive the use* of such a procedure? I trow not. Does his illustration, then, present the true issue of the question under discussion? But the butterfly really does not reassume its cast off caterpillar form. And what then? Are we to infer from this that therefore the body of man is not to be reunited with his spirit? If so, where is the connexion between the premises and the conclusion? Professor Bush would certainly confer a favour if he would point it out.

As to the *cui bono* of such a reunion between the body and spirit, I am not aware that our inability to exhibit it, is any proof that it does not exist. Kant, somewhere in his *Religionslehre*, presents the same objection to the resurrection of the body. "Reason," says he, "can see no advantage in the supposition, that a body, which, however much it may have been purified, is still to be found substantially of the same materials; a body to which we have never been rightly attached in this life, should be dragged after us through all eternity. Nor can reason comprehend what would be the use of this body, (which consists of earth,) in heaven, i. e., in another part of the universe, in which, probably, other substances than matter are necessary to the existence and preservation of living beings." In reply to which objection, Storr forcibly remarks that "no reason can be assigned why we should have a decided aversion to a

future union with our bodies; for it cannot be denied that the body affords the spirit very great advantages; and we have no reason to expect that the sufferings which result from the structure of our present body will be concomitant on the future *renovated* body. Nor can it be maintained, as Kant has asserted, that the most minute particles of our bodies, the ultimate elementary principles of which it consists, which no chemical science has ever been able to reach, are of such a nature as to disqualify it for existence in our future residence, the nature of which is totally unknown to us."*

But on pp. 81—83, Professor Bush does not seem fully satisfied to refer the subject entirely to the decision of the Bible. He says, "If the letter of revelation holds forth a view of the doctrine which arrays itself against the clearest evidence of facts and the soundest process of reasoning, is there no demand, on the other side, for the reconciliation of Scripture with science? Are we required to hoodwink our faculties in order to do honour to inspiration? Now, we do not hesitate to affirm that the human mind is so constituted that it cannot but feel the force of the objections which we have urged against the resurrection of the same body, or indeed of any body at all, except the spiritual body, which, we are compelled to believe, is eliminated at death, by established laws, from the clay tabernacles that we here inhabit. But if faith is supposed to be required to reject what reason sanctions, is not this in effect to say that we are called to do homage to God's word at the expense of doing violence to his work?—for the human reason is the noblest product of

* In his *Dissertatio de Vita Beata*, (Opusc. Acad. Vol. II., p. 84, etc.,) Storr beautifully explains 2 Corinthians v. 2, 4. And as it bears upon the point above referred to, we shall quote his remarks. "As it is the natural desire of our spirits, to inhabit a body; our groanings under the sufferings to which we are exposed in our present frail body, extort from us the wish, not only to be delivered from the present sufferings of that body, but to receive a body of a different structure, to receive a heavenly body, (v. 1,) instead of the earthly one; and especially to receive it in such a manner, ἐνδύσασθαι, v. 3, that we might never be without a body; that we might receive it without laying off our earthly body (ἐκδύσασθαι v. 2, 4,) without dying, (that mortality might be swallowed up of life.) In such a change we should never be divested of body; and thus the desire of our nature would be fully gratified." (See *Biblic. Theol.* pp. 371—2.) Such is the desire of the pious soul; and hence the assurance, that though separated from the body at death, it shall resume possession of it in the resurrection of the just.

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Omnipotence."—"The great question on the subject is, What *is* the fact which is asserted, and which we are required to believe? What is the *very thing* which Omnipotence is to do in order to do what is usually deemed necessary to the resurrection of the body? If we have not misconceived the prevalent sentiment of the Christian world, it is, that the same body which lived, and died, and was buried, is again to be raised. Let it be granted that this is the asserted *fact* of Scripture: we array against it the counter fact, that, as the raised body is to be a spiritual body, it *cannot* be the same. Here are two asserted facts in direct contrariety to each other. Can the one be intelligently held without some attempted explanation of the *mode* in which it is to be made consistent with the other? Is it an impeachment of due religious reverence to inquire if there be any possibility of bringing our faith and our philosophy into accordance on this head?"

But, 1. As to the question of "hoodwinking our faculties in order to do honour to revelation," we have already remarked, that nothing of this kind is necessary in order to receive the doctrine of the resurrection of the body as true. And Professor Bush does neither his cause nor himself any credit by thus perpetually throwing out the contrary intimation. This point, however, intimately concerns Professor Bush's principles of interpretation—a subject which will be fully considered hereafter.

2. The hypothetical principle stated by Professor Bush, in these remarks, may be recognized as correct, without a concession of any thing which he demands for it. He asks, "If the letter of revelation holds forth a view of the doctrine which arrays itself against *the clearest evidence of facts, and the soundest process of reasoning*, is there no demand on the other side for the reconciliation of Scripture with science?" I answer that *in such a case* there might exist such a demand. But Professor Bush has exhibited none of this "clearest evidence of facts," or this "soundest process of reasoning," in support of his theory, and hence there can be no demand of this kind in his case. His "*facts*" exhibit any thing but "the clearest evidence" in their favour; and his "process of reasoning," as we have shown, is any thing but sound. The evidence in verification of this statement has been spread before the reader in the preceding pages.

3. I freely admit that "the only ground on which we

can recognize the claims to preference of one mode of solving a difficulty of revelation above another, is, that it goes further towards satisfying the demands of our intelligence, all things considered, than the other." And it is on this principle precisely that I wholly reject the proposed theory of Professor Bush. And it is not overrating the matter to aver, that for every serious difficulty which encumbers the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, the theory of Professor Bush is encumbered with a hundred. Evidence of this will be more fully presented when we take up the Scripture argument.

4. In connexion with the foregoing objection the Professor likewise enters a *caveat* against "referring" the accomplishment of the resurrection of the body "simply to the Divine Omnipotence." But does he mean by this that we are to take for granted, that "the Divine Omnipotence" can accomplish nothing but what we can understand, and the *modus* of which we can explain? If this be his meaning, surely it calls for no reply from me. But if it be *not* his meaning, what is the import of his exceptions to the principle referred to? For if Omnipotence *can* accomplish any thing, the *modus* of which we are unable either to explain or understand, what hinders but that he should be able also to accomplish the resurrection of the body, if even we cannot comprehend or conceive how he does it? But let us examine, *seriatim*, the principles upon which this singular *caveat* is founded.

(1.) "We may be permitted to suggest," says he, "that a reflecting reason finds it impossible to contemplate intelligently the *fact*, simply as a *fact*, without reference to the *mode* in which it is to be effected." But what does he mean by "contemplating" here? Does he mean "meditating on," or "considering with continued attention?" This is the meaning of *contemplating?* Now Professor Bush, in his work, (pp. 75, 76,) speaks with a high degree of eulogy of *mesmerism*, and he has frequently contemplated the *fact* of "*clairvoyance;*" and doubtless supposes that he has contemplated this fact "intelligently." But has he (if there be such a thing,) any adequate conception of "the *mode* in which it is effected?" I fearlessly answer, *No!* He frequently speaks of the union of matter with spirit, and *vice versa*. Has he any idea of the *mode?* Has he any adequate conception of the *mode* in which food becomes a part of the human sys-

tem? And does he find it impossible to contemplate, or meditate, on these things as facts because he cannot conceive how they are effected? Why then will he, in impugning the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, apply a principle as sound, which, if applied to these things, he would reject as unsound? This is but a poor justification of the *caveat* referred to.

(2.) But, again, he asks: "What *is* the fact which is asserted, and which we are required to believe? What is the *very thing* which Omnipotence is to do in order to do what is usually deemed necessary to the resurrection of the body?" *Ans.* The fact to be believed, is that the body which died is to be raised. And this Omnipotence will accomplish by reconstructing the body, and changing it into a body adapted to the uses of the immortal spirit. There is no difficulty in believing this on the assurance of the Almighty.

(3.) Professor Bush proceeds: "Let it be granted that this is the asserted *fact* of Scripture: we array against it the counter fact, that, as the raised body is to be a spiritual body, it *cannot* be the same. Here are two asserted facts in direct contrariety to each other." But the Professor here takes for granted, that by a spiritual body is meant *pure spirit:* and this is, as we have shown, utterly destructive of his *tertium quid* hypothesis, as he would have then a pure spirit united to a pure spirit; an idea which he expressly and in so many words rejects on p. 83. But if a *spiritual body* is a body adapted to spiritual uses, (which is beyond doubt the import of the phrase, as we shall show hereafter,) then why or wherefore can it not be the same substantially as the body which died? There is, therefore, no contradiction here, and no "asserted fact of Scripture arrayed against a counter fact."

(4.) The Professor asks further: "Can the one (fact) be intelligently held without some attempted explanation of the *mode* in which it is to be made consistent with the other?" To this I reply, *first*, that Professor Bush here varies his position. For "the *mode* in which one fact is to be made consistent with another fact," is a very different thing from "the *mode* in which a *fact* is to be *effected*," or performed. A principle involving the former procedure, may, in the case supposed, be sound; while one involving the latter cannot be sound in the case supposed, as we have shown

above. And, *secondly*, an attempt to *harmonize* apparently discordant statements in the word of God, (and this is what Professor Bush refers to in the sentence last quoted,) is a very different thing from the attempt which the Professor has made in his "Anastasis;" in which, having assumed that his deductions from reason are legitimate, he has attempted to show from this assumption that the plain and obvious teaching of the Bible must be wrong on the subject under discussion; and that, therefore, it ought to be so explained as to harmonize with his view of what reason teaches.

These are the fallacious principles upon which he has refused to recognize our right to refer to "Divine Omnipotence," as being able to accomplish the resurrection of the body!

Such are Professor Bush's objections to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. And his assertion on p. 81, that the intelligent reception of this doctrine is attended "with greater difficulties," than the reception of the theory propounded by himself, will not be considered as of any great weight, if the foregoing are the *difficulties* referred to.

CHAPTER VI.

THE TRUE OFFICE OF REASON IN RESPECT TO REVEALED RELIGION.

The appropriate position of reason in religion, is a subject of high importance in this, and in all discussions where the principles of reason and those of true religion are supposed to be brought into conflict. The mere vague and undefined announcement that "reason and religion must be consistent with each other," and similar announcements of which Professor Bush's work is literally full, can settle nothing; and serve no purpose other than to perplex the honest and conscientious inquirer after truth. The statement made by Professor Bush and others who have written as vaguely on the subject, neither makes nor allows any distinction between the principles of reason, (so called,) which any man in particular may adopt, and the principles of right reason, such as God both recognizes and appeals to in his word. And hence every man is left to infer that the deductions of his

own philosophy, (however distorted by his education or his prejudices*) are legitimate, and that the announcements of revelation ought to be so explained as to harmonize with them.

It makes, therefore, nothing for Professor Bush to insist, as he so constantly does, upon the declaration that the truths of reason or philosophy cannot conflict with revelation: for the declaration *rightly understood and explained*, affirms nothing but what the church of God has advocated for centuries;† and at this day, also, I am confident that Professor Bush can point out no intelligent man in the Protestant church who has ever questioned it. But it is not to be forgotten that there is the same distinction to be observed between Professor Bush's view of right reason, and *right reason itself;* as between a man's view of truth and truth itself. It is true that what he offers on this subject is presented in connexion with his principles of hermeneutics, and it may be thought that we had better defer our remarks upon the matter until we come to consider those. But we think that Professor Bush has grievously perplexed his subject by

* The following passage from Lord Bacon, on this subject, cannot be too carefully pondered. "*Idola specus* sunt idola hominis individui. Habet enim unusquisque (præter aberrationes naturæ humanæ in genere,) specum sive cavernam quandam individuam, quæ lumen naturæ frangit et corrumpit; vel propter naturam cujusque propriam et singularem; vel propter educationem et conversationem cum aliis; vel propter lectionem librorum, et auctoritates eorum quos quisque colit et miratur; vel propter differentias impressionum, prout occurrunt in animo præoccupato et prædisposito, aut in animo æquo et sedato, vel ejusmodi; ut plane spiritus humanus (prout disponitur in hominibus singulis) sit res varia, et omnino perturbata, et quasi fortuita." And also, "Falso enim asseritur, sensum humanum esse mensuram rerum; quin contra, omnes perceptiones, tam sensus quam mentis, sunt ex analogia hominis, non ex analogia universi. Estque intellectus humanus instar speculi inæqualis ad radios rerum, qui suam naturam naturæ rerum immiscet, eamque distorquet et inficit." *Novum Organum*, Lib. I., §§. 41, and 42. Works, Vol. II., p. 435. London 1838.

† Nearly three centuries ago, the great *Ursinus*, speaking of *true philosophy*, says, "VERA enim PHILOSOPHIA, etsi et ipsa a doctrina Ecclesiæ multum differt, *tamen nec pugnat cum ea*, nec est mendacium ut aliarum Sectarum falsæ doctrinæ, sed est veritas; ET QUIDAM QUASI RADIUS SAPIENTIÆ DEI, MENTIBUS HOMINUM IN CREATIONE IMPRESSUS." *Explic. Cat. Heidelberg. Proleg.* p. 4. This fine passage may serve to evince with how little reason or propriety Professor Bush announces with such parade of controversial attitude, his vague and undefined proposition above referred to.

thus connecting them; and with such a view of the matter we surely may plead to be excused from following his example.

In discussing the subject, it is perhaps the better plan to begin with a consideration of what the Professor has offered in view of it, in the attempt to sustain the position which he has assumed. And in doing so, I shall inquire

I. *What is the office assigned to reason by Professor Bush?* We have already remarked that his leading proposition (referred to above,) as announced by him, is utterly vague and indefinite; and, as it stands isolated, is susceptible of either of two diametrically opposite explanations. We must therefore endeavour to ascertain the meaning which he attaches to it, by referring to those portions of his work, where he professes to illustrate its application.

In his application of it to his announcement of the results of scientific investigation, he says: "We cannot conceive that the homage due to a revelation from God requires us to forego *the inevitable deductions of that reason with which he has endowed us*, nor do we think it possible that that word will ever achieve its predicted triumphs over the human mind till its teachings, *on all points* that come within the sphere of a *true philosophy*, shall be seen to harmonize with its legitimate deductions." p. 29. What Professor Bush here means by "a true philosophy" will be seen by referring to his "*argument from reason*," and his "*objections*," stated on the preceding pages: and it will be seen also that the import of this phrase, as employed by him, differs *toto cœlo* from that in which it is used in the last marginal note, and from that in which it is employed by the Protestant church generally. The Professor perpetually confounds *his own philosophy* with *true philosophy;* and, of course, leaves the privilege of doing the same to every man who is satisfied with the legitimacy of his own deductions.

But, again. Professor Bush's "true philosophy" leads him, in its application to the doctrine of the resurrection, to say, "As we apprehend the subject before us, the ideas involved in the proposition of the resurrection of the same body are incompatible *per se*. The real question is, how Omnipotence itself can establish the relation of which we are in quest." p. 57. And forgetting also how easy it is to imagine that we have arrived at a certain knowledge of as-

serted facts, when in truth we know nothing about them, his philosophy leads him to say of the word of God, "If in the careful scanning of that word, the *letter* speaks a language contrary to *clearly ascertained facts* in nature and science, he will take it as type, figure, allegory, metaphor, symbol, accommodation, anthropomorphism—any thing rather than the declaration of absolute verity," (*Preface*, p. xi.,) and, instead of doubting whether he may not have fallen into some imperceptible error in respect to what he has concluded to be a "positive, fixed, irrefragable truth," he must, if the word of God "clash" with such a "clearly ascertained truth," at once conclude that "*the word itself must be a forgery and a lie.*" *Ibid. This is Professor Bush's philosophy.* But let the great Verulam (an authority which Professor Bush, on p. 23, has quoted and applauded) define for us *true philosophy.* "Divine philosophy is that knowledge, or rudiment of knowledge, concerning God, which may be obtained by the contemplation of his creatures [works]; which knowledge may be truly termed divine, in respect of the object, and natural in respect of the light. *The bounds of this knowledge are*, that it sufficeth to convince atheism, *but not to inform religion:* and, therefore, there was never a miracle wrought by God to convert an atheist, because the light of nature might have led him to confess a God, &c. *But on the other side, out of the contemplation of nature or ground of human knowledge, to induce any verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith, is, in my judgment, not safe.* Da fidei, quæ fidei sunt. For the heathen themselves conclude as much in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain: 'That men and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven.' *So as we ought not to attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of God to our reason; but contrariwise, to raise and advance our reason to the divine truth.*"* And, again, in the same book he remarks, that "the prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason as to the will of man; so that as we are to obey his law, though we find a reluctation in our will; *so we are to believe his word, though we find a reluctation in our reason. For if we believe only that which is agreeable to our sense, we give consent to the matter, and not to the author,*

* *Advancement of Learning*, Lib. II. Works, Vol. I. p. 34.

which is no more than we would do towards a suspected and discredited witness: but that faith which was 'accounted to Abraham for righteousness,' was of such a point, as whereat Sarah laughed, who therein was an image of natural reason." *This is true philosophy.*

Here is a contrast indeed. The one clearly and logically elevates reason above revelation, and makes that a judge which ought to be a learner; the other leads reason to listen to the voice of God, and induces it to take the attitude of a meek and humble disciple. The one leads to the preposterous absurdity of supposing that even though God has revealed himself to man for the purpose of assisting our reason, that yet after all God may be wrong, and reason be right; the other remembers that man's reason has been bruised and weakened and defaced, and greatly obliterated by the fall, and that it has often concluded and asserted that to be true which is not true, and is, therefore, willing and desirous to rest implicitly in the plain testimony of God. The philosophy advocated by Professor Bush has made the Christian a Rationalist and Infidel; *true philosophy*, as here described by Bacon, has made the Infidel and the Rationalist a Christian. The principles of the former philosophy never have been settled, and, consequently, its conclusions have been diametrically opposite to each other in different ages; nor can its advocates rest until they have explained away every thing which is incomprehensible in the Bible: while "true philosophy and true religion (as Dr. S. S. Smith beautifully remarks,) must ultimately arrive at the same principle." Professor Bush's philosophy scruples not to question whether God can perform an action, the *modus* of which we cannot comprehend; while true philosophy rests fully assured that God can accomplish every thing which he has said he will perform, without troubling itself about the *modus*.

II. Such then appears to be logically the position assigned to reason by Professor Bush, and upon which he ventures to dogmatize upon the truth or falsehood of the contents of revelation. True philosophy, on the other hand, assigns to reason a very opposite position. It pleads for the strictest scrutiny into the evidences upon which the claims of revelation are based; it collates and compares manuscripts, versions, and readings; it settles the true principles of hermeneutics; but when this is accomplished, it receives as true,

with childlike docility, whatever communication those records from God may contain. And that this is *the true position of reason* will appear from the considerations which follow.

1. The very design of revelation is to teach what reason itself, since the fall, could never have known. To enter into the *proof* of this, would be absurd; for all Christians admit that a revelation from heaven was *necessary*. But it could not have been necessary, if reason could have taught us without it, what it professes to teach. We shall *illustrate* the proposition however.

And *first*, passing by the still unsettled principles of natural and mental science, and upon which reason has been supposed to teach in one age, what it has denied in another, let us consider some of its dicta in matters supposed by the generality of men to be quite obvious. Colonel Ethan Allen's reason taught him the transmigration of souls. Lord Herbert's philosophy taught him that the indulgence of lust and anger is no more to be blamed than the thirst produced by the dropsy, or the drowsiness occasioned by lethargy. Hobbes' philosophy taught that the civil law is the only standard of right and wrong. Tindal asserted that the indulgence of lust is innocent. Bolingbroke's philosophy resolved all morality into self-love as its principle. He taught also that the shame of modesty is artificial; that the chief end of man is to gratify the desires and appetites of his flesh; that adultery is no violation of the law of nature; that this law teaches polygamy, and "does not forbid incest, except it be, *perhaps*, of the highest kind." Hume's philosophy taught that self-denial and humility are not virtues, but are useless and mischievous, and that adultery is proper and right. Helvetius also taught that it was not good policy to forbid adultery. Robert Owen and Miss Wright taught that chastity is a vicious restraint. These are some of the dicta of reason, where she has erected herself into a judge of the doctrines of revelation.

But *secondly*, the absolute weakness and inefficiency of reason in respect of those subjects upon which revelation alone can impart certainty, are equally apparent. Take for example the subject of man's duty to God. Reason and philosophy leave us on this subject in the most painful suspense. Socrates confessed that he had no sufficient ground of assurance that the doctrines were true which he was in-

clined to believe; or that the worship which he rendered was acceptable to the gods. It is true we may know something of the ground or obligation of duty, but this is very different from knowing what duty God may require of us. Every one who has attempted from philosophy or reason alone to define it, has differed either with himself, or with some other equally gifted of the advocates of the sufficiency of the light of nature. The same degree of uncertainty prevails on the question whether God will be merciful to the sinner upon his repentance and reformation. Reason, on the principle of justice, clearly concludes against the supposition. It can teach man that he does sin, but there it leaves him. And even if he may suppose that God will show mercy upon his repentance, he cannot tell how far this supposed mercy will extend—whether to all manner of sin, or to some sins only. *And where is the principle in philosophy to determine these questions?* The same degree of uncertainty attaches itself to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul or spirit of man. Or allowing its immortality, philosophy is utterly unable to tell what is necessary on our part in order to secure its everlasting welfare, and escape the future punishment of sin. We might continue these remarks, but the foregoing are sufficient for our purpose.

The design of revelation, therefore, is to instruct us in matters of the most vital importance to us; and matters, too, which reason of itself is utterly unable to discover, or to know any thing.

I am aware that Professor Bush may reply to all this, that he fully admits the necessity of a revelation, and will yield to no man in the profound regard which he entertains for the Scriptures. And I do not question the sincerity of his attachment to them. I believe his errors on the subject before us, are those of the head and not of the heart: but they nevertheless are errors, glaring errors, pernicious and ruinous errors, if followed out to their logical results. He does not doubt the necessity of revelation, nor the inspiration of the Scriptures which profess to be such: he wishes merely to prove reason and revelation to be consistent. But I have no controversy with him as to his *aim*, but with his procedure in his effort to accomplish it. In this procedure he has asserted and advocated principles which are subversive of revelation itself, and are the very foundation of

rationalism and scepticism. And we should be recreant to the cause of truth and righteousness if any tenderness to an accomplished and amiable man should influence us to treat with favour the pernicious principles which he advocates.

The plea of wishing to gain over well-informed and sceptical men to Christianity, by showing them that reason and religion are harmonious; is one which has often been made in order to justify the extremes of Socinian and kindred errors. Priestley also, thus endeavoured to gain over the Jews, but they repelled the attempt with the utmost scorn. The same result has attended the efforts of Unitarians and Rationalists universally. They have not hesitated to become infidels in order to gain infidels. But this whole procedure is based upon either the forgetfulness of, or refusal to acknowledge the Scripture truth that unbelief is lodged not so much in the head as in the heart. "Men *love* darkness rather than light." And there is no mere rational *explanation* that can in any wise render "the offence of the cross" less than it is, and ever has been.

Now it is perfectly plain that if reason is incompetent to the ascertainment of the truths of revelation, she must also be incompetent to decide that they are inconsistent with true philosophy. For their reconcileableness therewith may still depend upon principles as utterly unknown to reason, as were these truths themselves before they were revealed. Common sense may teach us this.

2. Hence the very idea of such a revelation clearly infers that there is no necessity that every doctrine which it announces should be taught also by reason.

I am aware how this proposition will be regarded by such writers as Professor Bush, and reference will be immediately made to the immortal work of Bishop Butler. The Bishop's *Analogy* is often thus referred to vaguely, as if he had attempted to *prove* the doctrines of the Bible by reason. But he has attempted to prove no such thing; and if Professor Bush in the *Anastasis*, had followed in his steps, he would have found few opponents among Christians. The aim of Butler's great work is to show that true philosophy sanctions no principles which can really conflict with revelation; and this he does agreably to the suggestion of Lord Bacon above referred to. He does not attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of God to reason; but first as

a little child, learns what God has taught in his word; and then endeavours to raise and advance his reason to the divine truth. But the whole structure of the Professor's argument is the perfect antithesis of all this. For he first consults reason's oracle; hears its imagined response, and then proceeds to *reconcile* the mysteries of God therewith.

But it is never to be forgotten that the credibility of what the Scriptures teach depends upon their authority. And hence whether "reason reluctates" or willingly assents, we are still acting rationally, when we receive any doctrine or teaching of God upon the mere authority of Scripture, without any confirmatory evidence of reason whatever. And if this be "resigning my reason," or "doing violence" thereto, I can only say that I wish *thus* to resign, and violate it while I live. Nor let the acute remark of Bacon be forgotten, that if we believe only that which is agreeable to our sense or reason, "*we give consent to the matter, and not to the author,* which is no more than we would do to a suspected and discredited witness." And Locke (Posthumous Works,) also remarks that "Therefore I gratefully receive, and rejoice in the light of revelation, which sets me at rest in many things, the manner of which my poor reason can by no means make out to me;" a sentiment that infers a clear acknowledgment of the fact that it is a small matter whether reason can or cannot furnish confirmatory evidence of the truth of every thing which God has advanced in his word. And I consider it more than doubtful whether any good has ever resulted from overstrained efforts to harmonize reason and revelation; especially when the beginning has been made (not at the *right end*, like that of Bishop Butler, but) at the wrong end like that of Professor Bush.

Moreover *it ought never to be presumed that true reason or philosophy can really conflict with revelation:* and in cases where they are supposed to do so, it is a fair and rational presumption that the error is *in ourselves*, and that our argument or deduction is wrong. Pascal has truly remarked that "the highest attainment of reason, is to know that there is an infinity of knowledge beyond its limits. It must be sadly weak if it has not discovered this."* And the Psalmist referring to the transcendent greatness and glory

* Thoughts on Religion, Chap. X. p. 134.

of divine things, exclaims, "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me: it is high, I cannot attain to it." Psalms cxxxix. 6. Hence, when our puny darkened minds attempt to grasp more of these things than God has seen proper to reveal, it is not to be wondered at that we become entangled in the mazes of inextricable error. In such an attempt, the mightiest intellect can only become bewildered. There is likewise a strong apparent resemblance between truth and error; and hence the propriety of suspecting our own inferences from mere reason, rather than the plain declarations of the all-wise God. "There is no truth," says Cicero, "which has not some falsehood connected with it."* And, in fact, it is not strange that error and falsehood are more congenial to the depraved mind of man than truth itself. Such considerations may well induce the theorist to pause in his proud speculations upon the character and truth of Almighty God. It is an easy thing in this country and in this age, to scatter "firebrands, arrows, and death," and *mean no harm by it.* But God will justly hold us responsible for the sentiments which we inculcate. We shall not have to answer it is true, for the weakness of our intellects, but we shall be held guilty if we use them not aright. Their imperfection may be excused, but when through neglect or indifference we wander from the truth, by the adoption of a pernicious principle, and thus abuse the intellect which God has given, we may well expect that such abuse shall be laid to our charge.

The conclusion from the foregoing remarks is, that reason is in her appropriate place, in discussing, (however closely,) the question whether God has spoken to man; and when scrutinizing the evidences by which revealed religion would support its claims. She is in her place in determining the principles upon which that revelation is to be expounded. And, having ascertained its import, she may apropriately also seek in the works of God for analogies and confirmatory evidence and illustration of the truths announced by God. But she is out of her sphere the moment she *commences* with her own deductions and seeks by "accommodation" or otherwise to harmonize the declarations of God therewith; or if she fail to do this, she is sadly out of her place to "pronounce the averments of revelation," "a forgery

* De Natura Deorum, Lib. I.

and a lie." And, in a word, she is out of her place whenever she ventures to sit as umpire on the contents of revelation, and so decide the question whether what God hath said is falsehood or truth.*

* Since writing the foregoing, it has occurred to mind that President Edwards had written on this subject. Had I thought of this sooner, I should doubtless have made the present chapter much longer. See his most admirable essay in Part I. Chapter VII., of "Miscellaneous Observations," Works, Vol. VII. p. 261.

PART II.

PROFESSOR BUSH'S REMARKS ON THE SCRIPTURAL ARGUMENT CONSIDERED.

CHAPTER I.

THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERPRETATION ADVOCATED BY PROFESSOR BUSH, CONSIDERED

As a preliminary to the consideration of the Scripture argument for the resurrection of the body, it is of importance to consider what are the principles upon which Professor Bush and myself have endeavoured to arrive at the import of the Holy Oracles.

Speaking of his principles of interpretation, the Professor correctly remarks that "a theory of interpretation which goes essentially to change the established view of this tenet, (the resurrection), must necessarily work a correspondent change in our estimate of a whole class of subjects bearing upon the theme of human destiny in another life. Now it is certain that the conclusions to which I have arrived, and which will be found embodied in the ensuing pages, must, if built upon sound premises, present the grand future under an entirely new aspect." *Preface* p. v. And again, he says, "We have no fear of being convicted, before an enlightened tribunal, of having periled the weal of the sacred oracles by the advocacy of a false principle of interpretation. We cannot conceive that the homage due to a revelation from God, requires us to forego the inevitable deductions of that reason with which he has endowed us." p. 29. He therefore evidently does not consider his *theory of interpretation* either as new or hazardous.

But in order then to exhibit a full and fair statement of the Professor's hermeneutics, we shall first present his *enunciation* of them as principles; and then his *application* of them to the doctrines and language of Scripture.

1. We took occasion on a former page to remark that his principles of interpretation, as stated in connexion with his argument from reason, appeared to be irreconcileably inconsistent. He speaks of revelation, as if it were the duty of reason to bow implicitly to its statements; and of reason, as if its deductions were equal or paramount to the announcements of revelation. But this is not peculiar to Professor Bush; for all the advocates of the accommodation principle, (unless they are like Wegscheider and Ammon, *downright infidels*,) fall into similar inconsistencies. But both of these principles, cannot, of course, be consistently entertained, by Professor Bush. One or the other must be abandoned.

In our delineation of his principles, we begin with the following extract from his Preface. "But here I am accosted again by the stern interrogatory, what right has reason to demand satisfaction at all on a point of doctrine addressed solely to faith? To this I reply, that reason certainly has a right to claim to be clearly informed as to what *is* the doctrine to be believed; nor can it possibly be required to forego its prerogatives in dealing with a professed revelation from heaven, containing the points to which our assent is demanded. While it is the office of reason reverently to receive all that God has clearly and incontrovertibly taught,* reason must still act *in determining the true sense of what he has taught*. It is human reason that originates the rules of interpretation for the inspired volume, and we claim nothing more for it than its appropriate function, when it is thus called in to decide the *meaning* of revelation. This *meaning*, when really attained, must always be in harmony with its own oracles. All truth must of necessity be eternally consistent with itself. No man is required to hold views of revelation to which a sound and enlightened science or philosophy can solidly object. No intelligent believer in the Bible will yield the *rationality* of his faith to the sceptical assailant. He will give to no one on this score a vantage

* But how are we to know when a thing is thus taught? Seeing that the Professor makes it a sufficient reason to *deny* that any truth is so taught that plainly conflicts with his reason or philosophy?

ground on which he can laugh in his sleeve at the weakness or credulity which receives, as points of faith, dogmas at war with known facts or unimpeachable deductions. If the averments of that word which professes to have emanated from the Omniscient Spirit, clash with any positive, fixed, irrefragable truth in the universe, then the word itself must be a forgery and a lie; for God would never set one truth against another. Panoplied by this principle, which is as firm as the perpetual hills, if, in the careful scanning of that word, the *letter* speaks a language contrary to *clearly ascertained facts* in nature and science, he will take it as type, figure, allegory, metaphor, symbol, accommodation, anthropomorphism—any thing rather than the declaration of absolute verity. His Bible comes from the same source with the philosopher's boasted reason. God is the infinite Reason, and it is impossible that the reception of his word can involve the denial of that lofty prerogative in man." Pp. x. and xi.

The suicidal inconsistencies which mark this paragraph, and such a presentation of the subject, have been sufficiently noticed on a former page. With all its saving clauses the passage is sufficiently revolting. And yet it is the most favourable presentation of his principle of interpretation which is to be found in the work of Professor Bush. Other extracts will be furnished presently. But before we proceed to furnish them, I would call attention to the fact that the Rationalists of Germany state their principle of "*accommodation*," (which, since the time of Semler, has filled their country with infidelity) in the same language, and characterized also by the same inconsistency so glaringly apparent in the foregoing extract. How perfectly coincident with the language of Professor Bush are the following passages from Dr. Röhr, (the great champion of Rationalism in the present day:) "Christian Rationalism denies not the fact of *an extraordinary revelation from God in the Holy Scriptures*, &c. It does not, in respect to finding and pursuing the way to eternal bliss, *refer man to his own reason*, as the source of the highest ideas and truths; BUT ONLY CLAIMS FOR HIM THE RIGHT, AND IMPOSES ON HIM THE DUTY, OF SIFTING AND PROVING THAT WHICH THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION MAKES KNOWN ON THE SUBJECT, BY COMPARISON WITH THE RELIGIOUS IDEAS AND PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN REASON; *in order that in the concerns of his eternal salvation, he may show himself to be neither blind*

nor credulous." *Allgem. Kirch. Zeit.* for March 8, 1829. And yet in his "Letters on Rationalism," he thus speaks: "With the Rationalist it is *reason alone* that decides in matters of faith, and in the adoption of religious doctrines. He admits the authority of the Scriptures only where they coincide with his own convictions; and that not as the determining ground of those convictions, for these he regards as true on their own grounds of reason." Kant, also, taught that "the revelation which has come into our hands, should be explained throughout in a sense which shall coincide with the general practical rules of a religion of pure reason." See his "*Religion within the bounds of Reason*," pp. 157–160. Hahn, in his celebrated essay on "*The Grammatico-Historical Interpretation of the Scriptures*," (in which he gave the "*accommodation principle*" its death wound in Germany,) thus speaks of the principle which has been adopted by Professor Bush, and is clearly embodied in the extract above quoted from his work. "This philosophical, or, as it is also called, *rational* interpretation, which was already practised in the schools of the Socinians and Cartesians, has been often termed since the middle of the last century, the *liberal* interpretation; because *in homage to the philosophy of the time*, it has relaxed so much of the strictness of the biblical doctrines as the spirit of the age demanded. This so-called philosophical exegesis has made its appearance in the greatest variety of shapes and modifications, according to the change of systems and the spirit of the age." And then, after referring to the system advocated by Kant, he adds: "And so it is with every so-called philosophical interpretation. They all extract from the Scriptures, or rather they *imply* in the words of Scripture, those opinions or ideas which the interpreter brings with him to the work."

The reader will also compare the foregoing with the subjoined extracts from the work of Professor Bush, containing further statements of his principles of interpretation. Referring to the expressions of Scripture respecting the resurrection, he says: "This we concede is Scripture language, and the simple use of the *ipsissima verba* of the Holy Spirit can never be a ground of censure towards any man who uses it with pure motives. Still we are at full liberty to inquire into its meaning, and to institute the most rigid comparison between the literal averments of holy writ, and

the inevitable deductions of our reason founded upon the ascertained results of science; for it is impossible that the import of the inspired oracles, when rightly understood, *should ever be such* as to compel us to forego the clear and legitimate conclusions which are forced upon us by the just exercise of our rational faculties. The sense, however, which we are constrained to put upon the *letter* of the sacred record may be different from that which is most natively obvious, and such as would never have occurred to us, but from an apparent conflict between the literal interpretation and the known facts or irresistible inferences derived from other sources—a point upon which we shall have more to say in the sequel. In the present instance it is unquestionable that the words quoted from our Saviour's address to the Jews do encounter a very formidable difficulty arising from the indubitable fact, that thousands and millions of human bodies that were once deposited in graves are not there now, and never will be again." p. 45.* Again: "The consequences of truth belong to the God of truth, and to him we may confidently leave them. The reader will judge for himself how far the conceded facts and premises of our argument (from reason) necessitate the conclusions to which we have adverted; (*i. e.* that the doctrine of the resurrection resolves itself simply into that of immortality.) If it be inevitable, we abide by it. Although thus far pursued merely as an argument from reason irrespective of revelation, yet if it be sound, we not only calmly repose in the conclusion, (and Professor Bush fully regards it as sound,) but are unshaken also in the conviction, that revelation *rightly interpreted* must harmonize with it. It is impossible that any two truths in the universe should clash with each other." p. 71. This is the *philosophical interpretation* with a vengeance. The Professor first becomes satisfied from reason what revelation *ought* to teach, and then so "modifies" revelation that it *must* harmonize with it. See also pp. 46, 81, 82 and 84.

Again. "What now is the obvious matter of fact as regards the particular subject of our present discussion? (the resurrection.) Are not the Scriptures constructed on this point, as on all others having respect to physical subjects,

* The singular mistake of Professor Bush in this reference to the words of our Saviour we have already pointed out in our reply to Objection VI. in Chapter V. above.

in reference to the then state of knowledge—to the popular impression and belief—among those for whom they were originally designed? And did the Jews and early Christians know what we know in relation to our physical organization? Was the science of animal chemistry developed in those early ages? Were they skilled in anthropology?" &c. pp. 90, 91. This statement embodies the position which is the very corner-stone of German neology. Its originator was John Solomon Semler; and the reader may find an exhibition of it in his *Geschicthe der Christlichen Glaubenslehre*, (by far the most important of all Semler's publications,) prefixed to each of the three volumes of Baumgarten's *Theologischer Streitigkeiten*, Halle, 1762. And in reference to this principle, as adopted and taught by him, Tholuck (whose candour will not be suspected) remarks: "The Gospels, in his view, were designed only for the Jews, and are adapted only to them. Here, then, we have the leading principle of Semler's interpretation, viz., *that the contents of the Old and New Testaments are of a local and temporary character*. This is the source of the corruption which he introduced into all the departments of theology. It is at once obvious what influence such a principle of interpretation must have upon doctrinal theology. A mode of interpretation which finds in the New Testament nothing but what is local and temporary, cuts off the very roots from which all the vitality of theology springs."* The principles advocated by Professor Bush not only logically infer, but he actually announces this very principle of Semler. See pp. 238, 239. But instead of assigning this local and temporary character to revelation, by limiting its import thus in respect to its great doctrines of the resurrection, judgment, &c., "to those for whom it was originally designed," how much more noble and truly philosophical would it have been to admit the statement of Bacon on the subject. True philosophy and theology harmonize in attesting its truth. "The Scriptures," says this greatest of men, "being written to the thoughts of men, *and to the succession of all ages*, with a foresight of all heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the church, yea, and particularly of the elect, *are not to be interpreted only according to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and respectively towards that*

* See Tholuck's Historical Sketch of the Revolution in Theology, which commenced in 1750 in Germany.

present occasion, whereupon the words were uttered, or, in precise congruity or contexture with the words before or after, in contemplation of the principal scope of the place; but have in themselves, not only totally or collectively, but distributively in clauses and words, infinite springs and streams of doctrine *to water the church in every part.*"*

Again, the Professor, on pp. 241, 242, thus repeats the sentiment: "That the expression (John vi. 39, 40) is *conformed* to the usual mode in which the resurrection of the righteous was spoken of among the Jews, is unquestionable. Still we cannot deem ourselves precluded from referring again to the principle, somewhat fully developed on a previous page, (p. 238,) on which many things in our Lord's addresses to the Jews are to be interpreted."† This, surely, is a sufficiently broad avowal of Semler's principle of accommodation to justify the severest censure on a scholar who can present it to the churches now as an unquestioned principle of hermeneutics. How exactly does it tally with the doctrine of Semler's "*little local Jewish ideas*," let Dr. Tholuck tell. In his *History of Rationalism* he says: "All the doctrines taught in the Scriptures, it was maintained, are either accommodations to Jewish prejudices, 'little local ideas,' according to his (Semler's) favourite expression, (even the idea of the kingdom of God he did not hesitate to class among these little local ideas,) or they are expressed in such terms, that we cannot, in our times, ascertain their import, &c. &c. On such an hypothesis, it is not easy to see how Christianity can have any positive doctrines. Nothing is more natural or more legitimate, than that the Rationalist theologians, as Henke, Wegscheider, and Bretschneider should, in carrying out Semler's views, make it

* Advancement of Learning, *Book* II., Works, Vol. I., pp. 78, 79. The same sentiment is thus beautifully, but more emphatically announced in his De Augment. Scient. Lib. IX. c. 1: "Meminisse autem oportet, Deo Scripturarum auctori duo illa patere, quæ humana ingenia fugiunt: secreta nimirum cordis, et *successiones temporis.* Quamobrem, cum Scripturarum dictamina talia sunt, ut ad cor scribantur, *et omnium seculorum vicissitudines complectantur.*—Altera, *quod non ad eos solum locutus est, qui tunc aderant*, SED AD NOS ETIAM, QUI VIVIMUS, *et ad omnis ævi ac loci homines, quibus evangelium fuerit prædicandum.*" Works, Vol. II., p. 429. *This is true.* Away then with the notion of the merely local and temporary character of the revelation of God!

† The same principles are broadly asserted also on pp. 244, 245, 269, 273, 278, 279, 345, 389, 390, &c.

their chief concern to exhibit the subject *historically*, and notice the various changes which have occurred in views of doctrine; and, finally, examine the basis of the Jewish notions, out of which Christian theology sprung."

2. In the application of this principle to the interpretation of texts and doctrines of Scripture, Professor Bush is very unwilling to admit that he does any *violence* to the latter. He utters many disclaimers to this effect, and it would be rather singular if he did not. But who, I would ask, among all the Rationalists of Germany, will admit that they interpret the Bible on this principle in any other than a natural manner? Semler himself would have been shocked at the imputation against himself of using *violence* in interpreting it.

To the doctrine of the resurrection of Christ, the Professor applies the principle in the following manner. Speaking of the evidence that his *body* literally arose, derived from the fact that his disciples touched him, and that he ate before them, the Professor remarks, "As to the act of eating—it was doubtless an optical act;" and p. 154, "the phenomena indicating a material body to the senses of the disciples *must* have been miraculously assumed. In other words, they were *appearances.*" p. 162. On page 164, he asserts that Christ's "earthly tenement" was "*dispersed;*" and on page 165, he boldly applies to the great doctrine of the resurrection of our Saviour the Semlerian principle as follows:—"We may admit, indeed, that the disciples *supposed* that the body which they saw and handled was the veritable body of their crucified Lord, *and that in their preaching the resurrection of Jesus they had no other idea than that of the reanimation of his body of flesh.* Under the influence of those carnal apprehensions which they *then* cherished, it was scarcely to be expected that they should have come to any other conclusion." (See also pp. 164, 166, 167, 168.)

So also is inspiration virtually disposed of, or at least left so uncertain, that we cannot know when we may safely rely on a declaration of the Bible. Speaking with reference to 1 Corinthians xv. 50—53, he remarks, "He (Paul) UNDOUBTEDLY SUPPOSED *that this change was to occur simultaneously* with that promised advent of the Saviour that was to be ushered in during the lifetime of that generation—a supposition built upon the *letter* of numerous predictions, but which the event has shown to be, erroneous." p. 200. See also all of pp. 189—202, and 215, 216, 251, 252.

The doctrine of the judgment must in like manner be explained away so as to agree with the *argument from reason.* Speaking in reference to it, the Professor remarks, "The result of his inquiries, if it agrees with ours, will be, that our Saviour and his apostles merely adopted the style of diction which had been immemorially prevalent among the Jews on this subject, and which is no doubt built upon the current phraseology of the New Testament." p. 336. "Here then we have the key to those expressions of our Lord in the Gospels, in which he speaks of raising the righteous 'at the last day.' He does not deem it expedient to depart from the established formulas of speech with which the Jews were familiar. Time and the course of events would develope the *truth*, and the subsequent generations of the church would in this respect possess an advantage withheld, for wise reasons, from its primitive ages. The intimations respecting the *judgment* are, as we conceive, to be interpreted on the same principle." p. 337. See also pp. 346, 347, &c.

It were easy to fill pages more with similar extracts from the *Anastasis*, but the foregoing will be deemed sufficient for the full development and illustration of this principle as entertained and advocated by Professor Bush. He has thus succeeded in getting rid of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, of the resurrection of the man Christ Jesus, of the resurrection of the wicked, and of the judgment to come; and on the same principle it is equally easy to get rid of every doctrine of the Scripture that is supposed to conflict with our reason or our philosophy. The Rationalists have only applied the same principle to the investigation of what they supposed conflicted with these things, and by an "unforced logic" have explained them all away. Like Professor Bush, they *began with reason*, and the process in their case was as easy, and the result the same as in his. A few illustrations will not be out of place.

Dr. Ammon applies this principle to the fact of Christ's walking on the water. Reason forbids the supposition that such a thing could be, and hence the Gospel must be so explained as to harmonize with reason and philosophy, for "truth cannot be inconsistent with itself." Hence, says he, "περιπατεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν (in Matthew xiv. 26,) cannot mean to stand upon the waters, as on land, as Jerome himself dreams, but to walk through the waves in the shallow part,

and then to swim."* Eichhorn can find *no difficulty* in the history of the destruction of Korah and his company, *if we only attend* to the true nature of symbolic language. "Might not the writer," says he, "in order to represent very strongly the awful and unusual punishment which was threatened, viz. *the burying them alive*, call it a swallowing up by the earth, a going down alive into the pit?". And the blossoming of Aaron's rod is *inconceivable* on any other supposition than that it was twined round with buds, leaves and fruit, to indicate that he had been chosen to the office of high priest. And according to him the modern discovery of electricity, ("*the advance of scientific discovery*,") fully explains the shining of Moses' face. Neither could he conceive how God should come down on Sinai. Hence, says he, Moses kindled a great fire on the top of the mountain. And as a great thunder-storm arose, he seized the occasion to proclaim the law, (which he had composed in his retirement,) as the statutes of Jehovah, and pretended that God had conversed with him. And the account of the creation and fall, is only a poetical and philosophical speculation. Le Clerc, however, does not think so. He (though he had not ascertained the principle of accommodation, yet) adopted Professor Bush's views of the necessity of explaining revelation so as to harmonize with reason: and thinks that the tree of life bore a fruit which was medicinal, and the tree of knowledge one that was poisonous. And in explaining the phrase "the

* The reader may wish to consult the original of this precious morsel: "Alio loco ejusdem Evangelistae (Matthew,) xiv. 26. *περιπατεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν* non est fluctibus *insistere* ceu continenti, ut ipse somniat *Hieronymus*, sed *ambulare per undas* in regione vadosa, deinde *natare* (v. 29.); Jesus enim discipulis, qui propter venti impotentiam navim remis adpellere non poterant, cum meando, tum natando obviam venit, Capernaumum cum illis rediturus." This is the exposition. And see now with what ludicrous gravity he undertakes to *establish* it. "Περιπατεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάσσης idem est, quod *ἐπιβαίνειν τῆς θαλάσσης* (v. Vitam Gregorii Nazianz., Opp. Colon. 1690. t. I. p. 5.), *ambulare per undas:* deinde respondet hebraeico הלך על פני המים, Gen. vii. 18, Ps. civ. 26, quod de navibus usurpatur. Sap. Sal. v. 10. *ναῦς διεχομένη κυμαινόμενον ὕδωρ*." Here surely is *criticism* enough to *prove* the point, if Professor Bush's principles be correct; and stronger proof too than the Professor has adduced in favour of the distinguishing propositions of his theory. See Prefationem Edit. Quint. Instit. Interpret. Ernesti, by C. F. Ammon, Lipsiæ, 1809. The best edition of the text, (with the most contemptible annotations) that has been issued since the time of Ernesti.

eyes of them both were opened," he says, "after they had eaten the fruit they perceived from the pain in their intestines that it was of a noxious quality." "Reason" forbade the supposition that the waters of the Red Sea should have divided and become as a wall on either side to let Israel pass through, and therefore he concludes that the waters of the sea were driven by a strong north wind into the ocean. Such is the result of *beginning* (as Professor Bush does) with the deductions of reason, and *ending* with revelation.

Dr. Ammon, also, being unable to conceive how a few loaves and fishes could supply thousands with food, explains the passage asserting it as follows; "Jesus probably distributed some loaves and fishes which he had, to those who were around him; and others among the multitude, influenced thus by his example, distributed in like manner the provisions which they possessed." Thiess cannot understand how Ananias could have been struck dead, as the *letter* of Acts v. represents; and therefore concludes, that when his dishonesty was discovered, "he fell down terrified; and probably was carried out and buried while still alive." Heinrichs, however, thinks that this is an unnatural supposition; and explains the passage thus; "Peter stabbed Ananias; and this does not at all disagree with the violent and easily exasperated temper of Peter." A thousand such instances can be produced of the application of the principle of interpretation referred to, but these may suffice.

On this principle, therefore, Semler explained away the doctrine respecting the demoniacs of the New Testament, the doctrine of the kingdom of God, and of the judgment to come. Other Rationalists, following in his footsteps have explained away inspiration, miracles, and every thing supernatural in the Bible.

On the same principle, Unitarians have explained away the atonement, Godhead of Christ, &c.

On the same principle, the Universalists have explained away the doctrine of future punishment.

Professor Bush, adopting the principle, now proposes to explain away the resurrection of Christ's body, the resurrection of the bodies of mankind; and also the doctrine of a judgment to come, to specify no other doctrines. Is the American church then, prepared for the adoption of such a principle?

SECTION II.

The View entertained of this Principle by the Evangelical Party in Germany.

A brief notice of this point will not be out of place here, as the Germans have made a fair trial of the principle referred to. I had hoped that their sad experience of the baleful effects of its adoption, would have been sufficient for the church of Christ till the end of time; but it seems that this hope was fallacious. The battle must be fought over again in this country; and it well becomes those, to whom under God, the purity and the welfare of Zion are primarily committed, to gird on their harness, and prepare for the conflict. It has been considered perfectly congenial with the principles of Unitarianism, and Universalism; and its adoption by these sectaries has created no anxiety. But if there must be an attempt made to defend it, and introduce it into American theology, the sooner the conflict comes on, and the ministers of Christ are compelled to take sides, the better.

The views entertained of it by the evangelical party in Germany are soon told. And, 1. They view it as utterly false and fallacious as a principle of interpretation. *Ernesti*, who was flourishing in Germany when it was introduced, hesitates not to condemn the principle at once. See his Institutio Interpret., Part. I., cap. I., §§. 18–23, and pp. 29–33; Leipsic, 1809, or the excellent translation of the same by Professor Stuart, pp. 16–19. So also *Storr* and *Flatt*, in their *Biblical Theology*, say: "Those who consider the declarations of Christ and his apostles concerning the Old Testament, as also many of their declarations on other subjects, as being an 'accommodation,' not only make a very arbitrary supposition, but *they violate the fundamental and unexceptionable principles of interpretation*, and deny the authority and credibility which we are compelled to ascribe to both Jesus and his apostles." B. I. §. 13.* *Hahn*, (above referred to,) says in reference to it: "When the interpreta-

* Their definition of accommodation is "a speaking in accordance with the erroneous opinions of their hearers, who had too exalted ideas of the Scriptures of the Old Testament, and not expressing precisely and truly their own opinions;" (see *ubi supra*,) the same principle precisely that is asserted by Professor Bush.

tion of the Holy Scripture takes place in a spirit foreign to them,—a spirit therefore not holy, *and consequently profane,—the Scriptures are not explained nor interpreted, but travestied.*" *Hengstenberg*, in the *Prolegomena* to his *Authentie des Pentateuchs, Erster Band*, does not hesitate to denounce such interpretation as "shallow and skeptical interpretation." *Tholuck*, speaking of it, says: "This is the source of the corruption which Semler introduced into all the departments of theology." *Hist. of Rationalism.* Such is their view of it as a principle of interpretation.

2. With respect to *the nature and character of the principle*, their views are very decided. *Tholuck* denounces criticism founded on this principle as "the destructive historical criticism." And again: "Only 'Jewish local ideas' were attached to the writings of the apostles, and *this contracting, shrivelling process* was called the *purely historical* method of interpretation:" and he ascribes the transition of the German theologians, from "Christianity to *infidelity*," directly to the adoption and carrying out of this principle. *Hengstenberg* speaks of it and its development as follows: "*Naturalism*,—that system which seeks to explain all events by the common laws of nature*—*and this tendency has its root in the estrangement of the age from God:*" and he and *Hahn* both speak of the principle in its results as producing an utter want of interest in the doctrinal precepts of the Bible. In one word, for it is needless to dwell upon this point, they consider it not only a preposterous and unwarrantable, but a perfectly atrocious principle, and one, which, in its legitimate results, cannot fail to introduce skepticism and an utter subversion of all religion. And with this view the venerable father of our sacred literature in this country entirely coincides. Speaking of the remarks of *De Wette* and others in open denial of the inspiration of the Scriptures, he says: "Little prepared, as we in general are in this country, for such avowals with regard to the sacred writers, STILL, I DEEM THEM FAR PREFERABLE TO THE FASHIONABLE 'ACCOMMODATION' DOCTRINE of the generation now passing off the stage in Ger-

* Hengstenberg refers to both Naturalism and Rationalism; and asserts that they are substantially the same thing. The quotation is, therefore, proper here; for Professor Bush's argument from reason is the great principle of *Naturalism;* and his *accommodation* notion, the great principle of *Rationalism.*

many. We know where to meet those who openly make such avowals; and although we cannot agree with them in opinion, we may commend their frankness and honesty." *Professor Stuart*, in Biblic. Repos. I., p. 60. This strong language is more than justified by the facts in the case.

SECTION III.

A brief history of the development and adoption of this Principle.

The consideration of this topic here might well be deemed irrelevant, were it not that the principles avowed in the work of Professor Bush are illustrated, and their nature and inevitable tendencies with singular accuracy established, by a reference to this history. The principle asserted in the "*Argument from Reason*," lies at the foundation of the early Naturalism of the seventeenth century. This will be questioned by no one who will read Lord Herbert's (of Cherbury) writings, or only Tindal's *Christianity as Old as the Creation*, chapters iv., xi. and xiv. A brief extract or two will establish the truth of this statement. Says he, "The truth of all revelation is to be judged by its agreement with the religion of nature." "Whatever is true by reason can never be false by revelation; and if God cannot be deceived himself, or be willing to deceive men, the light he hath given to distinguish between religious truth and falsehood, cannot, if duly attended to, deceive them in things of so great moment." "To suppose any thing in revelation inconsistent with reason, and at the same time pretend it to be the will of God, is not only to destroy that proof, on which we conclude it to be the will of God, but even the proof of the being of a God." "And to suppose any thing can be true by revelation which is false by reason, is not to support that thing, but to undermine revelation; because nothing unreasonable, nay, what is not highly reasonable, can come from a God of unlimited, universal, and eternal reason.—*I shall not be surprised*, (continues this noted infidel,) *if for so laudable an attempt, as reconciling reason and revelation, which have been so long set at variance*, I should be censured as a freethinker; a title, that however invidious it may seem, I am far from being ashamed of." And how does he attempt to reconcile reason and revelation? Why precisely as Professor Bush does. He begins

with "the irrefragable deductions of reason," and then endeavours to explain revelation in accordance therewith; instead of beginning, as Bishop Butler does, with revelation. Again: "The gospel, since it is impossible for men at the same time to be under different obligations, cannot command those things which *the law of nature forbids;* or forbid what it commands." Why? Simply because "no two truths in the universe can clash with each other." For like Professor Bush, this infidel made no distinction between *truth itself* and that which a man *thinks is true.** These extracts are sufficient. For they express the views also of Herbert, Morgan, Shafisbury, Bolingbroke, and the whole tribe of the older English infidels.

In reference to these principles, and their effect in developing the Rationalistic theory of Germany, and the principle of accommodation, Professor Tholuck speaks as follows: "The influence, direct and indirect, of English Deism upon Germany was much greater than would at first be supposed, or than has generally been believed. In England, we find what existed neither in France, nor in Holland and Italy. It possessed, as early as the first half of the eighteenth century, a tolerably complete system of Rationalism. A full view of what the English Deists effected in the departments of criticism, interpretation, theology, ethics and church history, will show how little of the doctrines of the Rationalists belongs exclusively to recent times; and how unfounded is the assertion of Bretschneider, that Rationalism is the fruit of the unexampled progress of science in the nineteenth century."†

It may be remarked, however, that the English deists were not the first to assert this doctrine. On the contrary, they became infidels by following out to its legitimate results, the forementioned principle, which had been incautiously admitted by several divines. Le Clerc and Spencer had asserted it in the time of Lord Herbert; and even Dr. Tillotson; Hoadly also, and Dr. Clarke, subsequently. These men took it for granted without sufficient examination, but did not carry it out to its results. This was, however, done

* See "*Christianity as Old as the Creation*," Chap. IV. and XI., pp. 62, 63, 154, 155.

† This is very like Professor Bush's "*Knowledge of Revelation Progressive*," as applied by him to the illustration of his theory. A *Historia Dogmatis*, is sometimes very valuable.

so effectually by the deists, that Dr. Röhr in his "*Letters on Rationalism*," (I quote from Professor Hahn,) "declares plainly that, as the advocate of rationalism, he acknowledged Herbert of Cherbury and his friends and followers as his own predecessors." See Biblic. Repos. I. 111—for a translation of the celebrated essay of Hahn, from which the foregoing quotation is made.

But let us consider how this principle, first incautiously asserted by several divines, was nurtured until it produced the precious blossom of "accommodation," which so soon ripened into the Sodomatical apple of rationalism.

Dr. John Spencer, Dean of Ely, (Nat. 1630, Ob. 1693,) in 1685* published his work *De Legibus Hebræorum Ritualibus*, and he has in this day, says Hengstenberg, found a fellow-spirit in Strauss. There is this difference between the two, that Spencer was satisfied with operating against revelation at a single point. This difference, however, is accidental, and is caused only by the difference of the times in which they lived. One cannot free himself from the thought, that were Spencer now living, he would lay aside this modesty; nay, that he even then thought far more than he said.

In fact he almost stumbles upon the full Semlerian accommodation notion; he uses the term συγκατάβασις, (which means accommodation,) under which softening term he does not hesitate to charge upon God a *fraus pia*. Take a passage or two:—"It is probable that God in the law, did deliver some sacred things covered up under the veil of types and symbols, because of a similar custom in use among the wise men of other nations, and especially the Egyptians." And by adopting these heathenish usages, God designed to amuse his people, (like a parent when he hands his children a parcel of play-things to occupy their attention and prevent their running into mischief,) so that they would not hanker after the *amusements* of the heathen worship. Hear his own

* Such is the date of my copy; though it has lately gone the rounds on very high authority, that the first complete edition was not issued till 1727. This work, (a good many copies of which I have seen in this country,) is, according to Professor Tholuck, calculated in the highest degree to prepare the mind for Rationalism. In proof of which, see but the third paragraph of the "*Ad Lectorem*," and his "*Prefatio*" to lib. III., and also cap. I. Dissert. I. *De Sacrificiis*, pp. 639—676; to specify no other instances.

words: "God in the mean time, that he might in every way prevent superstition, adopted not a few rites made sacred by the use of many ages and nations, *and which he knew to be tolerable follies;* quos ineptias norat esse tolerabiles." Thus *accommodation* begun with God at the beginning of the Pentateuch, according to Spencer; and why should Semler have thought it strange that it was kept up until the close of the Bible?

Spencer's book exerted a great influence, as appears from the repeated reprints of it, and the editions in Holland and Germany; and not a few theologians were short-sighted enough to coincide more or less with him.

Clericus (or Le Clerc, Ob. 1736) adopted the hypothesis of Spencer, without any modification or improvement. See for example his remark on Circumcision, in his Comm. on Gen. xvii. 10. In fact, every thing that goes beyond his own abstract idea of God he calls "*anthropomorphism*" (a favourite word with Professor Bush) and the like. Spencer's favourite word συγκατάβασις was also quite a favourite with him, in "reconciling reason with revelation." We have referred already to some of his comments in a former section. See also his Note on Gen. iii. 24 and xii. 3, &c.

Semler (Ob. 1792) followed Clericus, (whom he studied most intently,) and adopted his system entirely. He was a pupil of Baumgarten, and while listening to his cold-hearted phlegmatic lectures and criticisms, the great principle of "accommodation" (as he tells us) first dawned upon his mind. He now saw clearly, how revelation could be reconciled with reason, and rendered perfectly harmonious with it. He looked upon the philosophy which he had learned from Wolf, (who prepared the way for the system of Kant,) as "irrefragably true." His mind, in fact, was at rest on this subject; and the darling object of his soul was to show revelation to be consistent therewith.

J. D. Michaelis (Ob. 1791) followed Semler, and fell in at once with the principle which he had introduced into hermeneutics. His *Mosaiches Recht* evince on every page how nearly he followed in the track of Spencer and Clericus; and the superior advantages which he had derived from knowing the principle of accommodation as clearly defined by Semler. And as Semler had introduced it into criticism simply, (though he subsequently carried out its

results into every department of theology,) Michaelis obligingly undertook to show its importance in theology. "He was one of the few educated at Halle (says Tholuck) whose personal character evinced no traces of a pious education:" in fact, he evinced much less regard for religion than Semler himself. In 1760 (not 1761, as it is often incorrectly stated,) he published his *Dogmatic Theology*, in which he lays the foundation for the entire subversion of Christianity. It is enough to state in illustration of this, that Eichhorn was his pupil, and only carried out his system to its legitimate results.

Semler begun the application of his accommodation principle to the statements respecting the demoniacs in the New Testament. "This," as Tholuck says, "was the starting point of Rationalism." He also translated and published the notorious treatise of Dr. Farmer on the same subject. And it is to be deeply regretted that Professor Bush has not scrupled to follow Semler in the application of this principle to the same subject. See *Anastasis*, p. 244. Then followed its application to the existence of the devil, and to the doctrine of a judgment to come. Miracles followed next in the train; after which came, with no halting pace, pantheism and atheism.*

Thus from Professor Bush's doctrine of reason, was "*eliminated*" (as his spiritual body out of the corporeal,) the *subtle* and *refined principle* of accommodation. Surely it is time for those to pause, who, like Professor Bush, have not scrupled to take the incipient steps to these results.

* I have thought it unnecessary in this connexion to speak particularly of the influence of the philosophy of Leibnitz and Wolf in developing the principles of Rationalism. They started with the erroneous position of the English Deists (referred to above) respecting reason. Baumgarten was a disciple of Wolf, and adopted his philosophy, and from his teachings Semler elaborated the principle of *accommodation*, which is intended only to sustain reason and philosophy against the "apparently" contradictory doctrines announced in revelation. "God," say Semler and his followers, "accommodated his teaching to the little local ideas of the Jews;" and hence reason and philosophy must decide what is true as well as false in the Bible. And nothing can be admitted to be true therein, which reason cannot explain and justify on its own principles. Thus reason justifies accommodation, and accommodation justifies reason: and Professor Bush justifies both.

SECTION IV.

Objections to the Principle of Accommodation.

1. The legitimate results of this principle, as developed by those who have adopted it, and carried it out logically, show it to be utterly false, and indefensible.

The following passage (from the preface to the English translation of Knapp's Theology,) refers to the doctrines of the Rationalists, and their principle of accommodation; and is, as the reader will see, singularly applicable to the principles asserted by Professor Bush. "Theologians, it is said, have no choice left them, and must adopt the splendid results which are every day disclosed in all departments of knowledge; and if they would not suffer theology to fall into contempt, must admit some compromise between its antiquated doctrines and the progress of light. To effect this compromise, is the office assigned to modern RATIONALISM, by one of its ablest apologists. Rationalism, says Bretschneider, (in his *Sendschreiben* §. 78,) designs to restore the interrupted harmony between theology and human sciences, and is the necessary product of the scientific cultivation of modern times. But whence the necessity of this compromise? It is a necessity with which the believer in revelation can never be pressed, and which certainly was not felt by theologians of the old stamp. They had not asserted their independence of the pope and the schoolmen, only to yield it again to the empiric; and as to the advantages of this compromise, what has really been accomplished by this far-famed rationalism, after all its promises? It professed friendship for Christianity, but has proved its deadly foe; standing within the pale of the church, it has been in league with the enemy without, and has readily adopted every thing which infidelity could engender, and as studiously rejected every thing which true philosophy has done to confirm the truths of revelation. It promised to save theology from contempt; and how has this promise been performed? In the days of Spener, theology was the queen of sciences, so acknowledged by the mouth of Bacon, Leibnitz, Haller, and others, their chosen oracles. She wore the insignia of divinity, and 'filled her odorous lamp' at the very original fountain of light; but, in an evil hour, she took this flattering rationalism to her bosom. Now,

stripped of every mark of divinity, cut off from her native sources of light, and thrust out into the dark, this foolish virgin is compelled to say to her sister sciences, 'Give me of your oil, for my lamp has gone out." p. 15, London edition.

Another writer (in the Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge,) thus truly and accurately describes the effects resulting from the adoption of the principle referred to. "Semler appears to have been the author of that famous theory of accommodation, which, in the hands of his followers, became the most formidable weapon ever devised for the destruction of Christianity. As far as Germany is concerned, this language is not too strong; *and we may add, that it was the most impudent theory ever advocated by men professing still to be Christians;* and one, the avowal of which, can scarcely be accounted for, except on the ground, that as, because of their interests, it was not convenient for these teachers of theology, and ministers of the German churches, to disavow Christianity altogether, it was devised and maintained, in order to connect the profits of the Christian profession with substantial and almost undisguised deism. Thus the chairs of theology, and the very pulpits were turned into the 'seats of the scornful;' and where doctrines were at all preached, they were too frequently of this daring and infidel character. It became even, at least, a negative good, that the sermons delivered were often discourses on the best modes of cultivating corn, and wine, and the preachers employed the Sabbath and the church, in instructing their flocks how to choose the best kind of potatoes, or to enforce upon them the benefits of vaccination. Undisguised infidelity has in no country treated the grand evidences of the truth of Christianity with greater contumely, or been more offensive in its attacks upon the prophets, or more ridiculous in its attempts to account, on natural principles, for the miracles. Extremes of every kind were produced, philosophical mysticism, pantheism, and atheism."

This description, high-wrought as it may appear to be, barely comes up to the reality. And that this state of things is directly traceable to the adoption of the accommodation principle, is declared with one voice by the evangelical party in Germany. Hear Professor Tholuck; "Here then, we have the leading principle of Semler's interpretation, viz.,

that the contents of the whole of the Old and New Testaments are of a local and temporary character. This is the source of the corruption which he introduced *into all the departments of theology.*" Storr and Flatt aver that "the theory of accommodation involves the whole of revelation in uncertainty."

Now a principle which inevitably leads to such consequences, must be fallacious and false; but such are the consequences which legitimately result from the adoption of the principle of accommodation. Nor would it be of any force to reply to this by saying that these consequences resulted from the *abuse* of the principle referred to; for *first*, the assertion would be false; and *secondly*, it would be of no service to Professor Bush in the present discussion, if we should even grant the assertion. Because he has made the same application of the principle which Semler did; and of course we may well expect like results to follow, when it is carried out.

2. Our next objection to the principle under discussion is, that it is wholly unphilosophical and unreasonable, and contrary to all correct principles of interpretation. This has been conclusively shown already in our remarks on Professor Bush's argument from reason, and also in the former part of the present chapter. If revelation were designed for the Jews only, and for the generations to which it was originally given, the principle would not be so glaringly absurd. But seeing that it was intended for all men, and for every age, it is utterly unreasonable to suppose that it was accommodated by God to the "local ideas" of the Jews. And how utterly unphilosophical is the position upon which the alleged necessity for the adoption of such a principle is based, has been already shown to some extent. But the following passage from Professor Stuart presents the point in a clear and striking light. "If I bring along with me (in the interpretation of the Scriptures,) my philosophical creed, or my party theological creed, or my rationalist creed, or my convictions as an enthusiast, and in my explanation of Scripture permit either of these to influence or guide me, instead of the plain principles of exegesis which nature has taught all men in regard to the interpretation of language; then I do not make an *explication* of the sacred text, but an *implication*, (non explicatio sed implicatio,) i. e., I do not unfold to others what the sacred writers meant to say, and have actually

said, *but what I believe before I undertook to interpret them;* I do not *deduce* from their words the sense which the writers gave to them; but I *superinduce* a sense which these writers never designed to convey. This is not *to bring a sense* OUT of the words of Scripture, i. e., it is not *explication*, but it is *to bring* IN one upon it, or to add one to it, which is *implication* in the Latin sense of this word."

3. A third objection is taken from the fact that it is impossible to determine with any degree of certainty the meaning of the word of God according to this principle. No two Rationalists have ever agreed in their explanations of the Bible while adhering to the accommodation theory. An illustration of this has already been given in reference to Peter and Ananias. But instead of lengthening out these remarks by a citation of other dull instances, we shall present the authority of Hengstenberg, which will be universally admitted to be all-sufficient. "No two of the more important critics agree in their mode of solving the most important problems. It is a war of every man against every man. We had intended to present to our readers the laughable spectacle of these contests, in order that from the confusion and contradiction of the *positive* results of the later criticism, which is consistent with itself no further than its champions are united by a common doctrinal interest, they might form some conclusion about the boasted certainty of their *negative* results. But we feel an unconquerable disgust at the business, and we cannot bring ourselves to enter upon the field of arbitrary speculation, and collect together the masses of fancies that lie scattered there. Every one can easily supply the lack by taking in hand a few of the works on this subject, and comparing them. The impression made by such a labour would be apt to resemble that which one gets on visiting a Jews' school."* Hence,

4. Another objection, which is likewise fatal to this principle, is that no certain *criteria* can be given which shall (if this principle be allowed) enable us to distinguish between those declarations of Christ and his apostles, which they themselves believed, and those in which they accommodated themselves to the erroneous notions of the Jews. The Scriptures no where (says Storr) make a distinction

* See Prolegomena to his *Authentic des Pentateuchs*, Erster Band.

between what is universally true, and what is only local and temporary. And hence the theory of accommodation, as above remarked, involves the whole of revelation in uncertainty. But further,

5. It is utterly destitute of proof. Many of those coincidences between the instructions of Christ and the Jewish opinions, which have commonly been referred to accommodation, cannot be proved even to be historically true. The Rabbinical writings which are appealed to, are of more recent origin than the age of Christ and his apostles; and the works of Philo and Josephus do not uniformly exhibit the ideas which were prevalent among the Jews in Palestine. Moreover, the representations contained in these works, and also in some apocryphal books, differ in a variety of respects from the doctrines of the New Testament. But if even some of the instructions of Jesus and his apostles did coincide with the popular opinions of the Jews, it by no means follows that they must therefore have been erroneous. So far as these Jewish opinions were correct, they were worthy of the approbation of Jesus. And the providence of God may, by previous intimations of them, have paved the way for the reception of the peculiar doctrines of Christianity.*

6. Then further; the *necessity* for such accommodation on the part of Christ and his apostles, neither has been nor can be proved. This point has often been *asserted*, boldly and roundly; but the *proof*, though often called for, has never been forthcoming.

7. The moral character of Jesus and his apostles, likewise renders the supposition that they would thus countenance error, utterly inadmissible.

8. The supposition also, if received, must plainly ruin the character of our Lord as a safe and infallible guide to truth. For if he taught any thing clearly he taught clearly the doctrines which are produced as examples of mere accommodation. Even Professor Bush is compelled to admit this in reference to the doctrine of the resurrection.

9. The supposition that Christ and his apostles propogated (as this theory asserts) falsehood under the garb of truth, is

* See Storr and Flatt's Theology; and an excellent article on the subject of "Accommodation," in the Encyclop. of Rel. Knowledge; Dr. Knapp also, in his *Theology*, handsomely "uses up" the same wretched subterfuge of unbelief.

destroyed by the fact that they proved the truth of their doctrine by miracles.

10. And finally, this theory is at total variance with every thing recorded of our Lord's freedom of speech, sincerity, and fidelity. Would not even Professor Bush consider it wrong in himself to countenance errors in the manner in which he represents our Lord and his apostles to have done? His whole book evinces that he would deem it disgraceful for himself to do so. And so far indeed was our blessed Lord from accommodating his teachings to the errors of the age in which he lived, that, as Paley remarks, he is distinguished not only by a perfect freedom from popular errors himself, unparalleled by any other teacher of any nation and age; but by the unshrinking and martyr courage with which he perpetually confronts and answers them. Hence on one occasion, when informed that his exposure of a popular error had given offence to the leading sect among his countrymen, he unfolded the great maxim of his ministry, in these decisive words: "Every plant which my heavenly Father hath not planted, shall be rooted up." Matt. xv. 13.

The reader can now judge whether Professor Bush ought to have had "no fear of being convicted before an enlightened tribunal, of having periled the weal of the sacred oracles, by the advocacy of a false principle of interpretation," (*Anastasis* p. 29.) while we, having proved this principle of Professor Bush's hermeneutics to be erroneous, shall proceed briefly to announce the principles which shall regulate our interpretation of Scripture in the present discussion.

SECTION V.

True Principles of Interpretation.

To the question, "which of the different modes of interpretation that are followed, and which of the hermeneutical theories that have been set up, is the right one?" Hahn, in his celebrated essay thus replies, "That *the right interpretation is that one, which deduces from the Holy Scriptures the very sense which the writers of them intended to convey.*" On which felicitous definition, Professor Stuart truly remarks, "From this simple and intelligible statement it follows, that all accommodation of the Scriptures to our own preconceived notions of truth and propriety, unless indeed

these entirely agree with those of the sacred writers, is foreign to the business of true interpretaton. This concerns itself exclusively and solely with the sentiment of the writer to be interpreted. All the principles of language and criticism which it applies to exegesis, are only means which common sense has pointed out, as necessary and proper to be used in the explanation of any written or spoken language." *Biblic. Repos.* I. 139.

The meaning of the Spirit of God, who speaks in the Bible, therefore, is the meaning of the words which he employs, as educed by a fair and grammatical interpretation. When we have clearly and grammatically ascertained this, we have ascertained what God has truly announced in his word. And can any thing be more absurd than to suppose that this meaning is to be ascertained by a primary resort to the deductions of reason, or philosophy; or to the principle of accommodation?

Another, and very obvious principle is, that every writer best explains himself, and that no intelligent writer, will, as such, be inconsistent with himself. This has been sometimes called the analogy of faith; but more correctly the analogy of the Holy Scriptures. *Scriptura Scripturæ interpres.* This is a canon which is likewise almost perpetually violated by Professor Bush. He sometimes, it is true, resorts to it; but he oftener resorts to his accommodation principle, or to his argument from reason, and his *axiomatic* application of it, "no two truths in the universe can conflict with each other."

Another canon, and one also referred to by Bacon* is thus stated by Hahn; "Since the writings of whose interpretation we are here speaking, are *holy* writings, i. e., composed by men of holy minds and lives; and since they profess to contain a divine revelation, respecting truth and the means of becoming truly good and happy; we must, in order to be or to become capable of fully understanding them, come to the reading of the Holy Scriptures with a *holy feeling*, or with a heart open and longing for all that is good and true and divine. Then will the true sense and meaning of the Scriptures reveal themselves to us. In the contrary case, or if we are already prejudiced against them, although they contain the word of God, they will yet address us in language unintelligible and without effect. Indeed, it

* See De Augment. Scient. Lib. IX. cap. I.

cannot be otherwise even considered philologically. In order to understand and fully to enjoy the poets, and, consequently, in order to explain them, a poetical feeling is requisite, which shall be capable of following out the vast variety of the poet's creations, and of accompanying the flights of his fancy. Whoever will understand the works of a profound philosopher, must have inclination and capacity to trace the course of his ideas, and penetrate the depths of his investigations. In like manner, there is every where required for the understanding of a writer a kindred spirit, qualified by preparation. Just so a holy feeling is requisite for the understanding of the Holy Scriptures. In acknowledgment of this truth, therefore, our old interpreters required, in an entirely correct sense, that the Scriptures should be explained *in* or *cum* spiritu sancto, and that no one should enter upon the reading of them without prayer.

"This theory of interpretation, is (1.) in its principles applied to all writings in the world; they must be explained in accordance with the usage of language, with the history of their time, and with their internal connexion and spirit; and (2.) this theory alone affords a certainty of rightly understanding a work, because it is exercised according to certain rules, that are clear and of easy application. This holds good of no other mode of interpretation." Thus Hahn. Compare also the *Biblic. Repos.* II. 135.

We might, if necessary, fortify these statements with the authority of Ernesti. See *Instit. Interpretis Nov. Test.* Part. I. Sect. I. Cap. I.

CHAPTER II.

A CONSIDERATION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION AS PRESENTED AND DISCUSSED BY PROFESSOR BUSH.

THE Professor commences this branch of the discussion with some preliminary remarks, briefly touching the principle of interpretation which we have discussed in our preceding chapter. He insists that the "Scriptures are constructed on this point (the subject of the human body and soul,) *in reference to the then state of knowledge—to the popular impression and belief—among those for whom they were originally*

designed." pp. 90, 91. That is, in other words, they are with respect to "physical subjects" only local and temporary. And he also insists that astronomy and geology have compelled us to deviate from the literal averments of holy writ in some places; and that therefore it is reasonable to suppose that the results of physiological investigation ought to be, by a similar process, reconciled with the announcements of revelation.

This, as the reader no doubt perceives, is but a second edition of the Professor's "*Knowledge of Revelation progressive;*" and I may, without doing it any injustice, say that it is only an English abridgment and version of Bretschneider's "*Letter to a Statesman.*" There is in fact a remarkable resemblance between them. But we have said so much already, in exposing the principle of accommodation, and the argument from reason, that, though the matter is repeatedly presented by Professor Bush, at almost every step of his progress through his work, we cannot venture to tax the reader's patience with a second refutation of it. And shall therefore leave it with the remark, 1. that as to geology, its clear results are corroborative of, or consistent with the Scriptures. Nor are there any geological facts that have ever been pointed out, which, *in themselves*, contradict the exact ascertained meaning of a single passage in the word of God. And 2. The same remark may be made respecting astronomy.* Not even the passage in Joshua, (ch. x.) can be shown to conflict with the principles of the Copernican system.

* In order to *enforce* what the Professor advances in reference to the necessity of adapting revelation to the advance of scientific discovery; and to teach us "a humiliating lesson on the force of blind prejudice in its war with the progress of science" he gives us a succinct "history of the proceedings in the case of Galileo;" a "case" referred to by Rationalists, and Unitarians, and Universalists, and all other mere theorists so frequently, that it has been actually worn threadbare. They are all, forsooth, like Galileo; and of course all who oppose their errors must resemble Galileo's persecutors. This "case" Professor Bush repeatedly, and most invidiously refers to. See *Anastasis*, pp. 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, (note) and 90. But "It has been very properly remarked," says Dr. John Pye Smith, (Scrip. Geology, p. 217,) "that many a system-maker, when a check is offered to his crude and inconclusive conceptions,—fancies himself another Galileo, and glories in his imagined martyrdom." The reader will determine for himself whether there is any very striking resemblance between the case of the Professor and that of Galileo!

But in contemplating what Professor Bush has so much insisted on, respecting the superseding of the declarations of the Bible, by the results of scientific investigation, I have been exceedingly grieved at their latitudinarian nature and tendency. And as he, in his remarks, preliminary to a consideration of the scripture argument, condenses these views of his into a moral focus, in the following paragraph, I shall, before passing on, extract it, not for the purpose of remarking upon it, (for the sentiment has been sufficiently exposed already,) but to show, by contrasting it with a passage from another writer, and one with whose *theological system* Professor Bush has had no sympathy whatever, how much reason there is to suspect the soundness of the principles which he has so confidently advanced. The following is the passage from Professor Bush; a part of which we have quoted already.

"What now is the obvious matter of fact as regards the particular subject of our present discussion? Are not the Scriptures constructed on this point, as on all others having respect to physical subjects, in reference to the then state of knowledge—to the popular impression and belief—among those for whom they were originally designed? And did the Jews and the early Christians know what we know in relation to our physical organization? Was the science of animal chemistry developed in those early ages? Were they skilled in anthropology? Did they know any more of the settled truths embraced in this sphere of knowledge than of those which fall into the department of astronomy or geology? It avails nothing to say that the Spirit which indited the Scriptures knew these truths, if the writers did not. The Spirit knew too, equally well, the true structure of the solar system and the age of the globe upon which we dwell. Yet he has not seen fit to speak according to his knowledge on those points, and why should he any more on this? If there are actually stages in the progress of human intelligence; if the collective mind of the race, like that of an individual, passes through the grades of infancy, childhood, youth, and maturity; must not a revelation from God, vouchsafed to the earlier generations of men, adapt itself to their existing intellectual state? Can a child comprehend the deep things of a man? Who then will suppose that the obvious sense of the letter, on subjects that admit of continually growing light from subsequent discoveries, was in-

tended as a fixed standard of import from which no departure was to be allowed? Would not this be like requiring the man to continue to wear the garments of the boy?" pp. 90, 91.

Dr. William Ellery Channing, in discussing the evidences of Christianity, takes occasion to refer to the same subject—but what an inverted contrast between the "orthodox" and the "liberal" divine! He speaks as follows: "Passing over these topics, each of which might be enlarged into a discourse, I will make but one remark on this religion, which strikes my own mind very forcibly. *Since its introduction, human nature has made great progress, and society experienced great changes; and in this advanced condition of the world, Christianity, instead of losing its application and importance,* IS FOUND TO BE MORE AND MORE CONGENIAL AND ADAPTED TO MAN'S NATURE AND WANTS. Men have outgrown the other institutions of that period when Christianity appeared, its philosophy, its modes of warfare, its policy, its public and private economy; *but Christianity has never shrunk as intellect has opened, but has always kept in advance of men's faculties, and unfolded nobler views in proportion as they have ascended.* The highest powers and affections, which our nature has developed, find more than adequate objects in this religion. Christianity is indeed peculiarly fitted to the more improved stages of society, to the more delicate sensibilities of refined minds, and especially to that dissatisfaction with the present state, which always grows with the growth of our moral powers and affections. As men advance in civilization, they become susceptible of mental sufferings, to which ruder ages are strangers; and these Christianity is fitted to assuage. Imagination and intellect become more restless; and Christianity brings them tranquillity by the eternal and magnificent truths, the solemn and unbounded prospects which it unfolds. This fitness of our religion *to the more advanced stages of society than that in which it was introduced, to wants of human nature not then developed,* seems to me very striking. The religion bears the marks of having come *from a Being who perfectly understood the human mind, and had power to provide for its progress.* This feature of Christianity is of the nature of prophecy. *It was an anticipation of future and distant ages; and when we consider among whom our*

religion sprung, where, but in God, can we find an explanation of this peculiarity."*

This admirable passage is worthy of the exalted literary reputation of its author, and of the sacred cause which he defends. And shall we be told by a learned orthodox divine, that such is not the characteristic of the Bible? and that the argument is fallacious? One might reasonably enough suppose that it would be sufficient for an avowed sceptic to make such a declaration.

In respect to the "Definition of terms," which Professor Bush considers in Chap. iii. Part II., he concedes, so far as the Old Testament argument is concerned, all that I desire. He remarks, however, that "as the drift of our expositions will go to show that the intimations in the Old Testament of the doctrine of the *resurrection of the body*, are at last extremely dubious, so the occurrence of corresponding terms by which to express it, is in proportion but little to be looked for," p. 94. Yet he does not doubt that the doctrine of the resurrection is taught in the Old Testament, as the following passage (p. 92,) containing an excellent criticism on 2 Tim. i. 10, clearly evinces. "The emphatic declaration of the apostle, that Christ, through the gospel, 'hath brought life and immortality to light,' is evidently not to be understood as carrying with it the implication that the doctrine of a future life, and of a resurrection of some kind, is not contained in the Old Testament Scriptures. The genuine import of the original term φωτιζειν, conveys the idea rather of *shedding additional light* upon an obscure subject, than that of *announcing, declaring*, or *disclosing* it *de novo;* and this is confirmed by the words of the Saviour himself, Matt. xxii. 29: 'Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God;' from which it is evident, that had they rightly scanned the purport of their own Scriptures, they would have recognized the indubitable traces of this grand doctrine." The Professor might have added, also, that both Christ and his apostles affirm that the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead is taught in the Old Testament. Christ takes the point for granted in his dispute with the Sadducees, Matt. xxii. 31. Peter declares that David announced the resurrection of the Messiah, Acts ii. 31: and Paul assures us that this same

* Channing's Discourse on the Evidences of Revealed Religion, pp. 28, 29, edit. 3d. Unitarian Tracts, Vol. I. pp. 270, 271.

doctrine of the resurrection is taught in the Old Testament, (see Acts xxiv. 14, 15,) and also that the faithful servants of God mentioned in Hebrews xi., would not receive the offered deliverance from the sufferings which they endured for the sake of the truth, that they might obtain the *better resurrection*.*

I. The first passage which he enters upon the discussion of, is Gen. xvii. 7, 8.

"And I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee, in their generations, for an everlasting covenant; to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee.

"And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God."

His observations on this passage are brief, and begin thus: "Upon this Menasseh Ben Israel remarks, 'It is plain that Abraham and the rest of the Patriarchs did not possess that land; it follows therefore, that they must be raised in order to enjoy the promised good, or otherwise the promises of God would be vain and false. Hence, therefore, is proved not only the immortality of the soul, but also the essential foundation of the law, to wit: the resurrection of the dead." He also remarks that Mede, and the generality of Millenarian writers give it the same construction.

I have not been accustomed to rely upon this passage as a proof of the doctrine under consideration, though I think the Jewish exposition of it, backed as it is, by high Christian authority, deserving of some attention. But how does Professor Bush attempt to set aside the argument which has been deduced from it? Why as follows: "In reply, we observe, (1.) if our previous train of reasoning be sound, the drift of which is to evince that the future resurrection of the same body is intrinsically inconceivable and incredible, it follows that the bodies of Abraham and the patriarchs are no more to be raised than any other bodies, *whatever may be*

* "*The first resurrection*," as it is termed in the New Testament, and which appears to be the subject of 1 Cor. xv. See also Rev. xx.; Daniel xii. 2; Phil. iii. 11; and Luke xx. 36. Nor is it any valid objection to the criticism that κρεῖττονος ἀναστάσεως is destitute of the article. See Winer's Idioms of the New Testament. Part III. §§ 18 and 19; and Biblic. Repos. IV. p. 296 *seq.*

the language of the letter. What is denied of the race *in toto*, must be denied of the individuals *in parte*." p. 97.

Here, then, we have an illustration of the manner in which Professor Bush *applies* his "argument from reason." Reason first tells what the Bible *ought* to reveal! and if God declares any thing which is not in strict accordance with the Professor's philosophy, his declaration must be rejected, or at least modified until it does harmonize therewith. But we have shown that Professor Bush's previous train of reasoning is *not sound*, and hence this application of it is of no weight whatever.

His other "reply," is not more successful. It is as follows. "(2.) The admitted principles of philology are directly against the proposed (the *universally acknowledged*, he should have said,) rendering. By both the Greek and Hebrew usage, the particle 'and' is very often synonymous with 'even,' and should so be rendered, i. e., as exegetical of what goes before. Thus, 1 Chronicles xxi. 12, 'The Lord's sword *and* the pestilence,' i. e., *even* the pestilence." And after also quoting Numbers xxxi. 6, Ephesians iv. 11, and Matthew xxi. 5, he adds, "and so in numerous other instances. Here therefore, the meaning undoubtedly is, 'Unto thee, *even* to thy seed after thee will I give it.' This is all that is fairly included in the promise, *the immediate object of which is not a heavenly but an earthly Canaan.*" pp. 97, 98.

This is a specimen of strange exegesis. How does the fact, that ו is explanatory in the instances produced, prove that it is to be so taken in the instance under consideration? It is neither a case of explanatory *apposition*, nor of ἓν διὰ δυοῖν, in which such a construction *is* admissible. And what "admitted principles of philology are against the rendering" given to it in our common version? Does the fact that ו is *sometimes* so translated, prove it? If so where is the connexion between the premises and conclusion? How would the argument apply to other cases. Take, e. g. Genesis i. 1, "In the beginning God created the heavens *even* the earth." Isaiah vi. 9, "By hearing you shall hear *even* not understand." What would Professor Bush's argument be worth, if applied to prove that *even* is the proper rendering here? And yet it is just as good in the one case as in the other.

The Professor, to sustain this rendering, goes back to Genesis xv. 18, "*Unto thy seed will I give this land.*" But why did he not quote also verse 7, "I brought *thee* out of Ur, *to give thee this land to inherit it.*" Professor Bush could not but know that as both Abraham and his seed are distinctly and separately thus specified in chapter xv., so in chapter xvii. they are specifically enumerated in the verses under discussion; as without such a distinct specification, the promise, as here repeated, would not have been strictly the same as that previously given.

But instead of reverting to chapter xv., why did not Professor Bush go for illustration to the parallel phrases in the very chapter from which he makes his quotation;—or in attempting to explain "and" by "even," in verse 8, why did he not cast his eye on verse 7, which he has also quoted? If ו means "*even*" in one of these phrases, "the admitted principles of philology" require that it should mean the same thing in every parallel phrase in the connexion. How would verse 7 read, then? "I will establish my covenant between me *even* thee, *even* thy seed after thee—to be a God unto thee, *even* to thy seed after thee." Was God therefore the God only of Abraham's seed, and not of Abraham himself, as this construction would require? If not, how does the same declaration respecting Canaan, prove it to be the possession only of Abraham's seed, and not of Abraham himself? So too, in verses 9 and 10. "Thou shalt keep my covenant therefore, thou, *even* thy seed after thee in their generations. This is my covenant, which ye shall keep, between me *even* you, *even* thy seed after thee." Was the covenant, then, only between God and Abraham's seed? And did not Abraham keep it? (v. 11—14, and 22—27.) Was he not included therein? If these passages prove that he was, then verse 8 proves that he was also included *with his seed* in the promise of the land of Canaan.

But Professor Bush not only forgot to look at the parallel passages in the same chapter, but he omitted also to consult the inspired explanation of this text, as given by Stephen, in Acts vii. 4, 5. "Then came he out of the land of the Chaldeans, and dwelt in Charran; and from thence, when his father was dead, he removed him into this land, wherein ye now dwell. *And he gave him none inheritance in it, no, not so much as to set his foot on*; (οὐδὲ βῆμα ποδός) *yet he*

promised that he would give it to him for a possession, and to his seed after him, (καὶ τῷ σπέρματι αὐτοῦ μετ' αὐτόν,) when as yet he had no child." Comment here would be useless.

II. The next passage adduced, is Job xix. 25—27. "For I know that my Redeemer liveth," &c. p. 99. Of this he presents the Hebrew text, and the versions of the LXX. and Vulgate, and takes occasion to remark that "it would, perhaps, be impossible to cite any paragraph in the whole compass of revelation marked by greater variety of construction than the present." pp. 99, 100. This may be so; but it no more proves the import of the passage to be uncertain, than the myriads of diverse readings (in the MSS. of the New Testament,) presented by Mill, Bengel, Griesbach, &c. would prove, as sceptics assert, the meaning of the New Testament to be uncertain. For in both cases, many of the distinctions referred to, are without a difference.

But in considering this celebrated passage there are two points which must not be lost sight of, and to which we shall briefly advert. And *first*, mere *authority* cannot be appealed to, even in the present advanced state of Hebrew literature, for *settling* the question as to the true import of the passage; and *secondly*, the objections to the reception of the common rendering, resolve themselves substantially into this, to wit: the passage is *susceptible* of a different exposition, without violence to the original. Let us consider each of these separately.

1. As to the question of *authority*, Professor Bush pleads it strongly; and appeals to the late work of Mr. Barnes on Job, to sustain him in rejecting the common interpretation. But the point cannot be determined in this way. I was in hopes that the Professor would have furnished us with his own version of the passage, but he has not done so. We shall therefore look at the passage itself with reference to this question of authority.

He has not noticed that there are the two following distinct points of inquiry as to its import. 1. Does Job here confess his faith in the Redeemer? and 2. Does he announce his belief in the doctrine of the resurrection? Professor Bush and Mr. Barnes deny that he does either; while others maintain the first point, and not the last. The following is the passage with the rendering of the venerable and learned Dr. Hales.

ואני ידעתי גאלי חי ואחרון	"I know that my REDEEMER (*is*) living,
על־עפר יקום:	And that at the last (*day*)
ואחר עורי נקפו־זאת	He will arise (*in judgment*) upon dust (*mankind.*)
ומבשרי אחזה אלוה:	And after my skin be mangled thus,
אשר אני אחזה־לי ועיני ראו	Yet even from my flesh shall I see God·
ולא־זר כלו כליתי בהקי:	Whom I shall see for me (on my side,)
	And my eyes shall behold him not estranged;
	(*Though*) my reins be (*now*) consumed within me."*

With the single exception to the paraphrastic rendering of the third clause, and the fanciful construction of על־עפר this translation in substance receives the sanction of many of the most learned critics. There may be shades of difference in their rendering of a word; but they understand Job here to declare his faith in the Redeemer, and his expectation of a resurrection. *Witsius* (Œcon. Fœd. Lib. III. c. II.) has ably discussed it and maintains the common construction. So *Calvin* also, whose merits as an interpreter few will venture to question. (See Instit. lib. II. cap. 10, § 19. and lib. III. cap. 25, § 4.) *Lightfoot* also is very positive as to its import. (Works, Vol. II. 791. Folio.) *Pareus* (a learned commentator appealed to sometimes by Professor Bush,) after remarking that interpreters vary in their version of some of the words of the passage, observes, that "nevertheless *in this sentiment they all agree*, that here is a very clear confession of a sure and firm expectation of future deliverance from all sorrow in another life after the resurrection of the dead: and concerning *Christ*, by whose power the dead should arise." (Comment. *in loco.*) So also *Piscator in loco;* and *Junius* and *Tremellius* in their excellent notes *in loco.* The same view is taken also by the celebrated *Pfeiffer* (Opp. Tom. I. p. 169—) and by the elder *Schultens*, and by the older critics without number; so much so that *Poole* (Annot. in loco) who had closely examined the subject, remarks, that most of the interpreters, "both ancient and modern understand it of Christ and of his resurrection, and of Job's resurrection to life by his power and favour."

Since the time of Poole also, the argument from authority is equally strong. *Michaelis* and *Rambach* with *Velthusen*, advocate it strenuously. And Dr. Priestly, notwithstanding the criticism of *Grotius* (who is the father of the new inter-

* Hales' *Analysis*, Vol. II. pp. 83—86.

pretation,) hesitates not to remark that "Christians in general, from the earliest times, maintain that Job (here) declares his faith in a happy resurrection at the last day; *and this, I have no doubt, is the right construction.*" "His wishing so often for death as the end of all his troubles, *shows that he had no expectation of a temporal deliverance.*" *Rosenmueller* likewise, (who will not be accused of any partiality for the orthodox system,) remarks, that it refers to the resurrection of the body and the last judgment. "Eam oportet de venturo Judicio, *corporum resurrectione ultima*, et rerum omnium instauratione cogitasse." Dr. Good also sustains the view of Dr. Hales. Dr. John Pye Smith in his "Scripture Testimony to the Messiah," (Vol. I. pp. 191—211,) presents the same view, and translates the passage as follows:

> "I hereby do know my Redeemer, the Living One;
> And He, the last, will arise over the dust.
> And, after the disease has cut down my skin,
> Even from my flesh shall I see God,
> Whom I shall see on my behalf;
> And mine eyes shall behold him, and not estranged.*

Horne, also takes this view of it, and asserts that it is the one *which* "*is now generally received.*" See Crit. Introd. Vol. II. p. 237; see also, Carpzov's *Critica Sacra*, p. 744.

If there is any weight therefore, in the argument *from authority*, it is plain that Professor Bush should at once give up the controversy. But if there is not, why does he try to

* In order to show how little those who dissent from the common view of this passage, have ventured to depart from the rendering given it in the text, we shall quote one or two of their translations. *Grotius* thus renders it: "Scio ego Redemtorem meum vivere, et illum postremò staturum in campo. Etiamsi non pellem tantum meam, sed et hoc (nempe arvinam quæ sub pelle est) consumerent (morbi scilicet), in carne tamen mea Deum videbo (id est, propitium experiar); ego, inquam, hisce meis oculis; ego non autem alius pro me." See his Comment in loco. The venerable Dr. Knapp, who also departed from the common view, thus renders it: "I know that my Redeemer lives. And ere long, he, who now lies in the dust, will arise, (*he who is deeply bowed down by sickness and pain will recover;*) although my skin is consumed, I shall yet in this body see God, (i. e., *have in him a gracious God, be blessed and restored by him;*) as a *friend* shall I see him, and no more as an adversary." Christian Theology, Section 141, p. 465. But is "*ere long*" an *unforced* rendering of אחרון?

make the impression that authority is against the common rendering?

2. But *secondly*, the objections against the common rendering, seem to me to be based substantially on the fact that the passage *may be explained* differently from what it has been. Such is the foundation at least, of the presumption that it ought to be differently rendered; for the arguments offered to establish the statement, have no very great weight. We shall first attend to the exceptions of Professor Bush.

He narrows down the controversy to a single point. The propriety of referring this passage to the resurrection, says he, "obviously depends upon the soundness of the interpretation, which makes the language of Job a prediction of the Messiah." p. 100. Hence, therefore, if it be a prediction of the Saviour, according to this view, it must also assert the doctrine of the resurrection. The connexion here, between the premises and conclusion is not very obvious, and therefore, I could wish the Professor had presented us with his own translation of the passage. But let us see his reasons for refusing to recognize it as a prophecy of the Redeemer. They are as follows:

(1.) "The book of Job was not written by a Jew nor in the country of the Jews, and therefore not by one who was among the inheritors of the promise of the Messiah, or who is to be supposed *a priori* to have had any knowledge of a Messiah. Nor is there any other passage in the whole book importing that Job knew any thing of such a promised personage as the Jews understood by their Messiah. The book is not in its genius a *Messianic* book, but one purely *theistic;* and we are not at liberty, from the simple occurrence of the title 'Redeemer,' which we shall soon show to be more correctly translated by another term, to assign to the book a character which it has no adequate evidence of possessing." p. 100.

There is something here very much like an equivocation on the name Messiah. If the Professor means that Job did not know the promised Redeemer of men *by the name* Messiah, I admit it. But what then? Did Abraham, or Jacob, or Moses know him by this name? And did they, *therefore*, know nothing of such a Deliverer as was promised to the Jews? But this, surely, is not Professor Bush's meaning. Yet there is but one thing more that his language *can* mean, to wit: that Job had no knowledge of man's pro-

mised Redeemer. And, hence, in the second objection, he denies (as we shall see,) that he had any faith in the expected Saviour. If this be the meaning of Professor Bush, I scruple not to say, that it is one of the most groundless and unwarrantable assertions that he ever uttered. Does he think, then, that there can be true "righteousness" (such as Job is said to have possessed; see chap. i. 1; and ii. 3,) without true faith? This is a theological point, and not to be discussed here, but if it be the view of Professor Bush, it should be seriously reconsidered. Compare also the strong declarations in Ezek. xiv. 14, 20, respecting the righteousness of Job, where it is represented to be the same as that of Noah and Daniel, and let Professor Bush say whether he considers it a "righteousness by works." And again. Job constantly offered sacrifice. (see chap. i. and ii. and xlii.) Is it credible, then, that he, living in an early age of the world, and possessing all the knowledge of God which his conversation and actions exhibit, knew not the design of sacrifice? *If he did know this*, (and I think that Professor Bush will hardly maintain that his sacrifices, acceptable as they evidently were, were offered in ignorance,) *then he knew of man's promised Deliverer.* And then, further, had not all nations preserved some tradition of a promised Saviour? Upon what principle, therefore, are we to deny this knowledge to Job? Why should he not have heard of the promise made to our first parents after the fall, living, as he evidently did, in the time of the patriarchs? How vain, therefore, is the assertion of Professor Bush in the above extract, that there is no other passage in the whole book, importing that Job knew any thing of such a personage! His character for "righteousness" refutes the assertion; it is refuted by its sheer improbability, when viewed in connexion with the traditionary knowledge of this truth, and the time in which he must have lived; and it is refuted by every sacrifice that Job ever offered.

Such is the preponderance of presumptive argument, which arrays itself against the very point on which Professor Bush admits that the whole controversy turns. His second exception is as follows:

"(2.) Had the present passage really contained such an explicit declaration of Job's faith in a coming Messiah as is generally supposed, it is certain that he would have been entitled to a conspicuous place in that roll of ancient wor-

thies, recited in the eleventh of Hebrews, who "have by faith obtained an excellent report." But no mention of him occurs in that catalogue, nor is he ever cited in the New Testament as an example of *faith*, but simply as a pattern of *patience*."

The Professor, doubtless, intended this for argument; and if the principle be sound, it is certainly susceptible of a more extensive application than that which he has here given. Suppose we apply it therefore to Daniel, who expressed a strong faith in the expected Shiloh, or to Zechariah, or Isaiah, and infer that they had no faith in the Redeemer, because they are not enumerated in Hebrews xi., and what would he think of the conclusion? But we have shown it to be absolutely incredible that Job had no faith in the coming Saviour; and the fact that he has no "conspicuous place in that roll of ancient worthies" proves nothing at all. The Professor's last exception is as follows:

"(3.) Were the words before us to be justly regarded as expressive of his belief in the promised Redeemer of the Jewish Scriptures, it would have given him a just claim to the character of a *prophet*, as well as a *believer;* yet we find no intimation of his ever being deemed to possess that character, nor is this passage ever once alluded to by the apostles in their controversies with the Jews in regard to the Old Testament predictions of Christ."

This canon is as unfounded as the preceding. Where is the remarkable prophecy of Jacob, in Genesis xlix. mentioned by the apostles, and employed in their controversies with the Jews?

But in what way could the apostles have applied this passage of Job, "in their controversies with the Jews in regard to the Old Testament predictions of Christ?" I wish Professor Bush had told us, for it is very hard even to imagine how it could have been thus used. What did the Jews *deny* in the time of Christ, that could possibly come into conflict with the common version of this passage? Did they deny a future judgment, or the resurrection, or the coming of a Redeemer? If not, how could the apostles have used it in their controversies?

Such are the "reasons" which *constrain* Professor Bush "to dissent from any view which recognizes these words of Job as referring to the Messiah;" and by consequence, (as he views the argument,) to the doctrine of the resurrection:

and I am perfectly willing that the reader should judge for himself of their conclusiveness.

"But," says the Professor, "we have more positive proof *from exegetical sources* that no such allusion is contained in the language." p. 101. And this proof is simply that the word גאל answering to the term Redeemer, "is variously rendered by interpreters *vindicator*, *avenger*, *deliverer*." And he "*supposes* it to be applied to God considered in the character of a *vindicating* or *avenging patron* of Job, who would appear as the asserter and defender of his injured innocence—innocence, that is, so far as the unjust charges and accusations of his professed friends were concerned." And as the fulfilment of this expectation, the passage in Job xlii. 5, is quoted; "I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now *mine eye seeth thee*." This, the Professor considers as "a fair and unforced interpretation of this remarkable passage," and here ends his "more positive proof from exegetical sources."

To this I reply, 1. that this construction is, as before remarked, based merely upon its being an admissible grammatical explanation. As to its *reasonableness*, every one must judge for himself. 2. It is not only destitute of *proof*, but the evidence is directly against it. We have shown that Job must have had faith in the Redeemer; but there is no where in the book any proof that he had the least expectation of a temporal deliverance. And his wishing so often for death, as the end of all his sufferings, clearly shows that he in fact had no such expectation. See chap. vi. 8–11, and vii. 7, 8, and xvii. 11–16. Here then is proof against mere presumption. Job knew his Redeemer, as all the other righteous patriarchs did, and expected salvation through him; but he did not know that he should obtain temporal deliverance, but rather did he think the contrary. To which of these facts, then, ought the passage in question to be referred? 3. Hence also, though Job expressly declares that he has no hope as to the present life, yet he had a hope beyond death. See e. g., chap. xiii. 15. "Though he slay me yet will I trust in him." And hence he so vehemently desired death, that he might rest with God. The passage under consideration cannot therefore refer to a temporal restoration. 4. The term Goël גאל most properly agrees to the description which we have of the character and offices of Christ. And an examination of the places in the Old Testa-

ment in which God is called by this name, will show that most, if not all of them *may* be, and not a few of them *must* be referred to God the Son, the Malak Jehovah. See among others, Genesis xlviii. 16, Isaiah lix. 20, and lii. 3, lxiii. 16, and xli. 14, and xliv. 6, and xlix. 7, Psalm lxxiv. 2, &c., &c. The term, as Professor Bush confesses, is primarily used to designate the next, or near kinsman, p. 103. How then can it be, in any sense, applied with propriety, or without violence, to God, when not viewed as sustaining the offices of Jesus Christ? But as applied to the Redeemer, it is singularly appropriate. The Goël or next of kin, was to redeem the sold or mortgaged estate of his deceased kinsman, Leviticus xxv. 25; and was appointed to avenge his death, Numbers xxxv. 12; and to maintain his name and honour by raising up seed to him. Deuteronomy xxv. 5. And thus Christ is our nearest kinsman and brother, Mark iii. 35, and Hebrews ii. 11; "We are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones," Ephesians v. 30, and he has recovered by the price of his own blood our once happy inheritance forfeited by sin; he has avenged the death of mankind by destroying the kingdom of him who is the "murderer from the beginning;" and will for ever preserve the names and honour and persons of his chosen. Thus strikingly does the *name itself* apply to the Redeemer. And what then becomes of Professor Bush's "more positive proof from exegetical sources"?

The Professor also quotes Menasseh Ben Israel, as saying, that there is nothing in the passage relating to the resurrection; and as asserting, also, that it does refer to "the Redeemer of the soul, who translates it to a seat of happiness." Considering the view which Professor Bush takes of the passage, this is a singular authority which he has produced. He admits, that if Goël refers here to the expected Redeemer of the Old Testament saints, the passage must, by consequence, refer to the resurrection. But Menasseh Ben Israel says, *that it does refer to the Redeemer.* In support of this declaration, also, the whole of the primitive Christian fathers may be adduced. Hæc (*i. e.*, that Goël here refers to Christ,) communis est Patrum sententia, says Sanctius: "It is the common sentiment of the fathers." And *ab uno disce omnes.* Jerome Epist. ad Pammachium remarks: "What is more evident than this prophecy? None, even since Christ, hath spoken so plainly of the resurrection

as he before Christ." Not only asserting that Goël refers here to the Redeemer, but that the passage announces the doctrine of the resurrection. Jerome's authority as a Hebraist is not to be despised; and it is, at any rate, in the matter before us, quite as good as that of Rabbi Menasseh Ben Israel, whom the Professor has so strangely adduced in support of his own position.

So far as Professor Bush's criticisms and objections are concerned, therefore, the passage has lost none of its claims to be regarded as referring to the Redeemer, and to the doctrine of the resurrection.

There are other objections, which Professor Bush has not noticed, and which may be briefly referred to. "1. The ancient Jews appear to have known nothing of the explanation of the passage which is now commonly received: nor are there any traces of it in the LXX." But it must be remembered, that the Jewish commentators referred to, all lived and wrote since the time of Christ, and after the judicial sentence mentioned in Isa. vi. 10, had been inflicted upon their nation. Compare Matt. xiii. 15, Mark iv. 12, Luke viii. 10, John xii. 40, Acts xxviii. 27, and Rom. xi. 8. This objection is, therefore, of no weight, especially when it is considered that the primitive *Christians* did so explain it. And then as to the Septuagint version, it must be borne in mind that the Jews, from time immemorial, entertained the false notion, that Job in his sufferings denied the providence of God. Hence they would avoid giving his language any construction that might seem to recognize the doctrine of the resurrection, as the common version makes him do.

2. It is objected that it is contrary to all analogy that such a clear statement of these doctrines, (asserted by the common version to be contained in this passage,) should be found in so ancient a writing. But *analogical arguments* ought to be sustained by proof: for it is easy to *imagine* them to be real when they exist only in fancy. Enoch uttered one of the clearest prophecies of the second coming of Christ that is contained in the Bible—and he was only "*the seventh from Adam.*" Jude 14, 15. On this prophecy it may be also in place to quote a passage from the able "*Notes on Genesis,*" by Professor Bush, in reply to this objection from *analogy:*—"A brief but impressive specimen of his (Enoch's) preaching," says this forcible annotator, "is preserved by the apostle Jude, FROM WHICH IT AP-

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PEARS, THAT THE DOCTRINE OF THE SECOND ADVENT OF CHRIST, THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD, AND A JUDGMENT TO COME, WERE TAUGHT, THOUGH OBSCURELY, IN THE VERY EARLIEST AGES OF THE WORLD." From the ascension of Enoch, (Heb. xi. 5, and Gen. v. 22,) also, the resurrection of the body might well be inferred; especially when taken in connexion with the well known fact, that man was not created mortal, but became so by sin, from which he was to be redeemed. And that the ancient prophets and patriarchs were generally acquainted with these doctrines, seems to be clear from Heb. xi. and 1 Pet. i. 9–12. Abraham had the promise made to him, that Christ should come out of his loins; Gen. xii. 3; and he is said by Christ to have "*seen his day*," and rejoiced. John viii. 56. When he left Ur, also, it was a heavenly city which he sought, whose builder and maker is God, Heb. xi. 10, 16; which infers a very clear conception of the doctrine of immortality. The laws of Moses, also, against *necromancy*, Deut. xviii. 9–12, (compare also 1 Sam. xxviii.,) infer a knowledge of the same truth. So, also, the Hebrew name for the kingdom of the dead, שאול, (ᾅδης,) which often occurs in the Pentateuch and in other books of the Old Testament, infers the same knowledge. See Gen. xxxvii. 35, &c. And the same may be said with respect to the often occurring phrase, "*to be gathered to his people*," (or rather, "*to enter into his dwelling place;*") see Gen. xxv. 8; xxxv. 29; Numb. xx. 24, &c. Paul, also, argues from Jacob's remark in Gen. xlvii. 9, (where that patriarch calls his life a *journey*,) that the patriarchs expected immortality. Heb. xi. 13–16. See, also, Christ's argument with the Sadducees, Matt. xxii. 23, (compare Exod. iii. 6.) The *analogical* argument seems, therefore, to be all the other way.

3. It is also objected, that "if Job had such distinct expectations and hopes, it is hard to account for it that he did not earlier express them; that he did not oftener console himself with them, and that he constantly recurs to his own complaints and doubts, which would have been entirely set aside and answered by the knowledge of any such deliverance." *Knapp's Theology*, p. 465. But if there is any force in this objection, it applies equally against the construction of the passage given by Dr. Knapp himself, and by Professor Bush, and all who dissent from the common view. For if Job had the confident expectation of a *temporal* deliverance,

which they assert that he professes in these words, "why did he not oftener express it, or console himself by it;" and "why does he constantly recur to his own complaints and doubts, which would have been entirely set aside and answered by the knowledge of any such deliverance?" If this objection, therefore, proves the common view to be erroneous, it proves, also, the erroneousness of the view taken by Dr. Knapp and those who agree with him.

4. The next objection urged by Dr. Knapp is the following: "Nor can it be accounted for, that his friends should have replied nothing to the statement of such a doctrine as this, since they take up one by one all his remarks, his complaints, and his consolations, and refute them. How, then, could they have passed, unnoticed, this most important of all his arguments?" But—1. If it were a fact, however, that Job's friends do not reply to him here, it would only prove, that like some other controvertists, they had acquired the art of silently passing by what they could not answer. Then, 2. If it is true that they have not replied to the idea, (asserted in the common version of this passage,) of Job's faith in the Redeemer, and in the doctrine of the resurrection, neither can it be shown that they reply to the idea of an expected temporal deliverance. This objection, therefore, applies as strongly against the explanation of Dr. Knapp and Professor Bush as it does against the common one. But, 3. The friends of Job do give a *general* reply to what he has here advanced, and from that reply it is clear to my own mind, that they understood his words as we do. In his argument he had said, "You see how grievously God has afflicted me, you ought not then, by insult, to add to my calamities; but rather to comfort and console me. For however I may be afflicted, I know that my Redeemer liveth," &c. &c. But how does Zophar answer this? Why by accusing Job of *hypocrisy;* chap. xx. 5, etc., and by insisting that he *must be wicked*, because he was thus punished, and that therefore he had better repent before God's wrath and fury shall be poured out upon him far worse than it now is. See verses 23—29. Let the reader now decide whether such a reply would be more appropriate to the expression of a hope of speedy temporal prosperity, or to such a hope as Job is understood to express in the common version of the passage? The charge of hypocrisy might properly lie against the expression of such a hope, (for the words of Job may contain

the patriarchal confession of faith,) and the expression of it may have been considered as a presentation of his claim to be regarded as a true servant of God: and if he had no such hope, while he asserted that he had, the terms חנף and רשע "impious and hypocritical wretch," verse 5, could be properly applied to him. But this could hardly be done if he merely expressed a hope of speedy temporal deliverance. The avowal of such a hope might prove that he was simply labouring under a mistake; but could afford no ground for accusing him of impiety and hypocrisy, however his character in other respects might have been regarded.

5. Dr. Knapp again objects, "From many passages in the book of Job, it is clear that he was indeed acquainted with a life after death (he speaks of שאול); but there is no satisfactory evidence that he believed in a state of retribution beyond the grave; vide chap. xiv. 7–12; vii. 6; ix. 25; xvii. 11–16; xvi. 22, seq." But this appears to be a refinement of theological dialectics rarely indulged in by Dr. Knapp. Is it conceivable that Job should have separated the doctrine of a future life from that of a state of future retribution? But even supposing that he did, it would make nothing to prove that he did not believe the doctrine of the resurrection. For with precisely the same propriety that he may be supposed to make this distinction, it may also be supposed that he distinguished between the doctrine of a future resurrection and that of future retribution. If immortality does not infer future retribution, neither does the resurrection necessarily infer it. The objection therefore amounts to nothing; and the texts quoted by Dr. Knapp, make no more against a supposed resurrection than against a supposed immortality.

6. The last objection of Dr. Knapp, is, that the common translation of this passage "does violence to the words of the original, and is contrary to the whole *usus loquendi* of the Bible." The strength of this objection depends upon the weight of Dr. Knapp's authority. Let it have all that it is entitled to, but let not the opposing authorities be overlooked. The point cannot be discussed here, but Michaelis, Rosenmüller, Hales, Pfeiffer, Schultens, J. Pye Smith, &c., may be consulted respecting it. When Grotius and Mercier started the new interpretation, the violation of the Hebrew idiom was declared to be *all on their side*. And so far as the recognition of the Redeemer by Job is concerned, (and

on this point Professor Bush declares that the whole controversy turns,) Mercier himself, the very Coryphaeus of the interpreters of Job, is compelled to admit it substantially. Mr. Barnes also frankly admits that no violence is done to the *usus loquendi* by the common rendering.

III. The Professor next quotes and comments on Psalm xvi. 9, 10.

"Therefore my heart is glad, and my glory rejoiceth: my flesh also shall rest in hope. For thou wilt not leave my soul in hell; neither wilt thou suffer thy Holy One to see corruption."

And on this text he remarks: "The fact of a resurrection is *undoubtedly* taught in these words, and yet from the inspired comment of Peter, Acts ii. 29–31, *it is clear that it is a resurrection predicated of the body of Christ*, and not of the bodies of men in general;" (p. 104,) a remark which sounds rather singular when viewed in connexion with some others of the Professor on the same subject: as e. g. "It is no where explicitly affirmed—*that the identical material body of Christ arose*," p. 152. Most persons would think this a contradiction; especially as the Psalmist and Peter both speak directly of the FLESH of the Saviour, (בשר, and σαρξ); which can refer to nothing but to his "identical *material body*."

IV. The next passage to which he refers, is Psalm xvii. 15.

"As for me, I will behold thy face in righteousness; I shall be satisfied when I awake with thy likeness."

The Professor enters into a lengthened criticism of this passage, into which we shall not follow him; for he admits what renders such a course unnecessary. He supposes that Paul, in 1 Corinthians xv. 49, may have "a latent allusion to the passage," and consequently, that it may teach the doctrine of the resurrection; though he denies that it teaches *the resurrection of the body*. He also quotes the version of the Jewish commentator, Sol. Jarchi, ("I shall be satisfied when the dead shall awake from their sleep,") and observes, "This preserves the general sentiment of the text, but leaves it doubtful at what period this 'awaking of the dead' is to take place." p. 107. And he himself proposes to translate the passage and explain it as follows: "guided by them, (the accents,) we would translate, 'I shall be satisfied, in the awaking, with thy likeness,' understanding it of the beatific vision to be enjoyed at the illustrious period of the

'awaking' so often spoken of in the prophets as identical with the great consummation, when the righteous dead are to be *gloriously manifested* as risen from the dead;" denying at the same time, however, that this is to be understood "in a sense to include a *resurrection of their bodies.*" These admissions that the "*resurrection*" is taught thus clearly in the Old Testament Scriptures, are gratifying. What the term signifies in its biblical acceptation, will be considered hereafter. Professor Bush, himself, will admit, (as he thus concedes that these passages do teach the doctrine of the resurrection,) that if the Scriptures make known the resurrection *of the body*, clearly and unequivocally, that doctrine must likewise be announced in Psalm xvii. 15.

He next quotes Psalm xlix. 14, 15, which, as I do not believe that it refers to the resurrection, I shall dismiss without remark.

V. His next quotation is from Isaiah xxv. 7, 8.

"And he will destroy in this mountain the face of the covering cast over all people, and the veil that is spread over all nations. He will swallow up death in victory; and the LORD God will wipe away tears from off all faces; and the rebuke of his people shall be taken away from off all the earth: for the LORD hath spoken it."

This passage has caused the Professor much difficulty; his exposition of it is laboured, and has every appearance of being altogether unsatisfactory to himself. The following is the analysis of it. He says that the period spoken of, is plainly that particular era under Messiah's reign when the mystical Babylon shall be destroyed; "at which time the Lord God will abolish death for ever, and all sorrow." Death, he explains to be "another term for all manner of grievous pestilences, &c.—every thing which causes grief, mourning, and tribulation."—Such death as is spoken of Psalm xliv. 22; and as he thinks is referred to in Rev. xxi. 4, "There shall be no more *death;* i. e. (says the Professor,) no more premature death by disease, pestilence, casualty, the sword of war, broken hearts, or any form of wasting judgments. This is the kind of death that shall be swallowed up in victory, or, as the term is otherwise rendered, 'for ever,' at the time to which the oracle points forward." pp. 111, 112. He denies also that this time "is the end of the world;" and endeavours to explain Paul's words in 1 Corinthians xv. 54, so that they may not appear to contradict his construction of the text.

We utterly dissent from this view of the text. Professor Bush has failed to support his exposition of the word "*death*" מוֹת, and has left the subject of the *period* referred to utterly undefined. But we shall remark upon each of these particulars: for the latter is one of much interest to the general subject under discussion.

As to the import of the word translated *death*, in verse 8, while Professor Bush would not change the translation of it, he would explain it so as to make it mean not *death* in the natural acceptation of the word, but suffering, misery, &c., &c. But for such an exposition he gives us no reason whatever. But the objections to this view are, 1. It is wholly unsupported by reason or authority. Suffering and misery, and all the procuring causes of death itself, may be properly considered *as included in death:* and the abolishing of death, may, and doubtless must include, the abolishing of all its procuring causes; so far as they are concerned, from whom it is abolished. But for what reason, or on what principle can it be imagined that "every thing which causes grief, mourning, and tribulation," i. e., sin and all its evils—all that really procures death, are here said by the prophet to be abolished, and death itself to remain? Revelation xxi. 4, which Professor Bush brings in to illustrate and confirm his view, is directly against it; for this passage speaks of death proper. And at least until Professor Bush had explained it, so as to show that θάνατος is not here used in its ordinary sense, it was premature for him to refer to it as illustrating and corroborating his view of מוֹת in Isaiah xxv. 7. Then again, 2. His view is directly contrary to the teaching of Paul in 1 Corinthians xv. 54: "So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, (ἐνδύσηται ἀφθαρσίαν), and this mortal shall have put on immortality, *then shall be brought to pass the saying which is written,* (τότε γενήσεται ὁ λόγος ὁ γεγραμμένος,) death is swallowed up in victory." In this passage, Paul unequivocally applies the phrase under discussion to the great era of the resurrection of the dead. But to this, Professor Bush replies, that "such cannot be the meaning of Paul, provided it be not the meaning of Isaiah." p. 112. This is truly a singular canon of criticism; and is a method of expounding the clear and unambiguous declaration of an apostle, without a precedent, even in the *Anastasis* itself. It needs no response other than to say that the Professor has not correctly expounded the passage of Isaiah, if

his exposition is contrary to that of Paul: a declaration that requires no proof to sustain it.

Horsley in his commentary on Hosea xiii. 14, refers to the text under discussion, and exhibits the futility of such a criticism as that of Professor Bush in the following forcible remarks: "The prophecy which the Apostle cites (in 1 Corinthians xv. 54,) as one which would receive its completion in the general resurrection at the last day, is a saying 'that is written,' which shall then be brought to pass; this prophecy is written in Isaiah xxv. 8, and no where else. And this prophecy which he cites, he cites with precision. And it may be useful to observe, that he cites it not according to the version of the LXX. *He translates the Hebrew text verbatim*, in contradiction to the version of the LXX.; for the version of the LXX., in this place, is so wretchedly and abominably erroneous, that the sense it gives is exactly the reverse of the Hebrew text."* Here, then, Paul quotes and literally translates a passage from Isaiah, and unambiguously expounds it by showing when and how it will be fulfilled; and Professor Bush rejects the exposition of the apostle, and justifies himself in so doing, by the remark that "such cannot be the meaning of Paul, provided it be not the meaning of Isaiah:" and then attempts to show that the meaning which Paul has given it, is not the meaning of Isaiah. The mere statement of such a procedure is abundantly sufficient to expose it to reprobation. It would be difficult to find among orthodox expositors, a parallel case in the whole annals of Scripture criticism.

But let us advert to his attempt *to prove* that Isaiah does not mean what Paul understood him to mean. "To this we reply, that such cannot be the meaning of Paul, provided it be not the meaning of Isaiah. The Spirit that presided over both cannot utter oracles at variance with themselves. But nothing can be more obvious, from the whole drift of the prophet's strain, than that he is not speaking of *the end of the world*. He is merely setting before us one of the links in the great chain of events which are to distinguish the latter days of Zion's welfare. How then is the *Apostle's*

* The Hebrew is בלע המות לנצח. The LXX. (according to Reineccius) translate it κατέπιεν ὁ θάνατος ἰσχύσας; and Paul renders it κατεπόθη ὁ θάνατος εἰς νῖκος. Lowth renders it, "He shall utterly destroy death for ever"; and Barnes gives it substantially the same translation, "He will abolish death for ever."

quotation to be understood? An alternative of constructions is presented. He either cites the language of Isaiah as containing an announcement, *the words—the letter*—of which are strikingly applicable to the state of things which he is describing, without assuming that they were originally *intended* to refer to it; or, acting the part of an inspired expositor of Isaiah, he applies his language to the period of time which the Holy Ghost had in view in inditing it through the prophet; and this brings us irresistibly to the conclusion, that the epoch of the resurrection described by Paul is not to be placed *at the end of the world*, which Isaiah's abolition of death certainly is not." pp. 112, 113. Such is the proof that Paul cannot mean in 1 Corinthians xv. 54, to refer "to the grand era of the resurrection of the dead."

I pass for the present what is here said concerning "the end of the world," in order to canvass this "alternative of constructions." 1. Paul *either* cited the mere *words* or *letter* as applicable to what he is speaking of, without assuming that they were *originally* intended to apply as he applies them. This is "alternative" first. Now place along side of it the passage above quoted, from 1 Corinthians xv. "THEN SHALL BE BROUGHT TO PASS THE SAYING WHICH WAS WRITTEN." (See the Greek on a preceding page,) "*written*" *in Isaiah* xxv. 8. At the time referred to by Paul, "the *saying*" (not the *letter* or *words* merely, as susceptible of an accommodation to that event, but "the saying which was written,") is to receive its fulfilment. And the principle which would explain this away as a mere accommodation of *the letter*, to the thing predicted, would explain away every prophecy, the fulfilment of which is recorded in the New Testament.* Let the reader try it upon any other one found recorded there. Try it on Matt. i. 23, or ii. 6, or iii. 3, or viii. 17, or xiii. 14, 15, 35, or xxi. 5, or xxvii. 9, 10, or Luke iv. 18, 19, or John xii. 38, 40, or xix. 24, 36, or any other, and there is not one but may be explained away on this principle.

* In his Preface, p. vi., Professor Bush says, "I have profoundly weighed all the considerations which naturally urge themselves upon one who ventures to such *a length of rational and exegetical hardihood* as he (the reader) will probably find evinced in the work before him." The above-mentioned instance is, I presume, one of the specimens of this "length of rational and exegetical hardihood" to which the Professor refers. He certainly has characterized it appropriately.

The other of this "alternative of constructions," is, that Paul acts "the part of an inspired expositor of Isaiah," and applies his language to the time referred to by Isaiah; and this, says the Professor, "brings us irresistibly to the conclusion, that the epoch of the resurrection described by Paul is not to be placed at the end of the world, which Isaiah's abolition of death certainly is not." That is, in other words, (and we may safely defy the Professor himself to get any other meaning out of his language,) Paul acts as "an *inspired expositor* of Isaiah," and therefore his language in 1 Cor. xv., must "*irresistibly*" mean just what Professor Bush understands Isaiah to mean.

Isaiah xxv. 8, has therefore lost none of its force as a proof-text of the doctrine of the resurrection, by the criticism of Professor Bush. As expounded by Paul, it unequivocally asserts the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. It is the body alone which falls under the power of death. And death being conquered therefore, his prey is restored, and the body raised again.

VI. The next passage referred to by Professor Bush is found in Isaiah xxvi. 19.

"Thy dead men shall live, together with my dead body shall they arise. Awake and sing, ye that dwell in dust: for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out the dead."

It would be useless to follow our author through his laboured exposition of this passage; for his hypothesis is only one of an indefinite number, which have been resorted to for the purpose of explaining the prophet's meaning; and then we cheerfully concede that the terms "dead men," "dead body," "arise," &c., are to be taken metaphorically; and refer in their primary application here to the circumstances connected with the restoration of the Jews from the Babylonian captivity. These circumstances it is needless to narrate, for, so far as our argument is concerned, we are not called upon to enter into a formal exposition of the terms referred to. We admit, and Professor Bush admits, that they do not primarily refer to the future resurrection of mankind. The captives in Babylon were dead in a metaphorical or civil sense; and they shall again live, says the prophet. We are willing, even, for the sake of the argument, to adopt the language of our author, on the subject; "On the whole,"

says he, "we think it must be evident that the passage from Isaiah now under consideration cannot be appealed to as teaching, upon a fair construction, *the resurrection of the body*, (that is, directly, and primarily.) At any rate, if it conveys such an implication, it is only in an indirect and typical way, by which a national resuscitation—the primary sense—dimly shadows forth *the re-erection of the defunct body from its mouldering elements.*" p. 121.

Now it is our own belief that the passage in its primary sense does not announce the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, for the *body*, and the *dead* referred to were only metaphorically dead: we therefore think that "in an indirect and typical way it shadows forth the re-erection of the defunct body from its mouldering elements." But the question is, Upon what is this metaphor founded? Is it a mere inane expression, alluding to nothing at all? The Jews understood the meaning of *dead*, and *dead body;* and of a *dead body arising.* The language must be understood in its literal use, before it can be employed in metaphor. How then could the prophet refer to a metaphorical death and resurrection, if the doctrine of a resurrection were unknown to them? How could he use it as a figure to convey to his countrymen a sweet and precious truth, if the doctrine from which the metaphor was taken, was not believed by them? If they were acquainted with the sentiment, but regarded it only as fable, is it not clear that the prophet would have avoided selecting such a figure, lest his people might suppose that what he asserted was equally fabulous? There is therefore no possible way in which to avoid the conclusion to which Lowth comes; who, in referring to this passage, says, "It appears from hence that the doctrine of *the resurrection of the dead was at that time a popular and common doctrine:* for an image which is assumed in order to express or represent any thing in the way of allegory or metaphor, whether poetical, or prophetical, must be an image commonly known and understood; otherwise it will not answer the purpose for which it is assumed." *Notes in loco.* Mr. Barnes presents also the same view.

This passage, therefore, by the plainest implication, teaches the doctrine of the resurrection of the body.

VII. The next passage referred to by Professor Bush, is Ezekiel xxxvii. 1–14.

"The hand of the Lord was upon me, and carried me out in the Spirit of the Lord, and set me down in the midst of the valley which was full of bones, and caused me to pass by them round about:" &c.

Speaking of this *vision of the dry bones*, Jerome remarks, "Shall we not immediately give an advantage to heretics, if we should deny that this (representation,) ought to be understood of the general resurrection? For never would a similitude of the resurrection be employed for illustrating the restoration of the people of Israel unless a future resurrection itself was also believed: because no one confirms things that are uncertain, by things that have no existence."* And this also appears to be the general sentiment of the Christian Church. Tertullian and Augustine say, "From this passage the future resurrection of the body is assuredly to be inferred; for otherwise a similitude would not have been taken from thence for confirming the restoration of Israel." The Jews entertain the same view of the subject.

Professor Bush offers but few remarks upon this passage; but he refers us to his recent work, "*The Valley of Vision*," in which he has shown that Ezekiel xxxvii. 1—14, does not speak of the general resurrection, but "is merely a symbolical fore-shadowing *of the still future restoration and conversion of the Jews;*" a view, which seems to us, undoubtedly correct.

In discussing the passage, therefore, the question is not whether it speaks directly of the general resurrection—for it is conceded that it does not: but whether this employment of such a figure does not clearly infer that the doctrine on which it is based, or grounded, was known and believed by the Jews in Ezekiel's time? In accordance with the asserted views of the whole Jewish and Christian Church, (on the chapter before us,) we affirm that it does; and our reasons

* Nec statim hæreticis occasionem dabimus, si hæc de resurrectione communi intelligi denegemus? Nunquam enim poneretur similitudo resurrectionis ad restitutionem Israelitici populi significandam, nisi esset resurrectio ipsa et futura crederetur; quia nemo de rebus non extantibus incerta confirmat." Professor Bush quotes this same passage; and in order to avoid the *keen point* of old father Hierome in the first sentence, he translates *nec* by *nor*, "*nor shall we at once give advantage to heretics if we deny* that this is to be understood of the general resurrection." p. 116—thus making Jerome not only talk nonsense, (a thing he very seldom does, if compared with his cotemporaries,) but deny the very thing that he pointedly affirms.

for thinking so are briefly stated in our examination of the passage last quoted. Professor Bush, however, demurs as follows: "We are aware it is contended here also, as in the case of the preceding passage from Isaiah, that the announcement of a *spiritual* or *figurative* resurrection necessarily supposes a *literal*. But to this we reply by demanding the scriptural *evidence* that such a resurrection was taught or believed in Ezekiel's times. The fact is, it will be found, if we mistake not, that the usual argumentation on this head is mere reasoning in a circle. Certain passages, like those now adverted to, are brought forward, elaborately commented on, and conclusively shown to refer to a *symbolical resurrection*. (!) But from the force of established belief it is strenuously contended, that all these images are founded upon the doctrine of a literal corporeal resurrection; and when we call for the proof of this doctrine, lo and behold, we are referred to the very passages which are previously demonstrated to have another meaning!" p. 123.

What Professor Bush means by "the usual argumentation on this head," when he is perfectly aware that both Christians and Jews have always with one voice explained the passage before us to refer to a figurative resurrection, is hard to tell: but if our reasoning in this matter be a circle, it is one that can be very easily *squared*. To the "anouncement that a *spiritual* or *figurative* resurrection necessarily supposes a *literal*," (is *literal* the antithesis of *spiritual?*) he replies "by demanding the scriptural evidence that such a resurrection was taught or believed in Ezekiel's times:" for if it were *then* known and believed, the Professor will admit that the passage in question certainly refers to that doctrine. Is there any proof therefore? Let us see. We begin with our author's "*Notes on Genesis*," v. 22. "A brief but impressive specimen of his (Enoch's) preaching is preserved by the apostle Jude, from which it appears that the doctrine of the second advent of Christ, *the resurrection of the dead*, and a judgment to come, were taught, though somewhat obscurely, *in the very earliest ages of the world*. Wonderful as was *the translation of a living man to the world of glory*, we know nothing in the revealed purposes of God to forbid the occurrence of other instances of the like kind even in this or any other ages of the world, provided they were instances of equal eminence in piety. The same distinction was subsequently conferred on Elijah," &c. If,

then, the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead was known *before* the times of Ezekiel, how will Professor Bush undertake to prove that it was not known *in* Ezekiel's time? The next argument that proves it is also referred to in this extract. The Jews inferred that the righteous were to live again in their bodies, because Enoch and Elijah lived in theirs. The Professor also, on page 104, of his *Anastasis*, admits that Psalm xvi. 9, 10, announces the resurrection "of the *body* of Christ." Evidence might be multiplied; but surely these admissions, and affirmations of his own, must fully satisfy him that the doctrine was known and believed in Ezekiel's time: and that this imagined "reasoning in a circle," has no existence but in the imagination. Ezekiel xxxvii., therefore, contains a clear implication of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body.

VIII. The next passage quoted by Professor Bush, is Hosea vi. 2.

"After two days will he revive us; in the third day he will raise us up, and we shall live in his sight."

We shall dismiss this text without remark, as it is not a passage of primary importance in the controversy.

IX. The Professor's next citation is Hosea xiii. 14.

"I will ransom them from the power of the grave; I will redeem them from death: O death, I will be thy plagues; O grave, I will be thy destruction: repentance shall be hid from mine eyes."

Were I called upon to specify a passage in which the doctrine of the resurrection of the body is unambiguously taught, in the Old Testament, and on the interpretation of which I should be willing to rest the controversy, it would be this: for even Daniel xii. 2, is not clearer in its testimony; nor are we favoured in respect to it, as we are in respect to the passage in Hosea, with a lucid and unmistakable commentary of an inspired apostle. Such being the high (and universally acknowledged) claims of this passage to be primarily regarded in any attempted discussion of this doctrine, we should of course expect *a priori* that Professor Bush would have laid out his strength here, if any where, and not have laid aside his exegetical and critical apparatus, until there had been some plausible construction put upon the passage, which would neither assert nor clearly imply the doctrine which he opposes. But this the Professor has neither

done nor attempted to do. There is no exegesis of the passage, no criticism of the Hebrew, no reference even to Rabbi Menasseh Ben Israel! but the subject is coolly passed over with a reference to 1 Corinthians xv. 55, and a promise hereafter to discuss what Paul there says; followed by a remark upon שאול and a quotation from Horsley "on the general subject of the apostolic quotations from the Old Testament." p. 127. And here ends the chapter. This may have been all that Professor Bush supposed to be necessary; but it is not a rash assertion to say, that from the high-sounding pretensions of his work, it was *not all* that his readers had *a right to expect.* And *why*, in the name of candour and of all consistency, should he dwell so extensively as he has done, on passages which it is cheerfully conceded do not positively and directly *affirm* the doctrine under discussion, and then pass over, almost without remark, one which has ever been understood as clearly and fully asserting it?

Literally the passage reads thus:

> "From the hand of Sheol* I will redeem them;
> From Death I will deliver them:
> I will be thy death (or plagues,) O Death!
> I will be thy destroyer, O Sheol!"

The idea in the last two clauses is, that Messiah will visit upon death and Sheol, in retribution, what they had inflicted upon his chosen. The passage is highly poetic, and its import very easily perceived. Death has conquered the body; Sheol, or the invisible world retains the spirit. But Sheol must render up the spirit; Death also must resign the body. When he resigns it, he in turn is for ever conquered; and Sheol is now in turn taken possession of by those who were, so to speak, detained by it as captives. Hence it is also represented as wholly destroyed, for this separate state will then exist no more. See 1 Corinthians xv. 26, 55, and Revelation xx. 13, 14. As to נחם in the last clause of the verse, it seems there to mean properly *repentance*, as it is translated. The idea is, "I shall never repent of this declaration—I shall not fail to accomplish it fully." In Hosea

* Modern languages (European at least,) furnish no term by which to translate שאול or ᾅδης adequately. *It refers to the state of the dead without distinction as to condition.* The reader will find a very good exposition of it in Campbell's Prelim. Dis. VI. Part II. and some excellent remarks in a note by Howe, in his splendid sermon on Rev. i. 18. See *Works*, p. 309 seq.

xiii. 14, therefore, we have a full and clear and positive announcement of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body; —the deliverance of the spirit from Sheol, and of the body from the power of death.

X. The last passage adduced from the Old Testament by Professor Bush, is Daniel xii. 2.

"And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake: some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt."

The remarks of our author on this text are *first* in reference to the proper translation of it; and *secondly* in reference to the "kind of resurrection here announced." In respect to the first of these he proposes to translate the passage literally as follows: "And many of the sleepers of the dust of the ground shall awake—these to everlasting life, and those to shame and everlasting contempt:" which he paraphrases thus. "'*These*,' i. e., the awakened, awake to everlasting life; '*and those*,' i. e., the other class, *who abide in the dust*, who do not awake at all, remain subject to the shame and ignominy of that death, whatever it was, which marked their previous condition." pp. 131, 132. On page 120, he likewise refers to the passage, and gives it a similar explanation. In his "Valley of Vision" pp. 48—52, also, he gives it the same exposition; and remarks, "We should not be surprised if the progress of biblical investigation should yet establish the most intimate relation between these texts, (Isaiah xxvi. 19, and Daniel xii. 2,) and that intensely mysterious portion of the Apocalypse, (chap. 20,) which announces the spiritual quickening, in the first resurrection, of those saints who lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years, and of 'the rest of the dead who lived not, (οὐκ ἔζησαν —erroneously rendered 'lived not again,') until the thousand years were finished;' or, rather, perhaps 'as long as the thousand years were finishing,' i. e., during the whole course of the millennium, without any implication that they *should* live when that period had expired." p. 51.

This criticism of the Professor's is, however, not new. Old Rabbi Saadias Gaon in his commentary, long ago took the same view of it substantially. "This," says he, "is the resurrection of the dead of Israel, whose lot is to eternal life; but those who do not awake, they are the destroyed of the Lord, who go down to the habitation beneath, that is Gehenna, and

shall be an abhorrence to all flesh." The Rabbi, in this last clause, refers to Isaiah lxvi. 24, in which place also דִּרָאוֹן (translated *contempt* in Daniel xii. 2,) occurs, with the slight change of the : into a ·· —these being the only places where it is used in the Bible. The same exposition is likewise given by some of the English literal school.

The reasons given by Professor Bush to sustain this *translation* are, I think, satisfactory.* But his *paraphrase* of it is not sustained by the translation itself. I have no doubt that the time referred to in Dan. xii. 1, 2, is synchronical with that mentioned in Rev. xx. 1–6; and fully believe that the events there spoken of are the same. The *inference* of Professor Bush, that the "many" who do not at that time arise, or "the rest of the dead" who then arise not, *will never arise*, is wholly unsupported by Dan. xii. 2, and directly contradictory to Rev. xx. 7–13.

2. But "what *kind* of a resurrection is that here announced, and to what *time* is it to be referred?" asks Professor Bush in the next place: and we shall proceed to consider his answer to these important queries. He remarks that the context "indicates pretty clearly that the period referred to, can scarcely be that of 'the end of the world,' as that phrase is usually apprehended, for the sequel obviously announces an extended order of events stretching onwards through a long lapse of centuries to the time, whatever that be, when Daniel himself is to 'stand in his lot at the end of the days.'" With the exception of his error in referring "days," in this last clause, to this "long lapse of centuries," and making Daniel thus to stand in his lot at the end of them, instead of at the end of the days referred to, when it is said that Michael shall stand up, and the "many" arise, I entirely accord with this view of Professor Bush. So that, thus far, we are agreed. pp. 135, 136.

The Professor then expresses his conviction, "that this prediction of Daniel (chap. xii. 2) ushers in that new dispensation which was to be opened by the Messiah, at his death and resurrection, and which began more signally to verify itself at the destruction of Jerusalem." p. 135. And hence he recognizes an incipient fulfilment of "this oracle,"

* In his exegesis of the passage he has drawn very freely, as he acknowledges, from the "Princeton Biblical Repertory" for July, 1844, which contains a very able review of his "Valley of Vision."

in the dead raised by Christ during his ministry, "but more especially in that display of resurrection-power which was put forth upon" those mentioned in Matt. xxvii. 50–53. Thus far he supposes that the words "may be construed as having respect to a literal resurrection." But this he regards "as, in the main, a mere outward and sensible adumbration of a far more glorious work of moral quickening, which was to be the result of Christ's accomplished redemption in behalf of his people, and in which this prediction was to receive its more complete and signal fulfilment. From age to age this spiritual vivification was to proceed in connexion with the 'judgment of the great day,' the period of the עולם הבא, *the world to come*," &c. p. 136. And to illustrate this view he presents some striking passages from the *Zohar*, *Midrash Mishle*, *Torath Adam*, *R. Saadias*, 4 Esdras ii. 10, &c. We need not here examine these authorities, for they are adduced by Professor Bush only to show that his view of the circumstances connected with the period referred to, was held also by the Jews.

After these references our author explains what he means by the "moral quickening" mentioned in the foregoing extract. He says, "From the teachings of our Lord and his apostles we learn that all men are by nature *dead* in trespasses and in sins; and that the effect of the gospel, attended by the energetic influence of the Holy Spirit, is to quicken its recipients into a new and divine life, which, as it is a virtual resurrection while they are yet in the body, issues by necessary consequence in that consummated resurrection which accrues to them upon their leaving the body." p. 138. And after referring to some texts in the New Testament, and to the import of ἀνάστασις ἐκ νεκρῶν, (all of which will be attended to in its proper place, but by which the Professor here designs to show that Daniel xii. 2, must refer to the "moral regeneration" of which he speaks,) he concludes that the passage under consideration does not teach "*the resurrection of the body.* If the prediction," continues he, "really finds its fulfilment in the resurrection taught in the New Testament, and if it can be shown, as we shall hope shortly to do, that this is a resurrection which is gradually taking place from age to age, and one in which the spiritual body developed at death is intimately related to the spiritual life implanted in regeneration, then we see not how to resist the conclusion that this 'awaking from the dead,' announced by Daniel,

points mainly to a *spiritual* and not a *corporeal* resurrection." p. 140. Thus closes his criticism, and his attempt to get rid of the testimony of this plain-speaking text. But let us now review this laboured exposition.

The time referred to by Daniel, says the Professor, begun at the death and resurrection of Christ, and more formally at the destruction of Jerusalem; and is to extend throughout the gospel dispensation: and the resurrection is the spiritual resurrection of believers under the gospel. But 1. If Daniel xii. refer to the same period and events mentioned in Rev. xx. (which our author admits in his "Valley of Vision," no less than in his *Anastasis*,) how can that period refer to the time of Christ's resurrection, or to that of the destruction of Jerusalem? When the Apocalypse was written these events were surely past,* and that speaks of the period as still future. This would make the thousand years also commence about A. D. 33, or 70; while Professor Bush in his "Millennium of the Apocalypse," p. 101, assigns their commencement to be "somewhere between A. D. 395, and A. D. 450." The Professor's connecting link, therefore, between Daniel xii. and Rev. xx. must either break, or his exposition of the text under consideration must be abandoned. The same argument will prove that Daniel xii. 2, cannot refer to the resurrections recorded in the Gospels.

2. But there is another objection which is utterly subversive of that part of his exposition which makes the "awaking" spoken of in Daniel, to be the moral regeneration of men under the gospel, which Professor Bush regards as a resurrection that is completed when the spiritual body is developed at death. Were not men "dead in sin" before Christ? and were they not spiritually regenerated then? See Genesis vi. 3, Isaiah lxiii. 10, &c., &c. And were not all the pious that then died, raised from the dead at death, "by natural law," according to Professor Bush's theory? The following extract will answer this query. Speaking in reference to Matthew xxii. 31, 32, he says, "If there is a

* The best chronologers place the date of the writing of the Apocalypse after the destruction of Jerusalem. Baronius places it in A. D. 97. Alsted and Pearson, and Mill, and Fabricius, and Zeibichius, Klemmius, and Reineccius in 96. So also Le Clerc, Dr. Lardner, Basnage, Bishop Tomline, Dr. Woodhouse, &c. And all antiquity attests that John was banished to Patmos by the order of Domitian whose death occurred in September, A. D. 96.

palpable, we had almost said an unmistakable, averment in the compass of holy writ, it is that the true doctrine of the resurrection is proved from the fact, that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were living when Christ spake these words, and *consequently must have been raised and must be living in resurrection bodies.*" pp. 207, 208. If then the moral resurrection (or regeneration) of man had been going on ever since the promise of a Saviour in Genesis iii., and if the pious entered the resurrection-state so soon as they died, then what has become of Professor Bush's magnificent exposition of Daniel xii. 2? He makes the prophet say that a great event is to transpire at a certain time—Behold! there will take place *a wonderful event;* to wit:—*things will go on just as they have been going on ever since the creation!* Who can help thinking of *Parturiunt montes*, &c.? Yet such is the absurdity to which Professor Bush is driven in order to carry out his theory.

There are twenty other objections against the exposition of our author, all equally fatal to it, such as, for example, the impossibility of explaining "*sleeping in the dust of the earth*," (without doing the utmost violence to the whole *usus loquendi* of the Scrptures,) to refer to *death in sin:* but the foregoing will suffice. And the Professor's exposition being thus proved to be false, the text must still stand, as it ever has stood—an unimpeached and unimpeachable witness of the truth of the great Scripture doctrine *of the resurrection of the body.*

So far, therefore, as the Old Testament Scriptures are concerned, Professor Bush has done nothing to invalidate their testimony to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body: nor has he succeeded in even the shadow of an argument in favour of the theory which he advocates.

CHAPTER III.

A CONSIDERATION OF PROFESSOR BUSH'S REMARKS ON THE NEW TESTAMENT DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION.

SECTION I.

Preliminary Remarks.

THE Professor commences his remarks on this branch of the argument with the observation, that "the train of investigation thus far pursued has, if we mistake not, conducted us to one important conclusion, viz: that the teachings of the Old Testament, so far as they throw light at all on the theme of human destiny in the world to come, do not go beyond the announcement of the simple fact of *a future life:*" (p. 141:) a *conclusion* which we regard as wholly unsupported by his "train of argumentation," and the correctness of which we are entirely willing to leave to the reader to determine. Yet, notwithstanding, he candidly concedes that "it still must be admitted, as natural to suppose, that the doctrine declared by Christ on this subject (the resurrection) would be in the main a fuller and clearer enunciation of the very doctrine so darkly (!) intimated in the Jewish Scriptures;" (*ibid.*) an admission which is based upon truth, and which Professor Bush has beautifully illustrated in his ingenious and excellent criticism on φωτιζειν, (p. 92,) to which we have referred on a preceding page.

In Chap. V. Part. II., (containing these preliminary remarks to the New Testament argument,) he likewise proceeds to re-affirm his canons of criticism, (to which we have so fully adverted in Chap. I. above,) and admits that we are not at liberty "to array any *hypothetical assumptions* against the *clear* evidence of *facts*," as asserted in the teaching of Christ: "Yet," says he, "we are at liberty to have recourse to *a priori* considerations in fixing the principles on which language that is *intrinsically doubtful* is to be interpreted." p. 142. Few, I suppose, would ques-

tion the propriety of such a procedure; but the difficulty with Professor Bush is just here; he *does* array "hypothetical assumptions against the clear evidence of facts;" and he perpetually insists upon it, that language which, taken by itself in its proper connexion, is perfectly plain in its import, is "intrinsically doubtful" if it does not perfectly chime in with his *à priori* deductions of reason and philosophy. He first *proves* by these deductions that the meaning of the language is "intrinsically doubtful," as "no two truths in the universe can conflict with each other;" and then he "fixes the principles" on which "it is to be interpreted" in consistency with these self-same deductions—a vastly convenient method by which to make the Bible "a nose of wax," and render it the "laughing-stock" of infidelity.

"The question, then," says the Professor, "is a perfectly fair one, in what manner the Divine Teacher *would be apt to promulgate* to the Jews, and through them to the world, the grand doctrine of man's future existence. (This *is à priori* 'with a vengeance!') This question becomes doubly proper and urgent, if we may venture to suppose ourselves to have attained, by scientific discovery apart from revelation, a view of the subject which commands assent, but which is at the same time *apparently* in conflict with the literal statements of the Scriptures; for the case then becomes similar to that of geology,* where a *reason* is imperatively required for the seeming discrepancy between the letter of the sacred record and the ascertained facts of science." p. 142. Thus emphatically does he re-affirm the principles upon which his theory is based; and which have guided him through his long and laborious discussion of Scripture texts, and also conducted him through as many vagaries as, we think, could be conveniently played off in a duodecimo of four hundred pages!

* In reference to this often-repeated assertion of Professor Bush, I again distinctly and emphatically remark, that no geological *facts* have ever been pointed out, which in themselves contradict the clear import of any passage of God's word, as ascertained by the *acknowledged principles* (not, however, "accommodation principles") of Scripture criticism. And with high respect for his talents and learning, I affirm, that Professor Bush is *unable* to produce a *single instance* of the kind.

SECTION II.

Definition of Terms.

In entering into a discussion of the New Testament evidence on the subject before us, it is of great importance to ascertain the meaning of the terms which are most frequently employed in relation to it.

The Jews had no word precisely corresponding with the term ἀνάστασις as employed in the New Testament, though they somewhat familiarly designate the resurrection of the body by several words and phrases in use in their Rabbinic dissertations. The most common of these are תקומה derived from קום *to stand or rise up*, (see Zephaniah iii. 8, Isaiah xxvi. 19, &c.,) and תחיה derived from חיה *to live*, (its most ordinary import,) and also *to remain alive; to revive or recover*, Genesis xx. 7 and Isaiah lv. 3, and also *to live again;* see Ezekiel xxvii. 5, seq. and 1 Kings xvii. 22. Yet were they, (subsequent to Alexander's conquest) familiar with the term ἀνάστασις, and frequently employed it in translating the terms above-named, as a reference to the LXX. will evince. And a reference also to 2 Maccabees vii. 14; and xii. 43—45, will show that they applied the term directly to designate the resurrection of the body. (Compare also the statements in 4 Esdras ii. 10, 13, 15, 16, 30, 31.) They also employed the term ἀναβίωσις *a rising up again*, interchangeably with ἀνάστασις. These terms therefore, were in use among the Jews in the time of our Saviour.

The apostles and evangelists when reporting the discourses of Christ, or announcing the doctrine of the resurrection, do never use ἀναβίωσις. *Once* they employ ἔγερσις (from ἐγείρω *to rise*, a verb of very frequent occurrence, in the New Testament, and also employed by the LXX. to translate עור and also קום,) in designation of the resurrection of Christ, Matthew xxvii. 53; but the term by which they designate the resurrection-state is ἀνάστασις. And this term the Jews before Christ employed to designate *the resurrection of the body*, as we have shown. (See 2 Maccabees vii. 14, and xii. 43—45.) *This is the term* employed by the inspired apostle in his report of the dispute between Christ and the Sadducees; (Matthew xxii. and Luke xx.,) and in this dispute it is inconceivable that the term could have been

employed out of its popular acceptation. And if it were employed in the sense in which the Jews understood it, the term in the New Testament must necessarily import the *resurrection of the body.* This is a point of great importance, in determining the usage of this word in the New Testament; and of course Professor Bush can have nothing to say either against our argument or inference, as he constantly affirms that our Lord and his apostles "accommodated their teaching to the views" of the Jews. As the Jewish usage of the term, therefore, in its application to the future state of man, imports the literal resurrection of his body; the term must include this in its signification as employed by Christ in Matthew xxii.

It seems to me to be idle to appeal to the mere etymology of the word (as some writers do,) in order to determine its import as used in the New Testament. I do not deny that it *may be used* in different senses. It may mean simply, *erectio post lapsum*, or as Joannes Damascenus defines it, ἀνάστασις; δευτέρα τοῦ πεπτωκότος στάσις, i. e., *a second standing of that which had fallen down;* or, as Bretschneider defines it, it may mean simply *exsurgere*, (see LXX. in Jeremiah iii. 63, and Zephaniah iii. 8,) so far as the simple etymology is concerned; but the query is, what is its recognized import in the New Testament?

In reference to the import of the word Dr. Dwight remarks: "So far as I have observed, it usually denotes our existence beyond the grave." *Theol.* IV., p. 430. Dr. Campbell, also, says that "in this view, when applied to the dead, the word denotes, properly, no more than a *renewal of life* to them, in whatever manner this may happen." See *Note on* Matt. xxii. 23.* But I should rather have the *reasons* of these eminent men than their authority, great as it confessedly is: for I am satisfied that the meaning of the term, as applied in the New Testament to the future existence of the dead, is something far more definite than this. I have no design to write a dissertation; nor would I make the doctrine under discussion to depend upon a definition of a term; but there are several things which I have not seen

* I have been grieved exceedingly to see the uncandid statement which Professor Bush has made (on pp. 209, 210) of the view of Dr. Campbell, while purporting to make an extract from the note above referred to. The sense of the passage *is utterly changed.*

referred to in this connexion, and which have great weight in ascertaining the New Testament usage of the word.

Though Dr. Campbell, in the note above quoted, has, for the purpose of sustaining himself in his definition of the term, asserted, that "the Pharisees did not universally mean by this term, the re-union of soul and body," "as is evident," says he, "from Josephus;" yet, when his definition is out of his mind, he candidly admits that this historian's representations in the matter cannot be fully relied upon. He affirms, "that there are some things, however, which would lead one to infer that the opinions of the Pharisees, on this article, (the resurrection,) were more conformable to Christian doctrine, than is implied in the words of Josephus." *Prelim. Diss.* VI., Part II., § 19. The authority of Josephus, therefore, cannot demonstrate that the Pharisees did not universally mean by this term the re-union of soul and body. But as Dr. Campbell has involved the matter in a mist, so far as the Jewish view is concerned, (which it is highly important here to know,) I must ask the reader's attention to a few remarks touching the matter.

The Pharisees (who, however, were not the only persons among the Jews who believed the doctrine of the resurrection) did unquestionably hold the doctrine of the transmigration of the souls of the righteous. According to Josephus, they believed that "the wicked shall be for ever detained in prison, while the righteous shall be made to revive and live again." *Antiq.* lib. 18, c. 1. They, also, held "that all souls are incorruptible; but it is the soul of the righteous only *which passes into another body*, while the soul of the wicked abides in eternal punishment:" καταβαίνειν εἰς ἕτερον σῶμα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μόνον, τὴν δὲ τῶν φαύλων ἀϊδίῳ τιμωρίᾳ κολάζεσθαι. *De Bello Jud.*, Lib. II., c. 12. These passages require no explanation. If Josephus is correct, the Pharisees held that the soul of the righteous alone underwent transmigration.

They believed, also, the doctrine of the resurrection of the body—but it was the resurrection of the body of the righteous alone. Dr. Lightfoot, whose acquaintance with rabbinical literature no one will dispute, says: "The whole nation did so generally assert and hold the resurrection of the dead, (the Sadducees only excepted,) that they made the deniers of this point one of the three parties that should never have part in the world to come: as they speak in the

Talmud, in the Tractate of Sanhed. Perek. Helek.—'These are they that have no portion in the world to come; he that saith, the resurrection of the dead is not taught from the Law; and he that saith, that the Law is not from heaven; and Epicures.'" *Comment.* on Acts iv. 2. Works, Vol. I., p. 759, *folio.* This clearly expresses their belief in the resurrection, as distinct from the previous notion of transmigration. But the following passages (for which I am indebted to Professor Bush, pp. 253–4) will express their view of its limitation to the righteous: "Kimchi remarks, 'The benefit of the rain is common to the just and unjust; but the resurrection of the dead is the peculiar privilege of those who have lived righteously.'" Menasseh Ben Israel says: "From the mind and opinion then of all the ancients, we conclude that there will not be a general resurrection of the dead, and one common to all men." These conflicting views, thus confusedly mingled in their theology, we shall not undertake here to reconcile: for it is not necessary that they should be reconciled in order to answer entirely the purpose for which we have quoted them.

They held also, (as the foregoing passages show) that the *souls* of all, both righteous and unrighteous were alike immortal, or incorruptible. The language of Josephus is very express "ψυχὴν πᾶσαν μὲν ἀφθαρτον," *De Bell.* Lib. II. c. 12.

But though they admitted so clearly the future existence, or immortality of the wicked, THEY NEVER APPLIED THE TERM ἀνάστασις TO THAT STATE.—They never called the future state or existence of the wicked an ἀνάστασις:* but apply this term strictly and exclusively to the future state of the righteous; which they defined to be a state of union of the soul with its former body, or some other corporeal structure into which it had passed. The assertion, that ἀνάστασις was employed by the Jews either in the time of Christ or before it, to designate the future state of men without reference to

* As a further illustration and confirmation of this statement, see 2 Maccabees vii. 14. "God will raise me again," says the pious martyr, addressing his persecutor, "but for thee indeed there is no resurrection unto life." Καὶ γενόμενος πρὸς τὸ τελευτᾶν, οὕτως ἔφη, Αἱρετὸν μεταλλάσσοντας ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ προσδοκᾶν ἐλπίδας, πάλιν ἀναστήσεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. Σοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάστασις εἰς ζωὴν οὐκ ἔσται. This was, of course spoken in accordance with the views of his people, who consequently believed in *the future existence* of the wicked, but not in their ἀνάστασις.

their moral condition, and without respect to the reunion of soul and body, *is, therefore, utterly destitute of foundation.* And the inference is plain, that if such was not the usage of the Jews in the time of Christ, such was not the sense attached to the term by the Sadducees in Matthew xxii. or Luke xx.; as they doubtless employed it in its popular signification. And if they in their objection employed it as we have shown above, then our Saviour employed it so likewise; for had he changed its import in his reply, his answer would not have contained a refutation of the Sadducees' objection.

Such, too, is the common import of this term in the New Testament; and hence it is applied to the resurrection of Christ, which was a reunion of soul and body. See Acts i. 22, and ii. 31, and iv. 33, and xvii. 18, and Romans i. 4, and vi. 5, Philippians iii. 10, 1 Peter i. 3, and iii. 21. In like manner it designates also those who were recalled to life, as recorded in the Bible. See Hebrews xi. 35, (and 1 Kings xvii. 17 sq., 2 Kings iv. 20—36.) So, too, those who denied the resurrection evidently thus employed the term, 1 Corinthians xv. 12, for they doubtless entertained Professor Bush's view that the resurrection of the body (i. e., its reunion with the soul,) was impossible. Hence they denied it. And so, finally, the classical Athenians clearly understood the term as employed by Paul. For had they attached to it the idea of Drs. Campbell and Dwight, that it refers only to a future state of existence, they would never have mocked as they did. Because the doctrine of man's immortality, or future existence, they had already known; it having been the doctrine of Homer, Socrates, Plato, and all their best poets and philosophers. But they understood the term as conveying the idea of a future reunion of soul and body, and hence their unbelief and mocking. Acts xvii. 32.

Bretschneider remarks, *sub voce*, that the term is used in a two-fold manner in the New Testament: 1. In reference to the return to life of those who had died a while before; and 2. To designate the return of all the dead into life at the end of all things, or at the last day. Wahl sustains the same view of it. See Lexicon, *infra vocem.*

But Professor Bush has (pp. 144–150) endeavoured to unsettle the clearly established import of this word, in order to neutralize the force of its testimony in behalf of the great doctrine which he opposes. He exhibits a great deal of learning in explaining and illustrating its etymology, and

talks much about ἀνά and ἵστημι, and στασις and ἀνίστημι, and quotes many instances of the usage of this verb, (pp. 144, 145,) but none to illustrate the usage of ἀνάστασις itself. And then from all these etymologies, &c., &c., he comes to the conclusion that ἀνάστασις *itself* means no more than simple "*reviviscence*, without any reference to the *rising again* of the *defunct body*." But what is the use of all this display and learning to prove what no one denies? Who doubts that the import of ἀνά and ἵστημι, &c., &c., is what Professor Bush states it to be? The views offered by him on this subject may be found in every Greek lexicon in the universe. The question is not one of derivation, or of etymology; for our author knows that all agree on that subject; ***but it is a question as to usage.*** And to attempt to *settle* questions as to *usage*, by mere *etymologies*, is what one would hardly expect from a tyro, (much less from Professor Bush,) in this advanced state of philological literature. Nothing can be more fallacious. The etymology of a word often presents a meaning clearly and directly contrary to its universally acknowledged import in a usage which is confessedly correct.

I have remarked, that the word as employed by the Jews, and in New Testament usage, when applied with reference to those whose soul and body are separated, clearly imports a re-union of body and soul—***the living of the body in union with the soul.*** That this may be apparent to the reader, I shall refer to every instance of the use of the word in the New Testament. Unless I err it is employed therein forty-two times: and let the reader try if he can find an instance among them all, of its reference to the future state of the dead, where it does not clearly import a re-union of body and soul. The instances of its use are the following: Matt. xxii. 23, 28, 30, 31; Mark xii. 18, 33; Luke ii. 34, and xiv. 14, and xx. 27, 33, 35, 36; John v. 29, (*twice*,) and xi. 24, 25; Acts i. 22, and ii. 31, and iv. 2, 33, and xvii. 18, 32, and xxiii. 6, 8, and xxiv. 15, 21, and xxvi. 23; Rom. i. 4, and vi. 5; 1 Cor. xv. 12, 13, 21, 42; Phil. iii. 10; 2 Tim. ii. 18; Heb. vi. 2, and xi. 35, (*twice*); 1 Pet. i. 3, and iii. 21; Rev. xx. 5, 6. It is also used once in composition with ἐκ; ἐξανάστασις, Phil. iii. 11, where it refers to *the first resurrection*, which is a resurrection *from among* the dead ones.

Of all these instances there are but two whose meaning

is at all obscure, and neither of which makes any thing for the Professor's theory. The first is Luke ii. 34; οὗτος κεῖται εἰς πτωσιν καὶ ἀνάστασιν πολλῶν ἐν τῳ Ἰσραὴλ. "He is appointed for (εἰς is here used merely to denote the *end* or *destination*) the fall and rise of many in Israel." *Wolzogenius* renders it, "Positus est in ruinam et *resurrectionem*," &c., and observes: "Interpretum quidam ruinam hanc et resurrectionem de æterno interitu damnationis, et de resurrectione ad vitam æternam intelligunt; quod utrumque illud, quod præcessit, necessario sequitur. Nam qui eo modo, quo explicatum est, cadunt, eorum vestigia sequitur æternus interitus; qui vero superius dicto modo resurgunt, illi etiam ad vitam æternam resurgent."

The other is John xi. 25. Jesus saith unto her ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ ἀνάστασις καὶ ἡ ζωή, "I am the resurrection and the life:"* But this merely means as Grotius remarks. "I am the author of the resurrection," or as Wolzogenius observes, "causa resurrectionis et vitæ, seu effector ejus et dator." It is a Hebræism, in which the effect is put for the cause, or the cause is signified by the effect. See also John i. 4. In like manner Christ is said to be made to us "wisdom, righteousness, sanctification," &c., 1 Corinthians i. 30. The usage of the term therefore is uniform in the New Testament, and, as there employed, clearly announces the living again of the body, and its reunion with the soul.

In another part of his book, (p. 253,) Professor Bush has referred to the passage which we have above quoted from Josephus, and endeavours to give it a turn that would seem to favour his *tertium quid* theory. As the objection has the

* In the *Midrash Mishle*, fol. 67. (See also Buxtorf's Lexicon Talmud. p. 961,) there is the following remarkable expression respecting Messiah. After the remark that he is the second Adam who should restore the life and happiness which the first Adam forfeited, they, referring to Psalm lxxii. 17, ask "Why is his name called ינון?—*Because he shall hereafter raise the sleepers in the dust.*" How like the name which Jesus takes to himself in the above-quoted text! So also in *Neve Shallom.* lib. 9, cap. 5, 8, the old Jews speak as follows: "The Messiah is the last Adam, who will be greater than Moses, and above the ministering angels. He will take away the old sin (comp. John i. 29,) which brought death, and in his days shall be the resurrection of the dead. (Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 21.) God intended in the creation of Adam that he should be immortal; but sin brought death upon him; and therefore the divine intention, which was not accomplished in the first Adam, is fulfilled in King Messias."

appearance of ingenuity, it is proper to notice it in this connexion before passing to the next topic. He says, "It is obvious that the phrase καταβαίνειν εἰς ἕτερον σῶμα, *to pass into another body*," does not imply the doctrine of the transmigration of souls; but that "it yields as readily the sense of a translation of the soul into an etherial or spiritual body, such as we have endeavoured to show is taught by the united voice of sound reasoning and sound hermeneutics." When we view this statement in connexion with Professor Bush's "knowledge of revelation progressive," and his doctrine of "the resurrection body as inferred by reason," and the advance of science and scientific discovery, we certainly cannot but be amazed at the wonderful knowledge here attributed to this ancient sect of Jewish separatists. Well might they boast that they were the favourites of heaven, on account of their accurate knowledge of the truths of religion, and "despise others" (Luke xi. 52, and xviii. 9, 11,) if such were their wonderful attainments. To have anticipated, so long before Christ, the results of present "scientific investigation" was certainly a great deal; nor can I imagine how Professor Bush can possibly avoid the conclusion that their sect must have had among them true prophets of their own. And we might well ask, that as they had the *true doctrine* on this subject, and as their doctrine was very popular among the Jews in our Saviour's time, how it happened that he never appealed to them as supporting the true doctrine of the resurrection as taught by him, when such an appeal must have silenced even his most clamorous enemies? And we might also ask, Where was the necessity of his "*accommodating his teachings*" to the errors of the Jews on this subject, when their greatest and most opulent sect had already avowed the real truth? It would appear that the disciples also, before they were perfectly acquainted with the gospel, had the idea that the soul "passed *into another body;*" (see John 9,) and if they entertained the idea that this ἕτερον σῶμα *or other body* was a *tertium quid*, or a "spiritual body," as Professor Bush thinks Josephus means, then they must have thought that the then present ἕτερον σῶμα of the man *born* blind, must have been a spiritual body, or a *tertium quid*, and that *tertium quids* might be *born* like other bodies, and even be *blind*, and be cured by an anointing of clay.

But raillery apart, may I not with reason ask, whether a man is warranted, in order to support a mere theory, thus

to set philology and history at perfect defiance; and impose an utterly unheard of, and altogether arbitrary signification on a phrase, the true import of which no one has ever dreamed of doubting? Where in the writings of Josephus, or Philo, or in the LXX., or New Testament will Professor Bush find a *tertium quid* designated by such a phrase? But he not only sets philology at defiance, but his own theory also. For in his book he is perpetually labouring to prove that the *tertium quid* in man is enclosed, so to speak, in his corporeal frame; and that it itself envelopes the spirit, or the "bodiless and formless *mens:*" and that this *tertium quid*, which encloses the spirit, is eliminated from the body at death. It encases the spirit while it is *in* the body; it encases it *at* its discharge from the body; and it encases it *after* it has left the body. Where, then, can there be any *going into another body?*

But with all deference to the authority of Professor Bush, I deny that it is upon the authority of this passage of Josephus alone that the Pharisees have been charged with the doctrine of the metempsychosis. If they did entertain this doctrine, then Professor Bush must admit that his explanation of ἕτερον σῶμα is unnatural and absurd. Does not Josephus, therefore, in other places, assert that they held this doctrine? See Antiq., lib. 18, cap. 1, §. 3. and De Bell., lib. 2, cap. 8, §. 14, and lib. 3, cap. 8, §. 5. Take, also, the testimony of the Book of Wisdom, in the LXX., chap. viii. 20, where the speaker says, that by "being upright he came into a pure or undefiled body:" μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἦλθον εἰς σῶμα ἀμίαντον. Professor Bush would hardly believe that this undefiled body was a "*tertium quid.*" That the Jews in our Saviour's time entertained the same doctrine, appears from the fact, that during his ministry they speculated much concerning his identity with some of their former prophets. Some thought it was the soul of Elijah which animated him, and performed the great works which they saw; others Jeremiah, and others "*one* of the old prophets;" (see Matt. xvi. 14, and Luke ix. 19; see, also, John ix. 1–4;) but no one for a moment seemed to have any idea that the body thus inhabited was a *tertium quid*, or *spiritual body.* And their attempted assassination of a *tertium quid*, (had they believed the body of Christ to be such,) must at all events argue that they supposed there must be but little real difference between a ἕτερον σῶμα and ἑτέρα σάρξ. See Jude 7.

The New Testament usage of ἀνάστασις, therefore, when that term refers to man's future existence, uniformly infers a re-union of soul and body: and all Jewish antiquity unites to testify that such was its universally received acceptation in apostolic times.

Another term which Professor Bush makes the most constant use of throughout his work, and to which he attaches the highest importance in this discussion, is σῶμα πνευματικόν, *spiritual body;* which occurs in 1 Cor. xv. 44; and the antithesis of which is σῶμα ψυχικόν, *animal*, or *natural body;* see v. 46. And in order that the subject may be plain to every reader, I shall, in the *first* place, exhibit the view which the Professor takes of the phrase; and then shall explain what I conceive to be its biblical import. It is easy to perceive, that as this σῶμα πνευματικόν is the *tertium quid* of our author, so very much must depend upon our obtaining an accurate view of it before we proceed with the New Testament argument.

"*The spiritual body*,"—what is it according to Professor Bush's theory? His definition itself seems to need an expositor, or at least an illustration, to make it plain. It is "the *life* and the intelligence" "which conjointly constitute the essence of man," and which retire as the body dies. It is a "vital principle, *pervading the whole frame*, and which co-exists with the intellectual principle *in* the body; and which, therefore, may co-exist *out* of the body." "It is a *psychical body*," p. 66. It is formed of those "subtle elements *mixed up* in the grosser materials of our bodies, with which our mental operations are connected, and upon which they are dependent," p. 77. "By *spiritual*, in this connexion, we mean refined, ethereal, sublimated. By the development of a spiritual body, we mean the disengagement—the extrication—of that psychical part of our nature, with which vital and animal functions are, in the present life, intimately connected, and which differs from the pure spirit, the intellectual principle, as the Greek ψύχη, or *sensitive principle*, differs from νοῦς, the self-conscious intelligence. It is a *tertium quid*—an intermediate something between the cogitative faculty and the gross body. It is indeed invisible; but so are many of the mightiest agents in nature, and so are many of the noblest entities in the ranks of created beings." p. 78. The definition is not sufficiently clear yet; we cannot exactly see the Professor's meaning;

and so shall let him speak further. "This existence (*i. e.* the resurrection state) will indeed be in a *body*, but it will be a *spiritual body;* i. e., some exceedingly refined and ethereal substance, *with which the vital principle is connected*," p. 145. But on page 66 he says that the spiritual body is itself this "*vital principle* pervading the whole frame, and co-existing with the intellectual principle *in* the body." If, then, it is the *vital principle* itself, how can it be something "with which the vital principle is connected?" We must look still further at the Professor's definitions. Much have I desired that some Ariadne would only grant a clew of thread, by which to guide me through the intricacies of this puzzling labyrinth; for my friend, the author, has really tired me by keeping me in chase so long after what might be properly called a mere *tertium quid* of an idea. Perhaps the following *incidental* remark may help us: "Even in the present life, it is the spiritual body which feels the sensations of pleasure or pain." p. 264. Then, again he says: "The only germ in the human body answering to the germ in the plant, and upon which the apostles' comparison is built, *is the spiritual body itself.*" p. 179. Then it enters the spiritual world *as a germ*, or *nucleus*, and elaborates for itself a spiritual corporeity from the spiritual elements by which it is surrounded, pp. 176–181. See other remarks hereupon, and other definitions, in Part I., Chap. II. above.

On what principle it is expected that a person is to get an idea out of this mass of nonsense I cannot really imagine: and yet Professor Bush expects us to understand him here, in order to appreciate his argument, and see the appropriateness of his use of the term in question. If he has had any idea on this subject, he certainly has failed to employ language by which it might be conveyed to others. But as we cannot get hold of the abstract definition, perhaps we can of his illustrations of it. He asserts that Christ, and the righteous dead all have spiritual bodies; while he denies that the wicked have any; and asserts that they never rise again. Here then we have an *affirmative*, and also a *negative* illustration. Let us briefly consider each, and see if we can understand the nature of this *tertium quid*.

With respect to the spiritual bodies of the righteous, Professor Bush affirms that they are the same substantially as the resurrection body of Christ. See pp. 271, 347, 348;

And yet Christ's body did not "enter the spiritual world as *a germ.*" He admits also, that the soul or spirit of Christ was living between his death and resurrection, pp. 168, 220, 224, and yet avers that his spiritual body did not arise, or was not eliminated until the third day. pp. 163, 164, 261. He arose on the third day, and yet his material body arose not. pp. 163, 164, 168. And *at* death he entered at once into a spiritual body. p. 165. His, was a purely spiritual body, p. 156. Such is the *affirmative* illustration of what Professor Bush means by σῶμα πνευματικόν. The illustration, like the decision of Milton's Old Chaos, only "more embroils the fray," and makes "confusion worse confounded."

But perhaps the *negative* illustration, taken from the state of the wicked in a future world may help us. Throughout his whole book he constantly denies that they arise from the dead, or possess this *tertium quid* or *resurrection body.* If, therefore, we can only ascertain how they exist *without* it, perhaps we shall be able to ascertain what it is.

Now it is clear, according to Professor Bush, that the wicked do not exist in *material* bodies—yet they continue to live after the body dies, pp. 140, 141, 220, 232, and yet do not partake of the resurrection, (for the righteous alone are the subjects of it,) and they have no spiritual body eliminated at death; for such elimination is, in fact, says Professor Bush, the resurrection. pp. 232, 254, 312. Neither are the wicked, in a future state, "mere bodiless and formless *mens,*" says he, for "no error is greater than to suppose, that at death the soul goes forth from the body as a *bare power of thought*—bodiless and formless *mens;*"—this, continues he, "we do not hesitate to say, is nothing more than sheer hypothesis." p. 72. And yet, after death they reside in "spiritual tenements," and have "bodies," and suffer unspeakable misery. pp. 393, 395. Here then is the *negative illustration!* The fastidiousness of this age will not allow us to call any thing nonsensical which a learned man asserts; but if it did, I should pronounce the whole of what Professor Bush has said on the subject of *the spiritual body,* (in this his effort to evade the clear announcements of revelation,) the hugest and most astoundingly nonsensical medley that ever "the progress of science," and the fertile genius of the nineteenth century has produced. If it is the spiritual body —the same which feels pleasure or pain in this life, (see p. 264,)—that is eliminated at death, and which constitutes the

vital principle, I should like to know on what ground it is denied to the wicked? Have they no vital principle? If not how is it that they live at all after death? How is it that they feel the sensations of pleasure or pain in this life, if it is the spiritual body or *tertium quid* that feels those sensations? And as this *tertium quid* is the resurrection body, which belongs to the righteous alone, when do they become possessed of it? Not until they are regenerated? And do they then feel no pleasure or pain until they are regenerated? But if the wicked *have* this *tertium quid*, or resurrection body, what becomes of it when they die? Professor Bush says it is not eliminated from the body, like that of the righteous, for this would be a resurrection. What then becomes of it? It would be trifling with the reader's patience to press this matter.

The properties of this *spiritual body*, or *tertium quid* of Professor Bush's theory, remind one very strongly of the account of the learned traveller mentioned in the way of illustration by President Edwards.* For the Professor has discovered a creature that cannot exist without a body, and yet has not a body, and notwithstanding it still exists. And though it has not a body, yet it has a body; and the very body which it does not possess, that self-same body it does possess; and this though it neither has nor has not a body. At death it goes into another body, and yet it does not go into another body, for it is itself that self-same body into which it goes. It is always "exhaled" *at* the death of the body, for as it is the vital principle itself, while it continues in the body the body must be alive; and yet the body may truly die, and lie in the grave three days, without such an

* "If some learned philosopher, who had been abroad, in giving an account of the curious observations he had made in his travels, should say 'he had been in *Terra del Fuego*, and there had seen an animal, which he calls by a certain name, that begat and brought forth itself, and yet had a sire and dam distinct from itself; that it had an appetite, and was hungry, before it had a being; that his master who led him, and governed him at his pleasure, was always governed by him, and driven by him where he pleased; that when he moved, he always took a step before the first step; that he went with his head first, and yet always went tail foremost; and this, though he had neither head nor tail;' it would be no impudence at all, to tell such a traveller, though a learned man, that he himself had no idea of such an animal as he gave an account of, and never had, nor ever would have." *Freedom of the Will*, Part IV. Sect. 2.

elimination or exhalation. It belongs to the righteous *alone*, and yet all the unrighteous possess it who have also "spiritual tenements," which leave their physical bodies when they die, and yet do not leave them, for they have no spiritual bodies eliminated at death. If such be the theory by which the objections of reason to the doctrine of the resurrection are to be obviated, and that doctrine rendered palatable to philosophers, *sit anima mea non cum Philosophis.*

But what is the true scriptural import of σῶμα πνευματικόν? The phrase occurs twice in 1 Cor. xv. 44, and is used in antithesis to σῶμα ψυχικόν, v. 46. In the same connexion it is spoken of as a σῶμα ἄφθαρτον, (v. 42, 52, 54,) a body which is immortal like the spirit which shall inhabit it. It is also a σῶμα ἐν δόξῃ and ἐν δυνάμει, a glorious body, not subject to sickness, or disease, or weakness, v. 43. It is, also, a σῶμα ἐπουράνιον, v. 47, 48; a body adapted in all respects to a heavenly state: and those who possesss it are "like the angels," ἰσάγγελοι γάρ εἰσι, Luke xx. 36. It is, also, to be *like* the glorious body of Christ; ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ ἐσόμεθα. 1 John iii. 2: "Our *vile body* shall be made like his glorious body;" τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ; Phil. iii. 21. It is, also, a clothing of corruption with incorruption; τὸ θνητὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσηται ἀθανασίαν, 1 Cor. xv. 53, 54.

Then, also, it is spoken of as the antithesis of σῶμα ψυχικόν, as above stated; which is, as Schoetgen remarks, *corpus caducum, mortale*, "a frail and mortal body." And its synonyms also are φθαρτόν, θνητόν, and φθορά, ἀτιμία, ἀσθενεία, and ἐκ γῆς, χοϊκός. See 1 Cor. xv. 42, 43, 44, 47, 53, 54. Now ψυχή (from which comes ψυχικος,) is employed by the Greeks to signify that which man has in common with brute animals. And, as Josephus (Antiq., lib. I., c. 1. § 2.) remarks, that God made Adam with a πνεῦμα and a ψυχή.* Where πνεῦμα indicates what pertained to man as man, and ψυχή, what was common alike to him and other animals; the former plainly referring not only to his *anima*, or life by which *he lives* as an animal, but also emphatically his *animus*, or spirit, which is endowed with the faculty of understanding, knowing, and thinking; whereas the latter refers

* Ἔπλασεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς λαβών καὶ πνεῦμα ἐνῆκεν αὐτῷ, καὶ ψυχήν. Hence it is clear that Josephus believed man to be formed of σῶμα, ψυχή, and πνεῦμα, body, soul, and spirit. See 1 Thess. v. 23.

to those passions, desires, and feelings, &c., which we have in common with other animals. *Krebbs*, in his "*Observationes*," has excellently illustrated this difference, and at greater length than our space will here allow. See pp. 346–8, and 411.

In exact accordance with this criticism on the etymology of the word, do we find its usage in the New Testament. A single remark from Schoetgen (*sub voce*) will justify this declaration, without wasting time to prove it by references. "In Nov. Testament. ψυχὴ notat animam hominis non regeniti." *This term* in the New Testament refers to the soul of the "unrenewed man," or the man in a state of nature. And hence ψυχικὸς σῶμα is a natural or animal body,—a body subject to, and under the control of mere animal or natural passions and appetites like the brutes. Thus Jude 10 employs it. See also 1 Cor. ii. 14. And if, therefore, the *spiritual body* is the antithesis of the *natural* or *animal body*, (which is undeniable,) it cannot mean a body which is purely spirit, or a *tertium quid*, but simply a body ruled by the spirit, and adapted to spiritual uses. And all the attributes of this body, to which we have referred above, import not the most distant idea of the abolition of its previously existing corporeity; but merely the abolishing of its animal functions, and a *change* from a mortal condition into an immortal.

A further consideration of the subject will confirm this view. The quality of the σῶμα, must of course depend on the import attached to πνευματικόν. This word is not employed to designate a thing whose *essence* is spirit, but, as in Rom. i. 11, where it means gifts supplied by the Spirit, and not gifts whose *essence* is spirit; and thus in Rom. vii. 14, ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστιν, does not mean a law whose essence is spirit, but whose precepts are agreeable to the Holy Spirit. So, also, we find mentioned "spiritual blessings," Eph. i. 3, and "spiritual songs," in Eph. v. 19, and Col. iii. 16. And thus "*spiritual*" understanding," 1 Cor. ii. 14, means an understanding that can appreciate spiritual things. Hence the πνευματικοὶ are those who are renewed, illuminated, and governed by the Spirit, 1 Cor. ii. 13, 15, and iii. 1, and xiv. 37, and Gal. vi. 1; and τὰ πνευματικὰ are those things supplied or given by the Holy Spirit; see Rom. xv. 27; 1 Cor. ii. 13, and ix. 11, and xii. 1, and xiv. 1.

These remarks may serve to show with what latitude the term is employed in the New Testament. And they evince that any argument, against the resurrection of the body that dies, based upon the apostle's use of the term *spiritual*, is inconclusive and absurd. The reader will find the exposition which I have above given of the term πνευματικός fully sustained by Schoetgen, Bretschneider, and Wahl, (see also Bretschneider's *Handbuch der Dogmatik*, Vol. II., pp. 411, 413,) and by Stokius, &c., &c. And if we leave the lexicographers, we still find equally strong support. Professor Bush himself lends us his aid: "The original term, πνευματικός, (says he,) is derived from πνεῦμα, *spirit*, and *it cannot be doubted* that the dominant usage of this word by the sacred writers, is not in opposition to *material*, but to *carnal*, as when it is said, 'The *spirit* is willing, but the *flesh* is weak.'" p. 66. "It is called a spiritual body," says Rosenmüller, "because it is adapted to a spirit, and because its powers are far beyond what are requisite for the transaction of mere earthly affairs:" *in loco.* Calvin's remarks, *in loco*, (1 Cor. xv. 44,) are also very excellent; but we omit quoting them in order to present a more ancient, and equally excellent view of it. Speaking of the phrase *spirituale corpus*, Augustine (Cont. Adimant., cap. 12) remarks: "Quod spirituale dixit corpus in resurrectione futurum, non propterea putandum est quod non corpus sed spiritus erit: sed spirituale corpus omnimodo spiritui subditum dicit, sine aliqua corruptione vel modo. Non enim quia quod modo habemus corpus animale appellat, ideo putandum est, non illud esse corpus, sed animam. Ergo quemadmodum corpus animale nunc dicitur, quia subditum est animæ: spirituale autem dici nondum potest, quia nondum spiritui plene subjectum est, quamdiu corrumpi potest: sic et tunc spirituale vocabitur cum spiritui atque æternitati nulla corruptione resistere poterit." See also Epist. ad Consent., 145.

The phrase *spiritual body*, therefore, may properly mean the body of one in whom the Holy Spirit has dwelt in this life, and whom he has regenerated and sanctified; a body which he will raise from the dead at the resurrection, and adapt to the uses of the returning spirit. For as he is said to renew, and sanctify, and dwell in the body of the saint, and thus prepare him for future glory, (1 Thess. v. 20; 1 Cor. vi. 19, and 2 Cor. iv. 10, 11,) so he is eminently con-

cerned in the resurrection, and in furnishing the body of the saint by his own mighty power. Rom. viii. 11.*

This view of the nature of the spiritual body will be confirmed by considering what kind of body the New Testament attributes to the raised saints. "We shall not all sleep," says Paul, "but we shall all be changed, in a moment," &c.; 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52. The emphasis here is very strong, πάντες being twice repeated. It is not the living saints only who shall be changed; but it is affirmed of them simply, that they shall not die. "We shall not *all* die, but we shall all, whether living or dead, undergo this change, from mortality to immortality, and from corruption to incorruption." Ἀλλὰ ἅπτω means to change the form or nature of a thing into a better or worse, and not the substitution of an entirely diverse substance for the thing itself which is said to be the subject of the change. Such a change passed upon the body of our blessed Redeemer when he was *transfigured* (μεταμορφόω, Matt. xvii. 6,) and yet it was the same body then that it was before and after. In his transfiguration the same change doubtless passed upon his body as has since his ascension: for his body was the same in appearance during that transformation, as was the glorious body of Elijah; and his appearance then produced substantially the same overpowering effect upon his three disciples, that it did subsequently upon Saul; see Acts xi. and xxii.

If, then, such a transformation could be wrought upon his body, and yet it remain perfectly and identically the same; the same thing may take place in the bodies of the elect—both of those who are alive when he comes, and of those who are then raised from the dead, and that without destroying their identity. This is indisputable. And that the same change will be wrought upon their bodies as has been wrought in his, is clear from Phil. iii. 21. And that this change does not take place immediately *at* death, but will occur at his coming, is also clear from the same passage; and is, moreover, emphatically asserted in 1 John iii. 2, and 1 Thess. iv. 15–18. Such a body, then, as that of our Saviour, all glorious, may properly be called a spiritual body; and such will be our resurrection bodies, if we are truly his. And that this change, whatever it may be, infers no

* This text will be critically examined hereafter. See also Chalmers on Romans, pp. 261–264.

loss of corporeal identity, is clear from the uniform declarations of the Bible. "*This corruptible*," says Paul, "must put on incorruption, and *this mortal* must put on immortality." 1 Cor. xv. 53. Now it is impossible to refer this language to the spirit, for that is confessedly neither corruptible nor mortal. It can refer only to the body. Then in 2 Cor. v. 4, Paul says, "Not that we would be *unclothed*, but clothed upon, *that mortality might be swallowed up of life*." But *mortality* here can only be predicated of the body, and hence *it* is to be perfectly endowed with immortal life. The word translated *swallowed up* (καταπίνω) means *absorbeo aliquid ita ut non sit*, the body shall be mortal no longer. Its mortal functions and properties shall cease to exist for ever.

Such, therefore, being the plain scriptural import of the term *spiritual body*, the theory of Professor Bush is false and preposterous; and his objections to the resurrection of the body, based upon his application of this term, utterly unfounded.

In closing his remarks on onomatology, (pp. 149, 150,) Professor Bush makes a long extract from Locke's letter to Stillingfleet, (a poor, paltry, and inconsistent performance, and altogether unworthy of *his clarum et venerabile nomen*,) in which that great philosopher undertakes to show, that at the general resurrection man will rise with a *material* body, but not with precisely the same body that dies. If Mr. Locke's arguments prove this, I really cannot see how it asists the theory of Professor Bush, who utterly denies that there will be any day of general resurrection, and that man's resurrection body is, in any sense of the term, such as Mr. Locke asserts that it will be. In its proper place we shall notice what he has offered on this subject. But as he is the favourite author of Professor Bush, (who quotes from him continually in discussing the New Testament argument, and especially when any difficulty presses a little too hard,) it may be in place to show here the estimate in which he is held as a theologian and critic by some of the most learned and evangelical men of our age. Professor Tholuck (a candid witness) shall be the spokesman. Referring to Mr. Locke, this admirable scholar and critic remarks: "English theology has sustained irreparable injury from the writings of Locke, so highly lauded by Episcopalian divines. We have elsewhere shown *his defective views of Chris-*

tianity. Still, not only in England, but for a long time in Germany, he was regarded as a sound interpreter, and an able apologist of Christianity. His paraphrase of the epistles of Paul, translated by J. D. Michaelis, *are not only deficient, as Ernesti has shown, in philology, but they most miserably dilute and weaken the doctrines of the apostle.* The chief fault of this reputedly orthodox theologian, *is the oversight of the doctrine of human depravity*—the Pelagian error. From this source spring all his other errors. *According to him, every man's reason, without previous regeneration, (which is not included in his system,) must recognize Christian truth;* then this Christian truth is diluted and brought down to the standard of unregenerate men. The chief evidence of the truth of Christianity is found in miracles, or in the beautiful moral precepts of the Bible. *The doctrine of the atonement has as little place in his system as that of original sin.*"* This is a just and discriminating character. And while we shall in the course of this work, pay all proper attention to his arguments as quoted by Professor Bush, we shall, without intending any disrespect to his memory, pass over his theological opinions with little or no remark.

SECTION III.

An Examination of Professor Bush's remarks and criticisms on the fifteenth chapter of 1*st Corinthians.*

The subject of "the Resurrection of Christ," which strangely comes next in order in the work of Professor Bush, we shall pass by for the present, to follow our author in his long array of Scripture texts. He does not seem to regard them precisely in the light of proof texts, by which to sustain the conclusions of his "argument from reason;" but evinces a disposition to be perfectly satisfied, provided he can only show that their testimony is not altogether subversive of his theory.

I. The first passage of this chapter which the Professor quotes and remarks upon is the following: "Now if Christ be preached that he rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not

* See "Historical Sketch of German Rationalism."

risen;" 1 Cor. xv. 12, 13. And instead of entering into a discussion of that remarkable phraseology in ver. 12, which strikes so deeply at the very root of his theory, to wit: πῶς λέγουσί τινες ἐν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν οὐκ ἔστιν; i. e., how say some AMONG YOU—you Christians of the church of Corinth—that there is no resurrection of the dead? (a phrase upon which we shall remark hereafter,) he passes it without the least reference. The following is the whole of his criticism upon the passage: "The special doctrine of the resurrection, as generally held to be taught in this chapter, is that of a simultaneous resurrection at what is termed 'the last day,' or at 'the end of the world.' On this view it may fairly be submitted as a question, whether the apostle's reasoning is conclusive. We are unable to perceive how the fact of a resurrection *at some future time* can be adduced as a proof that Christ was *already* risen. And, on the other hand, if it could be shown that there will be no such resurrection, would that be a proof that Christ is not risen? Is it not, at least, within the range of possibilities that he should be the only one raised? The truth is, as the apostle's argument is usually explained, it makes it little more than reasoning in a circle. First, the *future* resurrection of the saints is proved by the *past* resurrection of Christ; and then, secondly, the *past* resurrection of Christ is proved by the *future* resurrection of his people. This consequence flows naturally and inevitably from regarding the resurrection of the righteous as a future simultaneous event. Let it be understood as a present event, or one that takes place with every individual believer as soon as he leaves the body, and this logical inconsistency is avoided, and a flood of light poured upon the train of the apostle's reasoning." pp. 169, 170.

This is all that the Professor has said on the passage; and every reader will no doubt think with me, that it is much to be regretted that our learned author did not *illustrate* how the adoption of his theory would "avoid this logical inconsistency,"(!) and so "pour the flood of light upon the train of the apostle's reasoning:" for as it seems to me, such a course would be only "*darkening counsel* by words without knowledge," instead of "pouring *light*" upon it.

With respect to the simultaneousness of the resurrection, I shall say nothing here, as that subject will come up in its regular order in our examination of Professor Bush's re-

marks on verses 51–55 of the chapter. But before he indulged in these hypercritical comments (not to give them a *more appropriate name*) he should have quoted, or at least referred to the connexion of the passage. The word of God is rather too holy a subject to be employed for the purpose of showing one's wit: and a writer who will first keep out of view the apostle's explanation of his own language; and then, having assumed a false position, attempt to sustain it by a display of witticisms at the expense of inspiration, deserves something more severe than a mere refutation. He should be made to hear the language of stern and indignant rebuke.

The argument of Paul, as the reader will see by referring to verses 3–11, and 14, 15, (which Professor Bush has omitted to notice,) is simply this: "I have testified to you, ye Christians of Corinth, how that Christ *died for our sins*, was *buried*, and *rose again* according to the Scriptures of the old economy; and that he was seen, after his resurrection, by multitudes of witnesses, (who are still living,) and lastly by myself. So we preach, and so ye believed. Here, then, is the evidence that Christ has arisen:—the Scriptures affirm that it must be so, and multitudes of living witnesses testify that it *has been* so. But if Christ be preached that *he* rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead? For if there is no such resurrection, then Christ is not risen; *because*, as I have already shown to you, (ver. 3,) he died, was buried, and rose again, *not for himself, but for us—for our sins*,—according to the Scriptures. And, therefore, if he has arisen, we must arise; and, on the contrary, if we do not rise again, then is he not risen; and, consequently, our preaching is false, and your faith in the Scriptures is vain; and we, who profess to have seen him after his resurrection, are proved to be false witnesses, because we have testified that God raised up Christ, whom he raised not up: and, consequently, you are yet in your sins, (for if he has not arisen, then he is not our Saviour from sin, ver. 3, 4,) and those who have died trusting in him, have trusted in one who cannot save them, and have, therefore, perished." Such is the apostle's argument, lying upon the very surface of his language, and plain, one would think, to the comprehension of a child. And yet the mind of Professor

Bush is so filled, and beclouded by his *tertium quid* theory, that he has utterly failed to perceive it.

He asks: "Is it not, at least, within the range of possibilities that he (Christ) should be the only one raised?" What! when he suffered, and died *for us*, and *rose again for us*, and as a *pledge* of the resurrection of his redeemed, and as the "*first fruits* of them that slept?" (ver. 20.) Does Professor Bush think it "*at least* within the range of possibilities," that our adorable Redeemer *has failed to accomplish what he undertook?* No! no! he does not, *he cannot* entertain such a thought, until he has surrendered his heart's dearest hopes. The remark was as thoughtless as it is unbecoming; though it lies at the very foundation of the objection upon which he has attempted to invalidate what is plainly the argument of the apostle.

The Professor cannot see "how the fact of a resurrection at *some future time* can be adduced as a proof that Christ was *already* risen. And, on the other hand, if it could be shown that there will be no such resurrection, would that be a proof that Christ is not risen?" But can he tell how the resurrection of Christ proves at all the resurrection of the redeemed? and how their resurrection (be it when it may) proves the resurrection of Christ? Paul says, that the establishment of either fact will demonstrate the other: and surely the Professor does not doubt the apostle's declaration. In the foregoing analysis of Paul's argument I have pointed out the connexion referred to. If our author cannot see how the resurrection of Christ proves the resurrection of his people, and *vice versa*, it is plain to all men that he ought not to have written on the resurrection. But if he can, then where is there any greater difficulty in perceiving the connexion between Christ's resurrection and theirs, and *vice versa*, though theirs is yet future, than to see this connexion on the hypothesis of their resurrection *at* death? It is perfectly preposterous to pretend that there is any such difficulty. In fact, the only difficulty in the case wholly attaches to the theory of Professor Bush; and on that theory it is indeed insuperable. Christ did not arise from the dead until the third day; hence his people are consoled with the assurance, that though they die, and are consigned to the tomb, yet they, like Christ their great forerunner, shall rise from its dark domains. In this case there is a comfortable and delightful analogy between his resur-

rection and theirs. *He arose from the grave, and hence they shall also arise.* But on the theory of Professor Bush, where is there any such analogy? He avers, that the resurrection takes place *at* death, and *not after* it. "The resurrection body is eliminated *at* death;" and "is exhaled with the vital principle." But the spiritual body of Christ, as the Professor himself avers, was not thus eliminated. He arose some days *after* his death; but his people rise *at* death; "every individual believer *is raised* as soon as he leaves the body," says Professor Bush. And are these events analogous? and is such the view which is "to pour a *flood of light* upon the train of the apostle's reasoning?" If, however, this "flood" *is* light, it must be such "*light*" as is emanated from the dark side of the moon; for the rays are all too feeble to enable us to get even a glimpse of the object upon which they are "*poured.*" And he who attempts to illumine the reasoning of Paul by the adoption of such a theory, will have good reason to say with one of old, "We cannot order our speech by reason of darkness." Job xxxvii. 19.

Professor Bush appears to be exceedingly anxious to convict the advocates of the commonly received doctrine of the resurrection, of reasoning in a circle. We have seen how he has fared in a former attempt, and an examination of the effort contained in his remarks on the text before us will also evince that this circle, like Dean Berkley's ideal world, exists no where but in his own mind. He affirms, that if Paul, in this chapter, asserts that the resurrection is still future, his reasoning is "little more than reasoning in a circle;" and that "this consequence flows naturally and inevitably from regarding the resurrection of the righteous as a future simultaneous event;" which "*logical inconsistency* is avoided," if we suppose that the resurrection "takes place with every individual believer so soon as he leaves the body." These are not only broad, but pretty tangible assertions. They are mere baseless assertions, of a very grave character indeed, but meriting no reply other than a bare denial of their truth. If Professor Bush has hazarded them merely for the sake of *effect*, he cannot fail to meet the reward of such temerity, in that decision which an enlightened public will sooner or later pronounce upon his performance. But if he had reasons for making them, then of course he is able to exhibit his proof upon which they

are based. I call for it therefore; and I ask him to produce his evidence that will justify the assertion, that the supposition of the resurrection being simultaneous and future, must convict Paul of reasoning in a circle. And I ask him to show, also, how this consequence is avoided by the supposition that believers arise from the dead *at* death. He has *asserted* that these things are so; and, in order that there may be a true issue, I *deny* positively, and unequivocally, that they are so. Let us have the proof therefore.

In closing my observations upon 1 Cor. xv. 12, 13, I would remark that it affords an unanswerable argument in favour of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. The proof is indeed incidental, but it is not the less conclusive. We quoted above the original of the clause referred to.—"How say some *among you* that there is no resurrection of the dead?" "That is," as a learned critic expounds it, "how say some among you Christians, (who believe the Gospel,) that there is no resurrection of the dead?" *Quomodo dicunt quidam in vobis.* Id est, inter vos Christianos, qui evangelio credidistis." See also the excellent criticism of Pareus *in loco.* And Piscator gives the true emphasis of the phrase when he says, that πῶς, or "*how* has here the force of rebuking or upbraiding; as if he had said, *they ought not, therefore, to deny the resurrection of the dead.*" *Scholia in loco.*

Now it is conceivable that a man may, like Professor Bush, deny the resurrection of the body, and yet be a good man; as the apostle in ver. 12 takes for granted that they were who said there was no resurrection of the dead. This, I say, is easily conceivable. But is it conceivable—can Professor Bush himself conceive how a person can be a good man and a Christian, who should deny *the future existence of man?* Can Professor Bush conceive that Paul would recognize such persons as members of the Christian church? Would Professor Bush himself recognize a man as a Christian, and believer of divine revelation, who should deny the future state of man? *No, he would not!* for he knows that such a procedure would at once confound Christianity with infidelity. What, then, is the import of "*resurrection*" here? ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν? Does it—*can* it mean a *future state*, as Professor Bush pretends? No, not without the most manifest absurdity. And if not, the term ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν can only refer to the *resurrection of the body;* the

deniers, of which held some such theory as Professor Bush, and, therefore, without asserting that they had forfeited their Christian standing, Paul endeavours to recall them to the true faith. And hence it is perfectly clear, also, that the theory of Professor Bush is really and truly a denial of the Bible doctrine of the resurrection of the dead.

II. The next passage is as follows: "For if the dead rise not, then is Christ not raised: and if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins. Then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished." 1 Cor. xv. 16–18.

The Professor opens his battery upon this text as follows: "The *gist* of the apostle's argument occurs in a subsequent part of the chapter, but we cannot but advert to the present passage as conveying a very singular sentiment on the common theory, that Paul is here maintaining the *resurrection of the body*. Upon that view we are at a loss to perceive the logical coherence of the reasoning. How does it follow that *those who had fallen asleep in Jesus had* PERISHED, provided there was no resurrection of the body? Their *souls*, the true constituent of *themselves*, were certainly in being, and what should prevent their *souls* being saved, even if their bodies did not rise?" pp. 170, 171. Professor Bush cannot see this: but, reader, look ye at the apostle's argument, and you will have no difficulty. Paul sets out (as above remarked) with a statement, the truth of which is based upon divine and human testimony, that Christ died, was buried, and rose again *for our sakes*. And then, in order to convince those of the Corinthian church who denied the resurrection of the body, he reminds them that they professed to believe this fact. He next proceeds to reason from it: *e. g.* "If Christ has done this for us, and has become the first fruits of them that slept, his resurrection must, therefore, be a pledge of the resurrection of those for whom he died. Hence what was begun in him, must be completed in his members. If he has arisen, then we shall also arise. But, on the contrary, if there is no resurrection of the dead, it follows that Christ has not arisen: because if he were the Saviour announced in the Psalms and Prophets, he must arise. If he has not arisen, therefore, he is not that Saviour; and, therefore, you have no Saviour, and are yet in your sins, and, by consequence, those who have died, depending on Christ to save them from

sin, have not been saved from sin, but are gone to hell, and have perished beyond all hope of recovery." Such is a somewhat diffuse paraphrase of the argument, evincing it to be logical and demonstrative, and the connexion, or "*logical coherence*," perfectly apparent.

But Professor Bush cannot see "what should prevent their *souls being saved*, even if their bodies did not rise." But how *saved?—without a Saviour?* Paul has just shown that if the dead rise not, then Christ is not the Saviour promised in the Scriptures; and that, therefore, those who trusted in him for salvation *could not be saved.* The import of Professor Bush's question, therefore, is this; could not the *souls* of those who fell asleep in Christ have been saved, even if he were not the Saviour? And if this be his meaning, the Professor must answer the question for himself; for it concerns a quite different matter from that which we now have before us.

In the foregoing quotation the Professor has made a passing reference to a phrase in ver. 18, upon which he ought to have bestowed some serious notice. It is this: οἱ κοιμηθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ, "those who are fallen asleep in Christ." On p. 173 he speaks also of "the state of those *who fall asleep in him;*" and on p. 190, also, he expresses the same idea—"We shall not all sleep, (*i. e.*, die,) but we shall all," &c.; yet in neither place does he attempt to explain it in consistency with his theory, that the resurrection takes place *at* death. The necessity for such an attempted conciliation will appear in a moment, if we only recur to some of his previous remarks and criticisms. In his remarks, for example, on Psalm xvii. 15, "I shall be satisfied when I *awake* with thy likeness," pp. 105–108; or on Dan. xii. 2, "Many that *sleep* in the dust of the earth shall *awake;*" pp. 132–134. Now this word "*awake*," he explains to mean "the awaking of the righteous to a beatified state" *at* death, at which time "the spiritual body is eliminated from the corporeal." So, then, according to this vastly convenient theory of the Professor, the believer *at death*, both "*awakes*" and "*falls asleep!*" Nor does our author find any difficulty, or perceive any inconsistency in using both of these phrases, (so diametrically contradictory to each other,) as descriptive of one and the same event.—As though it should be said of a man who went to bed on a certain night and slept until morning, at which time he

awoke, and arose from the bed; that his *going to sleep* in the evening, and his *awaking* in the morning, *meant one and the same thing*. Into these vagaries has our author been led, by his attempt to make death and the resurrection one and the same.

After quoting Mr. Pelt, &c., (whose reasoning, by the way, directly contravenes one or more of the fundamental principles of Professor Bush's theory,) our author closes with an effort to make ἀνάστασις to mean nothing more than "living again, future life, future state—as a state to be immediately entered upon at death, instead of 'resurrection,' implying the resurrection of the body:" and he informs us, that "by substituting, *throughout the chapter*," either of the foregoing terms, "the whole course of reasoning becomes *luminous and pertinent*, while it is, at the same time, brought into *perfect harmony* with the general tenor of the Scriptures on the subject." p. 172.

I have sometimes been almost tempted to doubt whether Professor Bush, in some of these round assertions, is really in earnest; for it seems to me that just in proportion as a proposition is destitute of proof, does he assert the existence of the most demonstrative proof in its favour. The term resurrection, or ἀνάστασις, occurs only in vers. 12, 13, 21, and 42. With respect to vers. 12 and 13, we have shown above, the utter impracticability of explaining the word in the way mentioned by Professor Bush. Try it then with ver. 21: "Since by man came death, by man also came a 'future state.'" Where, then, is the antithesis? The apostle's argument is, that to that upon which Adam brought death, Christ brought life. But Adam brought death to the body, and, therefore, Christ brought life to the body. Such is the antithesis; and unless, therefore, "future state" includes the revival of the body, it could not here translate ἀνάστασις. And then again. On Professor Bush's theory, how can we understand this verse? "By man came death." But death is the entrance upon the resurrection state, by "*natural laws*." Therefore, "by *Adam* came the entrance upon the resurrection state, and by *Christ* came the future state." Is *this* the way Professor Bush would construe the passage? But not to insist upon this, let us look at the last place where the word occurs: "So also is the resurrection of the dead," (*i. e.*, says Professor Bush '*the future state.*') "It is sown in corruption; it is

raised in incorruption." ver. 42. To substitute *future state* for *resurrection* here, would make sheer nonsense. The import is plain: "*It*, that is, the dead body, is sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption." The term "*sown*" we shall consider when we come to examine the remarks of Professor Bush on the passage in which it occurs.

III. The following is his next quotation: "But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first-fruits of them that slept. For since by man came death, by man also came the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive. But every man in his own order: Christ the first-fruits; afterward they that are Christ's at his coming." 1 Cor. xv. 20–23.

The force of the expression νυνὶ δὲ, "*but now* is Christ," &c., is as if the apostle had said, but now *it is false* that we of all men are the most miserable, and have hope in Christ only in this life, and none hereafter: For Christ *is risen* from the dead, and become the *first-fruits* of them that slept. The similitude of the first fruits was taken from a rite of the ancient law. For as in the offering of the first-fruits, the product of the whole year was consecrated, so, as Calvin remarks, "*the power of Christ's resurrection* is diffused to all his chosen." (Compare Phil. iii. 10; τοῦ γνῶναι τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀναστάσεως αὐτοῦ.) Thus also the apostle elsewhere reasons: "If the first-fruit be holy, the lump is also holy." Rom. xi. 16. Compare Lev. xxiii. 10, and Numb. xv. 18–21. Thus by his resurrection he made a way for the resurrection of his members, as the offering of the first fruits, according to the law, sanctified the whole crop.

Speaking of this term, (first-fruits, ἀπαρχὴ,) as applied by the apostle to the resurrection of Christ, Professor Bush remarks as follows: "The idea is not so much that Christ was the first, *in the order of time*, who rose from the dead —as we are expressly taught, both in the Old Testament and the New, that prior causes of resurrection had repeatedly occurred—but the *first in rank, the author, the procuring cause of the resurrection of the saints.* But the whole harvest began to be gathered in *immediately after* the presentation of the first-fruits, and it would be a very violent construction of the analogy to suppose it to imply that hundreds of thousands of years might elapse between the resurrection of the grand Precursor and that of the mass of his followers." p. 173.

There are several things here asserted, to each of which I would distinctly reply. 1. He says that ἀπαρχὴ here does not mean "that Christ was the first in the order of time;" and he attempts to sustain this position by a reference to previous cases of resurrection. But, (1,) does Professor Bush mean by this to intimate that a resurrection to this present mortal life, is parallel to a resurrection to an immortal state of being? If they are not parallel cases, why are they brought into the argument? If ten thousand had previously been raised, to die again, still when Christ arose from the dead to an immortal life, he was the first-fruits of those who should after him, in the time of the great harvest, obtain a like resurrection to immortality. And it is to discriminate his case from that of all others whose resurrection had preceded his, that Paul remarks, (for the peculiar benefit of those who, like Professor Bush, thought them parallel,) that "Christ being raised from the dead, *dieth no more;* death hath no more dominion over *him.*" Rom. vi. 9. But, (2,) why did not Professor Bush, instead of making the loose, unsupported assertion, that it does not mean "that Christ was the first in the order of time," enter into an investigation of the term or phrase itself? Were not the first-fruits under the Old Testament, "the *first* in the order of time?" Why should the term, therefore, not import here also that Christ is thus first? It is rather too much to ask us to yield our best-supported and most cherished convictions to the mere unsupported *ipse dixit* of Professor Bush. But why did he not examine other places where the term is used, and then favour us with the result? e. g., Rom. viii. 23, and xi. 16, and xvi. 5, or James i. 18, or Rev. xiv. 4. Or, why did he not take the instance in the very context itself? (ver. 23, and these, with the text, are the only instances of its use in the New Testament,) "Christ the first-fruits; AFTERWARD, (ἔπειτα) THEY THAT ARE CHRIST'S AT HIS COMING." What are we to think of such bold assertions of our author, so directly in the face of the clearest asseverations of the word of God? But if the word ἀπαρχὴ were passed over without examination by the Professor, he might have found phrases in abundance which would have illustrated this, and preserved him from making an assertion so utterly destitute of support. See e. g., Col. i. 18, where he is called the *first-born from the dead:*" πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν. Or, see Rev. i. 5, where precisely the

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same phrase is found. A consideration of these things can leave no doubt on the mind, as to whether Christ is here declared to be first in the order of time. But

2. The Professor thinks "it would be a very violent construction of the analogy to suppose it to imply that hundreds of thousands of years might elapse between the resurrection of the grand Precursor and that of the mass of his followers," as "the whole harvest began to be gathered in *immediately after* the presentation of the first-fruits." Now, (1.) what are we to think of such an objection, when viewed in connexion with the theory of Professor Bush? He teaches that the resurrection-body is eliminated from our corporeal fabric *at* death, by natural laws, and that all true believers who died from Adam to Christ entered upon the resurrection state, *i. e.*, arose from the dead. That is, the harvest was *half gathered before* the presentation of the first-fruits. And yet he says that we do "violence" to "the analogy," though we make the harvest, as he admits, to be *after* the gathering of the first-fruits. There is something so perfectly ludicrous about this that no exposure can make it more so. But (2.) the apostle says nothing about *the length of time* between the offering of the first-fruits and the harvest. The analogy is not concerned with this. He is simply speaking *first* of the gathering of the first-fruits, and *secondly* of the crop itself. He has told us that the first-fruits were gathered: and now he proceeds to show when the *crop itself* shall be brought in. *But this branch of the argument of the apostle*, so important to a right understanding of what he says respecting the resurrection, *Professor Bush entirely passes over;—he does not even quote the verses!!* From ver. 23, above quoted, he passes on to ver. 35, and omits the very part of the argument where Paul proceeds to mention *when* the harvest itself is to be gathered. Is such a procedure upright? is it honourable? Professor Bush has quoted and commented on several of these verses in another part of his book, (p. 367 *seq.*,) but not in connexion with the subject before us. Duty and honour required of him to notice it in this connexion. The passage is the following: "THEN cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule and all authority and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all

enemies under his feet. *Death*, the last enemy, shall be destroyed, &c. See vers. 24–28.

In this passage Paul speaks of the ingathering of the *harvest itself*, as he had been speaking already of the presentation of the first-fruits. The phrase εἶτα το τέλος ὅταν, &c., "*Then* cometh the end," is referred to the preceding verse, ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ, *at the time of his coming:* and is susceptible of illustration by other passages, almost without number, in the Bible. See e. g., Mal. iii. 17, 18: "*And they shall be mine, saith the Lord of hosts, in that day when I make up my jewels*," or special treasures. But in the New Testament the parallels and illustrations are so numerous and pertinent, that it is astonishing how any one could overlook them. Christ himself has represented it *under the very figure of a harvest*,—the very illustration here employed by Paul. See Matt. xiii. 24–30, and 36–43: "*The harvest*," says he, "*is the end of the world;* and the reapers are the angels. As, therefore, the tares are gathered and burned in the fire: so shall it be in the end of the world. The Son of man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them which do inquity, &c., &c. Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun," &c.

The phrase "end of the world," is συντελεία τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου, (see also Matt. xxviii. 20,) and is asserted by Professor Bush (pp. 367, 368) to mean the same thing as τέλος in 1 Cor. xv. 24; thus bringing these two passages (so far as the ingathering of the harvest is concerned) into a parallel. The inference is therefore irresistible, that the harvest is not to be gathered until the second coming of Christ. What could Professor Bush hope to gain by keeping out of sight this glaring proof of the falseness of his theory; at the same time also that he professed to be analyzing and discussing Paul's whole argument (in this chapter) on the resurrection?

In this connexion he has, likewise, passed over another overpowering proof of the falseness of his theory. I refer to ver. 29: "Else what shall they do who are baptized for the dead, (ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν), if the dead rise not at all? Why are they then baptized for the dead?" Now the argument deducible from this verse against Professor Bush's theory, that the resurrection takes place *at* death, and not after it, does not depend upon our being able to explain what was

the rite here referred to by the apostle. So far as the argument is concerned, any one of that almost score of interpretations mentioned by Bochart (Opp. Tom. I., pp. 1026–1035, Leyden, 1692, folio) may be the true one. But the point is this:—*the persons here spoken of by Paul, and whom he asserts to be dead,* (νεκροὶ) *had not yet arisen from the dead.* The supposition that they had arisen *at* death, would be an accusation against Paul of foolishness, or of dishonesty in his argument. The persons spoken of as dead were at that time dead, of course; and Paul and other believers asserted that they would rise from the dead. Of course, then, they had not arisen *at* death. And, therefore, the theory of Professor Bush, which asserts that man does rise at death, is utterly false. The conclusion is irresistible on the principle, (asserted by Professor Bush,) that Paul is in this chapter treating of the resurrection of only the righteous dead.

In the close of his remarks on vers. 20–23, the Professor throws out several observations which call for a brief notice. In order to justify the exposition which he has given in the passage quoted above, he adds that the true view of the matter is clearly indicated by the sequel, (*i. e.*, vers. 21–23,) in which we are taught, that this resuscitation of the dead, this investiture of the disciples of Christ with immortality, proceeds in a manner analagous with the successive generations of the animal and mortal family who derive *their first life from Adam.*" But if the reader will consult pages 175, 185, 186, &c., &c., of Professor Bush's work, he will find that, according to the Professor's theory, man derives not only his *first* life from Adam, but his "*spiritual body*" likewise; which the theory recognizes as the *second life.* But this only in passing. Our author continues thus: "As the first family is not formed at once, nor dissolved at once; as the members of it have risen into existence *in succession;* so neither will the other family be completed at once." pp. 173, 174.

The object of Professor Bush in these remarks, is to endeavour to afford his theory *en passant* the support of a fanciful analogy, dependent on his notion of the *succession* in the order of completing the family of Adam and that of Christ. Now it is true, as Paul remarks, that our first life (as well as our death) is derived from Adam, and our second life from Christ. But where is the *antithesis of*

succession referred to by the Professor? So far from Christ being the first of his great family who arose from the dead to a glorious immortality, Professor Bush makes his family to have preceded him in this resurrection *for thousands of years.* This surely is pointing out a queer *resemblance* between Adam as the *first* of his family, and Christ as the *first* of his! And the Professor is welcome to all the support that his theory can receive from such a *striking* analogy. But, secondly; he insinuates here also that the advocates of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body entertain the sentiment, that the family of Christ have nothing of succession in their assembling. If Professor Bush would open Howe's "Blessedness of the Righteous," or Baxter's "Saint's Rest," or Edwards' "Sermon at Brainard's Funeral," or any one of the "*Corpus Confessionum*," he would find the Protestant belief to be, that God adopts his elect out of the generations of man as they succeed one another; and that when they die, they "are present with the Lord," and there await the coming of the great day, when they shall re-assume their bodies, which shall then be changed and "fashioned like his own glorious body." Through the successive ages of the world, regeneration, justification, and adoption had rendered them "the sons of God" before they left earth: and, though it did not then "appear what they should be," they were willing to wait (either "in the body or out of it,") until he who is their life should appear, and clothe them anew, in the then beautified garments of their once mortal bodies, and thus gather them home as a precious *harvest*, purchased with his blood.

The Professor next endeavours to expound the phrase, "but every man *in his own order:*" but it is an exposition which may be significantly described by a phrase used sometimes by critics,—"*a running commentary.*" Unitarians and Universalists often affect to employ this kind of exposition; but theirs is not exactly "a running commentary," but a running away from the text. And even our author not unfrequently (in his *Anastasis*) uses this *method.* And here he passes this important phrase with the following mere *ipse dixit:* "Every man of this (Christ's) family, is to be quickened 'in his own order,' or *as* (*when*) *he dies*, from Christ the first-fruits," &c., p. 174. This is rather a too summary method of interpreting hard phrases, but perhaps the Professor thinks that "results and not processes are

for the public eye." Still, I should very much like to know how he ascertained that the meaning of the phrase is, that every man is raised from the dead *at* his death—that the *instant* he is dead, he is raised from the dead. It is wonderful that our author did not exhibit his evidence, and *demonstrate this point* at once, for it would have saved him much subsequent labour, and would also have been of great advantage to his theory; and I divine that the simple reason why he has not done this is, that *he had no proof to give.* Yet I have a little proof to offer of the *falseness* of this exposition, before I pass on. In 1 Thess. iv. 13–18, Paul, referring to the time of the resurrection and to that event itself, says: "This we say unto you, *by the word of the Lord*, that we which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord, *shall not prevent* (οὐ μὴ φθάσωμεν, shall not anticipate) *them which are asleep:*" that is, we shall not receive this glorious change before they do. And would not this be a most extraordinary piece of information for Paul *now* to impart, if he had been teaching all along that every man was quickened, or raised from the dead *at* death, or *as he died?* This would be "going to first principles" with a vengeance. It would be making him say, "those who are asleep have already entered on the resurrection-state, and have been changed; some of them thousands of years before this time of which I speak. And now I tell you from the Lord himself, (*it is a special and direct revelation,*) that those who shall be alive at the time of his coming, shall not enter upon that state *before* those who had entered upon it "even thousands of years ago." Does Professor Bush think that it would require a revelation to make the Thessalonians believe this?

As to the word translated order, (τάγμα,) therefore, whatever else it may mean, it can have no such import as that attached to it by Professor Bush. It is a military term, and is employed only once in the New Testament, although it is sometimes used in the LXX., e. g., 1 Sam. iv. 10, and xv. 4, and 2 Sam. xxiii. 13. Josephus also employs it. Antiq., lib. 14, cap. 15, §. 9, and De Bell., lib. 1, cap. 9, §. 1, &c. The idea seems to be, that every one shall be raised in his own rank. There is a distinction merely between the leader and the body of the army; (see the illustrations of the use of the word above referred to;) the leader is first, the τάγμα, or ταγματά, come after—each in his own order.

Hence in the second part of the verse Paul gives an exegesis of the part referred to.

Tertullian thinks that the order (or *rank*) is an order according to merit, as e. g., the martyrs first, then others next in merit, &c. See Rev. xx. This is likewise the view of the learned Mede. Others think that the resurrection here spoken of will be perfectly simultaneous, and that "order" refers to that celestial order spoken of by Paul, which shall exist among the raised saints, (and in which they shall be raised;) "as one star differeth from another star in glory." See also Dan. xii. 3, and Matt. xiii. 43. But to determine the point is of no importance to the argument.

IV. The next passage quoted by the Professor is the following: "But some man will say, how are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die. And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain: it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain." 1 Cor. xv. 35–37.

In order to perceive the force of the apostle's reasoning in this section of his argument, it is necessary to look at the questions propounded, and his reply to it. The question is, "How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? *ποίῳ δὲ σώματι ἔρχονται.* The epithet bestowed upon the objector by Paul shows that the objection was one of mere infidelity or heathen philosophy, which perhaps the Christians mentioned in ver. 12, had been perplexed with. Therefore says Paul to the objector, *ἄφρων, thou fool.* Hence the objection was not one intended to elicit information, but to justify doubt or unbelief: *q. d.* How is it possible that the dead should be raised, when their bodies are putrified, reduced to ashes, decomposed by the waters, consumed by fire, devoured by wild beasts? &c. How is it possible that they should arise again under such circumstances? The two questions are one, and the *δὲ* is here used to give force to the interrogation, and is employed for this purpose particularly in the repetition of a question; see *e. g.*, 2 Cor. vi. 14–16; which idiom it is important here to notice on account of the turn which Professor Bush endeavours to give to the subject.

This, therefore, is the question or objection: and Professor Bush was well aware that a great deal depended upon understanding it rightly. Hence he gives it the following

explanation: "'How are the dead raised, and with what body do they *come?*' i. e., not with what body do they *come up* out of the ground, but with what body do they *come down* from heaven?" p. 268. Even *he* has not "the length of rational and exegetical hardihood" to deny that the question in these two clauses is one—the latter clause being exegetical of the former. And what preposterous work does he make of the question itself? On his construction of it, it must read, "How are the dead *raised down* from heaven?" The man who would ask such a question must truly be an ἄφρων; so much so, that I think Paul would not have regarded his questions or cavils as deserving of much notice.

But taking for granted that the fool did ask, "With what bodies do the dead come down from heaven?" (though if they had already entered on their resurrection-state, or been "raised from the dead," it is rather mysterious how they should be called "*the dead*,") how does Paul meet the objection? What reply does he make to it? for he surely has made some; and he would have hardly thought it worth bringing forward had he considered it worthy of no answer. Why he begins his reply by stating an analogy taken from the *planting and springing up of grain.* And this is, according to Professor Bush, to show the objector with what body *the dead come down* from heaven? Surely the objector must have thought (if this were the import of his objection) that Paul was rather hard pushed, and was trying to *creep out* of a difficulty without being able even to put a good face upon it. But can any man seriously think that Paul would have answered the objection thus?

And then when he comes to apply the illustration or analogy, he shows the futility of the objection by remarking, "So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it is *raised* (i. e., according to the Professor's construction, *it comes down from heaven*) in incorruption," &c., &c. This is the application of the analogy from the grain. And well might the objector stare, at seeing such an analogy as that of the grain applied to illustrate the putting of something *into earth*, and having its fruit *come down from heaven.* We need not pursue this subject further than to remark, that Professor Bush himself explains "*raised*," in the verses last referred to, to mean, not the coming down of

the body out of heaven, but of its elimination *at death*. Thus refuting his own absurd construction of this question.

On the verses which stand at the head of this section, Professor Bush offers more remarks than on all those previously quoted from the chapter: but they are remarks not offered in elucidation of Paul, but in the vain attempt to engraft his own theory on the apostolic doctrine of the resurrection. But the best way to treat such inconsecutive and random argument as he offers on this whole chapter, is to subject it to a rigid analysis. And this, by the way, is the better style of refuting all objection and argument which present not a fair issue, or no issue at all. The Professor in the first place intimates, with much probability, that the analogy employed by Paul in this passage, was suggested by our Saviour's language, (see John xii. 24,) "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die," &c. He thinks, too, "that an analogy drawn from insect transmutations, would have been a more striking" illustration; but questions "whether the facts known in this province of nature were known to the apostle." pp. 174, 175. Paine, in his "Age of Reason" expresses the same sentiment; but Watson replies justly, that "had he known as much as any naturalist in Europe does, of the progress of an animal from one state to another, as from a worm to a butterfly, I am of opinion he would not have used that illustration in preference to what he has used, which is obvious and satisfactory." *Apology*, Letter IX.

The Professor next proceeds to show the points of agreement and of disagreement between the illustration employed by Paul and the thing illustrated. There is, says he, a "coincidence in the fact of '*dying*.' In both cases there is that process of decay and dissolution which we denominate *death*." He then "aims at precision of ideas, and notes the points of difference as well as of similitude." One of these "points of difference" is, that "the 'dying,' which the apostle predicates of the seed, takes place subsequently to the sowing. But the human body does not die after it is deposited in the dust. It is previously dead—'for the body without the spirit is dead'—and therefore cannot die again." Here, then, the depositing of the seed in the ground, is, according to our author, intended by Paul as analogous to the depositing of the body in the earth: and the "point of dif-

ference" which he finds, is that the seed is then *living*, and the body is *dead*. But how will this harmonize with what he offers on a subsequent page? He says: "So far is the apostle from teaching that the body is 'sown' by being deposited in the grave. *It is sown at its* BIRTH, *and not at its* DEATH." p. 186. I shall hereafter remark on the incorrectness of this observation; and I refer to it here merely to show how easily Professor Bush can refute his own criticisms. For if the body is *sown at birth*, and if this is what Paul here teaches, (as our author asserts,) then the body when it is sown, is *alive* as well as the grain. What, then, has become of this "*point of difference?*"

The Professor next proceeds to remark, that "as there is something in the plant which *dies*, so there is also something which does *not* die:" and that "we cannot, of course, suppose that the apostle intended to say that this embryo died, although this is the very point of Thomas Paine's railing accusation against the Scripture doctrine of the resurrection, and on the ground of which he calls St. Paul a fool; contending, that if the seed really and literally *died*, no plant would grow, *which is indeed true*," says Professor Bush. "But this evidently is not the apostle's meaning; and if the skeptic had ever put his hand into a hill of young potatoes," &c. pp. 175, 176. Now it is well known that the Jews thought the death of the grain was necessary to its reproduction. Hence our blessed Redeemer says, in a passage referred to above, "except a corn of wheat fall into the ground *and die*, it abideth alone: but *if it die*, it bringeth forth much fruit." And this process of decomposition is what they meant by *death;* and it surely is absurd to give the term another and a different meaning, and then say that Tom Paine was right, and the apostle consequently wrong in the use of it. The reply of Watson to the "paltry and contemptible cavilling" of Paine in this instance, is so appropriate in its application to the foregoing remarks of Professor Bush, that I shall merely quote it, without adding any thing further than to express my regret that our good friend the Professor has placed himself in such questionable society. "Every husbandman in Corinth," says the Bishop, "though unable, perhaps, to define the term death, would understand the apostle's phrase in a popular sense, and agree with him, that a grain of wheat must become rotten in the ground before it could sprout; and that, as God

raised from a rotten grain of wheat, the roots, the stem, the leaves, the ear of a new plant, he might also cause a new body to spring up from the rotten carcass in the grave." Letter IX.

It is useful once in a while for the mariner, as he passes onward to the destined port, to look at his compass and chart, and institute a reckoning, in order to ascertain not only how far he has proceeded, but whether he be truly in the right way: and this is the more important if his way be in the vicinity of shoals and quicksands, and the atmosphere be filled with fog. We may perhaps here act wisely, if we imitate his example. Following in the wake of our author, we have had a foggy atmosphere ever since we started. We have opened up the shallows (see Æn. I., 144–147) thus far; but here we deem it important to pause for a moment and examine our chart.

The question which Paul is discussing is, "How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?" We have remarked, that δὲ is used here to give force to the interrogation. It is used as γὰρ in verse 13. As we have remarked above also, there can be not the shadow of a doubt that the questions are one—that ἐγείρονται and ἔρχονται both refer to the same thing, and mean, *prodeunt*, or *come forth*. The objector, therefore, supposed that the resurrection of the body, (not *the future state of man*, as Professor Bush seems to think,) is impossible. And hence the strength of his objection consists in this:—If the dead are raised again, what body can they have, with which to return to life? But they have no σῶμα, or body now, for (by hypothesis) it has been burned up, or devoured by beasts. And hence the dead are not able to return to life again. This is the objection; and it is easy to imagine how delighted those old philosophising objectors would have been, could they then have had a copy of Professor Bush's *Anastasis*.

This is the question, nor must we permit ourselves to lose sight of it in this section. The Professor, in his remarks on Paul's reply, perpetually loses sight of it. But while we continue to analyze what he has offered, we must still carefully note the direction to which the *compass* points.

The single object of Paul in this branch of his argument, is, by means of the illustration taken from the sowing and springing up of grain, to repel or refute the assertion of the skeptic, that the resurrection of the body is impos-

sible. I say "*body*," because even Professor Bush will not venture to deny that the objection is based upon the asserted impossibility, *not of the future state of man*, (which would turn the reply of the apostle into sheer absurdity,) *but of the resurrection of the body.* And if this be the force of the objection, then Paul's reply contemplates that resurrection. It is, therefore, the *impossibility* of the resurrection of the body which was asserted by the objector; and, by consequence, the clear possibility of it which Paul is maintaining. He enters into no philosophical speculations; but states a plain matter of fact. The grain which you sow, says he, dies—it decays; until it is no longer grain, but a mere putrescent mass. So, also, it is with the human body; it decays, and is a body in *form* no more. But *God gives* to each seed which you sow, a body; (see ver. 38, which Professor Bush, with an unfairness which nothing can justify, and the object of which is perfectly apparent, has separated from its connexion.) It is not nature which does it, but God by his mighty power. He raises the beautiful stalk and ear from the putrid mass of the naked grain which you have sown. And the God who is able to do this, is able also to raise from the decayed body of man, the glorious body of which I speak. And you are an ἄφρων, or a fool, says Paul to the objector, if you do not see that the God who does the one can do the other.

The question, as to what *amount* of the grain of seed which is sown enters into the transformed body of the blade, stalk, and ear, is a question which has nothing to do with the point which Paul is elucidating. In meeting the objection, based upon an alleged impossibility, he proceeds upon the assumption, which even the skeptic durst not refuse to grant, that there is a clear identity between the seed sown, and the body which God gives it. Such an identity as would justify the husbandman, as he looked over his field of grain after it was grown, in saying, there is the grain which I sowed last Fall. Nor does Paul attempt to tell what constitutes this identity. The indisputable fact itself is sufficient. And so, also, is it with the human body, as he proceeds to remark in vers. 42–44, a passage which will come up for consideration hereafter.

These remarks will serve to show how inappropriate are the criticisms of Professor Bush on pp. 176–182; in which he takes up for consideration the question of the *germ*, from which

the resurrection body, as it is asserted by some, will be elaborated. But the point which Paul is here considering calls for no such discussion, and therefore I shall pass it by with a few brief remarks. It is upon this utter misunderstanding or misapprehension of the point of the apostle's reasoning that the Professor builds those fanciful notions (taken from Göethe) of the spiritual body being a germ, and leaving the material body as a germ, and elaborating for itself a spiritual corporeity from the spiritual elements by which it is surrounded, &c. &c., and upon which he dwells, and rings the changes *etiam ad nauseam.* The argument of Paul has no more to do with such notions than it has with Alnaschar's dreams. But let us attend to a few of the more important remarks of our author on this subject.

He observes that "we cannot understand the apostle's reasoning, unless he means to *affirm* (!) that there is something of the nature of a germ which emanates from the defunct body, and forms either the substance or the nucleus of the future resurrection body." p. 178. And from this he would infer that the spiritual body is "eliminated *at* death." But Paul, as above remarked, means to affirm nothing on the subject. His argument in no sense calls for it. He denies the assertion of the fool, by stating that God would provide the body when it was needed: which he also illustrates by showing that God provides the future body of the grain that is sown and has putrified. But as to the *manner* of his producing it, he says nothing in either case.

The Professor also remarks, that "the only germ in the human body answering to the germ in the plant, and upon which the apostle's comparison is built, is *the spiritual body itself.*" p. 179. *Assertions* are easily made; but they are of little account if wholly destitute of proof, as in this case. The apostle says nothing about *germs* in either case, and therefore builds no comparison upon them.

Our author again remarks: "We cannot suppose Paul to have had recourse to the comparison, without having in view some *point* of resemblance in the two cases. That *point* his own words certainly develope. In regard to the grain, he affirms, 'Thou sowest not the body that shall be.' What is the correlative to this, unless it be, that 'the body that dies is not the same body that shall be at or after the resurrection?'" p. 179. But Professor Bush misapprehends the apostle's argument; the point of comparison, *is in respect to*

God's furnishing the future body in both cases. It is as easy, says Paul, for him to do the one as the other. And the fact of the decay of the body which takes place, is no more an objection to its being reproduced by God, than the same fact would be in the case of the grain. It is amusing to notice the Professor's repeated refutation of himself. We have here another instance. He has, as above noticed, already explained "*sowing*" to mean *birth;* and now he finds that *death* is "the correlative" of putting the seed in the earth. The remark of Paul "Thou sowest not the body that shall be," is explained by himself *in the very phrase* from which Professor Bush has cut off this part: "Thou sowest not that body that shall be, *but bare grain*," ἀλλὰ γυμνὸν κόκκον. *Granum sine culmo, sine arista*, as Grotius explains it. It is merely a contrast between the naked unclothed grain, and the beautiful form with which God shall thereafter clothe it.

The Professor again remarks: "Admit, for a moment, that the *life* itself of the body ceases, and that it is only after long ages of time that the succeeding corporeity ensues, and the analogy is at once destroyed. The true *life* of the seed is not for an instant intermitted, even in the midst of its *dying;* and we maintain, that it is only by the development of the spiritual body *at death*, and not from the entombed relics in the grave, that any parallelism in the two cases can be recognized." p. 180. But we have already remarked that the comparison of the apostle and that of Professor Bush differ *toto cœlo.* Paul makes no such comparison as the Professor institutes; and therefore it would be strange indeed if he could see any parallelism. "The analogy that is *destroyed*" therefore, is not that instituted by Paul, but by the Professor.

This important passage, therefore, not only fails to furnish our author the least support, but it bears the most decided testimony to the doctrine which he has endeavoured to impugn.

V. The next passage quoted by Professor Bush is the following: "But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body. All flesh is not the same flesh; but there is one kind of flesh of men, another flesh of beasts, another of fishes, and another of birds. There are also celestial bodies, and bodies terrestrial—but the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial another.

There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for one star differeth from another star in glory." 1 Cor. xv. 38–41.

We have already remarked on our author's separating the first of these verses from its immediate connexion: and before we proceed to discuss what he has said on this branch of the apostle's argument, we shall follow the apostle himself. He now drops the illustration taken from the grain, and anticipates an objection which he saw would be offered to the doctrine itself—or rather perhaps, to present another view, or illustration of the doctrine, by which to obviate the objection stated in ver. 35. And the connecting link between this argument and the one taken from the grain is this—'There is a diversity of bodies, and I have shown that it is not absurd to believe that a dead body may be revived in another form.' He then proceeds. 'But omitting further remark on the grain, let us come directly to the subject of animated nature. You say that it is absurd to suppose that the decayed and dissolved flesh of animals can be revived—and therefore, as man is an animal, that it is absurd to suppose his body will ever rise again. But stop—there are different kinds of flesh. One appertains to men, another to beasts, another to fish, and another to birds: and in fact this is a diversity which you find in the heavenly bodies as well as in things on earth. You are compelled to agree with me, therefore, that there is this difference—and I willingly agree with you that there is to be no resurrection of beasts, birds, &c. But the flesh of man, (created in the image of God, and redeemed by the blood of his Son,) is far different from the flesh of brutes. Man is also compounded of body and spirit, which is not the case with the brutes. And therefore there is not the same necessity for their bodies to be raised. Here, then, is a difference not only in the flesh, but in the destiny. The one requires a body, for the spirit lives. In the other case there is no spirit to live, and a body is, therefore, not needed.' And having obviated this objection, the apostle continues his argument in ver. 42, seq.: "So also is the resurrection of the dead," &c.

Our author commences his criticism on these verses with a remark of his own, and another of Mr. Locke, both aiming to present a construction of ver. 38, that might enervate the argument which it furnishes, (taken in its proper connexion,) against their notions of the resurrection. But we are

content to take the passage to mean, that the body which is produced from the grain, is the body given it by God. This is what Paul asserts, and neither Professor Bush nor Mr. Locke have offered a syllable which can set aside its plain and obvious import. It is abundantly sufficient for the argument.

In order to favour his theory, the Professor, remarking on the phrase, "there are also celestial bodies," σώματα ἐπουράνια, ver. 40, observes: "It is, we believe, not unusual for expositors to understand the phrase, 'bodies celestial,' of the sun, moon, and planets. *But this is entirely a modern diction.* There is no evidence, we believe, that the original σώματα was ever used in this sense by the ancient writers, sacred or profane. The 'bodies,' of which the apostle here speaks, are *human* bodies, and, as he says, there *are* (not *shall be*) celestial human bodies, what other inference can we draw, than that they are the glorified resurrection-bodies in which the risen saints now exist?" p. 182. But what does he mean by "entirely a modern diction?" He will find the phrase so expounded (to go no further back) by Erasmus, 300 years ago; and by Estius, and by Pareus, and Crellius, and Poole, and a whole mass of other expositors not *generally* reckoned amongst the *moderns.* It is not, therefore, a "modern diction," though our athor's theory might require it to be so.

Nor is he more successful in his effort to prove that σώματα cannot be here employed metaphorically by the apostle. Josephus employs the word with a latitude that sufficiently justifies such a usage. In De Bell. II., cap. II., §. 5, speaking of Archelaus, he says: "He desires to obtain the shadow of that kingly authority, of which he had already seized the substance," (or body,) σκιὰν αἰτησόμενος βασιλείας, ἧς ἥρπασεν ἑαυτῷ τὸ σῶμα. So also in the Proem to the same work, §. 5, he uses the expression, τὸ σῶμά τῆς ἱστορίας, "a body of history," referring to a true narration as distinguished from one that is false and fictitious. The same term he employs also in speaking of David's connecting the citadel with the lower city, by which he made it *one body.* Antiq., lib. VII., cap. 3, §. 2. Diodorus Siculus, also, includes in the metaphorical use of the term, the sun, stars, &c., ἅπαν σῶμα τῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως, lib. I., cap. 11. The Latins, also, employ the corresponding term in their own own language with equal latitude of signification. They speak of aquæ corpus, Lu-

cret. de Rerum Nat. II., 232; and they apply the same term in designation of a tree, a rock, a city, nation, &c., &c., so frequently that it would be idle to specify instances. Now in all these instances, (or to speak only of the references to the Greek writers,) σῶμα is used metaphorically, Professor Bush to the contrary notwithstanding. Such an use of it is, therefore, allowable. And hence it is allowable for Paul to employ it in this manner.

But we cannot consent to rest the question here. The metaphorical use of σῶμα and *corpus* is frequent among the Romans and Greeks: and that Paul employs the Greek term to designate the sun, moon, and stars, is plain from the explanation of his meaning which he gives in ver. 41. But where, let me ask, do the Greeks or Latins ever employ either of these terms to designate a *tertium quid?* for such Professor Bush declares the resurrection-*bodies* to be. This surely *is* a "modern diction:" and I hesitate not to say that he can find no instance of such an usage in any of the writers referred to. How vain, then, not to say, preposterous, are the inferences which he has attempted to deduce in favour of his theory, from an explanation of the term, which is not only destitute of any positive evidence in its favour, but has the entire usage of language against it.

On page 183 he ventures also most egregiously to misrepresent the apostle, by saying, that "he proceeds to show, by similitudes drawn from various natural objects, that man may have a different body fitted to the different state in which he enters *at death*." Now there is not in the whole chapter the remotest allusion to any such idea whatever. It is painful to be compelled to contradict my friend so roundly. But an author who will venture upon such utterly baseless assertions must expect to be contradicted.

The Professor closes his remarks on these verses by quoting an excellent note (which in no sense justifies his theory, however,) from the commentary of Mr. Barnes, *in loco:* and happy had it been for him had he, in expounding the argument of this chapter, only followed the principles which guided that popular expositor.

VI. The next passage quoted and commented on, is the following: "So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption: it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory: it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power: it is sown a natural body, it is raised

a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body." 1 Cor. xv. 42–44.

The first clause of this passage contains what critics call a metonomy of the adjunct for the subject. For ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν is here to be taken for *those who arise from the dead*. It is a figure often used by Paul, *e. g.*, circumcision often means those who have been circumcised; Rom. ii. 25, and iii. 30, and iv. 9, 12; Eph. ii. 11; Phil. iii. 3, 5, and *vice versa*, with uncircumcision. Election is also taken for the elect; see Rom. xi. 7. The import of the phrase, therefore, is, *so shall things be* in the resurrection of the dead—the body, which previously had decayed, &c., &c., shall then be thus, or so.

The apostle here begins to apply the illustrations which he had been presenting—*q. d.* 'The different kinds of grain which are sown, though they decay, yet do not mingle. A mysterious arrangement of Providence keeps them distinct. That same Providence keeps the body, or flesh, of man distinct, though it decay, or, to human appearance, is utterly consumed, or incorporated with other bodies. Now in the resurrection of the dead, that which is thus sown in corruption, is raised in incorruptibility,' &c., &c. But here we are met with a "take heed" from Professor Bush; who begins his criticism on this passage as follows: "The true purport of this language is not so obvious as might at first blush appear. The point of difficulty is, to determine whether the 'sowing,' as applied to the body, is to be understood of its consignment to the dust, or, as Whitby suggests, of the corrupt and corruptible nature in which man is born into the world." p. 184. It is a "point of difficulty," however, which he feels *no difficulty* in determining. With little or no "argument from reason," or Scripture either, he soon decides that "the 'sowing,' *therefore*, is our birth in Adam, or in the *nature* of Adam, and our resurrection but the finished result of our birth by regeneration in Christ." "So far is the apostle from teaching, that the body is 'sown,' by being deposited in the grave. It is sown at its *birth*, and not at its *death*." pp. 185, 186.

It is not singular that Professor Bush should so strenuously insist on this point, for he well knew that unless it could be carried, his whole theory would share the fate of every other castle built merely in the air; and which has

elaborated for itself an aerial corporeity, from the aerial elements by which it is surrounded—that is, it would be sadly in want of a foundation. But let us canvass his reasons for announcing this conclusion. He says

1. "The dying affirmed of the seed is not strictly parallel of the dying which holds good of the body. In the one case it takes place *after* the subject is deposited in the earth, in the other *before*." p. 185. But how would such a consideration tend to show that therefore "the sowing" referred to must mean "our birth in Adam?" There is an awful hiatus between the premises and conclusion, and one which Professor Bush can never pass over. The proper inference from this asserted failure in the "strict parallel," is, as we have shown already, that Paul intended no such parallel. He does not refer to the "grain" or "flesh" for the purpose of drawing out imaginary parallels, but to refute the objector's assertion that the resurrection of the body is impossible. And he does this by a simple reference to an undisputed fact. The question as to "germs," &c. &c. has nothing to do with his argument. The objector affirmed that a dead and decayed body could not be made to revive: Paul denies the assertion, and refutes it by a reference to the grain. And this is the sum total of the "*parallelism*" which he draws.

2. "But," says the Professor, "another consideration of still greater weight is derived from the contrast which follows between Adam and Christ. 'And so it is written, the first Adam was made a *living soul*, (ψυχὴ ζῶσα,) the last Adam a *quickening spirit*.' But how does this illustrate the case of the natural and spiritual body? The answer to this is suggested by the import of the terms which the writer employs. The original word for *soul* (ψυχὴ) is that which is always employed by the apostle to denote the *animal soul*, or *the life of the natural or animal man*, as contradistinguished from spiritual. It is the substantive from which is formed the adjective ψυχικός, *always* translated in the New Testament *natural*.* Now the apostle had just said that 'it is sown a

* This declaration may serve as a tolerably good illustration of the carelessness with which Professor Bush makes assertions. As to its being "*always* translated," &c., it is used *but three times* in the New Testament, besides in the verses before us; to wit, 1 Cor. ii. 14, and Jas. iii. 15, and Jude 19, *in only one of which* it is translated "*natural*."

natural body, it is raised a spiritual body.' Here he refers to the origin of these two bodies. The one is derived from Adam, the other from Christ." p. 185.

On a former page we have clearly explained the import of ψυχικός as used in the New Testament. It means the soul of the unrenewed man as distinguished from the regenerate. And as to this "consideration of still greater weight," which comprises every thing that Professor Bush has offered in defence of his construction of σπείρω, it will be found, on examination, to have no more weight than the one which precedes it. For in the *first* place, he has attempted a distinction which is subversive of his whole theory of a spiritual body, possessed in this life, and eliminated *at* death by *natural laws*. As we have abundantly shown already, he makes the spiritual body as much a part of man in the present life, as his material body: and of course the one is as much derived from Adam as the other. His theory throughout assumes that the doctrine of immortality is the same as that of the resurrection: and therefore if man be immortal, he obtains his immortal part through the instrumentality of Adam as well as his mortal. A reference to the delineation of his theory in chap. II., part I., above, will show this at once. And therefore to say that man receives his animal body from Adam, and his spiritual body from Christ, is, according to this theory, to talk sheer nonsense. How is a spiritual body eliminated by mere *natural laws*, and yet derived from the mere grace or mercy of Christ! The resurrection of the body, being a pure miracle, is effected by the power and grace of Christ; and *natural laws* have nothing to do with it.

But *secondly:* according to this theory the spiritual body is *sown*, as well as the animal body. The "sowing," says Professor Bush, refers to our birth: and at our birth, even he himself will admit, we have a σῶμα, a ψυχή, and a πνεῦμα; *a body, soul, and spirit.* Now when the *spirit* leaves the body at death, it leaves it with a "*tertium quid*—an intermediate something between the cogitative faculty and the gross body," p. 78; (that is, something between *matter*, and the "*bare power of thought!*" p. 72,) and this intermediate something, "is intimately related to the spiritual life implanted in regeneration;" (p. 140,) "it constitutes the inner essential vitality of our present bodies, and it lives again in another state, *because it never dies.*" p. 70. "We know that

there are these subtle elements *mixed up in the grosser materials of our bodies*, with which our mental operations are connected, and upon which they are dependent, and we cannot know but that they may exist separate from our bodies, *and form in fact, in the strictest propriety of speech*, a spiritual body." p. 77. Now if all this be so, (and Professor Bush surely will not question it,) then it follows irresistibly that we derive our spiritual body from Adam, no less than our natural body. And, therefore, if "sowing" here, relates to *our birth*, as the Professor asserts, then, Paul's language amounts to no more than this, that the natural body and the spiritual body are *both sown*. Where, then, is this derivation of the one from Adam and the other from Christ? And such being the *reasons*, therefore, by which Professor Bush seeks to justify his reference of σπείρω to *birth*, and not to *burial*, it is clear that he has not the shadow of a justification for doing so.

He refers to Locke and Whitby, also, as seeming to countenance such a rendering: great names, to be sure, but we should rather have had their *reasons* than their authority. The first vestige that I can find of this sentiment is the broad assertion of it in cap. VIII., §. II. of the *Compendiolum Socinianismi*, (Amsterd. 1598,) to which we have referred, and from which we have largely quoted in part I., chap. II., § 2, above. The same exposition is given by the two great champions of this school, Crellius and Slichtingius, in their Commentaries on 1 Corinthians. Conrad Vorstius, whom the Arminians of the early part of the 17th century, laboured so earnestly to have appointed to the Professorship of Theology in the Leyden University, and who was a sort of *tertium quid* between them and the Socinians, being neither one thing nor the other, (see Narratio de Vit. et Script. D. Dav. Parei, pp. 17, 18, *folio*, and Scott's Synod of Dort, pp. 37–44,) was the next to adopt the exposition. He was a *vir acutus atque eruditus*, but was all the time like a vessel at sea without chart, compass, or helm—for like Priestley, he neither knew the latitude nor longitude of his theological sentiments, and had no idea where he should stop in his downward career. The Arminians regarded him as a man of piety and learning, and hence Locke and Whitby, thinking that their theories of the resurrection could be more satisfactorily sustained by the adoption of this criticism, did not hesitate to adopt it: and from them it has descended to Pro-

fessor Bush, to whom the fact of its being "*entirely a modern notion*," seemed to form *no very serious objection* to his favouring it with his support.

The fact of its being a criticism originating with the *Fratres Poloniæ*, can constitute of itself no rational ground of objection against it; yet the fact of their having invented it in order to save their theory, which is so wholly preposterous and anti-christian, forms the best of reasons why every Christian expositor should hesitate before adopting it, and subject it to a thorough investigation. Had Professor Bush done this in the present case, in the spirit with which he penned his admirable "Notes on Genesis," (and uninfluenced, of course, by any *tertium quid* theory,) he would no more have perilled his well earned reputation, by endorsing such a specimen of philological nonsense, than he would have said that truth and falsehood are the same.

1. In reply to this criticism I remark, *first*, that it is pleasing to see how orthodox its Socinian and Pelagian authors (in which catalogue, however, we are very far from insinuating that Professor Bush ought to be placed,) can at times become on the doctrine of original sin. Every one knows how pathetic their appeals to public sympathy have been on the subject of the Calvinistic view of this doctrine. "The poor little innocents that come into the world as pure as angels," have been pitied and compassionated, and defended against the "*cruel doctrine*," by valiant champions, whose harness, having been buckled on, could not be laid aside until victory should declare in favour of the poor little injured and cruelly slandered infants. But now the cause of these little ones seems to be hopeless indeed; for their advocates are willing to parley with *the enemy*, and abandon the fortress of defence, if only he will consent to let them peaceably get rid of their own bodies. This granted, the infants may take care of themselves.

The "sowing" here, say these men, "is our birth in Adam:" and the passage must, therefore, mean that "man is *born* in corruption, (φθορᾷ,) he is raised in incorruption: he is *born* in dishonour, (ἀτιμίᾳ,) he is raised in glory: he is *born* in weakness, (ἀσθενείᾳ,) he is raised in power: he is *born* a natural body, (σῶμα ψυχικόν,) he is raised a spiritual body." If σπείρω refer to birth, this must, indisputably, be the meaning of the passage. Let us then look at the import of these terms, and, by the aid of our Socinian and Pelagian friends,

we shall have at least *one passage* that cannot but settle the question, whether mankind is not *born in a state of sin and misery.*

The first term is φθορὰ, *corruption.* Now it will hardly be said by these gentlemen, that *natural corruption* can be predicated of "infants who are as pure and whose nature is as upright as Adam's was when he was created," for Adam's nature was not then corrupt. What, then, does the term mean? If we are permitted to refer it to a *dead body*, it is easily understood; but we are not allowed to do this here, and it must be made to refer to a healthy, *living infant.* We must, therefore, look at its usage elsewhere. Aside from this passage it is employed only eight times in the New Testament. In ver. 50, it plainly has the same meaning as here. It may mean *natural corruption* in Col. ii. 22, and perhaps in Rom. viii. 21, as also once in 2 Pet. ii. 12, (where it is used twice,) but in the other places, to wit, Gal. vi. 8; 2 Pet. i. 4, and ii. 12, 19, it means the most revolting *moral* corruption. Such, then, must be evidently the state in which mankind is born.

The second term is ἀτιμία, from ἄτιμος, which itself is compounded of ἀ, privative, and τιμή; (the very etymology is enough to show its import, and such is, in fact, its meaning in the New Testament;) which, besides in the verse before us, is used but six times in the New Testament. In Rom. i. 26, it is rendered "*vile;*" and in ix. 21, "*dishonour;*" in 1 Cor. xi. 14, "*shame;*" in our text, "dishonour;" and so, also, in 2 Cor. vi. 8, and in 2 Tim. ii. 20; and in 2 Cor. xi. 21, "reproach:" *in every instance it is used in a bad moral sense.* Ἄτιμος is used but four times, and in each of these, in strict accordance with its etymological import; see Matt. xiii. 57; Mark vi. 4; 1 Cor. iv. 10, and xii. 23.

On the term ἀσθενεία it is unnecessary to dwell. It is used to mean, *weakness, infirmity, imbecility*, either of body or mind, &c. And on the phrase, σῶμα ψυχικόν, we have dwelt already.

Who can look over this character which Socinians have, by clear implication, bestowed upon infants, and not say, "Alas! poor little creatures—this is worse than the *decretum horribile* itself—it is worse than the worst forms of imputation," &c., &c. But there is no escape from these consequences, if "*sown*" here means what these men assert. The infant when *born* must be a subject of moral corrup-

tion in its worst forms; it must be "without honour," "dishonourable," "vile," &c., &c.; and as these things cannot, of course, be predicated of it in consequence of its actual transgressions, the poor Socinian and Pelagian have no other alternative but to hold on to their bodies, and so give up their definition of σπείρω; or else admit the doctrine of imputation, and that, too, in a form (which is not by any means the true one, but) in which they have ever caricatured it, and gloried in holding it up to contempt.

2. But again. I have already remarked that this is the branch of the argument in which Paul applies his illustrations so as to answer directly the question of the fool. That question, *was concerning the dead*—not *birth* but *death*.—How are the *dead* raised up? And if Paul had replied to this question by telling the objector how people *were born*, he would have acted as neither Professor Bush, nor any other man of sense would have done; and might well have apprehended that his ἄφρον would have been returned with interest. And therefore Paul is not here speaking of persons being born, but of their consignment to earth.* But the clause (in v. 42,) which I have explained above, clearly exhibits the connecting link between the reasoning of the apostle here, and the illustration taken from the grain. And as Piscator remarks "'*Is sown*', here, means the same thing as '*is buried*.' It is a metaphor, by which the apostle changes by an alternation the words concerning agriculture. For in verse 36, above, he attributes those things to the seed which pertain to our bodies: but here, on the contrary he attributes to our bodies what pertains to the seed." *Scholia in loco.* "*Seritur;* id est, sepelitur. Metaphora, quâ Apostolus verba ἐναλλάξ permutavit de industria. nam supr. 36, semini ea attribuit, quæ pertinent ad corpora nostra: hîc contrà corporibus nostris tribuit quæ pertinent ad semen." The profoundly learned Glassius, in his *Philologia Sacra*, Lib. V. Tract. I. cap. 11, p. 1736, makes the same remark almost in the same words. And so far as mere authority goes, his opinion is of more worth than that of all

* The learned and acute Cloppenburg remarks with great force, "Nam à *versu* 35, sermo fuit de mortuis, ut non venerit Apostolo in mentem loqui de generatione per seminis traducem: sed loquutus est de sepultura cadaverum, quæ instar seminis terræ mandantur, in spem messis, quæ futura est in consummatione sæculi; confer Joh. xii. 24, et Matt. xiii. 39." *Confut. Socin.* Cap. 8.

the Socinians who have ever lived. Grotius also remarks that "when the apostle might have said, *It is buried*, he preferred to say *It is sown*, that he might not depart from the foregoing similitude taken from the grain." Grotius wrote this also after he had been enlightened by the Socinian criticisms. (See his letter to Crellius in Vol. III. of the *Fratres Poloniæ*.) It is needless to refer to other commentators.

On this principle, therefore, does the apostle employ the language referred to, and respond *directly*, (that is without a formal analogy,) to the objection which he has been discussing: q. d. "It is true, it is, as you intimate, sown in corruption; but this is no objection, for it is raised again in incorruption. True, it *is* sown in dishonour, for it has been the instrument of sinning against God; but this dishonour shall not cleave to it hereafter, for it shall be raised in glory. I admit all that you say of its weak and wretched condition; but God will, in the resurrection, impart to it new vigor; it shall be raised in power. True it *is* but a mere animal body when sown; it had never been entirely obedient to the spirit; and therefore not fit for the glory which is to be revealed; but God shall raise it a spiritual body; which shall be better adapted to the use of the πνεῦμα, than it was in this world even to the ψυχὴ itself." The argument of the apostle requires, therefore, that σπείρω should be here interpreted of the consignment of the body to the earth; according to the sentence "Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return."

3. But in addition to these considerations, I remark that Professor Bush is not able to adduce a single instance from the New Testament, the LXX., or elsewhere, of σπείρω being used simply for the *birth* of a human being. The corresponding term in the Old Testament, is זרע, which is translated by σπείρω in the LXX. almost always. I have examined twenty-eight instances of its use, and in no one case is it employed in any way that would at all countenance such an idea. The term is mostly employed in reference to the literal planting of seed. But in Judges ix. 45, it refers to the scattering of salt as seed. In other places it is used figuratively in reference to the performance of works either good or evil, which will at the great harvest of the judgment, produce their appropriate fruit. See Job iv. 8; Prov. xxii. 8;

Hosea viii. 7; and also Psalm cxxvi. 5; Prov. xi. 18; Jer. iv. 3. (Compare also Gal. vi. 7, 8.)

Its *primary* import, therefore, is simply *to scatter*. Its *secondary*, *to sow*, or *plant seed*. See Hosea ii. 23, Jer. xxxi. 27. In *Niphal* it means *to be sown*, as a field, and also *to be scattered as seed;* and hence *tropically* it means to be impregnated, Numb. v. 28. In *Hiphil*, to bear seed as a plant, Gen. i. 11, and *tropically to conceive seed*, as a woman. But even here it is, by the writer, most carefully distinguished from *birth* itself, (Levit. xii. 2,) for זרע refers to the *sowing*, or *impregnation;* which is carefully distinguished from ילד *to bring forth*. In all these instances, which serve to exhibit the Hebrew usage, as well as that of σπείρω with the LXX., there is nothing that can be tortured even into an analogy to the meaning contended for by Professor Bush, and the Pelagians, and Socinians. And the reason is plain;—*birth*, so far from being a *sowing*, is the production of *the fruit itself:* and to confound such an eternal distinction in the very nature of things, would be to render language itself a perfect chaos, and wholly incapable of asserting any thing.

An appeal to the New Testament, will bring us to the same result. The term is used about forty-four times, in addition to the instances in the passage before us: Nor can Professor Bush find one instance which will at all justify his reference of it to *birth*. There is one that may, it is true, be thought to squint that way, and as the Professor has not regarded the rules of exegesis very strictly where his theory is concerned, he may think it will afford him some support. He is welcome to all the assistance which it will yield him, however: but it will require "a length of rational and exegetical hardihood" to which he has not yet attained, to represent Paul as taking an analogy from the workings of Satan, to illustrate the subject of the resurrection. The instance is Matt. xiii. 38, 39. "The tares are the children of the evil one. The enemy that *sowed them* is the devil:" ὁ δὲ ἐχθρὸς ὁ σπείρας αὐτὰ, ἐστιν ὁ διάβολος. Socinians might not care about violating the rules of language, in order to maintain their notions; but Professor Bush will admit, that αὐτὰ cannot possibly relate to υἱοὶ here as its antecedent; and can only relate to ζιζάνια *tares*.

The rendering of σπείρω propounded by Professor Bush, therefore, has not only nothing to support it, but is in direct

violation of all the laws and analogies of language; and of course is undeserving of any regard.

4. It may be further remarked that in the ἐναλλάξ or *alternation* which Paul here uses, (and which we have referred to above,) the laws of language perfectly justify him in such an application of the illustration he had been using, as to represent our bodies as *sown*, when deposited in the earth, as the seed-corn, to which he refers, had been. And then he could have found instances both of Hebrew and Greek usage to justify such an application of σπείρω, even if his illustration did not call for it. I have not *searched* for instances confirmatory of this, but know that the representation can be fully established, should any one call it into question. A single one just occurs to mind, found also in a book quoted by Paul in this very chapter. Hosea (chap. ii. 23,) refers to Jehovah as saying, "And I will sow her (my spouse) to myself in the earth;" rendered by the LXX., καὶ σπερῶ αὐτὴν ἐμαυτῷ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς. Now at the time referred to, the spouse of God was represented as dead; and the idea is, I will sow her in the earth as seed, from which a new and more spiritual church shall arise. I have just opened Pareus *in loco.*, and find the following beautiful annotation, singularly corroborative of the above representation. "Primus spurius erat *Iidsreel*, *semen Dei*, sic dictus, quia Deus populum contumacem erat disseminaturus seu dispersurus. Nunc convertit etymon in melius: *Ego seminabo eam mihi in terra:* hoc est, faciam vere semen Dei, quod vox sonat: et quidem *seminabo eam* non in aëre, ut dispergatur à ventis, sed *in terra*, ut crescat; et seminabo *mihi*, ut crescat mihi in peculium. Promittit igitur novæ Ecclesiæ ex dissipatione collectionem, et dilatationem in toto terrarum orbe per vocem Evangelii, quod vere est semen Dei immortale ex quo nascuntur filii Dei. Matt. xiii. 37; 1 Pet. i. 23." This is beyond doubt the true idea of the passage.

The irresistible inference from all this is, that "sown," in the passage before us, is to be interpreted of the deposition of the body into the earth: and by consequence, that *the body* which dies, and is consigned to the earth, is raised again from the dead. As σῶμα is confessedly the nominative of σπείρεται the conclusion is utterly unavoidable: "*It*, (the σῶμα,) is sown (consigned to the earth,) in corruption; *it* is raised in incorruption: *it is sown* in dishonour, *it is raised* in glory: *it is sown* in weakness, *it is raised* in power: *it*

is sown a natural body, *it is raised* a spiritual body." It cannot be wondered that the Socinians and Pelagians with Professor Bush should labour hard to destroy σπείρω in order to get rid of this overwhelming conclusion.

VII. The next passage quoted by the Professor is the following: "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption. Behold I show you a mystery: We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump; for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality." 1 Cor. xv. 50–53.

With this passage the quotations made by Professor Bush from 1 Cor. xv., terminate: and he has terminated them, so as to omit the passage which fixes the *order* of the event of which Paul is speaking, and which shows beyond the power of denial that the idea of the resurrection taking place *at death* is false. Is it fair for Professor Bush thus to push out of sight those passages which cannot be made, by any "twistification" to utter a dubious testimony? Certain I am, that he would utter the most unmeasured condemnation of others who should be guilty of such a course. The passage is the following: "So, WHEN this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, THEN SHALL BE BROUGHT TO PASS the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. O Death! where is thy sting? O grave! where is thy victory?" vers. 54, 55. Professor Bush had sense enough to see that this announcement settled the point as to the simultaneousness of the resurrection spoken of in this chapter, and that the wit of man was inadequate to construe the passage differently and yet make sense of it, and hence he was prudent enough to say nothing about it. But let us attend to the argument of the apostle.

As an inference from all his preceding discussion, Paul here announces the fact, that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God." The phrase, "flesh and blood," refers to our present *animal* body, which cannot be adapted to the uses of the spirit until thoroughly changed. This is rendered plain by considering the passage which immediately precedes this verse. "The nature we derive from Adam is animal, and earthly; but Christ, the last Adam,

is a quickening spirit; and as we have borne the image of the earthly, so must we bear the image of the heavenly: and hence a mere animal, and earthly body, (flesh and blood,) cannot inherit the kingdom; but must be changed into a body adapted to the spirit, as Christ's was, when he arose from the grave." (vers. 45-50.) Such seems to be the argument of the apostle; after which, he immediately proceeds to explain, or show the mystery, (not previously clearly understood nor apprehended,) that this change should pass upon all the children of the second Adam.

Professor Bush, in remarking upon this passage, falls into the common error of supposing that those only who are alive when Christ comes shall be changed.* But Paul gives no countenance to this idea; but plainly teaches the reverse. "We shall not all die, it is true," says he, "but whether we die or are alive at that time *we shall all be changed* (πάντες δὲ ἀλλαγησόμεθα,) and therefore, neither in the case of those who die before that time, nor in the case of those who are alive, shall flesh and blood inherit the kingdom of God." This is the obvious course of his argument; and to prevent, as we might suppose, the very mistake above referred to, he repeats in the next verses the

* Grotius and others dissent from the received reading of this text, because of the poor unsupported reading of οἱ πάντες μὲν οὐ κοιμηθησόμεθα, οὐ πάντες δὲ, &c. But the Text. Rec. has the support of the great body of the best MSS., and of the Codices used by Acacius, Jerome, Pelagius, Œcumenius, Valla, Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Apollinarius, Theodotus, Theophylact, &c., &c., not to name the Arabic, Syriac, Coptic, and some ancient Latin versions: while the MSS. which dissent from it *all vary*. So also do the Latin versions, which have a different reading. One has it, "We shall all indeed die, but we shall not all be changed;" another, "We shall all indeed arise, but we shall not all be changed," &c.; another has it, "We shall not indeed all die, but we shall all be changed," which is in accordance with the approved reading. On the alleged inconsistency of this reading with Heb. ix. 27, Stapleton, a bigoted Papist, charges the Greek text with falsehood and impiety, that so he may exalt his darling Vulgate. The supposed inconsistency of these two texts, produced efforts to reconcile them, whence these variations arose; which, according to Griesbach's excellent rule, prove the genuineness of the common reading. Even Crellius remarks on the subject, that "It is said concerning all the faithful, that they should be changed in a moment; and, therefore, those also are included who arise." "De omnibus enim fidelibus dictum erat eos in momento mutatum iri, atque adeo etiam eos qui resurgunt." *Com. in loco*, p. 366. The context, also, seems clearly to require this reading.

assurance that "the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we (i. e. whether we are then alive, or had previously died,) shall be changed:" and he states as an additional reason why this change should be universal, that "this corruptible must put on incorruption," &c., δεῖ γὰρ τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο, &c. Because if it did not put on incorruption and immortality, then flesh and blood must inherit the kingdom of God.

After a passing remark respecting the phrase "flesh and blood," and an attempt to show (without investigating the passage) that the change spoken of here, is predicated only of those who shall then be alive, the Professor proceeds as follows: "But we here encounter a great difficulty in view of our previous position, that the true resurrection takes place *at the death* of every individual believer, when he emerges from a material into a spiritual body. Is it not clearly implied, not to say expressly asserted, in this passage, that the resurrection of all the righteous is simultaneous, and that this event is still future, to occur at the epoch of the second advent, and in conjunction with the translation of the living saints?"

"We can have no object in denying or disguising the fact, (continues he,) that these words have very much the air of directly contravening the general tenor of our interpretation of the preceding portions of this chapter. Still, if our previous train of reasoning be sound, [a most important proviso, truly,]—if our conclusions be fairly sustained by the evidence adduced—it is certain that these words *rightly understood* cannot be in conflict with them. Every part of the word of God must be in harmony with every other part, though apparent discrepancies may exist, to the clear conciliation of which we may not always be competent. In the present case, we are so strongly persuaded of the truth of our previous conclusions, founded both upon the intrinsic nature of the subject itself, and upon the just interpretation of language, that our confidence in them is no wise shaken by the literal reading of a passage, which *seems* at first view to enforce entirely *another theory.* (!) It remains, therefore, to inquire in what manner this declaration of the apostle, is to be made consistent with what we conceive to be the general teaching of the New Testament on the subject of the resurrection, viz., *that it is the same with the future life of the righteous.*" pp. 190, 191.

From this train of remark the reader will at once see that

the "argument from reason," and the "principle of accommodation," are both to be brought in to the aid of the Professor in his difficulty: and hence is apparent, the importance of the thorough examination to which we have subjected them in the formor part of our work. No Christian doubts that the Bible, when "rightly understood," is perfectly consistent with itself; but the question here is not as to this point, but whether Professor Bush's theory is consistent with the Bible? and this he himself will admit, is an entirely different question. In passing, I would request the reader to notice also, the distinct announcement in the closing paragraph of this quotation, that the New Testament doctrine of the resurrection, is the same with the future life of the righteous: that is, in other words, that so far as the righteous are concerned, the New Testament doctrine of the resurrection, and the New Testament doctrine of immortality, are one and the same thing. It would be out of place to discuss this subject here; yet we cannot but express our regret, that, as the Professor has told us that the wicked are not partakers of the resurrection, and yet live hereafter "in spiritual tenements," he had not also told us whence their spiritual tenements were derived, and wherein they differed from those of the righteous. Are they not immortal, and incorruptible, &c. &c.?

But to return. The Professor has, with tolerable fairness, stated the difficulty, presented by this text, to the adoption of his theory: let us therefore follow him in order to ascertain how he obviates it. It is evident from the foregoing extract that it has in nowise daunted him. So far, however, as the remarks are concerned, respecting his "previous train of reasoning," and his "conclusions founded both upon the intrinsic nature of the subject itself, and upon the just interpretation of language," he can obtain no assistance in this case: for we have demonstrated that his previous train of reasoning is *not* sound, and that his conclusions, "founded upon the intrinsic nature of the subject," are *false*, and his rules for "the just interpretation of language," *utterly fallacious;* and finally, that he has totally misapprehended the apostle's argument throughout the chapter, and has constantly put upon his language a meaning not only wholly arbitrary, but one which it cannot be made to bear. If, therefore, the Professor would remove the obstacle which this passage puts in his way, it must be "by a purely independent process."

He commences his effort with some observations concerning the expectations which the ancient Jews entertained respecting the coming of their Messiah; and he remarks that they confounded his second coming, with his first, by overlooking his previous ordained humiliation. And after remarking that our Lord announced the fulfilments of those prophecies (on which they had based their expectations,) as still future, he says, "And let it here be remarked, that while the predictions of our Lord himself on this subject were in fact but the application of numerous Old Testament prophecies to their true-meant design, these predictions, thus drawn from the earlier prophets, *were the foundation of all the knowledge which the apostles possessed respecting the Lord's second coming.*" And to show that he does not mean this to be understood of the apostles while in their comparatively blind and unbelieving state during our Lord's ministry, he continues thus: "In other words, their own announcements on the subject were not strictly *original*, or uttered *de novo*, but were the echo of the Saviour's oracles, and of those of the Old Testament on which they were founded." And then after asserting the palpable misrepresentation that 1 Thess. iv. 15–17, "is but a paraphrase" of Matt. xxiv. 29–34, (by which means he hopes to get rid of the plain testimony of Paul in that passage, that he spoke, what is therein recorded, by an express and direct revelation from "the Lord,") he adds, "Consequently, if the true meaning of the symbolic language in which our Lord delivered his predictions was not made known to the apostles, *of which their writings afford no evidence*, they would naturally interpret them according to the letter, and suppose a speedy fulfilment." p. 191–193.

These references to the old Jewish notions, are of course to prepare the mind of the reader for the adoption of the principle that the apostles were never freed from their Jewish prejudices, which, consequently, must more or less have influenced their teachings. Then of course follows the inference hinted at above in no ambiguous language, that the apostles were not inspired (in the sense in which the old prophets were) to communicate a revelation directly from heaven, but merely delivered their own random views, made up of the prejudices of a Jewish education, and of their own mere opinions of what Christ meant in his teachings; and, therefore, as they were mere fallible men, they could not

help being mistaken, at least on the subject of the resurrection: so much so that reason must be called in to set the matter right, and Professor Bush as the champion of reason must come forward, and modify the views of the church on this subject and correct the errors under which it has been labouring ever since it entertained the doctrine of the resurrection. If this be not the clear import of the foregoing declarations, let the reader himself endeavour to explain them, in consistency with their connexion, so as to arrive at a different conclusion: for I frankly confess it transcends my powers to do so. But let us follow our author further.*

After remarking that the epistles were written in the interval between the crucifixion and the destruction of Jerusalem, and that the apostles undoubtedly cherished the expectation that they should live until the day of judgment, he proceeds to show "from two very opposite sources," that such was truly their belief. The first of these authorities is Edward Gibbon, Esq.; and from the notorious *fifteenth chapter* (every section of which contains some egregious misrepresentation of the primitive church) of his "*Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*," he makes a long extract, charging Christ and the apostles with having predicted that the day of doom would occur during the lifetime of the generation in which they lived. Professor Bush is heartily welcome to the full support of this *high* authority. His other "*source*" is Dr. Watts, from whose preliminary essay to his "*World to Come*," he extracts several paragraphs intended

* In this connexion (p. 192,) the Professor also repeats a remark which he had made in the Preface, page ix., to the effect that Christ promised that his Second Advent should virtually take place while some of the generation then on the stage of action should be living. The text he refers to is Matt. xvi. 28. But a reference to the parallel passages will at once show that the *coming* here, is the *coming of the kingdom of God with power*, Mark ix. 1, or its signal manifestation, Luke ix. 27, which Professor Bush will not deny, took place in the apostle's time. The Professor is a strenuous advocate for "*a double sense*" of prophecy, (see his "*Hierophant*," pp. 73, 97, 121, 145, 169, and 193,) and if he will but follow each of the evangelists referred to, only a few verses after their record of these words of Christ, he will find reason to believe that the Saviour here refers to a visible *earnest* and *specimen* of his coming personally: which Peter, who was one of the three witnesses of his transfiguration, calls the *power* and *coming* of our Lord Jesus Christ, see 2 Pet. i. 16–18. There is, therefore, no occasion whatever that "this declaration should be *repealed*." See *Preface*, page ix.

to show that "the Christians of the first age did *generally* expect the second coming of Christ to judgment, and the resurrection of the dead, in that very age in which it was foretold:" and that "from the words of Christ in John xxi. 22, it is probable that the apostles themselves *at first*, as well as other Christians, might derive this apprehension of his speedy coming." And from all these things the Professor concludes that the apostles were mistaken as to the true time of Christ's second advent.

In order that we may not lose our way, let us here pause a moment and consider where we are. We started on our course with the declaration of Paul in our eye, that the resurrection of which he treats in 1 Cor. xv., will transpire at the second coming of Christ; but he says nothing as to the point of time *when* that advent will occur. Professor Bush was in our company when we started, and he set out with the avowed intention of showing us the path to his theory without going out of the way of this explicit declaration of the apostle. Our author admits that the way, "at first view," seems to be rather crooked, and inclining in an opposite direction; but he attributes this to the distance from which our observation has been taken—a nearer view, will, he thinks, show it to be "as straight as a rule can make it." It is true, that thus far we have not approached very near to it, but we may nevertheless here pause a moment to survey the ground already traversed. And

1. Suppose then we grant that the apostles were absolutely ignorant of the time when the second advent should occur, and really thought it would take place in their lifetime, (which latter sentiment, by the way, we hold to be utterly false,) and what follows?—that they were mistaken about every thing? If not, then pray how does it follow because they did not know precisely *when* the second advent would take place that therefore they did not know that the resurrection would be simultaneous? for *this* is the point *now* before us. Suppose it should be said of Professor Bush, that *because* he does not know the day of Christ's final and glorious manifestation, that *therefore* he does not know whether angels will attend on him then, and the whole assembly of the redeemed? Would not our author look with contempt and pity upon the man who seriously deduced such an inference from such premises! And can he not see that the inference (even on his assumed principles,) is just as

legitimate in one case as in the other? Even should we grant, therefore, all that he claims on the authority of Mr. Gibbon and Dr. Watts, it would avail him absolutely nothing so far as the true issue is concerned. The point is not, *when* will the second advent occur? but simply, *what* will then take place? But

2. The apostles have no where asserted that Christ would come in their day, or that they believed he would. No passage intimating this can be produced. John xxi. 22, does not imply in fact any thing like it; but merely that the apostles, in their state of comparative ignorance *at the time that Christ spoke these words*, drew the inference referred to. From their remarks on this subject, others of "the brethren" obtained the same view, till the "saying went abroad," *not that Christ would come in that generation, but that John would not die*—which looks like any thing else rather than that the advent would take place in the lifetime of that generation. But admitting that such was the inference which they drew from it, it only proves that they were *then* mistaken, and not that they continued in the error. And John's recording it after all the other apostles were dead, will hardly be thought to have been designed to show them that they were wrong. But we shall continue our remarks on this topic, after having heard Professor Bush somewhat further.

After the quotation from Dr. Watts, he proceeds thus: "But to all this we are aware it may be objected, that it impugns the inspiration and infallibility of the sacred writings. If they laboured under a mistake on this point, how can they be said to have been prompted by the unerring guidance of the Holy Spirit? And if they have mistaken the mind of the Spirit in regard to the *doctrine* of the second advent, why may they not have mistaken it on other doctrines, and thus the church be left without an infallible standard of truth?" pp. 195, 196.

The reader will note that the point previously discussed by Professor Bush was whether the apostles had mistaken the *time* of the second advent; but here, he dexterously substitutes "*doctrine*," and keeps up this substitution through the remainder of the discussion: so that the reader might be led to infer that the apostles had really announced nothing certain respecting that doctrine. But how does he meet this objection? Here are his words: "To this objection thus

urged, we reply, in the first place, that it does not present a fair issue. The question is not whether the apostles have erroneously represented any doctrine which they were inspired to deliver, *but how far their inspiration extended:*" and he proceeds to say that the apostles "were made the subjects, or rather the organs of special *revelations*—revelations, lying entirely without the compass of their own unassisted faculties;" and that so far as these "revelations, were concerned, the apostles must of course be considered as having spoken with absolute inerrancy:" that "acting as the organs of certain divine communications, it would be natural that they should exercise their thoughts upon the themes that thus expressed themselves through them. But the judgments which they personally formed on these disclosures, being distinct from the truths themselves, *may not have been free from error*, simply for the reason, that they did not come really within the scope of their inspiration. The mind of the Spirit is one thing, and their personal view of its meaning is another; and *it is very conceivable that we, from having more ample data,* MAY BE BETTER ABLE TO JUDGE OF THIS MEANING THAN THEY WERE." "We contend therefore, that it does not truly detract from Paul's claims to inspiration that he should not have understood what was not revealed, or that he should have *so stated what was revealed as to evince that he had in some respects mistaken its true purport—that he should have put upon it a sense which we now know to be erroneous.*" And "in this view" he professes to be "happy to be confirmed by the authority of Mr. Barnes, in his remarks on the very passage we are now considering." pp. 196–198. I am neither the advocate of nor apologist for the peculiar sentiments attributed to Mr. Barnes; but should be exceedingly sorry to think that he had ever uttered any thing that would sanction this glaring neology. The passage quoted from him in this connexion, by Professor Bush, contains not the most distant endorsement of these principles, if we except a little careless verbiage at the conclusion, which ingenuity might, perhaps, compel to speak a language which it never was intended to utter. But in this very extract Mr. Barnes repeatedly declares, that, though the apostles do not profess to state the *precise time* in which the predicted events will occur, they yet "*state truly and exactly the order*" of those events: a sentiment which the reader will agree with me in

thinking, is any thing else than an endorsement of Professor Bush's views.

Such, therefore, is the Professor's *first reply* to the foregoing objection. The *second* we will attend to in its order hereafter.

I quote these revolting sentiments from our author, not so much for the purpose of refuting them, (for their nature and tendency has been sufficiently exposed in a former chapter,) as to evince by what means he is determined to retain his theory and rid himself of the opposing testimony of the word of God. Nevertheless a few remarks on the subject in passing, will not be deemed out of place.

The obvious design of these remarks of Professor Bush, is not to prepare the way for *explaining* the language of the apostle, so as to make it accord with the theory in question, but to get rid of its testimony altogether. Hence it is first maintained that Paul was ignorant not only of the *time* when the second advent should take place, (which no one known to me disputes,) but that he had mistaken the mind of the Spirit respecting the doctrine itself, and that in his writings and preaching, he had communicated his mistakes to others: and that we, in this age, may be better able to judge of the meaning of the Spirit than were the apostles themselves. Semler himself would not have dared to give utterance to sentiments like these; and yet they must be thus published to the American churches as unquestioned principles of hermeneutics!

But it is apparent at a glance that on these principles the whole of the New Testament is involved in the utmost uncertainty. I could safely challenge any man to specify a single doctrine therein announced, which I could not explain entirely away without in the least deviating from the course pursued by Professor Bush with respect to the passage before us. And if the apostles were so ignorant and mistaken, that we can now better understand even the revelations which they were commissioned to announce than they could themselves, the great wonder is that Professor Bush should have thought it worth while at all to attempt a reconciliation between their statements and his theory. Why not honestly stand forth, and, by virtue of his claim to understand the revelation of God better than the apostles did, at once set aside their authority? This would have been open and fair;

and precisely what the public have a right to expect from the man who will advocate these abominable principles.

With respect to the subject, or proposition upon which these inferences depend, I have offered a remark or two upon it a few pages back, with the intention to resume the consideration of it here. The sum total of the evidence that our author has adduced, on which to charge the apostles with mistake and error in their teachings, is simply and merely this;—they knew not the day nor the hour of Christ's advent. Then assuming *that they professed to know it*, and really announced that it would take place during the lifetime of that generation, he concludes that, as they were mistaken on this point, they had totally misunderstood the doctrine of the second advent, and consequently, their testimony on that subject can establish nothing against the truth of his theory. This is his argument in its logical dependence, presented in a nutshell. Now let us look at it.

In addition to what has been offered on this subject already, I remark that there is not a particle of evidence which goes to prove either that the apostles *announced* that the second advent would occur in their day, or even *entertained the opinion* that it would. Grotius, who I think was the father of this notion, predicates it upon the futile remark, (like Professor Bush,) that "the prophets and apostles had not a revelation *concerning every thing:*" "Sicut Prophetæ, ita et Apostoli non de omnibus habuere revelationem." See *Append. ad lib. de Antichristo*, Opp. IV. p. 475.* Well, suppose they had not, and what follows? Why that *therefore* they thought the coming of Christ would take place in their own day, and, *consequently*, were mistaken. This is truly drawing an inference with "a cart rope." For absurdity it is equal to the remark of Grotius on the same page, where, commenting on the language of the apostle in 1 Cor. xv. and 1 Thess. iv. he says that "he divides those *who are raised from the dead*, into two classes, to wit, those *who should die* before the resurrection, and those who *should be alive* at the time when it occurred."

* If any one wishes to pursue this subject, and see Grotius and Locke handsomely "used up" in relation to it, let him turn to Macknight's Preface to the 2d epist. to the Thessalonians. It is too long to extract and too excellent to abridge. See also Pres. Edward's "*Miscellaneous Observations*," Part I. Chap. II. Works VII. 221.

But says Professor Bush, "Do not some of their expressions clearly intimate that the apostles believed it?" *No, not one!* And suppose they have that appearance to Professor Bush, does this prove that such was the meaning of the apostles? and are we hence to infer that they were in error, and knew nothing about the *order* of events at the second advent, &c. &c.? The assertors of this sentiment can find nothing in all the epistles touching this point, which for plainness and explicitness can be compared with the declarations of Christ. See Matt. xxiv. 34; Rev. xxii. 10, 12, &c. And if such declarations when made by the apostles, prove that they were in error, the same reasoning will prove Christ to have been in error. If the inference follows not in one case neither does it in the other. But I have detained the reader on this point long enough, and shall dismiss the subject with one or two brief remarks.

And *first;* I am willing for the sake of the argument to admit with Dr. Watts, that the primitive Christians generally may have expected the second coming of Christ in their time: but let it be remembered that "*the primitive Christians generally*" were not *inspired* to teach God's truth as the apostles were. They were for the most part uninspired Jews, and had always believed that the destruction of the temple and the end of the world or day of judgment should be synchronical. They *inferred*, therefore, the speedy coming of this day, from what Christ had said respecting the approaching destruction of the temple and subversion of the Jewish polity. And *secondly*, the apostles were so far from teaching that the second advent would occur in their day, that they esteemed the opinion to be an error of such magnitude that they formally wrote to correct it. It was for this purpose emphatically that Paul wrote his second epistle to the Thessalonians. Such was the uniform belief of the ancient church. And even the clause in 1 Thes. iv. 15, "We who are alive," (from which Mr. Locke and others have discovered that Paul expected to live till the time of the resurrection,) Chrysostom, Theodoret, Œcumenius, Theophylact and others assert, was not intended by the apostle to mean that he expected to live till then, but "was spoken for those Christians who should be alive at that time." Hence in 2 Cor. iv. 4, he declares his own expectation of a resurrection. "He that raised up the Lord Jesus *shall raise up us also* by Jesus," &c.; and hence he laboured that he

might attain to the resurrection of the dead. Phil. iii. 11. See also 2 Thess. ii. 1, 2. Even Crellius (in 1 Cor. xv. 52,) remarks that Paul had no such hope, and announced by many declarations that he did not expect it. "Opponit autem apostolus vocem, *nos*, mortuis, non quod Paulus omnino speraverit, se quoque ipsum una cum Corinthiis, ad quos scribebat, et quos vocula ista complectebatur, usque ad adventum Christi fore superstitem, *imo potius ex multis ejus apostoli dictis satis liquet, eum id nequaquam sperasse.*"

The Professor's second reply to the foregoing objection is as follows: "Our Lord's second coming, and its associated events are described in highly symbolic and prophetic terms, taken mostly from the language of the Old Testament prophets, and so framed as to be intrinsically obscure and capable of being erroneously apprehended. Nor does it appear that Christ himself distinctly laid open to his disciples the nature of that event. *Consequently*, as the predictions respecting the first coming were so worded as to be liable to misunderstanding before he came, even by the very prophets themselves who recorded them, so the idea seems entirely reasonable, that the predictions respecting his second coming may not have been perfectly understood in all respects even by the apostles and the primitive Christians." pp. 198, 199. But to this I reply, *first*, that to predicate the issue upon the question, whether "Christ himself distinctly laid open to his disciples the nature" of his second advent, is to present a false issue. The point is not, whether Christ himself instructed them on this subject, but whether what they have offered in relation to it was by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. *Here* we *affirm*, and Professor Bush *denies*. *Secondly*, as to "highly symbolic and prophetic" terms, there are none of them in the passage now under discussion; the remark, therefore, in such a connexion, is uncalled for and unwarrantable. And, in the *third* place, the question, as to the intelligibleness of the old prophecies, is not, "whether the prophets themselves *understood* fully what they wrote," but "whether they have in their writings *asserted* errors and mistakes." And so of the apostles—the question is not, whether they might have entertained erroneous views when not under the immediate inspiration of the Spirit, but whether they have taught errors and mistakes in their epistles, &c.?—a question which resolves itself simply into this, "Whether all Scripture is given by inspiration

of God?" If they have inculcated "their own errors and mistakes" as the truth of God, then all Scripture *is not given by inspiration.* If they have not, then this discussion is out of place, for we are now speaking only of their *writings.* It is the statements which they have left on record, and which they asserted to be the truth of God, that Professor Bush is discussing; and to these statements alone are his remarks applicable. He continues as follows:

"And why does their ignorance of this single point—*the time and manner of the second advent*—any more invalidate their inspiration than a like ignorance in the Old Testament writers invalidates theirs?" But Professor Bush loses sight of the point. The question is not, whether they were ignorant of the time and manner of the second advent, but whether they have in their writings asserted on this subject what is false? Whether they have recorded their errors as the truth of God?* Let Professor Bush state an instance where either prophet or apostle asserted his own mere opinions or errors for the truth of God. He continues thus: "The apostle, in the present instance, discloses the grand fundamental fact, that, at the time to which the Holy Spirit refers, there should be a translation of the living saints. This he has stated infallibly, because he spake as he was moved by the Holy Ghost, and how could *he* make any other than an infallible suggestion? But we have no evidence that the precise *time* of this event was any where made known," &c. p. 199.

There is a want of candour in this and kindred statements of Professor Bush, which, taking into consideration the nature of the intensely interesting and stupendous theme before us, would justify a severity of reply, alike painful to the writer and reader. The Professor knows as well as I can tell him, that "the precise *time* of this event" is a subject in no way connected with the question. No one asserts

* If the reader would wish to consult some of the passages in which it is clearly asserted or implied, that the apostles spoke by the Spirit of God, he may turn to the following: John xiv. 16, 26, and xv. 26, and xvi. 7–15; (compare Matt. x. 19, 20; Mark xiii. 11; Luke xii. 11, 12;) and Luke xxi. 14, 15; Acts ii. 4, and iv. 13; and 1 Cor. ii. 9, 10, 12, 13, and vii. 40; Eph. iii. 5; Gal. i. 12; 1 Thess. ii. 13; and 1 Tim. iv. 1; Acts xv. 23, 28; 2 Tim. iii. 15, 16; and Acts viii. 18; and xix. 6; 1 Cor. xii. 1–11, &c., &c.

that Paul knew it; and in the passage under discussion, he claims to state merely the *order* of events, and leaves wholly undertermined the question as to the day or year of their occurrence. So far from having attempted to state that era, it can be inferred from nothing he has said, that he even claimed to know any thing about it. To charge him with *mistake*, therefore, on this subject, and consequent error in his announcements respecting the doctrine of the second advent, is not only to make a most unfounded and perfectly gratuitous accusation, but one which, unless openly and unambiguously retracted, must subject its author to the clear imputation of sanctioning the grossest forms of skepticism and infidelity.

There is, besides the foregoing, a misrepresentation of the apostle in the above extract, so gross and so easily detected, that it is impossible to conceive what the Professor expected to accomplish by means of it. He represents Paul as *disclosing* in the passage before us, "the grand fundamental fact," that at the period referred to, to wit, the second advent, "there should be a translation of the living saints;" and "this he has stated infallibly, because moved by the Holy Ghost." And to this, forsooth, in order to save his theory, he would limit the *infallibility* of the apostle's declaration. But let the reader turn back and read the passage: "Behold, I show you a mystery: We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, *at the last trump; for the trumpet shall sound*, AND THE DEAD SHALL BE RAISED *incorruptible, and we shall be changed.*" vers. 51, 52. What must be the nature of that man's powers of perception who can here see nothing asserted but the "translation of the living saints;" or who is so sharpsighted as to see a difference between the authority on which it is stated that the saints should be changed, and that on which it is asserted that there will at the same time be also a resurrection—a simultaneous resurrection of (at least) the righteous dead? It would be insulting the common sense of the reader to dwell upon this subject. But if, as Professor Bush asserts, the Holy Spirit infallibly announced one of these occurrences, he also announced the other; *and therefore Professor Bush's theory is in direct contradiction to the infallible announcements of the Holy Ghost.*

The Professor concludes the foregoing remarks with a criticism on Matt. xxiv. 34, "This generation shall not pass

away till all these things be fulfilled;" which he supposes to mean that "the event predicted should occur, *or rather begin to occur*, in the term of the natural lives of the then existing generation of men." It cannot be doubted that such an exposition is in the strictest accordance with the true principles of prophetical interpretation.* But as the Professor is a strenuous advocate for the "double sense" of prophecy, why should he object so earnestly to the reference of αὕτη γενεά here, to the Jewish *nation*, and as intended by our Saviour to intimate their permanently remaining distinction from all other nations, (while all other nations then on the stage of action should substantially "pass away,") until all things which he there spake should be perfectly accomplished? The *primary import* of γενεά is not *aevum*, *aetas*, or as the Germans say *ein Menschenalter*, (for this is wholly secondary,) but *natales*, and hence *progenies*, *familia*, *genus*, &c.; from which by a very natural application, it comes to mean *natio*.—"This nation (whatever becomes of the other nations of earth) shall retain its distinctive character until all these things shall be fulfilled." A reference to Poole's Synopsis will show that this is an exposition of long standing, and sustained by high authority. *Mede*, in Fragmentis Sac. (sub finem Dissert. Ecclesiast. p. 93, or Opp. p. 712,) gives it this exposition. *Markius* also sustains it, see Exercit. Exeget. p. 566; *J. Christian Wolfius* also in Cura Philol. et Crit. p. 533: *Stokius* also, Clavis Novi Test. sub voce, γενεά, p. 227; *Hermanus Venema*, also, see Dissert. Sac. p. 236–7, Lib. i. cap. xi. *in fine*. *Beza* translates γενεά by *natio* seven times in Matthew and twice in Luke. And if Professor Bush will take his concordance and run through the word as used in the New Testament, he will find that it may properly be so translated much oftener. See Matt. xiii. 39, 41, 42, 45, and xvi. 4; and Luke xi. 29, 30, 31, 50, 51; Phil. ii. 15; Matt. xi. 16; Mark viii. 12, &c. Such a rendering of the text in question seems also to accord better with the declaration Jer. xxxi. 35, 36. These things should certainly have led our author to hesitate before charging this interpretation with doing "*the most downright violence*" to the words in question; and as he has offered no *reasons* for this assertion, but

* See for example Rev i. 1, where the phrase "things which must shortly come to pass," (see also ver. 3,) unquestionably means "things which must *shortly begin* to come to pass."

affirms it on the weight of his own authority, *perhaps* the foregoing authorities may *collectively* amount to an equal weight.

In the next paragraph the Professor repeats the revolting sentiments upon which we have animadverted above. For the sake of the curiosity of the thing, I will present the reader with a specimen: "The preceding remarks may, perhaps, be considered as having *levelled an avenue of approach* to the true view of the apostle's language. He has faithfully and unerringly announced that part of the divine counsels which relates to the transformation of the living saints at the period referred to, whatever that period may be. He has informed us that they shall undergo a change equivalent to that which accrues to the risen, i. e. the re-living dead. *He undoubtedly supposes that this change was to occur simultaneously with that promised advent of the Saviour that was to be ushered in during the life-time of that generation*—a supposition built upon the *letter* of numerous predictions, but which the event has shown to be, in this respect, erroneous." p. 200. This is sufficient to show that we have not misapprehended the meaning of our author in our remarks on the previous quotations. The language of Paul in the passage before us, evinces to the mind of the Professor that he "undoubtedly supposed" what is clearly erroneous: and hence there is no necessity for explaining the text, as its testimony either pro or contra is not of any account. Truly this is *reconciling* Scripture with reason, in perfect accordance with what he avows as "*correct* principles of interpretation."

After a few remarks on the Judgment (which will be hereafter noticed,) the Professor proceeds to close his remarks on this passage:—"In the mean time," says he, "*let no man suppose he can reject the view now suggested, and fall back upon one that is free from equal or greater difficulties.*" This is in the style of a noted remark at the close of the "*Confessions*" of Rousseau. But I deny it wholly, and call upon Professor Bush to prove it by showing that those who entertain the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, are, in order to maintain it, necessitated to charge the apostles with teaching mistakes and falsehoods for truth. I throw back the assertion, therefore, upon Professor Bush, and pronounce it to be as destitute of truth as it is of Christian propriety.

But, says the Professor, "The single declaration of the Apocalypse, 'The leaves of the tree *shall be* (!) for the healing of the nations, (Gentiles),' leaves all the common theories of the future at fault, because they afford no solution of the problem, 'What Gentile nations remain to be healed in heaven?'" p. 202. But suppose this were even so, and how would it justify the author in charging Paul with teaching mistakes and errors? No one needs any "theory of the future," in order to maintain the doctrine of the resurrection of the body; and it is perfectly nugatory to make such a remark in such a connexion, and pretend that it has any application to the subject. But further: the reader will notice how easy it is for Professor Bush, in order to support his theory, to take away symbols from where they really are, and place others where there are none. A few pages back he pretended to find them (in 1 Cor. xv. 50–53,) where there are none; and now he pretends there are none in Rev. xxii. 2, which is notoriously full of them. But thirdly, even taking it literally, as the Professor does, his exposition and question are wholly at fault. For the New Jerusalem spoken of has come down *out of heaven* (chap. xxi. 1–4,) to the new earth, (v. 23, 24,) and in it was the throne from which the crystal stream emanated; (ch. xxii. 1,) and along that river were the trees, of whose leaves the Professor speaks. (v. 2.) The question as to "*heaven*," therefore, is out of place. And as to the word "*healed*," if the Professor had looked at the original he would have lost his confidence in the question he propounds. Θεραπία (from θεραπεύω *ministro, servo*, see Wahl and Bretschneider,) means properly *ministerium*, or as Wahl defines it in German, *Dienstleistung*, that is, *rendering of service;* and the passage which is so formidable to Professor Bush, means no more than that the leaves of the tree of life were for the service of the nations. Or, if he will contend for a stricter etymological rendering of the term, let him take the following, which perfectly consists with the last named: "The leaves of the tree were for the continuance of the health of the nations;" i. e. a pledge for the continuance of the divine favour to all eternity.

As Professor Bush has not attempted, on philological grounds, to invalidate the testimony which this passage bears to the utter falseness of his theory, we have nothing to offer that can present the truth which it asserts more plainly than

our own excellent translation of it. It announces that the resurrection is future, and that it will be a simultaneous event, to occur at the sounding of the last trump, at which time also those who are alive shall be changed from a mortal condition to immortality, and from corruption to incorruption. Such is the clear and unambiguous testimony of the apostle, and therefore the theory that denies the resurrection of the body is false. For if the resurrection takes place hereafter, it cannot of course be a resurrection of the soul or spirit, and therefore it must be a resurrection of the body. And then again, that the body is here clearly referred to is manifest from verse 53: "For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal immortality." This language cannot refer to the immortal spirit; for that, confessedly, is neither corruptible nor mortal. Hence it cannot refer to the clothing of the spirit with a *new body*, for this would not be "*mortal* putting on immortality" in any sense of the term; nor could it be "*this corruptible* putting on incorruption." It would require a statement entirely opposite to that of the apostle here, to describe such an event. It therefore can refer only to the body, and to its being changed from a fragile, mortal state, to a state of immortality. So also in 2 Cor. v. 4, Paul uses the same idea substantially; "*That mortality* might be swallowed up of life;" i. e. that it might be endowed with immortal existence.

We have now brought our remarks on this important chapter to a close. We have not passed over a single remark or criticism of Professor Bush's, bearing on the subject, without fully and fairly stating it; and we are willing that the reader should judge whether we claim more than is our due when we claim to have refuted, not only his arguments, but every shred or vestige of an argument which he has offered with a view to invalidate the testimony of this glorious witness to the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. It establishes the fact that the resurrection is still future; that it will be simultaneous; that it will be a *resurrection of the body that died*, and a consequent reunion of it with the soul; and as an irresistible consequence, it drives into the land of shadows, or to a certain other place mentioned by Milton, (Parad. Lost, b. III. 445–497,) the *tertium quid* theory of Professor Bush, and the preposterous notions that men are raised from the dead *at* death, (that is, no sooner dead than alive again;) that the wicked are not

raised at all, and yet possess spiritual bodies; and the ridiculous idea of the poet Goethe, that the soul is a germ, which will elaborate for itself a spirtual corporeity out of spiritual elements; with a huge heap of like nonsense which our author soberly pretends is *more reasonable* than the doctrine of the resurrection of the body.

SECTION IV.

Examination of passages from Matthew.

I. The next passage adduced by the Professor is the following: "And if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell. And if thy right hand offend thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell." Matt. v. 29, 30.

In examining any portion of a connected and consecutive discourse, it is perfectly obvious that we should always consider the connexion in which it is found; for the connexion is often of the greatest assistance in enabling us to determine the precise import of any word or words as therein employed. Christ, perfectly aware that many would deem the precept in ver. 28, ("Whosoever looketh on a woman with impure desire," &c.) too difficult, if not impossible to be observed, adds the tremendous sanction in the text; showing plainly that the perpetration of such a crime must expose the sinner to the doom of hell-fire: and consequently, though it were difficult to observe the precept, better far observe it; and if, in order to do this, even a right hand, or a right eye should be sacrificed, still, be it so, rather than to incur such a doom. In this connexion, therefore, it is plain, that, though Christ does not inculcate the duty of maiming our persons, he does teach by one of the strongest oriental figures, that we have no alternative between a refusal to part with sin, at whatever cost, and the eternal endurance of hell-fire.

Our Lord, in the course of his journeys through Palestine, sometimes repeated his instructions to different audiences, with some slight variation. Thus the figure of leaven, he frequently employed in his teaching: see Mark viii. 15, and Matt. xvi. 7, 18, and also Luke xii. 1–12. And the *parable*

of the leaven he repeated, at least, on two different occasions. See Matt. xiii. 33, and Luke xiii. 20, 21. So also the parable of the mustard seed, Matt. xiii. 31, 32, and Luke xiii. 18, 19. And so with the figure before us. He employs it also in Matt. xviii. 8, 9, and in Mark ix. 43–48; in which latter places he specifies the *hand* after the *eye*, for the reason referred to above. But the connexion in each place abundantly demonstrates that Christ is speaking of the awards of sin in a future world. The attempt to confine the execution of the threatening to the present world, turns it into a complete farce. For the threatening would be applicable to the Jewish nation alone; and to them only while their government remained. The whole passage, therefore, as a threat, or admonition, can have no application at all in the present time. But if it refer to the future world, it clearly implies that soul and body are alike to partake of the punishment of sin.

We have never regarded this passage as one of the "*seats*" of the doctrine of the resurrection; though it clearly implies that doctrine. But as Professor Bush has introduced and discussed it, we shall thoroughly examine it also. And after explaining its import, shall consider what he has offered in relation to it.

The term here translated *offend*, is σκανδαλίζω; a word neither in use among the classical Greek writers, nor the LXX.; though Aquila employs it several times in the Psalms, Proverbs, and Isaiah. It comes from σκάνδαλον, which properly means *a stumbling block;* or as Flacius in his "*Clavis Sanc. Script.*" p. 1119, (notwithstanding he gives the word a wrong etymology,) felicitously explains it, "Declarat autem proprie aliquid in via positum, in quod ambulans impingat, et corruat." Σκανδαλίζω σε has therefore, plainly, a causative force, like the hiphil of the Hebrews,—*facio offendere*, as Bretschneider has expressed it: "*if thy eye or hand make thee to offend.*" The term is used also not only to express external sins, or offences manifest to others, but also those that are internal, or secret. Hence the idea, so far as this term is concerned, is this: "*Whatever causes thee to sin*, (or to become a stumbling block to others,) *separate it from thee at whatever cost, or it will assuredly bring thee to hell.*" Now a hand and an eye, &c. *are parts of one's self;* and therefore do not come under this category; as they can be employed by us only as *instruments of our sinning.*

The maiming is therefore altogether moral; and the figure is taken from the members of the body, only to impress the great moral truth more deeply upon the mind. Porphyry and Julian might therefore have spared their silly merriment over this precept: and Mr. Noble and Professor Bush might have saved a little credit if they had selected some other passage upon which to try their skill at the *reductio ad absurdum.*

The next term to be considered is γέεννα, *gehenna.* It is derived from גיא הנום or the *vale of Hinnom;* a very beautiful valley near Jerusalem, and which bounds it on the south. Josh. xv. 8, and xviii. 6. It is also called the valley of the sons of Hinnom. 2 Kings, xxiii. 10, and 2 Chron. xxviii. 3. In this valley was the place called *Tophet,* in which the Israelites, imitating the horrid superstition of the neighbouring nations worshipped Moloch, (the idol god of the Ammonites,) by sacrificing to him their own offspring. See 2 Kings, xxiii. 10. 2 Chron. xxviii. 3. Ezek. xxiii. 37. 39; (compare Levit. xviii. 21, and xx. 2.) The whole valley, in consequence of this, and its subsequent pollution by Josiah, was called *Tophet;* (from *Toph,* to vomit with loathing, as Professor Stuart observes, Exeget. Essays, pp. 140, 141.) Into this place the filth of Jerusalem, and carcasses of dead animals, &c. were thrown, and consumed by fires which were kept burning perpetually. And hence, as Tremellius remarks, the name Gihanna, or Gehinnam, came to be employed *by the Jews, Chaldeans, and Syrians, to denote hell itself.* "Unde factum est, ut postea à Chaldaeis, Syris et Hebraeis antiquis Scriptoribus nomen ipsam Gihanna vel Gehinnam usuparetur ad significandum locum reprobis in aeternum cruciandis destinatum. Ita usurpatur in lib. Pirkeaboth admodum antiquo cap. I. et V." *Notae* in Matt. v. 22. The term γέεννα is used twelve times in the New Testament; in each of which it designates what we in English properly term hell.* The strange remark of Professor Bush on this subject will be noticed presently.

By viewing this passage in connexion with its parallel in Mark ix. 43–48, it will be at once perceived also that Christ refers to Isa. lxvi. 24; and that by γέεννα he means the place "where the worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched."

* Matt. v. 22, 29, 30; and x, 28; and xviii. 9; and xxiii. 15, 33; Mark ix. 43, 45, 47; Luke xii. 5; Jas. iii. 6.

Now by common consent it is admitted that the prophet, in vers. 23, 24, of the chapter referred to, is speaking of the state of things after the new heavens and the new earth shall have been created." Mr. Barnes (*in loco*) remarks that "The Saviour (Mark ix. 44, 46) applied *the language* (of Isa. lxvi. 24) to the future punishment of the wicked, *and no one, I think, can doubt that in Isaiah it includes that consummation of worldly affairs.*" Vitringa makes substantially the same remark. Lowth, (*in loco,*) also, observes, that though Christ employs the image of Gehenna and the worm and fire, for the purpose of representing hell, yet *he marks "in the strongest manner, the difference between Gehenna and the invisible place of torment.*" Nor can the time referred to be assigned to any other period than that of the consummation of all things. And if so, it is perfectly plain from the prophet, that soul and body will be reunited: for surely even Professor Bush would hardly say that פגר (here translated *carcass*) can possibly mean a *tertium quid*, or "a resurrection-body eliminated at death," for he denies that the wicked possess any such thing. Without pretending, therefore, to penetrate the veil of futurity, it may be truly affirmed, that as the wicked are to serve as eternal monuments of God's wrath, upon which all holy beings shall for ever look and behold the consequences of sin, so *carcasses* here, and the term *body* in Matt. v. 28, 29, must clearly imply a resurrection of the body and re-union of it with the soul.

Now in commenting on this passage, Professor Bush, after referring to the etymology of Gehenna, and quoting Mr. Barnes and Dr. Campbell to prove that the term was used as an image or emblem of hell itself, remarks as follows: "Consequently, if the term denotes an *image*—an *emblem*—of hell, or place of torment, it does not denote *the place itself*, and of that (*i. e.*, the place) we must form our ideas from other sources." p. 204. It would be difficult to give an appropriate character to this criticism, which thus, for the sake of saving an unfounded theory, surrenders to Universalists at once the whole ground upon which the unanswerable argument for future punishment, derived from the usage of γέεννα in the New Testament, is based. The term, according to Professor Bush, can never mean *hell*, because Gehenna is only an image or emblem of it! The conclusion is as shallow and unsupported, as the remark is uncalled for and

injudicious. What was the design of our Saviour in using the *image* or *emblem* in this connexion? It is an image of hell, as the Professor admits. Did Christ then mean that there was danger of mankind *now* being cast into the valley on the southeast of Jerusalem? Professor Bush will hardly say so. But he either did mean this, or, that there is now danger of so sinning against God as to incur the penalty of being cast *soul and body* into the fire that shall never be quenched—and, consequently, he here teaches that the wicked are to be raised from the dead in order to undergo this penalty.

The Professor next attempts the *reductio ad absurdum*, and, after taking for granted that "material fire" is not an ingredient in the future punishment of the damned, he proceeds to remark, that "if one part of it (Matt. v. 29, 30,) is to be taken in the strictness of the letter, every other is also, and, consequently, it follows that if the *body* here literally means the body, the *right eye* means the right eye, and the *right hand* the right hand; and then we come to the conclusion, that entrance into heaven is facilitated by plucking out an eye and cutting off a hand," &c., &c. But, gentle reader, the entire basis of this "consequently," rests upon the sand. It is not true, that if one part of a passage is a figure, that *consequently* all of it must be. Professor Bush cannot read his Bible five minutes in any part of it without finding his principle contradicted. Even the passage under discussion contradicts him—for he himself admits that the important terms, "offend," and "profitable," are not figurative. In John vii. 38, we read that Jesus said, "He that believeth on me, as the Scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water." Is then the first part of this passage figurative because the latter is? If not, what becomes of the Professor's "consequently?"

But let us see how the Professor himself explains the passage. "What then," says he, "does the passage, when viewed in connexion with the general tenor of the Scriptures, natively teach? 'Evidently,' says Mr. Noble, (*Appeal*, p. 61), 'the offending eye and hand are mentioned to denote certain perverse propensities of the mind or spirit, from which alone, all the organs of the body act; and as certain organs of the body are thus put for certain disorderly functions of the mind or spirit, which is the real man, to carry on the figure, and to avoid the incongruity of a mixed metaphor,

the whole body is naturally, and, according to the strict laws of composition, put for the whole mind or spirit, and thus for the whole man as he exists after death.'" p. 204–5. We have already remarked that "eye" and "hand" in this passage are to be understood figuratively. But it by no means follows because they are to be so taken, that therefore "*body*" must be understood in a figurative manner. Professor Bush, by asserting the contrary, has not only made "body" a figure, but "*hell*" also; and consequently the threatening implied in the passage must be also a *figurative threatening;* and as the whole is based upon the sin referred to in verse 28, that sin itself must be figurative, and the woman figurative; nor is it possible to imagine where the Professor's idea would permit us to stop. And it may be further remarked, that there is no "incongruity of a mixed metaphor" in our Saviour's language, if we take *hand* and *eye* figuratively and *body* literally, as the writer quoted by Professor Bush pretends; any more than there is in a thousand other passages of the Bible. If that gentleman had found any where but in the Scriptures the expression "The Lord God is a *sun* and a *shield*," Ps. lxxxiv. 11, he would have pronounced it an "incongruous mixed metaphor." So also in Hosea x. 12, "Sow to yourselves in righteousness—reap in mercy; break up your fallow ground; *for it is time to seek the Lord*, till he come and rain righteousness upon you." Here, according to these critics, is a sad confusion of the literal and figurative; for the third clause is strictly literal and all the rest highly figurative. What "incongruity of a mixed metaphor!"

But we cannot pass without remark the exhibition of logic and mental philosophy contained in the foregoing passage, which has been endorsed and adopted by Professor Bush. "Certain disorderly functions of the mind or spirit" are represented by "certain organs of the body," says the writer: and therefore "the whole body" must mean "the whole mind or spirit." This is a true specimen of Swedenborgian reasoning; and it is the exact style in which all their works are composed. Most of the uninitiated into the mysteries of the Baron's Psychology, however, would say, that if "the eye and hand" represent *some* of the disorderly functions of mind or spirit, then "the whole body" must represent *all* the disorderly functions of mind or spirit; and this, as a child can see, is the true inference. According

to this profound expositor therefore, all the disorderly functions of mind or spirit are to be cast into hell. And such is the exposition by which Professor Bush's theory is to be sustained, and to be proved more consonant with reason than "*the common theory.*"

It is worthy of remark, however, that even these writers, as appears from the foregoing extract, are compelled to admit that "*body*" here means *the whole man as he exists after the resurrection.* If the Bible therefore teaches the *resurrection of the body*, this passage, confessedly, is intended to teach just what we have explained it to mean.

II. The next passage quoted by our author is the following: "And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." Matt. x. 28.

This plain and unequivocal announcement, that those who fear not God, are to expect to be cast body and soul into hell, is a clear implication that the bodies of the wicked must be raised to life in order that they may undergo that doom. And so the passage teaches not only the resurrection of the body, but the resurrection of the wicked; both of which are denied by Professor Bush.

The testimony afforded by this passage in favour of the doctrine of the reunion of body and soul is so overwhelming, that even the Socinians of Poland, who, in Chap. 8 of their *Compendiolum*, deny the resurrection of the wicked, are obliged to admit it in direct contrariety to their avowed sentiments. Wolzogenius (in Pol. Fratres Tom. VI. p. 275,) remarks on it as follows: "Properly speaking neither soul nor body is killed. For neither the one nor the other alone possesses life; but man lives by the union of the soul with the body. Therefore man is killed by the separation of the soul from the body." "As Christ names the place, to wit Gehenna, where God can destroy the soul as well as the body, it appears that by the word *destroy* he does not mean simply to kill, or to annihilate, (for this God can do at once when the soul is separated from the body,) but to torment and torture."

This celebrated critic therefore (laying aside his materialism) explains the language of Christ to refer to a literal tormenting of soul and body in hell. And such is its plain and obvious import. But let us see how Professor Bush would set it aside: "neither this, nor any other text," says he, "bearing upon the life after death, can be explained in dis-

regard of the results which we have previously reached respecting the intrinsic and essential nature of the spirtual body in contradistinction from the natural. If these results address themselves, upon their own evidence, with irresistible force to our convictions, it is impossible that the mind, constituted as it is, can receive a declaration in conflict with them." p. 205.

But to this repeated appeal for aid to his "argument from reason," &c., it is sufficient to remark again that the argument has been fully proved to be wholly unsound, and its results utterly fallacious. It can afford Professor Bush no assistance whatever.

The following is the remainder of Professor Bush's criticisms upon this passage: "The leading scope of the passage is, that there was a destruction in this world which was not at all to be feared in comparison with a destruction which *was* to be feared in the next world. But the destruction in both cases was of course to be of such a nature as corresponded with the conditions of being in each world. In this world it was a material body which might be killed; but as material bodies do not pertain to the spiritual world, the destruction there to be feared was such as might befall the bodies there possessed. But these were spiritual bodies, as we learn from sound sources of information, though not expressly asserted, as it was not necessary it should be, in the present connexion. Thus understood, the words present no difficulty, except to one who would educe from them a proof of the resurrection of the body." p. 206. But the words in their obvious import present no difficulty whatever to one who believes the doctrine of the resurrection of the body: and the fallacy of the Professor's evasion is easily demonstrated. For 1, the use of σῶμα *body*, in the passage, leaves not the least possible ground to conclude that there is any difference between the present and future body of man, other than a change from a mortal state to an immortal: the body is identically the same. The word is σῶμα in both instances. "Fear not them who kill (see Winer's Idioms, Part II. §. 15,) the *body*, but fear him who is able to destroy both soul and *body* in hell." No room is left therefore, to doubt that the body in both instances is one and the same. And then further: *Body* (σῶμα) is in both instances distinguished from *soul* (ψυχὴ); and this distinction prevails therefore no less in the future state here referred to, than in the

present. This important consideration Professor Bush was imperiously called upon to notice, in a professed examination of the passage, but he has passed it without remark. But 2. It is true that "the destruction in both cases must be of such a nature as to correspond with the conditions of being in each world," as the Professor remarks: and it is also true that the conditions of being in the future world are here plainly stated by Christ. Man will then have a ψυχὴ, (which Professor Bush calls a *tertium quid*,) as well as a σῶμα, or material body: this material body must, therefore, in order to exist there, be raised from the dead. This consequence is inevitable. 3. Further: By ψυχὴ, Professor Bush constantly asserts, the vital principle is meant, which forms the resurrection body. See pp. 66, 67, 72, 78, &c. In the present state of existence, says he, this resurrection body exists in the σῶμα or material body. But Christ here teaches that not only the ψυχὴ or "resurrection body," but the σῶμα or material body also, (of those who fear not God,) will be cast into hell: and therefore Professor Bush's doctrine of the resurrection body is utterly false, because it directly contradicts the teaching of Christ. Thus clearly does this passage announce the great doctrine for which we contend: and Professor Bush in no conceivable way can explain σῶμα to mean the resurrection body or *tertium quid* of his own theory, for thus he would have two resurrection bodies, a ψυχὴ and a σῶμα, and this is contrary to his whole theory. But *finally*, he has not been able even to attempt an explanation of this passage, without involving himself in gross contradictions. The destruction to be feared in a future world, says he, is "such as might befall the *bodies* there possessed. But these," continues he, "*were spiritual bodies.*" Now throughout his book he openly denies the resurrection of the wicked. Of course, then, if they are not raised, they can have no bodies, that is, spiritual bodies (according to his theory,) such as the righteous possess. Yet here he is forced to admit that those that fear not God have both a ψυχὴ and a σῶμα in the world to come.*

* Episcopius referring to ψυχὴ in this passage remarks; "Vitam hanc appellat τὴν ψυχὴν; quod notandum est, ne putemus subtiliter distinguendum esse inter τὴν ψυχὴν, et τὸ πνεῦμα; promiscue enim his vocabulis uti Spiritum Sanctum ex hoc loco patet, et similibus: vide Job xii. 10; xxvii. 3; Habac. ii. 29; Zach. xii. 1." Opp. Tom. I. p. 54.

III. The next passage quoted by Professor Bush is the following: "But as touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. God is not the God of the dead, but of the living." Matt. xxii. 31, 32. See also the parallel passages in Mark xii. 18–27, and Luke xx. 27–38.

In his remarks on this passage, Professor Bush asserts that it plainly teaches his theory that the resurrection takes place at death. We shall therefore in the first place notice what the Professor has advanced; and then proceed to explain the passage itself.

The Professor correctly remarks that "the true question in debate (between Christ and the Sadducees) is *the resurrection of the dead.*" "This," continues he, "the Sadducees denied, and the Saviour intended to affirm. Now it is obvious that if the term 'resurrection,' in its correct usage in the Gospels and the New Testament generally, denotes the *resurrection of the body*, we cannot deem ourselves at liberty to depart from that sense in the present instance. Not the slightest evidence appears that our Lord intended to use the term in any other than its common and well known acceptation. If its ordinary use implies the resurrection of the body, it doubtless implies it here." pp. 206–7. Some, we are aware, will take exception to this canon of criticism; but we entirely accord with the remarks of the Professor, so far as they apply to the instance before us of the usage of ἀνάστασις. The Sadducees and our Saviour here undoubtedly employ this term in its commonly received acceptation.

Thus far we agree; let us now take up the point wherein we do not agree. The Professor continues thus: "But if that be the true sense, it is equally obvious that our Lord's argument is not an explicit, pointed, and direct refutation of the Sadducees' error; for how does the fact that the *spirits* of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are now living, prove the resurrection of their *bodies?*" To this I remark, that it is *not* equally obvious that our Lord's argument on this supposition furnishes no explicit, pointed, and direct refutation of the Sadducees' error. It is perfectly obvious that as man is dead when soul and body are separated, so he is raised from the dead when soul and body are reunited. And as the Sadducees denied the existence of the spirit of man (see Acts xxiii. 8,) it was by common consent, between themselves

and the rest of the Jews, taken for granted, that if this point could be established, the future reunion of body and soul must follow as a matter of course. Hence to prove this point, Christ refers to a passage in the Pentateuch, (the only part of the Old Testament which they received as divine,) from which the existence of the spirit is plainly inferred. And, therefore, on the admitted principles of both sides the argument was perfectly conclusive.*

To object to such a mode of argumentation, so common and so universally approved as this, only proves that Professor Bush felt the extreme necessity of making out a special case. In his own book he constantly reasons thus from the admitted principles of those whom he opposes. And not only so, but even on his own exposition of this passage he makes the Saviour reason inferentially; as the whole application of the argument is only *an inference* which he deduces from the passage quoted—"God is not the God of the dead, but of the living." To object therefore to the position that the Saviour here refutes the Sadducees "by inference," is to object, not only without any valid reason for doing so, but in direct contrariety to his own exposition of the argument.

But let us hear our author further. After quoting one or two writers to illustrate his meaning, he adds, "Writers of this class consider the passage as simply teaching *by inference* the resurrection of the body; i. e. if the spirits of the patriarchs are alive *now*, their bodies will be *hereafter*. But we not only dissent from this interpretation; we remonstrate against it. We contend that it is a violent wresting of a word from its plain, natural, obvious sense, in order to make it subserve the purposes of a different and preconceived theory." p. 207. The former part of this statement is sufficiently replied to above, and as to the latter part, it is difficult

* The Jews uniformly considered the doctrine of the resurrection of the body as involved in that of immortality. See *Schoetgenii Horæ Heb. et Talmud. ad Jno.* 5. Hence, as Dr. Knapp remarks, "They would regard the restoration of man as incomplete unless his body were restored. They believed the latter essential to the entire restitution of man, because in the present life he consists of both body and soul. And as the body here participates in our virtues and vices, &c., so they supposed that it would hereafter participate in our reward or punishment. Hence they represent the intermediate state in which the soul exists without the body, as an imperfect state." *Knapp's Theology*, p. 466, § 141. London ed.

to refer to it without administering a rebuke which Professor Bush has more than a score of times deserved in the course of this discussion. To hear him thus accusing those who here give to ἀνάστασις its well ascertained and only proper import in such a connexion, of "*wresting* a word from its *plain*, natural, obvious sense, to make it consistent with a preconceived theory," and this, at the same time that he has throughout his book not scrupled to exhibit some of the most glaring as well as revolting instances of such conduct that modern times have witnessed, certainly evinces on his part a length of not only "exegetical" but rationalistic and moral hardihood that we were hardly prepared to expect.

But it is amusing to see how *circular* is Professor Bush's reasoning on this subject. He first ascertains the "natural, obvious sense" of ἀνάστασις, almost entirely (if not quite so,) from the exposition which his theory requires that word here to bear: and then he proves the truth of his theory by this "natural, obvious sense" of the word. And yet in the same breath he makes a great parade of convicting others of reasoning in a circle.

But let us follow our author in his fervid declamation. "If there is a palpable, we had almost said an unmistakable, averment in the compass of holy writ, it is, that the true doctrine of the resurrection is proved from the fact, that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were living when Christ spake these words, and consequently must *have been raised*, and must be living in resurrection-bodies. Otherwise, as Dr. Dwight remarks, 'the declaration concerning them is no proof of the resurrection.' What kind of resurrection is that in which nothing is *raised?*" pp. 207–8.

The Professor here cannot be satisfied with the argument as stated by Christ, but must still resort to inference. No one doubts that the doctrine of the resurrection is proved by the fact that Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob were then living. And it being proved by Christ that they were living, though their bodies had long before decayed, it followed that they were not to remain in an imperfect disembodied state, but should be restored to life—to a reunion of body and spirit. And the fact that they now thus live, proves that they shall be raised from the dead. The argument is perfectly plain and obviously conclusive. But says Professor Bush, the fact that they were then alive proves that they "*must have been raised*, and be living in resurrection bodies." But *how* does

it prove this? Is there no such thing as the soul living separate from such a body? If there is not, then Professor Bush's argument has force. But he says that the righteous alone are raised, or obtain resurrection bodies; and yet the wicked live, says he, in a future state. The soul therefore may live, (even according to our author himself,) though destitute of such a body: and how does the fact, therefore, that the patriarchs were then alive, prove that they had been raised from the dead? Even on our author's own principles, they may have been living in a separate state. Such, however, is the amount of his logic; and I sincerely wish that there was no heavier charge in this instance than against his logic. The manner in which Dr. Dwight is brought in to support this absurd inference can scarcely without difficulty be reconciled with strict candour. Let the reader turn again to the extract; these patriarchs "must have been raised, and must be living in resurrection bodies. Otherwise, as Dr. Dwight remarks, 'the declaration concerning them is no proof of the resurrection.'" Now, reader, Dr. Dwight *never either asserted or believed that these patriarchs had thus been raised from the dead*, as this "*otherwise*" would make him assert.

But he expands the idea contained in the foregoing quotation more at large as follows; and let us hear him before we proceed further with our reply. "But their *bodies* certainly had not been raised," says he, "and can the sun in the heavens be more obvious to the senses than the conclusion to the mind, that the 'resurrection of the dead,' as here affirmed by the Saviour, has no reference whatever to the *resuscitation of dead bodies?* And are we not justified in maintaining, that the only resurrection of the dead ever to be experienced by man, is that of which these patriarchs have long since been the subjects? Is there more than one kind of resurrection? Does not our Lord's language establish this as the genuine and legitimate sense of the term? Is it not exactly tantamount to *future state?*" In the same style he proceeds through the rest of his remarks on this passage, (occupying half a page,) and endeavours to establish this notion. But, in addition to what has been offered above, I remark, that all this is in direct contradiction to Professor Bush's own exposition elsewhere: and therefore it is unworthy of a moment's consideration, or any serious refutation until he has rendered his argument consistent with

itself. Speaking of the resurrection of the saints mentioned in Matt. xxvii. 50–53, he says, "but not then (i. e. at the time of Christ's crucifixion) was the time for their true and invisible resurrection, for it was designed that in all things *He* should have the prëeminence." "And it *behooved not that the resurrection of the members should precede that of the Head.* Accordingly the interval of three days elapsed before they came forth (the mere bodies were not *they*,) and went into the holy city, and appeared in spiritual vision to many of their brethren." pp. 217, 218. How then can it be true that Abraham, Isaac and Jacob had been raised from the dead, and were living in resurrection bodies when Christ spoke the words in Matt. xxii.; and yet that the resurrection of the members did not precede that of their head? Is not such criticism beneath all serious reply or refutation?

The Professor therefore has totally failed to adduce from this passage any proof whatever that the resurrection takes place at death; or that the immortality of the soul is the same thing with the resurrection. In the course of our remarks on his criticisms, the true import of our Saviour's language has been made apparent. The view which we have presented is susceptible of the fullest confirmation. *Horne* in his "*Critical Introd. to the Scriptures*," Part II. B. II. chap. 8. § I. vol. I. p. 423, thus maintains the soundness of the entire principle upon which we have based this interpretation. "By INFERENCES, we mean certain corollaries or conclusions legitimately deduced from words rightly explained; so that they who either hear or read them may form correct views of Christian doctrine and Christian duty. And in this deduction of inferences we are warranted both by the genius of language, which, when correctly understood, not only means what the words uttered in themselves obviously imply, but also what may be deduced from them by legitimate consequences; and likewise by the authority of Jesus Christ and his apostles who have sanctioned this practice by their example. To illustrate this remark by a single instance:—Our Lord (Matt. xxii. 23–32,) when disputing with the Sadducees, cited the declaration of Jehovah recorded in Exod. iii. 6. 'I am the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob;' *and from this he proved the resurrection of the dead inferentially, or by legitimate consequence.*"

Such was truly the argument of our Redeemer; and the man who would object to his "dialectics" in this matter,

and call the argument inconclusive, in order to justify his appropriation of it to the defence of a theory which is as destitute of reason as the wildest dreams of Ignatius Loyola, has afforded but poor proof of a superior acquaintance with true hermeneutics and logic. Wherein does such conduct differ from the arrogance of Priestley and Belsham, who have ventured to charge the Apostle Paul with reasoning inconclusively?

Whitby is an author to whom Professor Bush sometimes refers with approbation. In his criticisms upon this place that learned writer remarks, that "Hence also it is evident against *Heinsius*, and others, on this place, that ἀνάστασις, even when it is not joined with flesh, or body, signifies *the resurrection of the flesh*, or body; *and when the resurrection of the dead is mentioned, as here*, IT NEVER BEARS ANY OTHER SENSE." "Those learned men are very much mistaken who say, that Christ designed not here to prove the resurrection of the body, but only the αναβίωσις, or life of the soul after death. For, (1st,) the argument of the Sadducees being taken from the supposition, that if there was a resurrection, there must be marriage, and the persons raised must be man and wife, as they were before, shows plainly, *that they put the question concerning the resurrection of the body;* for marriage belongs not to separate souls, but only to persons in the body. And, therefore, if Christ said any thing pertinent to their objection, and opposed his argument to that which they designed to disprove, he must speak of, and prove the resurrection of the body. And, therefore, Methodius (apud Epiph. Hær. 64, §. 35,) well notes, *that if Christ had not done this, but only had asserted the permanency of the soul, he had not answered, but confirmed the reasoning against the doctrine of the Pharisees.* (2dly.) Christ here declares the Sadducees thus erred, not knowing the power of God, ver. 20. Now that consists not in sustaining an immortal soul in life, but in raising the body from the dust to life: Acts xxvi. 8; Eph. i. 19, 20; Phil. iii. 21; Heb. xi. 19. And, (3dly.) This is extremely evident from the very words of Christ, both here and in St. Mark and Luke. For (1.) the question put to Christ is not put thus: *If their souls live whose wife is she?* but, ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει, ὅταν ἀναστῶσι, *in the resurrection, when they shall arise, whose wife shall she then be?* Mark xii. 23. To which Christ answers thus: Ὅταν ἐκ

νεκρῶν ἀναστῶσι, *when they arise from the dead*, (ver. 25,) *when they partake*, τῆς ἀναστάσεως τῆς ἐκ νεκρῶν, *of the resurrection from the dead*, (Luke xx. 35,) *they neither marry nor are given in marriage*. Now a time so determined, *and respecting what should be hereafter*, cannot refer to the present state of their souls, which in no sense are raised from the dead, but only to the future condition of their bodies." *Paraphrase*, &c., *in loco*, Vol. I., p. 184. We quote the above, not for the purpose of giving Whitby's *authority*, but his argument: and it is triumphantly conclusive. Professor Bush is acquainted with the commentary from which this extract is taken, for in other places in his book he both quotes and refers to it; and in such an examination of the subject under discussion as he professes to have given, he was certainly called upon to have fairly stated, and to have fully met the foregoing argument, before he should have ventured to pursue the course which he has taken with the passage before us. When a man comes before the public, as he has done, claiming to have come up to the spirit of the age in the ascertained results of his scientific and scriptural investigation, and professing to announce conclusions which must essentially modify the views which the Christian world has ever entertained respecting the most stupendous and momentous themes connected with the future destiny of our race, it is expected that he should be the last person in the world who would evade a difficulty by misstating a question, or by refusing to notice an argument which he is unable to obviate.*

* If the reader would desire to see this argument of our Saviour with the Sadducees further discussed, he will find it done at full length and most ably, in the singularly acute "*Analysis and Scholia*," of *Piscator*, (Tom. II., 120;) and, also, in *Pareus* (Comment., *in loco;*) and, likewise, with equal ability and at great length, by *Episcopius*, in his "*Notæ in Matt.*, Opp. Tom. I., p. 146–149. Each of these writers draws out the argument fully, and in a complete syllogism. See, also, *Poole's* excellent Note on the subject in his "Annotations:" and the learned dissertations of *Grotius*, *in loco;* and, also, *Wolzogenius*, Polon. Frat. VI., p. 362–365, and 664, 665. *Lightfoot*, also, has presented some important considerations in his "Specilegia," or "Handful of Gleanings from Exodus," *Works*, Vol. I., p. 701, folio; and, also, *Witsius*, in his *Œcon. Fœd.*, B. III., cap. II., §§. 11–15. A reference to either of these well known critics will evince how great has been the unfairness of Professor Bush in treating the passage under consideration as he has done.

IV. The next passage is the following. I quote it just as it is given by Professor Bush, both in Greek and English, for reasons which will be stated presently.

MATTHEW xxvii. 50–53.

GR.	ENG. VERS.
Ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς πάλιν κράξας φωνῇ μεγάλῃ ἀφῆκε τὸ πνεῦμα.	Jesus, when he had cried again with a loud voice, yielded up the ghost.
Καὶ ἰδού, τὸ καταπέτασμα τοῦ ναοῦ ἐσχίσθη εἰς δύο, ἀπὸ ἄνωθεν ἕως κάτω, καὶ ἡ γῆ ἐσείσθη, καὶ αἱ πέτραι ἐσχίσθησαν·	And behold the vail of the temple was rent in twain from the top to the bottom: and the earth did quake, and the rocks rent;
καὶ τὰ μνημεῖα ἀνεῴχθησαν, καὶ πολλὰ σώματα τῶν κεκοιμημένων ἁγίων ἠγέρθη·	And the graves were opened, and many bodies of the saints which slept, arose;
καὶ ἐξελθόντες ἐκ τῶν μνημείων μετὰ τὴν ἔγερσιν αὐτοῦ εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὴν ἁγίαν πόλιν καὶ ἐνεφανίσθησαν πολλοῖς.	And came out of the graves after his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many.

The Professor, after a few common place remarks on the subject of the resurrection, introduces his criticism on this passage, by expressing a hope that he shall "present it in a somewhat new and interesting light: and by observing that all conjectures as to the particular persons here said to be raised are vain and fruitless; and likewise all attempts to ascertain what became of the raised bodies. "They were in their graves," says he—"they were raised: this is the extent of our information respecting them." p. 210–211. He then proceeds as follows:

"In entering upon the consideration of the event itself, we observe, first, that the language of the text is to be especially noted: πολλὰ σώματα τῶν κεκοιμημένων ἁγίων ἠγέρθη, *many bodies of saints that slept arose.* A question of no small difficulty, as to the precise meaning of these words, is suggested by the fact, that although these bodies are said to have 'arisen' at the time of the crucifixion, yet they did not come forth from the graves till three days afterwards; and even then it does not clearly appear that this 'coming forth' is predicated of the bodies; for the language is, καὶ ἐξελθόντες ἐκ τῶν μνημείων, μετὰ τὴν ἔγερσιν αὐτοῦ, εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὴν ἁγίαν

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πόλιν, καὶ ἐνεφανίσθησαν πολλοῖς, *and having come forth from the graves after his resurrection, they entered into the holy city and appeared unto many*, where it is not to be overlooked, that the participle ἐξελθόντες is in the masculine gender, whereas the previous noun, σώματα, *bodies*, is in the neuter. What then is precisely the effect denoted by the verb ἠγέρθη, *arose?* Or, in other words, what was the condition of these bodies, as distinguished from their previous condition, during the three days prior to the issuing forth of the *persons* (the οἱ ἐξελθόντες) from their tombs? And was it these *bodies*, that then came forth and appeared to those that saw them? If so, why is the gender changed? Why do we not read ἐξελθόντα instead of ἐξελθόντες? These are points of very difficult solution, though liable to be overlooked by the mere reader of the English translation, which does not, because it could not, present the nicer shades of the original. The natural impression produced by the phrase 'the dead bodies arose,' would doubtless be, that they were reanimated by the spirits which formerly inhabited them, and thus from dead carcasses, became living persons. But then it strikes us as exceedingly strange, that a multitude of living, conscious, intelligent persons should be abiding in their sepulchral habiliments, for the space of three days, in the tombs, in which they had been deposited at death."

There are two points in reference to this subject, here introduced by Professor Bush, each of which calls for a remark: the asserted difficulty respecting the resurrection of these bodies "at the time of the crucifixion;" and the change of gender, from the neuter to the masculine. He evidently wishes to involve this plain-speaking text in a fog, and the sequel will show how he has succeeded therein. We shall attend to each of his "difficulties" in their order.

1. As to the "question of *no small difficulty*, as to the precise meaning of these words, suggested by the fact, that although these bodies are said to have 'arisen' at the time of the crucifixion, yet they did not come forth from the graves till three days afterwards"—I remark that it is a difficulty that has no existence except in an erroneous pointing of the passage. Professor Bush, in v. 50–53, has followed the pointing of no codex with which I am acquainted. It is not the pointing of the Textus Receptus, either as given by Stephens, or Leusden, or Bagster's Polyglott; or of the text of Mill, or Bengel or Griesbach. Professor Bush owes

it to himself to state whose text he has followed. And this is not all; but he has presumed to change the pointing of our English version by putting a semicolon after "arose;" *apparently to give countenance to this alleged difficulty.* And I call upon Professor Bush to state what edition he has followed in this matter; for he cannot but be sensible that in this connexion it is an affair of grave and serious importance so far as he is concerned. Where is the English text pointed as he has given it above? I have examined a large number of the best editions and find it in none of them.

The punctuation of the Professor is obviously designed to represent the rising of the bodies referred to, to be synchronical with the rending of the veil, or with the death of Christ; and their coming out of their graves to be after his resurrection: and thus an air of mystery is to be thrown around the passage, under cover of which he expects to avoid the difficulty which it throws in the way of his system. In times when the authority of the Greek punctuation was not understood, it might have been allowable to acknowledge the existence of a difficulty here; but why could not Professor Bush have openly admitted that no such difficulty exists in the best versions. In the excellent one of Bengel, for example, the pointing obviates the difficulty entirely. After *ἐσχίσθησαν* at the end of v. 51, there is a colon; and from this until the end of v. 53, the comma is the only intervening point. Griesbach points it somewhat differently, but the "difficulty" is equally well obviated: *καὶ ἡ γῆ ἐσείσθη, καὶ αἱ πέτραι ἐσχίσθησαν, καὶ τὰ μνημεῖα ἀνεῴχθησαν· καὶ πολλὰ σώματα τῶν κεκοιμημένων ἁγίων ἠγέρθη, καὶ ἐξελθόντες ἐκ τῶν μνημείων, μετὰ τὴν ἔγερσιν αὐτοῦ εἰσῆλθον* &c. Here, the earthquake, the rending of the rocks, and the opening of the graves are represented as synchronizing with the rending of the veil and the death of Christ: while the raising of the bodies, and their coming from their sepulchres and going into the city is represented as occurring *after* his resurrection. Where then is the alleged difficulty of Professor Bush, from the fact of their being "said to have arisen at the time of the crucifixion?

It is worthy of remark also that on the same page on which he quotes Matt. xxvii. 50–53, as well as on the preceding page, he has a long quotation from Campbell on the Gospels. Now while he had this work of that eminent critic in his hand, why could he not have referred the reader

to his translation of this passage? It is as follows: "Jesus having again cried with a loud voice, resigned his spirit. And behold the veil of the temple was rent in two from top to bottom, the earth trembled, and the rocks split. Graves also burst open, and after his resurrection, the bodies of several saints who slept were raised, came out of the graves, went into the holy city, and were seen by many." To mention an alleged difficulty, and to show that its attempted solution is unsatisfactory, and then to use the difficulty to cast dust in the eyes of a reader, is a procedure which has sometimes been adopted with some show of fairness; but Professor Bush has for this purpose asserted the existence of a difficulty which he could not help knowing has received an abundant and every way satisfactory solution.

2. The other difficulty of the Professor is in respect to the gender, and the agreement of σώματα *bodies*, which is neuter, with ἐξελθόντες which is masculine. Why was the gender changed? he asks: and he would try to find here a place to introduce his *tertium quid*. But there is no place here for such an introduction. The gender is changed for the best of reasons. The σώματα or bodies, were revived by their union with the soul; and when they came out of their graves they were *mere bodies* no longer—no longer σώματα merely, but truly ἄνθρωποι, *persons*, living men, constituted of body and soul, as they were before they died. The very difficulty of the Professor, therefore, affords a singularly strong confirmation of the doctrine which he opposes.

It is amusing to see how much of Professor Bush's lengthened detail upon this passage is based upon these asserted difficulties, the existence of which he takes for granted, as well as the fact that they admit of no satisfactory solution, unless on the principles of his theory. He also quotes "*Noble's Appeal*," pp. 64, 65, in which that writer professes to find strong proof in favour of Swedenborgianism, from the fact that no one can tell with absolute certainty what became of the raised saints. Such lucubrations are unworthy of serious notice. And on this subject the Professor remarks that "To us the hypothesis is far more probable, that the *bodies* disappeared immediately upon what is termed their 'rising,' and were seen no more; for the supposition is to us utterly incredible that these material bodies were the objects beheld by those to whom the subsequent appearance was made. To the objections already urged against the supposition, we may

add, that the term for 'appeared,' (ἐνεφανίσθησαν) is the proper term for the *manifestation of a spiritual being*, whether angel or departed spirit. This indicates that they were seen *in vision*, and not with the natural eye, which was not formed to take cognizance of *spiritual bodies*." pp. 213–215.

The "*objections already urged* against the supposition," that the material bodies were the objects of vision to the many to whom the raised saints appeared, are those already noticed above; and the reader will judge for himself how much weight should be attached to them. And as to the other "objection" here stated, the reader may also judge of its weight when I tell him that the Greek word referred to by Professor Bush, (ἐμφανίζω,) is employed in the New Testament just *ten times; and in not one of them* is it used for "the manifestation of a spiritual being, *whether angel or departed spirit*." In our text such a meaning is clearly out of the question, as σώματα itself shows. In John xiv. 21, 22, and Heb. ix. 25, it is used in reference to Christ's manifestation of himself to his people *after his resurrection*, and also to his appearing in our behalf at the throne of God. The reader may turn to the other instances of its use, which are as follows: Acts xxiii. 15. 22, and xxiv. 1, and xxv. 2. 15; Heb. xi. 14. Professor Bush wished to prove that the bodies of these saints were dissipated, and that the holy city in which they appeared, was not the earthly, but "celestial Jerusalem," p. 217, and such is the course he has adopted, by which to gain this point!

The remainder of the Professor's remarks on Matt. xxvii. 50–53, have no real bearing on the subject under discussion, and therefore we pass them without further notice.

SECTION V.

Examination of passages in John's Gospel.

I. The next passage quoted by Professor Bush, and formally discussed by him is the following:—"Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation." John v. 28, 29. p. 234.

Here is as plain and emphatic a declaration as can be

made, that both the righteous and unrighteous are to be the subjects of the resurrection of the body; and also that the period of this resurrection was still future when Christ uttered these words. Consequently the theory that denies the resurrection of the wicked is false; and the assertion that the righteous who had died before this time had entered upon the resurrection-state, is also false. Yet our author is in no wise discouraged by this formidable testimony, but proceeds with a serious effort to obviate its force.

After admitting that the testimony is very weighty; and stating that if he knows himself he "would deal with the profoundest deference, and with the utmost fairness, with every declaration of holy writ," (a point, which, one would suppose, ought to be taken for granted in a teacher of Christian theology,) he proceeds with several "suggestions," by the aid of which he would aim to reconcile the passage with his theory. The *first* of these suggestions is, that Christ "for the most part" speaks of the resurrection "as the distinguishing privilege and prerogative of the righteous:" to prove which he quotes Luke xx. 35, 36, and xiv. 12–14. But if this were even so, it would not help Professor Bush, for Christ here asserts with the utmost plainness the resurrection of the unrighteous.

His *second* suggestion is as follows:

"(2.) The passage, as understood in its literal import, does certainly encounter the force of that cumulative mass of evidence, built upon rational and philosophical grounds, which we have arrayed against *any* statement of the doctrine that would imply the participation of the *body* in that *rising again* which is predicated of the dead. We do not by any means affirm that the conclusions from that source, to which we have come, are sufficient of themselves to countervail the rebutting conclusion which may be formed from the present passage. All we would say is, that *they have weight*, and consequently we are not required, or rather are not at liberty, at once to dismiss them, as a kind of profane intruders into holy ground, where even the 'daughter of a voice' from Reason is not to insinuate itself into the ears of Faith. We confidently re-affirm our position, that the human mind *cannot* be insensible to the claims of the arguments which we have presented in the form of *rational objections* to the views of the resurrection that would naturally

be suggested by the literal reading of the present text." p. 235–6.

This passage is *backed* by a note containing an extract from Mr. Locke in which he contends for the resurrection of a *material* body, but denies that the same body that died will arise; (for this is the doctrine contended for by Mr. Locke against Stillingfleet;) and what this has to do with Professor Bush's theory, the reader will determine for himself. Locke admits that a body is raised from the earth, and this our author utterly denies. Yet Professor Bush and Mr. Locke are willing to become friends, if by so doing this plain testimony of our Saviour can be sacrificed.

The foregoing "suggestion," however, unfortunately for the Professor, has no more weight than the first; and it can lend him no aid in disposing of the passage under consideration. We have fully demonstrated that his "argument from reason" is not worth a rush; and that "that *cumulative mass of evidence*,(!) built upon rational and philosophical grounds," is no evidence at all, and has not the weight of a feather in settling the question before us.

On the next page he follows up this "suggestion," with remarking that "So far as we are competent to form a judgment, the evidence from reason *preponderates* in favour of the idea of the immediate entrance at death upon the resurrection-state. This evidence we have seen to be confirmed by the testimony of a multitude of passages which yield this more easily and naturally than any other sense." Unfortunately for our author, however, this statement is destitute of the least confirmatory evidence. So far from his having produced a multitude of passages, he has not produced *a solitary one, which yields any such sense as this!* He proceeds as follows: "But in the text under consideration, and perhaps a few others, the doctrine of a future, simultaneous bodily resurrection *seems* (!) to be explicitly taught. Here then we are reduced to a new dilemma. The character of the difficulty is changed. It is not so much now a conflict between revelation and reason, as it is *an apparent conflict between one part of revelation and another.*" p. 237. Not at all, Professor Bush: there is neither a new nor an old dilemma. There is no conflict between true philosophy or reason, and revelation; nor is there any between one part of the Bible and another part. All this is base-

less assumption; no facts have been adduced to sustain it. The only real conflict in the matter is between Revelation and Professor Bush's theory.

The Professor's *third* "suggestion," is a formal acceding to Semler's notorious principle of "accommodation," by the aid of which he would also endeavour to obviate the difficulty presented by this text. But neither can German neology here lend our author any aid, as we have fully shown in Part II., chapter I., above.

Under this *third* and last of his "suggestions," he also introduces Dan. xii. 2, and supposes that our Saviour had that passage in mind when he uttered the words under consideration: and if so, even the Professor must admit, that the Prophet also announces the resurrection of the wicked as well as of the righteous. It would surely be, what was once called, "a *retrograde improvement*," to *explain* what is clear and obvious, by that which is dark and difficult.*

The Professor closes his remarks on this passage as follows:

"Even framed as it is, the declaration may be understood to yield an important truth in accordance with the view we have presented. For true it unquestionably is, that all those whose bodies are consigned to the sepulchre emerge from their defunct state, in obedience to the voice of him who has the keys of death and hell, into a sphere of existence where, according to their works, they are either crowned with life everlasting, or doomed to a judgment of wrath without end. If this be intrinsically true, it is certain that our Saviour's words cannot teach the contrary; and if they do not mean this, they must mean something consistent with it. If the truth is not to be harmonized with itself in this way, let him who can, suggest another and a better." pp. 240, 241.

* Professor Bush is not satisfied with only adopting the creed of the German Neologists on the subject of the resurrection, but he avails himself of their very arguments and expositions of Scripture. Dr. Ammon's exposition of John v. 21, 24, 28, is of the same character as the Professor's; and Hammer replies to him by remarking, among other things, that "The supposition, that Christ intended to describe the moral resurrection, with figures drawn from Dan. xii. 2, is not only destitute of proof, but is actually improbable; *for there is not a single word which gives the least intimation of such an allusion;* moreover, the words are not those of Daniel, nor is Daniel, in the passage to which we refer, at all speaking of a moral resurrection."

It seems to be rather a hard case, but even this idea fails to afford the Professor any assistance. To say nothing of that egregious perversion of language, by which a coming forth *out of the grave* is explained to mean no more than "emerging from a *defunct* state" *before* the body is consigned to the sepulchre; and to say nothing either of his making both the righteous and wicked alike thus emerge into the resurrection-state, in direct contradiction to his theory, which denies the resurrection of the wicked; the absurdity of the foregoing criticism will at once be seen by referring to the fact, that our Saviour says the hour *is coming*," ἔρχεται, in which this event will take place. Surely, then, it had not already occurred. And, therefore, the doctrine that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, with all the pious dead who were in their graves before the time of Christ, had entered upon the resurrection-state *at death*, is utterly false and unfounded.

II. The next passage is thus quoted by Professor Bush:

John vi. 39, 40: "And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me, I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day. And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day." p. 241.

It will be observed that the construction in the first of these verses is what grammarians style imperfect. Πᾶν agrees with no other word, and stands in the place of ἐκ παντός. This idiom is hebræistic; as πᾶν in the nominative is again resumed by the genitive of the pronoun, ἐξ αὐτοῦ. It is also to be noticed that the article (τῷ) at the close of each of the verses is *emphatic.*

Professor Bush commences his remarks on the passage with the following reference to the important phrase therein twice occurring—"*the last day.*" "The same declaration in substance or in form occurs, v. 44, 54. It certainly denotes the resurrection of those who believed in him, and, according to the letter, a resurrection within the limits of a certain period, denominated here 'the last day.' An equivalent allusion to this day occurs also, chap. xii. 48: 'The word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him *at the last day.*' That the expression is conformed to the usual mode in which the resurrection of the righteous was spoken of among the Jews, is also unquestionable." The phrase is

certainly an important one in this connexion, and I wish our author had made some effort here to explain it. He does not, however, and immediately after the forequoted remark, commences with another application of the neological principle of *accommodation:* expecting thus to evade the testimony here given against his theory, and in favour of a future simultaneous resurrection and judgment.

Now it cannot be successfully contested that the phrase ἐσχάτη ἡμέρα which is here employed, and translated *last day*, or emphatically "*the* last day," is a phrase equivalent to κρίσις μεγάλης ἡμέρας in Jude 6; and ἡμέρα τῆς κρίσεως in Matt. x. 15; and xi. 22, 24; and 1 Jno. iv. 17; and also to the ἡμέρα δικαιοκρισίας τοῦ Θεοῦ in Rom. ii. 5; and to ἐκείνη ἡμέρα of Matt. vii. 22; and ἡμέρα Κυρίου in 1 Thess. v. 2; and also ἡμέρα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ in Phil. i. 6; and 1 Cor. i. 8: as also to the phrase συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος as used in Matt. xiii. 39, 40, 49, &c. Compare also the expressions ἡ ἀποκάλυψις τοῦ κυρίου, ἡ παρουσία, &c. &c., in 2 Thess. i. 7; 1 Cor. i. 7; and iii. 13; and 1 Tim. vi. 14; and 2 Tim. iv. 1; and Tit. ii. 13; 2 Thess. ii. 8; and 1 Cor. xv. 23; and 1 Jno. ii. 28; 2 Pet. iii. 12, &c. All these expressions clearly refer to one and the same period, or crisis in the world's history, as the reader will see by turning to the references, and noticing in what connexion the phrases are found.

The events which are to transpire on this day are also clearly stated, and they are all declared to be yet future. "God has *appointed a day* in which he will judge (μέλλει κρίνειν) the world in righteousness," &c. Acts xvii. 31. A number of the preceding references likewise inculcate the same doctrine. See also 1 Cor. iv. 5. It is called also "the day of wrath," ἡμέρα ὀργῆς, a statement wholly irreconcileable with the doctrine of Professor Bush, that the present merciful dispensation of the Gospel, is the day of judgment. Rom. ii. 5. At this time also the dead are to be raised; (See the passage under discussion; and v. 44, and 54; see also 1 Cor. xv. 23, and *passim*; and 1 Thess. iv. 16; Jude 14; Rev. i. 7.) All mankind are then to be judged, the dead and the living, both small and great. Matt. xi. 22, 24; 2 Cor. v. 10; Rev. xx. &c.

Immediately after the passage above quoted from the "Anastasis," our author proceeds to refer to the *accommodation* principle to help him out of his difficulties. And he

makes also a long quotation from a book called "*Chandler's Vindication*," asserting the same principle. But this principle we have already sufficiently exploded, and shall not discuss it in connexion with every text in the consideration of which Professor Bush chooses to introduce it. And so far as his reference to it here is concerned, it can afford him no assistance whatever.

On p. 244, however, he makes an effort to justify his adoption of this neological principle in the following words:

"When our Saviour, for instance, says, Matt. xii. 27, 'If I by Beelzebub cast out devils, by whom do your children cast them out?' are we to suppose that he intended to sanction the common belief, that such exorcisms were actually performed at that time by others than his own disciples? The conceit was rife among the people that such *was* indeed the case, and our Lord simply adopted the argument *ex concessis*, without intimating whether the popular belief had a ground or not.* The same remark applies to a subsequent part of the same conversation, where he speaks of an evil spirit going out of a man, wandering over waste and dry places, and finally returning reinforced by a company of other spirits worse than himself, and taking possession of his old habitation. This surely does not imply the absolute truth of such a representation, but is merely a specimen of his adapting his teachings to prevalent ideas."

But the Professor is quite unfortunate in his illustrations of this principle. So far as Matt. xii. 27 is concerned, Christ does plainly assert the fact that "such exorcisms were actually performed at that time by others than his own disciples." If the Professor had turned to Mark ix. 38–40, he would have met a case in point.—"And John answered him, saying, Master, we saw one *casting out devils* in thy name, and he followeth not us: and we forbad him, *because he followeth not us*. But Jesus said, Forbid him not: for there is no man *which shall do a* MIRACLE *in my name*, that can lightly speak evil of me." See also Luke ix. 49. Here was a man who did the very thing in question, and yet followed not with the disciples of Christ. And Christ himself admitted the reality

* The Professor here quotes Mr. Barnes in a note, as saying, "The words of Christ here do not prove that they had actually the power of casting out devils, but only that they *claimed* it, and practised *magic* or *jugglery*," (Notes on Matt. xii. 27,) a sentiment uncalled for and unwarrantable.

of the performance, and called it a *miracle*, δύναμις. He admits the same thing also in reference to *many*:—"Many will say to me in that day, Lord! Lord! have we not prophesied in thy name? and in thy name *cast out devils?* and in thy name *done* many wonderful works? (*miracles*, δυνάμεις.) *And then will I profess unto them, I never knew you: depart from me ye that work iniquity!*" Matt. vii. 22, 23. There is, therefore, no *accommodation* here to the erroneous views of the Jews; and of course nothing to justify the Professor's application of that principle in evading the difficulty which the text under consideration places in the way of his theory.

Nor is our author more fortunate in his reference to the relapsing demoniac of which he speaks. See Matt. xii. 43–45. The passage is no doubt a parable, but founded in actual truth, as our Lord's parables uniformly were. And as this case is always referred to by the advocates of the principle of accommodation, in justification of that principle, it will be in place here to offer a few remarks upon it.

The immediate occasion of our Lord's introducing this *parable* was his having cured a demoniac. (See Mark iii. 19–21, in connexion with Matt. xii. 22.) The multitude around were amazed at his exhibition of power over the spirits of darkness, and exclaimed "Is not this the Son of David?" But when the Pharisees heard it they exclaimed, "He hath Beelzebub—this fellow doth not cast out devils but by Beelzebub, the prince of the devils." This charge Jesus refutes by showing that Satan could not contend against himself. (v. 25, 26.) And then reasoning from the truth which the Jews themselves admitted, that demons could be cast out (v. 27), he shows (v. 28), that this action of his in thus expelling the demon, proved that the Messiah was among them —and that of course he himself was the Messiah. It also evinced, (as he proved, v. 29,) that he was more powerful than Satan, and so far from being in confederacy with him, was truly his enemy. (v. 30.)

He then gives them the awful admonition (contained in verses 31, 32,) respecting their guilt in ascribing the works of the Spirit of God to diabolical agency: assuring them that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, (of which this was a marked example,) would never be forgiven. And he concludes the address with assuring them that they must give an account of their words at the day of judgment.

It was then that certain Scribes and Pharisees said "Master, we would see a sign from thee!" That is, an evidence that you are the Messiah whom you claim to be: by which they insinuated that casting out demons was not a sufficient evidence, as others did the like; refusing to acknowledge, however, that whenever they were *truly* cast out it was always in the name of Christ; so that when others did it, it was still a proof of his Messiahship.* Hence he reproves the unbelieving spirit which dictated this request, and remarks that the men of Nineveh and the Queen of the South, should, in the day of judgment, condemn that guilty race for refusing to believe the evidence which his works afforded of his being a greater than either Jonas or Solomon. He then in continuation of his remarks, introduces the parable under consideration, and applies it by saying "*Even so shall it be also unto this wicked generation.*" (Comp. Matt. xii. 22–45; Mark iii. 19–30; and Luke ii. 14–36.) The plain meaning of which is, 'You go on to disbelieve and to deride me and my works; suffering yourselves herein to be led astray by the Devil, under whose influence you will continue until you finally perish.'

John, by his preaching, and Christ, by his preaching and miracles, had freed, as it were, that unhappy people from the influence of the Devil, and led them to the very door of eternal life. But by giving way again to Satanic influence he had returned upon them with greater force than ever, and would now precipitate them to perdition.

The simile in the parable is taken from the case of a demoniac, from whom the demon had gone out. This demon passes through dry places, (δὶ ἀνύδεων τόπων,) seeking another resting place among those poor creatures who dwelt in caves, or among rocks and tombs. But finding no subject to occupy he returns to his former habitation—the poor wretch out of whom he had departed: and finding this seat still unoccupied either by the Spirit of God, or by an unclean spirit like himself; and fearing that the power that ejected him might still be present and prevent his re-entrance, he goes and takes with him a number of other spirits like himself, and sufficient, as he hopes to withstand any effort to eject him hereafter; and they going in dwell there.

* "*In the name of Christ*," was the formula used by others, as above shown, see Mark ix. 38–40; Luke ix. 49, 50; Matt. vii. 22, 23.

The obscurity in the phrase "*he findeth it empty, swept, and garnished,*" is removed by recollecting that it is a Jewish phrase or idiom, and means no more than that he found it furnished for an inhabitant: "swept and garnished," but still "empty," i. e. destitute of one. Whereupon he proceeds to enter it anew.

The allegory is intended, therefore, to describe the dreadful state of the Jews. Nor can Professor Bush produce a particle of proof to show that it is not a matter of fact in every part of the representation. The Jews may have had such ideas before, respecting evil spirits; and again, they may have had no such ideas until communicated by Christ. But until the advocates of the principle of accommodation produce some proof to justify their so doing, it is perfectly nugatory for them to adduce this passage as an instance of the Saviour's accommodating his teaching to the *erroneous notions* of the Jews.

Professor Bush next remarks that the Jews employed a variety of terms (such as spirit, soul, heaven, hell, world, 'world to come,' 'end of the world,' &c.) doubtless in an erroneous sense: and that the Saviour employed them "without intimating that he did it in any other than the common acceptation." And on the strength of this most shameful assertion, he says, "So in the present case we rest in the conclusion, that our Lord spake on the subject of the resurrection in accordance with the sentiments of the diction then prevalent, *and that his words are not to be regarded as a criterion of the absolute truth of the current doctrine.*" pp. 244, 245. And in this way does Professor Bush prefer to get rid of the explicit testimony of our adorable Redeemer, rather than to resign the paltry theory which he has arrayed against his teaching. More barefaced infidelity cannot be found in the whole of Tindal's deistical work, called "*Christianity as old as the Creation.*"

III. The next passage adduced by our author is John xi. 21–26. "Then Martha said unto Jesus, Lord, if thou hadst been here, my brother had not died. But I know that even now, whatsoever thou wilt ask of God, God will give it thee. Jesus saith unto her, thy brother shall rise again. Martha saith unto him, I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day. Jesus saith unto her, I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were

dead, yet shall he live: and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die. Believest thou this?" p. 246.

The doctrine of a simultaneous resurrection *at the last day*, is here very clearly announced. If the reader, however, would like to know how Professor Bush regards it, he can read his exposition as follows.

"This is a passage of similar import with the preceding, and is to be construed on the same principle. The words of Martha evince that she merely echoed the general sentiment of the age, and perhaps of former ages, in declaring the expectation that her brother would rise *at the last day*. Our Lord does not, indeed, in so many words assure her that her belief was founded upon an incorrect view of the truth; at the same time, upon a closer view of the Saviour's language, we cannot easily resist the impression, that he actually designed to correct something that was erroneous, or at least inadequate, in her belief. On any other supposition let us see how the discourse proceeds. Martha tells Jesus that she has no doubt that her brother will rise at the last day; and he, admitting and approving the sentiment, replies, 'I am the resurrection and the life,' intimating, on this construction, that what she said was very true, that at the last day *he* should raise her brother to an immortal life. He then proceeds, advancing in some way upon what he had just said, and informs her that all dead Christians shall live again, and that no living Christian shall die for ever. *But upon this view of the passage, what has he said but what Martha had already told him that she knew?* For surely, if she knew that Lazarus should rise again at the last day, she must, upon the same grounds, have known that every deceased Christian would also rise at the last day, and that no living Christian would die for ever. This sense seems, in fact, to be precluded by the question which Christ immediately proposes, 'Believest thou this?' Can we suppose he would spend so many words to tell Martha what she already knew, and then, after all, ask her whether she believed this?" pp. 246, 247.

But this view the Professor dismisses as unsatisfactory, and proposes the following.

"The following, then, we conceive, to be a much juster interpretation. Our Lord really designs, by imparting to her the true nature of the resurrection, to inform her, also, that that 'last day, which she was expecting, had even now

in effect come, and, therefore, that there was no reason why she should give way to sorrow, or even despair of having her brother restored to her. He tells her, 'He that believeth in me, though he should die, as your brother now seems to have done, yet, in fact, it is little more than an illusion on the senses; he still lives to every high and real purpose of existence. Nor is this all; every living man that believes in me shall, in fact, never die. Although, indeed, he may be called in God's time, to put off the mortal body, and though you may call this death, yet, in truth, it is a change scarcely worth the name. Of his conscious, active, and happy being there is no interruption at all for ever. If such, then, be the true state of the case in regard to departed believers—if they really emerge in full life and consciousness from the dying body into the resurrection-state —why imagine the resurrection to be deferred to some distant future period, called the 'last day?' Believest thou, Martha, what I say? If so, you perceive you have little occasion to grieve for your deceased brother; nevertheless, as the mere reanimation of the lifeless corpse is a comparatively trifling work of Omnipotence, '*your brother shall rise again.*' Here, doubtless, was much new and important doctrine, in regard to which it might, very properly, be asked of Martha, 'Believest thou this?'" pp. 247, 248.

Such is the criticism of our author on this important passage; and thus would he first set aside the obvious meaning of the passage, and then establish his own exposition of it. We shall follow him in each of these attempts.

With respect to the first particular, he has egregiously failed in his attempt to present the obvious and ordinary view of the passage; and, as he has based his rejection of this view upon this very mistake of his, it is plain that his reasons for rejecting it amount to nothing. Our Lord does not assure her, in so many words, says he, that her belief was founded upon an incorrect view of the truth; (but why should he, if he "accommodated" himself to her errors?) but yet we cannot easily resist the impression, that he designed to correct something erroneous or inadequate in her belief. This may have been so to some extent; yet not in the sense pretended by Professor Bush. Martha, like the rest of our Lord's followers, doubtless had an inadequate view of his character and mission. Hence our Lord introduces this very point directly to her in this conversation.

But, says Professor Bush, upon the view of the passage, that Christ here informs Martha that all dead Christians shall live again, what has he said but what Martha had already told him that she knew? "For surely she knew that Lazarus would rise again at the last day," and, of course, that all other "deceased Christians would also rise at the last day." We thank Professor Bush for this full admission, that such was the belief of Martha, and, by consequence, of the rest of our Saviour's followers. But yet he has failed to present the import of our Saviour's questions, "Believest thou this?"—a point upon which, as Professor Bush has presented the matter, the whole subject turns. Christ does not ask, "Believest thou that the righteous dead will hereafter be raised at the last day?" This, Martha had told him that she believed: but he asks her, "Believest thou that *I* am the resurrection and the life;" and that the resurrection, at the last day, is so connected with me as the Saviour, "that whosoever believeth in *me* though he were dead, yet shall he live"—live, and never die? "Believest thou this?" A mere glance at the text will show any one that this is the import of our Saviour's question: and it is impossible to conceive how an intelligent man could mistake it. The answer of Martha itself, which is given in the next verse, (and ought to have been quoted by Professor Bush, as it is the last verse of the paragraph, as well as the answer to the question,) clearly evinces also what was the import of the query. She does not say, "Yea, Lord, I believe that the dead shall arise"—but "Yea, Lord; *I believe that thou art the Christ, the Son of God, who should come into the world!*" ver. 27. Our author's rejection of the common view, therefore, being based upon a total and unaccountable misapprehension of the import of the passage, can avail nothing; and the passage, as thus interpreted, must continue to utter a solemn testimony against the ruinous errors of his theory.

But the Professor was hard put to it, for he must, of course, make a show of rejecting the foregoing and obvious explanation, before he could, with any appearance of propriety, propose the one which might be more favourable to his principles. Hence, after rejecting it, he offers what he conceives to be "a much juster interpretation." And this interpretation the Professor would have to be, that Christ teaches Martha that the resurrection takes place *at* death;

and that hence Lazarus had "really emerged in full life and consciousness from the dying body into the resurrection-state;" "a change," from the present state of being, "scarcely worth the name of death." Now the reader will please to take notice, that all this occurred *before* the resurrection of Christ; "and it behooved not," says Professor Bush, (p. 217,) "*that the resurrection of the members should precede that of the Head.*" And yet the Professor would have it, that Christ is here teaching Martha, that the resurrection of the members *did precede* that of the Head! Surely this is but a poor illustration of the truth of "the doctrine of correspondencies."

And then again, in the 23d verse, "Jesus saith to her, Thy brother shall rise again," (*ἀναστήσεται ὁ ἀδελφός σου.*) This is fatal to this "much juster interpretation" of the Professor; for if he had already entered the resurrection-state, and Christ intended, as our author asserts, to teach Martha this fact, it needs no words to show that he would hardly have used an expression which asserted that he had not yet arisen. It is true, doubtless, that by this expression, our Saviour meant that he should be again raised to life by an union of soul and body; but this concession Professor Bush cannot avail himself of, while he maintains that Christ was here teaching Martha that the resurrection took place *at* death, at which time he "really emerged into full life and consciousness."

The exposition of the Professor also involves the idea that, as Lazarus had already truly arisen from the dead in a spiritual body, he must have either left that body behind him when he united again with his material body, or have brought it with him, and entered his material body with his "refined, ætherial, resurrection body." And surely, if he could do this, others may do it likewise. And therefore, on the Professor's own principles, there is after all, no absurdity in a spiritual body becoming reunited with a material. And provided the material body is adapted to spiritual uses, as it will be at the resurrection in the last day, there can be therefore no absurdity in the spiritual body uniting with it again. So that if the Professor's exposition be not retained, the passage is fatal to his theory; and if it is retained, it is ruinous to his "argument from reason," and to his philosophy. The Professor might well remark that such an exposition would contain "much new doctrine" to Martha; and the query

might well be propounded to others besides her, "Believest thou this?"

The reply of Martha to the Saviour's question, is also fatal to this "much juster exposition" of Professor Bush. She does not answer any question that he makes the Lord to propose to her: but simply replies that she believes in his Messiahship. And the plain and irresistible inference is that *therefore no such questions were propounded to her.* Had our author honestly quoted the reply of Martha, as he should have done, the reader could at a glance have discovered the absurdity of this "much juster exposition."

But Professor Bush does not seem satisfied, after all, with his own exposition: and hence he cannot conclude without again calling to his aid "*the cumulative mass of evidence*" so often referred to already, and from which he concludes that "if, as we have endeavoured to show, the general tenor of Scripture is adverse to the idea of a resurrection so long delayed, the *true sense* of the Saviour's language *cannot bear that interpretation.*" p. 249. "*If,*" is sometimes an important word, though a little one; and it is certainly true that *if* Professor Bush's arguments and expositions are sound, his theory must be true: but alas! they are unsound and at direct variance with Scripture and true philosophy, and, therefore, his theory is a mere castle built in the air—or an Aladdin's palace, which, without the aid of a genie, may be transported whole into the land of dreams.

SECTION VI.

Examination of passages in Acts.

I. The next passage quoted by Professor Bush, is Acts ii. 29–35:

"Men and brethren, let me freely speak unto you of the patriarch David, that he is both dead and buried, and his sepulchre is with us unto this day. Therefore being a prophet, and knowing that God had sworn with an oath to him, that of the fruit of his loins, according to the flesh, he would raise up Christ to sit on his throne; He seeing this before, spake of the resurrection of Christ, that his soul was not left in hell, neither did his flesh see corruption. This Jesus hath God raised up, whereof we are all witnesses. Therefore being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he

hath shed forth this, which ye now see and hear. For David is not ascended into the heavens, but he saith of himself, The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit thou on my right hand, until I make thy foes thy footstool."

The assertion (with which Professor Bush begins his remarks on this passage,) that "*ascended*" (ἀνέβη) in ver. 34, here means "*exalted* in the heavens, in the sense in which Peter is here speaking of the Messiah," i. e. "a glorious exaltation, or ascension and session at the right hand of God," is an idea that will not stand any serious examination. The single and primary meaning of the verb is *to ascend:* as e. g. when the Jews were said to *go up* to Jerusalem, Matt. xx. 18, and John xii. 20. And, then, where the phrase "to ascend into heaven" is employed, either in the New Testament or the LXX., it in no instance means to be *gloriously exalted* in heaven: and if such an idea is found in the connexion, *it is not in the word itself but in other terms used along with it.* See John iii. 13, and xx. 17; Rom. x. 6; Eph. iv. 8–10; Rev. iv. 1. Even John vi. 62, in no sense means *exaltation*, but a mere return or ascension to a situation previously occupied. See also Deut. xxx. 12; Ps. cxxxix. 8; Prov. xxx. 4; Isaiah xiv. 13, 14; Jer. li. 53; Tobit xii. 20, &c., &c. The criticism therefore is unfounded. And though Mr. Barnes is quoted by the Professor as sustaining his exposition; yet it is plain that he was led to adopt it by a supposed *theological* difficulty, rather than by a thorough grammatical investigation of the passage. And yet, upon this erroneous rendering of the word, Professor Bush has based the whole of his attempt to explain away the clear announcement that as David's sepulchre, (which contained his *body*,) was still in Jerusalem, so it was clear that he had not arisen from the dead, and of course had not ascended into heaven as Messiah, but must, (according to prophecy,) after his resurrection. David's unopened sepulchre proved that *his* body was still under the dominion of corruption: and Peter denies that he had as yet arisen from the dead.

The first verse of the passage also proves the falseness of the doctrine of Professor Bush: for Peter here asserts of "David that he *is* both dead and buried." But in no sense of the word could this be true if he had been already *raised from the dead*, as Professor Bush would have him to be. There can be no more preposterous contradiction than to say that at one and the same time a person is dead and

buried and raised from the dead and entered upon the resurrection-state. Professor Bush must cease laughing at the Romish doctors' profound discussion of the question, *whether a thing can be in two places at one and the same time.*

In the same paragraph also, from which our author makes this quotation, there is another passage which is equally destructive of his theory. "Him (i. e. Christ) ye have taken and by wicked hands have crucified and *slain:* whom God hath *raised up, having loosed the pains of death: because it was not possible that he should not be holden of it.*" vers. 23, 24. Christ arose, says Professor Bush, in a *spiritual body;* and his material body never arose. But it is plain that the spiritual or resurrection-body can in no sense be under the dominion of death. And yet that which was *slain,* is here said to have been *raised up* by God; and it is also said that this raising up (after the period of three days,) was *by loosing the pains* (or bands) *of death,* because it was not possible that death should hold him. The assertion, therefore, that Christ arose in a spiritual body is false.

Professor Bush, in carrying out his erroneous observation respecting the import of the word "ascend," remarks that "the apostle certainly did not mean to say that that which constituted the actual and essential *ipseity* or *selfhood* of David, was then reposing in the sepulchre at Jerusalem." (p. 251.) True, he may not have meant to say so: but much less does he say that his "*ipseity* or *selfhood,*" (if I may be pardoned the use of these barbarisms,) had entered upon the resurrection-state; or had been raised from the dead. Nor does he intend to say that the soul of David had not ascended into heaven: but simply *that David had not.* The soul of David is not David himself; and neither is his body David. But soul and body united constitute David. *And David, soul and body had not ascended into heaven,* though his soul might have done so. And hence the proof that Peter gave that David had not ascended into heaven, was that he had not yet arisen from the dead; his body yet saw corruption. This same argument applies, to show the erroneousness of Professor Bush's exposition. For if David had arisen from the dead, he would have ascended into heaven; but he had not ascended, and therefore he had not arisen from the dead. This passage, therefore, must still stand as an insuperable obstacle in the way of Professor Bush's theory.

II. The next passage presented by the Professor is the following:

Acts xxiv. 14, 15: "But this I confess unto thee, that after the way which they call heresy, so worship I the God of my fathers, believing all things which are written in the law and in the prophets: And have hope toward God, which they themselves also allow, that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just, and the unjust."

Here is a plain statement not only that Paul believed and taught that *there shall be* a resurrection *of the dead*, (that is, of those who were *dead* at the time in which he spoke these words, as well as those who should die afterwards,) both of the *just* and the *unjust*. He asserts that *they all shall arise:* and also that this same doctrine is asserted in the law and in the prophets. He also avers that this doctrine was "allowed," or acknowledged to be true, by the Jews themselves. There can be no plainer avowal of the truths for which we contend, nor a plainer denial of the theory contended for by Professor Bush. How then does he dispose of this overwhelming statement? We shall see.

Entirely overlooking the declaration of Paul, that THERE SHALL BE *a resurrection* OF THE DEAD, he begins his remarks as follows: "A problem of a twofold solution is here presented to us. First, upon what authority Paul affirms that the Pharisees believed in a resurrection 'both of the just and the unjust?' Secondly, *supposing the assertion to be well founded*, how are his words to be construed in consistency with what we assume to be the true doctrine of the Scriptures on this subject?" pp. 251, 252. And after a feeble attempt at *solving* this "twofold problem," he dismisses the passage without further remark. But is this criticism? Such a course of evasion is utterly unworthy the name of investigation. We shall follow him, however, in the solution of his *problem*.

I pass, for the present, the polite intimation of a doubt expressed by the Professor, whether the assertion of *the apostle* "*be well founded*," for the reader will not be at a loss how to estimate a theory that reduces its advocates to such an extremity of solution. But in examining the "authority" upon which Paul makes the assertion, it will be proper first to follow our author in his statement of *counter authorities*. He is not satisfied to receive the testimony of the Apostle in

this matter, unless supported by the authority of others. I suppose that Paine or Voltaire would have been fully willing to believe the Bible on such terms.

But the Professor attempts to sustain himself in this singular position as follows: "We must certainly admit that the unequivocal assertion of an inspired apostle carries with it a *primâ facie* evidence of conveying an absolute truth. Yet when such an assertion relates to a matter of historical fact, on which we have other sources of information, we are, doubtless, at liberty freely to inquire how far the assertion is sustained by authentic records, and in what way any apparent discrepancy between them is to be reconciled. We do not conceive that the simple declaration even of an inspired man, on a subject of this nature, is a necessary foreclosure of all inquiry into its grounds." p. 252. But this is a mere evasion; or an attempt to confound things which are entirely different. Professor Bush cannot but know that there is a wide difference between inquiring into the grounds of an assertion, *the truth of which is unquestionable*, and an inquiry whether the assertion is true or not. Now while he professes to be doing the former of these (as his words would evince), he is really doing the latter. And hence he adds, "In regard to the present point, *we think the evidence is conclusive that the Pharisees, as a body, did* NOT *hold to the resurrection of the wicked.*" p. 252. He also quotes the testimony of Josephus, and R. David Kimchi, and R. Menasseh Ben Israel, &c. &c., to prove that they held no such sentiments as he asserts that Paul here attributes to them: from all of which he concludes that "*there seems no room to question* that the general sentiments of the Pharisees in all ages have been adverse to the doctrine of the resurrection of the wicked," (pp. 252–254,) and *ergo*, Paul was plainly mistaken in asserting what he does in the passage before us.

Now there is something so uncandid in such a procedure —in pretending to be inquiring into the grounds of an assertion, and so attempting to escape the odium which he might well apprehend would result from an open denial of its truth, at the same time that he is doing his utmost to impugn its authority, that it needs but be mentioned to become the subject of merited and universal reprehension.

But yet this whole criticism of the Professor is based upon a total misapprehension of the passage before us. Paul is

not here speaking of the Pharisees "as a sect," *but of the Jews;* (and the Pharisees were but a small part of the nation;) he affirms that the Jews held the doctrine referred to. The Pharisees, may or may not have held it, (and even our author is compelled to admit that at least *some* of them did so believe,) but the Jews as a nation did believe that the wicked would be raised from the dead. On the principle of *accommodation*, even Professor Bush is compelled to admit this. For if Christ *accommodated* himself to the errors of the Jews, it is plain from Matt. xxv. 31–46, and John v. 28, 29, that this must have been the view of the multitudes of his hearers. So also if the apostles *accommodated* their teaching in like manner, the inference is irresistible that the nation must have entertained this view, as the text itself under consideration at once shows. And if they *did not* accommodate themselves thus to Jewish errors, it follows of course that they in these passages announced the truth. So that either way, our author cannot escape the inference which he denies.

If it be necessary to sustain by authority the statement that Paul is here speaking, not of the Pharisees as a sect, but of the Jewish nation, I would refer the Professor to the context; and also to Horne, who remarks that the apostle is here speaking "of the Jews in general, and of himself in particular." Crit. Introd. Vol. I. p. 351. Dr. Knapp also remarks that "It may be perhaps that this (i. e. that the wicked would not be raised from the dead,) was *taught by some* at the time of Josephus; but during the first century *it was the more prevailing belief even among the Pharisees, that both the righteous and the wicked would share in the coming resurrection.*" And after referring to Acts xxiv. 15, he continues: "But frequent traces of this opinion are to be found in the Chaldaic Paraphrases, and in the writings of the Rabbins *after the time of Christ*, although it never (i. e. after this time) became general among the Jews." See "*Christian Theology*," p. 467, London Ed. So also Rabbi Israel, in his book *De Anima*, cap. 8, says that "Both the body and soul of the Israelites who sin in the body shall be tormented in the fire," i. e. of hell. And Rabbi Bechai says that "The Israelites who forsake the law, shall be raised from the dead and suffer eternal torments in soul and body."

Such, then, is the Professor's "solution" of the first "*prob-*

lem." As to the second, to wit, "how the apostle's words are to be understood consistently with the dominant teaching of reason and revelation on the subject," he remarks that they are to be explained as he, the Professor, has explained the language of Christ, in relation to the same subject. "In explaining the one," says he, "we have explained the other:" and so he dismisses the subject. But so far as the Professor's *explanations* of the language of Christ are concerned, the reader will probably agree with me, that to take *them* in order to clear up the Professor's difficulties with this passage, would be truly explaining *ignotum per ignotius.*

SECTION VII.

Examination of passages in the Epistles.

I. The next passage adduced by our author is the following:—"And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the spirit is life because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you." Rom. viii. 10, 11. (p. 255.)

Professor Bush begins his remarks on this passage with the following observation: "*Nothing is more obvious* to the careful reader of this and the other epistles of Paul, than that the term 'body' is used in a somewhat figurative sense, to denote not so much the physical organization in distinction from the soul, as the body considered as the seat and subject of moral corruption, *and thus set in opposition to the spiritual or renewed part of our nature.* By the body's being dead, *therefore*," &c. On the correctness of this remark depends the correctness of the exposition which he offers of the passage. But the remark is not sustained by fact. *It is not a fact* that "nothing is more obvious to the careful reader," than that Paul thus places σῶμα, *body*, "in opposition to the spiritual or renewed part of our nature." It is painful to be compelled to contradict thus pointedly so many positive assertions of Professor Bush; but if he will hazard them without examination, he must expect that, when they concern subjects of such vast im-

portance, and yet are unsupported by fact, they will be contradicted. The remark struck me as somewhat singular, and, as I have professed to be a "careful reader" of Paul, and had never noticed the fact asserted by the Professor, I thought the subject worthy of examination. Our author would have the σῶμα, "the seat and subject of moral corruption," and the antithesis of the "spiritual or renewed part of our nature;" and then he hopes that it will, therefore, not appear to be any very great loss, if, after all, the spirit should not become re-united therewith. But the truth of the matter is this: Paul employs σῶμα in his epistles ninety-six times; and out of all these Professor Bush cannot produce five where it is used as he would have it constantly to be. So far is this fact from being *obvious* to the readers of Paul. The word is thrice used to designate the seat of the affections, or the nature of man as led by the senses, (Rom. vi. 6, and vii. 24; 1 Cor. ix. 27,) and *once*, or twice, perhaps, as Professor Bush asserts, (Rom. viii. 13; yet see the marginal reading in Griesbach:) but, on the other hand, it is referred to as a subject of the sanctifying influences of the Spirit, and directly styled "a temple of the Holy Spirit," and an instrument of doing the will of God: 1 Cor. vi. 19, 20; Phil. iii. 21; Rom. xii. 1, 2. If Professor Bush had said that σὰρξ was often employed by the apostle in contrast with "the spiritual or renewed part of our nature;" he would have said what is susceptible of proof: see Rom. vii. 18, 25, and viii. 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13; 2 Cor. x. 2; Gal. v. 13, 16, 17, 19, 24, and vi. 8; Col. ii. 11, 23. Σὰρξ, *flesh*, is thus often used in contrast with spirit, and the *works of the flesh* to *the works of the Spirit;* and σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα, *flesh and blood*, is said to be excluded from the kingdom of God; but never is this said of the σῶμα, *body*. This is to be *changed;* Phil. iii. 21, and 1 Cor. xv. 42-55. And so carefully does the apostle distinguish between them, (as a general thing,) that in his use of the two terms in Col. ii. 11, it is of the *flesh*, or σὰρξ that the *sin* is predicated: "The body of *the sins of the flesh*." Professor Bush, in order to maintain his theory, would evidently have these two terms employed as synonyms, that he might be able to reason from one to the other; but this is entirely inadmissible.*

* "Σαρξ *flesh*, properly differs from σῶμα *body*, in this, that the latter denotes the entire body, as a whole, without respect to any of

The Professor continues his remarks as follows: "By the body's being dead, therefore, in connexion with Christ's inhabitation of it, *is implied an admission*, that, viewed in itself, as actuated by its native propensities, it is indeed (*μέν*) dead in trespasses and sins." But I apprehend that there is a wide distinction to be observed between being dead *ἐν ἁμαρτίαις in sins;* and dead *διὶ ἁμαρτίαν, on account of sin*, of which Paul here speaks. The former cannot be predicated of a body in which the Holy Spirit dwells; but the latter may, as it means simply *destined to death.*

Our author proceeds still further to confound this distinction, and then gives the following explanation of the passage: (p. 256.)

"This principle of divine life, thus infused into the soul which inhabits a body morally dead, will gradually work outward from its centre, and quicken that body also with a divine vitality. For as this principle of life flows from Him who 'hath life in himself,' and who gave such a demonstration of its efficacy in raising up Christ from the dead, the supposition is perfectly easy, that the same power is competent to a complete spiritual quickening of the whole man in his saints, so that they shall stand before him as in the highest sense *alive*, soul, spirit, and body. The text is therefore entirely analogous with Col. ii. 12: 'Buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with him through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him from the dead.'"

But if this be the meaning of the passage, it certainly makes nothing in favour of the Professor's theory. If in this world the renovation of believers is "a complete spiritual quickening," "so that they shall stand before God as in THE HIGHEST SENSE *alive*, soul, spirit, and body," then "the spiritual life implanted in regeneration" is something more than the commencement of the existence of a *tertium quid*, which is to be eliminated at death. And if the *body*—the *σῶμα*, thus becomes in the highest sense alive, under the saving operations of the Spirit, it would require some pretty substantial proof to make one believe that it would thereafter perish, so as to be in no sense partaker of the benefits of

its conditions, whereas the former denotes the human body with reference to its weakness, its debility—its mortality." *Tholuck in John* vi. 59.

redemption in the next world. To suppose that Christ after thus redeeming it, and making it truly alive, along with the soul and spirit, would still suffer it to perish for ever, would be to suppose what is utterly repugnant to the dictates of Scripture and of right reason.

I am aware that Professor Stuart, and Mr. Barnes, and other eminent critics have supposed that the phrase "shall also quicken your *mortal bodies* by his Spirit that dwelleth in you," does not refer to the resurrection of the body but to its renewal and sanctification by the Spirit. Calvin also was of this opinion: "Unde colligimus," says he, "non de ultima resurrectione quæ momenta fiet, haberi sermonem, sed de continua Spiritus operatione, qua reliquias carnis paulatim mortificans, cælestem vitam in nobis instaurat." Comment. in Rom. viii. 11. The same view is taken by Piscator and others: but these all admit that as the *body* is thus renewed, it would be a great absurdity to suppose it would not be raised again from the grave. There are, however, equally great authorities who understand the passage to announce the resurrection of the body. Dr. Hodge, Pareus, Howe, Whitby, Grotius, Poole, and others, entertain this view; and even Crellius, (whose denial of the resurrection of precisely the same body which is here possessed would have led him to take some other view,) is so pressed with the obvious antithesis in ver. 11, that he is compelled to fall in substantially with the foregoing view. "It appears," says he, "that the apostle wishes to embrace a two-fold sense in these words; the first the principal, and the other secondary. The principal is, that we should receive these words as referring to the future resurrection and vivifying. The secondary is, that we receive them as referring to the spiritual vivifying of our bodies," &c. Frat. Pol. III. 137. And Slichtingius on the same passage remarks, that "By the Spirit of God our mortal bodies are consecrated to immortality, nor can God desert and leave them unless he wills that his own Spirit which dwells therein should desert and leave them." Vol. V. 230. We shall, therefore, proceed to give our own view of the matter in reply to Professor Bush, who, of course, does not believe that the future resurrection of the body is here referred to. He thus proceeds: "The idea of any allusion to a physical resurrection is opposed by the following considerations:

"(1.) The quickening here spoken of is evidently one

that is effected by the agency of the Holy Spirit. But a literal resurrection of the dead, even supposing it taught at all, is not elsewhere attributed to the Spirit. He is represented as the author of the present spiritual life of the saints, but not of their future physical life." p. 256.

This is a strange reason for Professor Bush to offer. It might do for any one else, but coming from an advocate of his theory, it borders rather on the ludicrous. He first denies that "a literal resurrection of the dead" is taught at all, in the Bible; and then, as though he had admitted that such a resurrection was to be performed by the Father or Son, he seriously tells us that the *Spirit*, at all events, was no where said to be "the author of the FUTURE PHYSICAL LIFE" of the saints. Have the saints, then, such a future physical life? If they have, why does Professor Bush elsewhere deny it? If they have not, why does he say that the Spirit is not the author "of their future physical life."

The absurdity of his urging this objection is still further apparent from the fact that it is in direct contradiction to a very favourite doctrine of his theory. He says, "We must believe that the only germ in the human body answering to the germ in the plant—*is the spiritual body itself;*" (p. 179,) and this "*germ*" is implanted by the Holy Spirit in regeneration, says he: "The effect of the Gospel, attended by the energetic influence of the Holy Spirit, is to *quicken* its recipients into a new and divine life, *which, as it is a virtual resurrection while they are yet in the body, issues by necessary consequence in that consummated resurrection which accrues to them upon their leaving the body.*" p. 138. "The spiritual body developed at death is intimately related to the spiritual life implanted in regeneration." p. 140. And he is perpetually repeating this. Now is not this making the Holy Spirit truly and properly the author of the only resurrection for which our author pleads? And yet he says that "the quickening here is evidently one that is effected by the Holy Spirit;" and that as the resurrection is not elsewhere attributed to the Spirit, therefore this text cannot refer to the resurrection. But the syllogism might be changed, on our author's own principles, thus; The Spirit is the author of regeneration: but regeneration is "a virtual resurrection," at which time the "germ" is "implanted," which is the resurrection-body; and therefore Rom. viii. 10, 11, *does refer to the resurrection.*

Professor Stuart objects to the application of this text to the resurrection, on the ground that this would make the resurrection to be effected by the Holy Spirit, to whom it is said to be no where else attributed in the Bible. "Where," he asks, "is the resurrection at the last day, of our physical bodies, attributed to the sanctifying Spirit in believers? Very different is the statement in Col. ii. 12, 13; Eph. i. 19, 20, and ii. 5, 6; Rom. vi. 4." *Comment. in Rom.* viii. 10. The passages here referred to, however, do not assert that the Spirit *will not* be concerned in the resurrection of believers; but only that he sanctifies them in this life.

Admitting, however, that there is no other passage, in which the Spirit is said to be concerned in our resurrection, so far from concluding herefrom that this *cannot* be asserted of the Spirit in the passage under consideration, I should, other things being equal, deduce just the opposite inference. The Spirit is one with the Father and Son, and acts in unison with them in every work that is not strictly *personal*, or peculiarly characteristic of the several persons of the Godhead as such; and the resurrection is a work which is not more characteristic of the one than the other, as will be shown presently.

But before we proceed to the inference, we shall illustrate the premises. It will be admitted that to each of the persons of the Trinity belong alike the names and attributes of the Godhead. Hence *dominion* is alike ascribed to each: see Rom. x. 12; Luke ii. 11; Rom. xi. 34; (with Isa. xl. 13;) 2 Cor. iii. 17. The exercise of Almighty power is also attributed to each separtely. Eph. iii. 7. "The grace of God given to me by the effectual working of his power." 2 Cor. xii. 9. "That the power of Christ may rest upon me." Rom. xv. 19. "Mighty signs and wonders by the power of the Spirit of God." So also the revelation of the divine will is attributed to each severally: e. g. Phil. iii. 15; Heb. i. 1, attribute it to the Father; Gal. i. 12; 2 Cor. xiii. 3, to the Son; and Luke ii. 26; Mark xiii. 11; 2 Pet. i. 21, to the Spirit. The sanctification of believers is also in like manner attributed to each. To the Father in Jude i.; to the Son in Heb. ii. 11, and to the Spirit in Rom. xv. 16. The commission and authority to preach the Gospel proceeded also from each severally. From the Father, 2 Cor. iii. 5, 6; from the Son, 1 Tim. i. 12; from the Spirit, Acts xx. 28. The creation of mankind is ascribed to each also. To the

Father, Ps. c. 3; to the Son, John i. 3; and to the Spirit, Job xxxiii. 4. "The Spirit of God hath made me." Such is doubtless the true import of the passage רוח־אל עשתני: though it is the only passage which I know of where this work is ascribed to the Spirit. The resurrection of the body of Christ, is also attributed to each. To the Father, 1 Cor. vi. 14, "God hath both raised up the Lord, and will also raise us up by his own power." To the Son, John ii. 19, "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." To the Spirit, 1 Pet. iii. 18, "Christ—being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit."

Should we not expect then to find, *à priori*, that the same agencies that raised the Head, would raise also the members? This expectation is certainly not unreasonable; and especially may we look for some such testimony respecting the Spirit, when we find the resurrection so clearly ascribed *to both the Father and Son.* See John v. 21. But Rom. viii. 11, will certainly fairly admit of this construction: and if it be the only passage which can assert this truth, it strikes my own mind, that so far from this being a reason why it should be otherwise explained, it is a strong *à priori* reason to conclude that such is indeed its true import.

There is a striking propriety also in representing the Spirit as participating in the work of the resurrection. 1. He is the author of life and he restores spiritual life to man. He renews and sanctifies the soul and body. Hence 2. the *bodies* of Christians are declared to be the temples of the Holy Ghost. 1 Cor. iii. 16; and vi. 19. Now the resurrection is only the revival of that life of man which death had interrupted. Who so proper, therefore, to restore and perfect that state of being, and reconstruct his own temples which death had thrown down, as the great inhabitant of those temples? 3. We have also seen that he raised Christ. Who so proper, therefore, to raise the members, as he who had raised the Head? 4. It may be remarked further that σῶμα πνευματικόν in 1 Cor. xv. is explained by many to mean not only a body adapted to spiritual uses, but one that will be as it were supplied (i. e. raised and changed) by the Holy Spirit himself. 5. This doctrine is also in strict accordance with other representations of the Bible, and with the sentiments of the ancient Jews. See e. g. Ezek. xxxvii. 9, 10, where referring to the resurrection of the army who had been slaughtered, and whose bones were "very dry,"

the prophet exclaims, "Come, *O Spirit*, from the four winds and blow upon these slain that they may live." Now the Jews explain this to mean "that the resurrection shall be effected by virtue of the Holy Spirit." The Targum of Jonathan renders the passage, "And he said to me, Prophesy to the Spirit, prophesy, son of man, and say to the Spirit, Thus saith the Lord God, Come from the four spirits, unto these slain that they may live." I have rendered רוח "*O Spirit*," instead of "*wind*," as it is in the English version, for, that רוח here means *Spirit*, seems to me indisputable. I think that Professor Bush has fully demonstrated this in his "*Valley of Vision*," p. 22, 23, in which he well remarks, that "The case is too clear to admit of doubt, that the Spirit here spoken of is to be understood of the Holy Spirit." Consequently, as there is always the strictest propriety in all the figures employed in the revelation of God, and as this passage, though it presents a symbolical resurrection, is descriptive of a literal one, we may truly conclude that it is the province of the Spirit to resuscitate not only the morally but physically dead. 6. And finally, such was likewise the doctrine of the primitive church, who seem to have attached this meaning to the passage. Irenæus says, "Our bodies rising by the Spirit shall be made spiritual, and by the Spirit they shall have a life which shall always continue." Adv. Hær. Lib. V. c. 7. And Origen, in Rom. viii. 11, says, "They may know that by the Spirit of him who raised up Jesus from the dead, they shall be revived, and raised from the dead after the similitude of Christ."

The next exception of Professor Bush against referring this passage to the resurrection of the body is as follows:

"(2) The phrase θνητὰ σώματα, *mortal bodies*, cannot fairly be interpreted to mean the same as νεκρὰ σώματα, *dead bodies*, which yet it must be, if the doctrine of the literal resurrection is here taught. By 'mortal' is signified, not *dead*, but *tending to death*, *subject to death*. On the theory assumed, the apostle is in reality made to say, 'God shall raise to life your living dead bodies,' which is of course an idea too extravagant to be for a moment admitted." p. 256–7.

But this is a mere witticism. And even if "the theory assumed" does make Paul speak thus, it would have been wise for Professor Bush before he thus referred to it, to inquire how his own theory must make Paul speak. He must say, according to our author, "God will *raise to life*

your *living* bodies;" or, if the resurrection be not referred to, as Professor Bush maintains, then, as the words are addressed to Christians, *i. e.*, those already quickened, our author's theory must make Paul say, "God will raise to life your spiritual bodies, which are already alive, and which can never die, because they shall be eliminated at death."

But as to the assertion, in the former part of this objection, that "θνητὰ σώματα, cannot fairly be interpreted to mean the same as νεκρὰ σώματα," it is copied from Mr. Locke's paraphrase, and is worth about as much as the generality of his *profound* exegetical remarks. Mr. Locke did not produce any proof whatever of his assertion, and Professor Bush imitates him so closely as even to imitate him in this. But our author contradicts his own exposition. The phrase σῶμα νεκρὸν occurs in ver. 10, and in expounding it, as we have seen above, he gives it the same meaning that he here attaches to σῶμα θνητὸν—making them both mean a body that is truly living.

He also copies from Mr. Locke the criticism, that θνητὸν supposes the thing joined with it to be *living;* and hence he has translated the phrase, "living dead bodies," taking for granted that Mr. Locke's authority settles the point. But, 1. I remark that when this term, as in this place, refers to a body to be quickened, it never means any thing else than a *dead body.* Professor Stuart, (against whose authority in a matter of Greek usage even Professor Bush would hardly venture to bring that of Mr. Locke,) plainly allows, that the phrase here means the same thing as σῶμα νεκρὸν. Vorstius remarks, that "θνητὰ is here put for νεκρωθέντα," i. e., *datum neci.* But, 2. So far from θνητὸν never meaning that which is truly dead, we find Paul, in 1 Cor. xv., twice applying it as descriptive of the state of the body in the day of its resurrection from the grave. At that time, says he, *this mortal,* (that is, the bodies of men, whether they shall be then living, or shall have previously died,) τὸ θνητὸν τοῦτο, shall put on immortality; and that, when *this mortal* shall have put on immortality, death shall be swallowed up in victory. 3. The analogous passage in 2 Cor. iv. 14, also clearly implies that such must be the import of the phrase: "He which raised up the Lord Jesus, shall raise us up also by Jesus, and shall pre-

sent us with you." See, also, Cudworth's excellent criticism, Works II., 605.

The last exception of Professor Bush is the following:

"(3.) This interpretation destroys the continuity and coherence of the apostle's discourse. It supposes him abruptly to break off from a connected series of remarks relative to walking not after the flesh, but after the spirit, to leap onward to the resurrection of the dead, and, having simply glanced at this, to return as suddenly and resume the thread of his argument. This is, to say the least, a very violent supposition." p. 257.

This, too, is taken from Mr. Locke; and a careful viewing of the passage will show it to be altogether unfounded. Paul is discoursing of the benefits and advantages of those who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit—they shall have life and peace here through the Spirit; and though the body is destined to death because of sin, yet it shall not perish; but as God raised up Christ's body, so, also, shall the bodies of believers be raised by the Spirit, and thus, their salvation be complete. And hence we are not debtors, to live after the flesh, for they who do so shall die, (penally,) but those who by the Spirit mortify the deeds of the body shall live. There is no "leaping," nor "abrupt breaking off," here; but the argument is logical and conclusive.

II. The next passage is v. 22, 23 of the same chapter. "For we know that the whole creation groaneth, and travaileth in pain together until now: for not only they, but ourselves also, which have the first fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of the body: *τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σωμάτος ἡμῶν.*" p. 258.

Professor Bush offers but a very few remarks on this passage; and to discuss it fully in its connexion, would require many more pages than can be here occupied for such a purpose. We shall therefore dismiss it with a brief remark or two upon his exposition of the latter part of it; for it is to this that his criticisms are wholly confined. The sum of what he offers is the following:—After remarking that the *adoption* here mentioned is undoubtedly the manifestation of the sons of God, he adds, "The 'redemption of the body' evidently indicates a state identical with that of this *acknowledged adoption* which is in reserve for the heirs of the

kingdom. This is to be the realized consummation of the Christian's hopes, that to which they are all to come as one redeemed, regenerated, sanctified *body*. It is their *common* inheritance; and as the church is often spoken of as a *body*, of which Christ is the presiding head and the pervading life, we perceive nothing incongruous in the idea that this collective body of the saints is here intended by Paul. Certain it is, that there is a difficulty, on every other explanation, of accounting for the use of the singular number in this connexion. Why, if the common view be well founded, does he not say 'redemption of our *bodies*' instead of 'redemption of our *body*?' This may appear at first blush a criticism of little weight, but we are persuaded it is one of prime importance, and that we are entitled to demand some rational solution of the problem involved in the phraseology. Nothing certainly would be more natural than the use of the plural if he were speaking of the physical resurrection of believers. As it is, we cannot doubt that the term is to be taken in a collective sense, for the spiritual or mystical body of Christ, the whole aggregate of believers; so that 'our body,' in this connexion, is merely another phrase for *the body to which we belong*."

The idea here asserted, and which runs through this whole extract, is that τοῦ σωμάτος ἡμῶν, *our body*, here, as a collective noun, refers to the Church of Christ, redeemed and saved by him; and the criticism designed to sustain this view, and which Professor Bush thinks "is one of prime importance," and which justifies him in "demanding some rational solution of the *problem* (!) involved in the phraseology," is that if σῶμα here refers to the physical body of the Christian, why should not the phrase be "redemption of our *bodies*, instead of redemption of our *body*?" We shall attend to each of these in their order.

Professor Bush, in introducing the former of these ideas, has confused his own mind more than a little, by not having noticed that the New Testament clearly announces a twofold adoption or filiation. The first takes place in regeneration, when the believer is born again. See John i. 12, 13, and iii. 3–5. And hence he is said to have the *spirit of filiation*, πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας, whereby he cries Abba, Father. Rom. viii. 14, 15. See also 1 John iii. 1, 2. This takes place while the believer is in the present world. But there is another and more glorious and *manifested adoption*, and which is

referred to in v. 23 of the passage before us, at which glorious period the believer is raised from the dead, and thus being a "child of that resurrection" to immortal life and bliss, which is alone the prerogative of those who on earth had been the children of God, he is made "like to the angels." Luke xx. 36. This *manifestation of adoption* is immediately consequent upon the resurrection; (and hence this is the period for which believers are looking with groaning and anxious expectation;) nor is there any where a statement of the promise of this glorious adoption, unless in this connexion. But Professor Bush makes the resurrection of believers (which is itself a part of this very manifestation) to occur *at* the death of each believer, and the manifestation of adoption to occur at some vast and indefinite period afterwards. And thus, instead of the believer's spirit, by virtue of his adoption at regeneration, retiring at death to a region of rest, and there expecting his full redemption, which shall be when the body is raised and changed into a spiritual body; at which period it will be gloriously manifested to all orders of holy beings that he is a son of God; Professor Bush would have the believer raised at death, and enter into the fullest and highest fruition of heaven's joys, *before it has been manifested that he is a son of God:* and thus he frustrates the very object of such manifestation; reverses the whole order of the divine economy in this matter, and renders the great and glorious event, for the occurrence of which the whole creation groans, *an unmeaning and uninteresting ceremony.*

As to the assertion that σῶμα ἡμῶν is here a collective noun, it is an assertion that cannot be sustained. Lightfoot entertains the same view (Works, II. 1149, 1150,) but offers no proof to support it. The idea originated with Origen, who says that "*our body* here means *the whole church:*" to which Pareus shrewdly replies that the sentiment "is pious, but not solid; for the church is not *our body.*" *Comment. in loco.* Piscator correctly remarks, that the singular is here put for the plural, *our bodies*, by an enallage of the number. Grotius favours the same view, and Osiander also, *in loco.* But the remarks of Crellius are so pertinent, though plainly militating against his own view of the resurrection, that I will present a quotation. "The redemption of our body," says he, "is the liberation of our body (corporis nostri) from all evil and corruption; which shall be effected when our bodies are made like to the glorious body of

Christ," *in loco.* Slichtingius gives the same view: "The apostle explains by apposition what he understands by *adoption* in this place; to wit *redemption*, that is, by a synecdoche of the species for the genus, the deliverance or liberation of our body. The soul is now redeemed and delivered from vice; but our body is not yet redeemed and liberated from death and corruption, and from those things which bring death and corruption. But so long as our body remains in this servitude, so long shall our blessedness be incomplete and imperfect; but it will continue therein until it is delivered from it by being gloriously changed." (*in loco.*) But yet, as Professor Hodge remarks, "*The redemption of the body* is not so in apposition with the *adoption* that the two phrases are equivalent. The adoption includes far more than the redemption of the body. But the latter event is to be coincident with the former, and is included in it as one of its most prominent parts. Both expressions, therefore, designate the same period." See *in loco.*

This exposition of the phrase, *our body*, as presented by these writers, and to whose testimony that of Professor Stuart may be added, is clearly the true idea. Never is *the church* called *our body;* but in its collective capacity it is always declared to be *the body of Christ.* See 1 Cor. xii. 27; Eph. i. 23, and iv. 12; Col. i. 18, 24.

But *secondly*, what is the weight of the "criticism of prime importance" by which Professor Bush endeavours to sustain this view? Unfortunately for him, it is at direct variance with the usage of the apostle, and therefore it can afford the Professor no assistance whatever. The very next passage which he quotes (2 Cor. v. 2–4,) contains no less than three refutations of this *prime* criticism: "For in *this* (*τούτῳ* to wit, in *our earthly house of this tabernacle*, *ἡ ἐπίγειος ἡμῶν οἰκία τοῦ σκήνους*. ver. 1.) we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with *our house* (not *houses*, *τὸ οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν,*) which is from heaven. For we that are in *this tabernacle* (not *tabernacles*, *ἐν τῷ σκήνει*) do groan being burdened." Would it, therefore, be a criticism of prime importance to ask why Paul did not here say *houses*, and *tabernacles* instead of *house* and *tabernacle*, when he clearly referred to the earthly and heavenly bodies of all believers? So also in Phil. iii. 21, he says, "Who shall change our *vile body*," (*τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν.*) Here is the same "collective noun" according to Professor Bush.

And is the church of Christ, then, a *vile* body? But these references are more than sufficient to show the futility of this "*prime*" criticism, without wasting any more time upon the subject.

III. The next passage quoted by our author is the following: "For in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven: if so be that being clothed, we shall not be found naked. For we that are in this tabernacle do groan being burdened: not for that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life." 2 Cor. v. 2–4. p. 259.

To have presented this passage complete, Professor Bush ought to have quoted ver. 1: "For we know, that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." He commences his criticism on the passage with the remark that "several points having an important bearing on our theme, disclose themselves in this passage." The *first* of these is, that "the house from heaven for which the apostle longed is the same with the spiritual body of which he speaks." 1 Cor. xv. 44. And this, says he is "the very unanimous judgment of commentators:" and he considers it not "undeserving of notice that the apostle here uses the present tense ἔχομεν, *we have*, and not the future, *we shall have*."

It may be indeed true, that the house from heaven is the spiritual or resurrection body: but there is not the least intimation in the passage that the apostle expected to be thus clothed *at* death. His earnest desire to be clothed with the heavenly tabernacle is not therefore an earnest desire to die (as Professor Bush's theory would represent it,) but an earnest desire for the redemption of the body, which will be effected at the resurrection. The Jews represented the intermediate, or separate state of the soul as an imperfect state, and speak of it as *nakedness*. See e. g., the Chaldee Paraphrasts on Job xxxviii. 14, &c., and this is the very idea of Paul here; ὃν γυμνοὶ ἐυρεθεσόμεθα, *that we should not be found naked*. In Pirk. Eliezer, c. 30, and also in Midrash Coheleth, c. 5, the Rabbins say that a Samaritan came to inquire of Rabbi Meir (who was born under Nero,) whether the dead rise *naked?* to whom the Rabbi answered that "The pea which is sown naked, is raised clothed with a pod, and much more, therefore, do the dead arise clothed." The

idea of the apostle therefore, is, that the dissolution of our earthly house will leave us naked until we are clothed upon with our heavenly house; and therefore we desire the glorious period of the redemption of the body to come, so that being clothed we shall not be found naked.

The criticism that is not "undeserving of notice," that Paul here uses the present, *we have*, instead of the future, *we shall have*, (by which our author would desire to intimate that the resurrection must take place at death,) is unworthy of any one but a mere tyro. Does not Professor Bush know that the sacred writers often use the present tense for the future? Let him turn to John iii. 36, and vi. 47, and Matt. xxvi. 2, and xvii. 11; or let him turn to *Winer's Idioms of the New Testament*, Part III. § 41.

The other "important point disclosed in this passage," according to the Professor, is thus stated by him:

"Secondly, it is clear, we think, that Paul expected to be clothed upon with this heavenly house *as soon as he left the material body*. This is evident from the whole strain of his discourse, but especially from v. 6, 8: 'Knowing that, whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord: we are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and present with the Lord.' What other inference can we draw from this, than that he expected at once to assume that celestial tenement which would capacitate him for 'being with Christ?' that is, having a body 'fashioned like unto his glorious body,' as Moses and Elijah certainly had when they appeared with him upon the holy mount. If he did not anticipate an immediate entrance at death into the beatific presence, where did he expect to be? Did he count upon a long interval of dormant and unconscious repose before he awoke to the felicities of heaven? Did he believe the soul would sink into a dreary lethargy of centuries or chiliads in duration, while the body was mouldering away in the dust, and passing into unnumbered new relations?"

This passage calls for several remarks. And, 1. To intimate, as Professor Bush here does, that those who entertain the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, believe in the "dormant or unconscious repose" of the soul; and to pretend that there is no alternative between believing that the resurrection takes place at death, and that the consciousness of the soul is suspended between death and the

resurrection, is a course of procedure not only unworthy of him, but which evinces that he felt it to be rather hard work to press this passage into the support of a theory with which it is at direct variance. 2. It is *not* clear, as the Professor asserts, that Paul expected to be clothed upon (with this heavenly house, *i. e.*, as he explains it, to enter the resurrection-state,) as soon as he left the body. His expression simply is, that "although his earthly house were dissolved, he should have a house not made with hands, that would never be dissolved, but continue eternally in the heavens." As to entering that house immediately on leaving the body, the text neither asserts nor implies it. 3. The passage, so far from sustaining the Professor's theory, directly impugns it. Paul says, "We do not groan to be unclothed, or divested of this earthly tabernacle, (*i. e.*, to die) but clothed upon," &c., ver. 4. Unclothing, therefore, and being clothed upon, are plainly two distinct things; as distinct in this economy as in nature itself. The putting off the garment is one thing, (and this, says Paul, is not, in itself, the thing which we are so anxious for, see Phil. i. 23, 24,) and putting on another garment is another and a different thing. But Professor Bush makes both to be one and the same thing. He makes Paul here express a wish to retain his under garment, and merely to throw off his outer one. "Even in the present life," says he, "it is the *spiritual body* which feels the sensations of pleasure and pain;" (p. 264;) and this body merely forsakes, or throws off, the outer body at death. Now if Mr. Noble, (a favourite writer of Professor Bush,) should have upon him at one and the same time two coats, an under coat, and a "great coat;" and should, upon calling to see the Professor, throw off his over coat; and then begin the conversation by saying, "I have had such a desire to put off this great coat, and to put on the one that I now have, and which you have seen me put on by throwing off the other;" would the Professor admit that there was either sense or reason in this? And yet this is the way he makes the apostle reason in the passage before us. When the *putting off* an over coat, therefore, is the same thing with *putting on* an under coat, the Professor may say that this passage does not pointedly condemn his theory.

4. The 6th and 8th verses, which the Professor quotes in the above extract, do not prove that the resurrection takes

place at death. They have no reference to that event, but refer merely to the separate state of the souls of the blessed, who after death go to the Lord, to wait for the redemption of the body. See Luke xxiii. 42, 43, and xvi. 22; Rev. vi. 9–11, &c. And the assertion, therefore, which the Professor makes on the next page, (p. 261,) that Paul evidently regarded his being clothed upon, (*i. e.*, with his resurrection-body,) as "a necessary preliminary to his being with Christ," is an assertion that has nothing to sustain it. Moses, and the souls mentioned in Rev. vi. 9–11, and the penitent thief, Luke xxiii. 42, 43, in their separate state, are present with Christ, as much as are Enoch and Elijah. It is, therefore, a misstatement to attribute to Paul a sentiment the reverse of this.*

IV. The next passage quoted is v. 10, "For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad." p. 262.

On this passage the Professor correctly remarks, that "'The original, 'for we must all appear' (τοὺς γὰρ πάντας ἡμᾶς φανερωθῆναι δεῖ), means properly, *we must all be manifested.* The idea conveyed is something more than that of the simple fact of our *standing* or *being presented* at the judgment seat of Christ. It implies the *development* which

* I have been amused at the Professor for introducing the following passage in this connexion.—"No one can fail to be struck with the *evangelical* tone of Cicero's language on a similar subject, in his Tusculan Questions—'posse animos, quum e corporibus excesserint, in cœlum, quasi in domicilium suum, pervenire,' *that souls may, when they have forsaken their bodies, come into heaven as into their own domicil.*" p. 260.—He has evidently quoted the passage at second hand, for he has not given it correctly, nor does he tell in what book of the Tusculan Questions to find it. I shall not here criticise it, however, (for the reader can, if disposed, consult it in its connexion, in Lib. I., cap. 11,) but only express my wonder that the Professor should pronounce the sentiment evangelical. That it is evangelical, I admit; but how can he admit it in consistency with his theory? Cicero, in connexion with the passage, (see cap. 9, and 10, and 12,) holds to the entire destruction of the body, of which he would not leave even a *tertium quid.* He speaks, as Professor Bush's translation shows, merely of the "*soul,*" upon leaving the body, entering, *not a spiritual body, but heaven itself,* as its own permanent abode. And this, says Professor Bush, is so *evangelical,* that "no one can fail to be struck with it." But if this *is evangelical,* it must be admitted that the Professor's theory *is not so.*

then is to be made of character, as the ground of retribution." He then makes a long quotation from Mr. Locke, in which that philosopher denies the identity of the present body with the future *material* resurrection body; and whose sentiments he leaves to "carry their own weight to the mind of the reader." We have, however, sufficiently discussed this question of identity, and shall pass it here without further remark. The Professor also adds, that he sees "in the text no allusion to the resurrection of the body; and with any thing else that may be taught by it we have at present no concern. He that has sinned or obeyed in the material body may properly be *rewarded or punished* in the spiritual body; as it is in that, that the true personality of *every one* resides. The idea that the *present body* must necessarily share in the punishment of the sins which it was instrumental in committing, is one that receives no countenance from the decisions of a sound reason. The body, as such, is no more capable of suffering than the sword, the pistol, or the bludgeon, with which the murderer may have taken the life of a fellow being. Sensations, it is true, are received *through* the body, but the body is no more the seat or subject of them, than the telescope is the subject of vision. Even in the present life, it is the spiritual body which feels the sensations of pleasure or pain. How much more in the life to come?" pp. 263, 264. Such is the comment of our author on the passage: and it calls for but a few brief remarks.

1. And *first*, the simultaneousness of the judgment here referred to by Paul, (compare Matt. xxv. 31–46, and Rev. xx. 11–15,) is entirely passed over by our author without notice, though it is a matter so deeply affecting his theory. We need not here dwell upon the subject, however, for it will come up for discussion hereafter.

2. As Professor Bush can see no allusion to the resurrection of the body in the text as he quotes it, can he not in that important reading referred to and advocated by Grotius, (See also Bengels' Apparatus Criticus *in loco*, and Griesbach's Nov. Test.) of *τὰ ἴδια τοῦ σώματος*, for *τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος?* That is, that every one may receive *the things proper or appropriate to the body.* Besides the support of some important MSS., this reading is sustained by Origen and Theodoret, &c. The Latin vulgate gives it the same: "*ut referat unusquisque propria corporis.*" Grotius, in

explaining the reading remarks that "ἴδια, here, are those things which are due to the body; as justice is said to render to every one his own, because it is often τὸ ἁρμόζον, or suitable. *That every one may receive the reward or punishment which is due to his body.*" Such is his view of it, though he explains *corpus* to mean *person*, or the man himself; a criticism that will not harmonize very well with the foregoing remarks of Professor Bush. But in a professed examination of this text by a critic who announces conclusions so utterly at variance with this reading, important as it is, and who was therefore bound to give it a most serious consideration, we find that he has taken not the least notice of it. Is this the way to illustrate the proposition that "the knowledge of revelation is progressive?" 3. But says Professor Bush, "The idea that the *present body* must necessarily share in the punishment of the sins which it was instrumental in committing, *is one that receives no countenance from the decisions of a sound reason.*" This assertion needs proof, and our author has offered none. And from the specimens of his argumentation which we have already had, we must be excused for expressing a doubt as to his qualifications for being an umpire as to what "sound reason" does or does not teach.* Baxter, speaking on the same subject, remarks, that "It is congruous to the wisdom and governing justice of God, that the same body which was partaker with the soul in sin and duty, should be partaker with it in suffering or felicity." *Works*, vol. 21, p. 331. Howe advances the same sentiment. *Works*, p. 223. The same sentiment is asserted by Hilary, the deacon. "Every one of us," says he, "shall receive at judgment the deeds of our body, but we shall not be adjudged to good or evil without the body." Methodius (apud Œcumenius *in loco*) also expressly asserts that the soul shall not receive its deserts as a separate spirit, but *through the body.* "Οὐδὲ γὰρ γυμνὴ ἡ

* "As we have advanced in the careful and candid examination of the book, (the *Anastasis* of Professor Bush,) our conviction has been greatly increased, not so much of the grievousness of the specific errors of the work, as of the intellectual peculiarity, may we say infirmity, apparent on its pages. Of our men of extensive and varied learning, our eloquent writers, and our devoted and successful scholars, *he is certainly among those who hold the fewer qualifications for appreciating and presenting 'the inevitable deductions of reason.'*" *Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review*, for January 1845, p. 179.

ψυχὴ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος κομίζεται ταῦτα." Theodoret, Theophylact, and Chrysostom assert precisely the same doctrine. But it is needless to refer to instances, for such is the general sentiment of the Christian church: and we are willing that the reader should decide whether the foregoing writers, at least had not some claims to the knowledge of what *sound reason* teaches, or whether Professor Bush has wholly monopolized that precious commodity.

4. The singular assertions in the foregoing quotation from our author, to the effect that sin may be properly "punished in the spiritual body," &c., harmonize charmingly with that leading feature of his theory, that the wicked never enter the resurrection-state, or are raised from the dead. The spiritual body, says he, belongs only to the righteous, for the wicked never rise: and yet, when pressed with a text that contradicts this, he can freely present the wicked with a resurrection or spiritual body, in order that they may be punished in it, for the sins they committed in the material body. Such is the way in which he perpetually contradicts himself.

V. The next passage is one of great importance in this discussion, and we shall present both the original and translation. We quote the text of Griesbach.

1 Thess. iv. 13–17.

GR.	ENG. VERS.
Οὐ θέλομεν δὲ ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν, ἀδελφοὶ, περὶ τῶν κεκοιμημένων, ἵνα μὴ λυπῆσθε, καθὼς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα.	But I would not have you to be ignorant, brethren, concerning them which are asleep, that ye sorrow not, even as others which have no hope.
Εἰ γὰρ πιστεύομεν, ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἀπέθανε καὶ ἀνέστη, οὕτω καὶ ὁ θεὸς τοὺς κοιμηθέντας διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἄξει σὺν αὐτῷ.	For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him.
Τοῦτο γὰρ ὑμῖν λέγομεν ἐν λογῷ κυρίου, ὅτι ἡμεῖς οἱ ζῶντες οἱ περιλειπόμενοι εἰς τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ κυρίου, οὐ μὴ φθάσωμεν τοὺς κοιμηθέντας.	For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord shall not prevent them which are asleep.

"Οτι αὐτὸς ὁ κύριος ἐν κελεύσματι, ἐν φωνῇ ἀρχαγγέλου, καὶ ἐν σάλπιγγι θεοῦ καταβήσεται ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ, καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ ἐν Χριστῷ ἀναστήσονται πρῶτον·

For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God; and the dead in Christ shall rise first:

Ἔπειτα ἡμεῖς οἱ ζῶντες οἱ περιλειπόμενοι, ἅμα σὺν αὐτοῖς ἁρπαγησόμεθα ἐν νεφέλαις εἰς ἀπάντησιν τοῦ κυρίου εἰς ἀέρα· καὶ οὕτω πάντοτε σὺν κυρίῳ ἐσόμεθα.

Then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord.

The course which the Professor takes with this passage may be described in a single sentence. He first presents his own exposition; then candidly confesses that it is not so good as the common one; and then finally, to get rid of the testimony which the passage bears against his theory, brings in his exploded principle of accommodation, and unhesitatingly charges the apostle with being mistaken. As the passage is a deeply important one in this connexion, we shall follow him throughout his exposition of it, though first, we shall present a brief critical view of its import.

"We wish you not to be ignorant, says the apostle, of the condition of those who are asleep, (i. e. *of believers who have died;*) and you will then know that there is no reason why *you* should sorrow respecting them, as unbelievers or Pagans do, who have no hope that their friends who die will ever rise again from the dead." That this is the idea of Paul is clear from the fact that the Pagan world did believe, in the immortality of the soul. As an illustration of this the reader may refer to the quotation from Cicero, a page or two back. The Christian knowing that the separate state of the soul is an imperfect state, would sorrow indeed, if there was no hope of a reunion of the soul with the body. Hence as a ground of consolation against any such apprehensions, which the speculations of disguised Sadducees might have engendered, the apostle continues: "For if we believe that Jesus our Head died and rose again, why, this admitted fact should teach us that in like manner they who sleep in Jesus (i. e. his members who have died,) shall God *raise* with him the Head, because the Head cannot be perfect without the members." That ἄγω, here,

means *bring from the grave*, and not merely from heaven, as it is constantly explained, is clear to my own mind; for the word means *to lead forth, or out of*, as to its primary sense, and metaphorically, *to incite or quicken.* Thus in Rom. viii. 14, "As many as are *quickened* by the Spirit of God," &c. See also Gal. v. 18, and 2 Tim. iii. 6, "*Excited* by divers lusts." So also the LXX. "A fools lips *awaken or quicken* him to wickedness." Prov. xviii. 6. Thus also those who are asleep when Jesus comes, God shall lead forth (i. e. their souls from heaven and their bodies from the grave,) with him, as Jesus himself arose from the state of the dead. "And those who are alive and remain until period of the Lord's coming," says Paul, "shall not anticipate those who are then dead," i. e. they shall neither be changed, nor rapt into the clouds before them. This he asserts by the special command of the Lord. He then continues, with a description of the advent, and a more particular description of the scenes to which he had just referred. "The Lord shall descend from heaven with a shout, and the voice of the archangel and the trump of God;* and *first* the dead in Christ shall arise; and *then* we who are alive and have remained until that time shall be caught up along with them (and of course, therefore, as I have just said, we shall not anticipate them,) to meet the Lord." The rendering of the phrase οἱ νεκροὶ ἐν Χριστῷ ἀναστήσονται πρῶτον, by "*the dead in Christ shall rise first,*" is plainly inaccurate: for this phrase is not contrasted with *the rest of the dead* (as this rendering would imply,) but simply with the clause ἡμεῖς οἱ ζῶντες, *we who are alive.* There is no reference whatever to the resurrection of others at this time; and there is no other antithesis than that expressed above; *first* the dead in Christ shall arise; *then*, (that is, the next event that will take place, ἔπειτα,) they who are alive shall be caught up along with the raised saints, and there being changed, they shall ever be with the Lord. Such is a plain

* This is a hebraeism for *the great trumpet.* See Matt. xxiv. 31. So also Job i. 16, "the fire of God," means a great fire. See also Gen. x. 9; Jonah iii. 3; Luke i. 6; Acts vii. 20; 1 Sam. xx. 12; Gen. xxx. 8; Ps. lxviii. 16, and xxxvi. 7, and lxxx. 11; Is. xxviii. 2, &c. The Hebrews, Greeks, &c. convoked their assemblies by sound of trumpet, and hence when God convokes men he is, in an appropriate figure of speech, said to do it with a trumpet. See Ps. xlvii. 5; Is. xxvii. 13; Jer. iv. 5, and vi. 1; Hos. v. 8; Joel ii. 1, &c.

and brief exposition of the leading thoughts in this magnificent passage, and we shall now hear what our friend the Professor has to offer in view of it.

After observing that "the general scope of this passage is obviously to minister consolation to those addressed, under the grief arising from the death of Christian friends," our author proceeds to reiterate the declaration that Paul and the other apostles, with the mass of Christians, anticipated the coming of Christ here referred to, "in the lifetime of that generation." We have already refuted this assertion; and if the reader would see it fully disposed of, and the real tendency of such a view exposed in a masterly manner, let him refer to Part I. Chapter II. of the "Miscellaneous Observations" of President Edwards, Works, Vol. VII. pp. 221–227. He next repeats the assertion, that by the phrase "for this we say to you by the word of the Lord," Paul merely means to repeat what Christ had declared in Matt. xxiv. 30, 31; a sentiment as destitute of propriety as it is of proof; and only uttered to shield his theory from the direct testimony afforded by this passage against it. For even if a direct and present revelation to Paul of the truth here announced is not to be supposed (which is far from being the fact), there is no more reason to say that he repeats what Christ says in Matt. xxiv., than to suppose that he meant to say as Piscator remarks, "I announce this from the word which I heard from Christ himself, when I was rapt into the third heaven." 2 Cor. xii. 2. 4. Osiander (Dr. Lucas) paraphrases the passage, "This we say to you by the word of the Lord, i. e. we do not recite our own opinions in this matter, but the word of God, which you ought to believe:" and it surely is preposterous to assert that Matt. xxiv. 30, 31, contains what is here asserted by Paul in 1 Thess. iv. 13–17. Grotius expresses the precise idea of the words, "This we say *by the command* of Christ, ex mandato Christi:" with which Beza (in loco) agrees, "*In nomine Domini, et quasi eo ipso loquente.*"

Our author next remarks that "in the general interpretation of the passage a serious embarrassment arises from the difficulty of determining the precise import of ἄξει, *will bring.*" But we have exhibited the import of this term already; and if, in addition to the instances already presented, the Professor will turn to Acts xiii. 23, he will find the word translated "*raised.*" See also the LXX. in Zech. iii. 8. Many other instances of like usage can be specified: but if

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the Professor will only look at the antithesis, he will find that it requires this sense: "For if we believe that Jesus *died* and *rose again*, even so them also that *sleep* in Jesus will God *raise*, or *quicken*, with him." *Sleep*, here, is the correlative of *died;* and *rose again* the correlative of ἀξει, in the two cases mentioned, to wit, that of Christ and his members. He died, and they die; he arose again by divine power, they shall also rise again by the power of God. There is no "difficulty" here, only in the attempt of the Professor to reconcile this statement with his theory. God, who brought Christ from the dead (Heb. xiii. 20), will also bring from the dead those who sleep in him, so that the members shall be quickened along with the Head.

If the Professor had said that he found great "embarrassment" and "difficulty" in explaining the terms τοὺς κοιμηθέντας *those who sleep*, in accordance with his theory, we should have readily granted the obstacle to be insuperable. His theory makes the dead saint not *sleeping* but *awaking;* and this he expresses in so many words in remarking on Ps. xvii. 15 (pp. 105–109), "I shall be satisfied when I *awake* with thy likeness." This awaking, says he, is the entrance upon the resurrection-state at death. When the believer is raised from the dead, he is therefore neither *dead* nor *asleep*, but truly and properly *awake*. How, then, can all these saints of whom Paul here speaks, be *asleep* when Christ comes, when, according to the Professor, they are *awake* and already raised from the dead?

These remarks will enable the reader fully to appreciate the following laboured criticism of Professor Bush, in which he gives one of the most ludicrous perversions of language that I have lately met with. After making the following observation, (founded on his erroneous view of ἄγω) "But here an objection would at once occur—How can they come with him, unless previously they were with him?" he says (pp. 266, 267), "This natural query the apostle proceeds to obviate in the sentence that follows: 'The dead in Christ (i. e. those that have slept in him) shall rise first,' i. e. shall rise, or shall have arisen, *previously*. That this is a probable sense of πρῶτον=πρότερον, in this connexion, may be shown by an appeal to the *usus loquendi* in the following passages: Matt. v. 24, "Leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way, *first* (πρῶτον, *previously*) be reconciled to thy brother," &c. Matt. xii. 29, "How can one enter into a strong man's house and spoil his

goods, except he *first* (πρῶτον, *previously*) bind the strong man?' Mark ix. 11, 12, 'Why say the scribes that Elias must *first* (πρῶτον, *previously*) come? And he answered and told them, Elias verily cometh *first* (πρῶτον, *previously*) and restoreth all things.' 2 Thess. ii. 3, 'For that day shall not come except there come a falling away *first* (πρῶτον, *previously*).' 1 Tim. iii. 10, 'And let these also *first* (πρῶτον, *previously*) be proved.' The evidence, therefore, may be considered strong, that this is the true sense of the term in this connexion, and the clause, being thrown in for the purpose of meeting a tacit objection, ought to have been enclosed in a parenthesis. The whole passage will then read thus:—'For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God (and the dead in Christ shall have previously arisen); then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds (ἐν νεφέλαις, *in clouds*, i. e. in multitudes, as the article is wanting), to meet the Lord in the air.' The phrase ἅμα σὺν αὐτοῖς ἁρπαγήσομεθα, *shall be caught up together with them*, means not on this view so properly that *we shall be caught up in company with them*—for how could *they* be caught up when they were already *descending* with Christ from heaven?—but simply, we shall be caught up *to be with them*."

We have already shown that the clause which is the basis of this huge display of criticism and learning, means simply that "*first* the dead in Christ shall rise, *then* the living shall be caught up along with them in the air:" and I am most happy to be able to give the authority of the great *Winer* substantially in support of this criticism. He remarks that *the dead in Christ* are not here contrasted, by the apostle, with "the Jewish or Pagan dead," i. e. the rest of the dead, but that "the contrasted clause is ἡμεῖς οἱ ζῶντες, *we who are alive*. See "*Idioms of the New Testament*," Part III. § 19. And yet upon the foregoing poor misconstruction of the passage, our author builds his astounding criticism. He does not, however, venture to explain how the risen saints are both asleep and awake, (as his theory makes them,) at the same time.

But as a matter of Scripture criticism and New Testament usage, the foregoing remarks of the Professor are most unfortunate for his repuation: for in not one instance which he adduces as a parallel usage, is the usage *at all*

parallel. 1. In the passage before us, πρῶτον is used in enumeration—the common style of Paul's enumeration, πρῶτον, *primum, first;* and immediately following it, is the ἔπειτα, *deinde, then;* see instances of this usage in 1 Cor. xii. 28, and xv. 46, and Heb. vii. 2, 27; compare also 1 Cor. xv. 5, 7, 23. *And yet, in not one of the instances adduced by Professor Bush, is* ἔπειτα found! 2. And then again: In the instances before us, πρῶτον is simply used in enumeration, as above remarked; but in the instances* adduced by our author, it is used for πρότερον, or *pro comparativo.* Professor Bush ought to know better than to indulge in such preposterous criticism. It might have done five hundred years ago; but it is in this age a most unhappy illustration of the proposition, that "the knowledge of Revelation is progressive."

Upon *such a basis* the Professor follows up his conclusions to the end of his exposition on p. 268; and, after asserting that ἁγίαις in Jude 14, must refer to *raised saints,* instead of *holy ones* or *angels,* agreeably to the repeated announcements of the Saviour himself, Matt. xiii. 41, and xvi. 27, and xxiv. 31; Mark viii. 38, and xiii. 27; Luke ix. 26, and xii. 8, 9, (and agreeably, also, to the reading of some MSS. μυριάσιν ἁγίων ἀγγέλων, or ἀγγέλων without the adjective, as others have it,) he caps the climax as follows:

"With these prophetic intimations familiar to his mind, it was not unnatural that he should speak of Christ's being accompanied on his return to earth with these glorified legions of saints; and if this view be admitted as sound, it will perhaps afford the true key to his language, 1 Cor. xv. 35: "How are the dead raised, and with what body do they *come?*' i. e., not with what body do they *come up* out of the ground, but with what body do they *come down* from heaven?"

What the reader will think of this, in connexion with the Professor's *note,* p. 265, in which he admits that all the apostles and primitive Christians believed that the resurrection would take place at the second advent, is easy to imagine; but we pass it to make a single remark upon his use of the passage in 1 Cor. xv. Paul asserts that the

* All except the last, in which it is used in enumeration with the corresponding term εἶτα. The proper rendering of the passage is, "And, *first,* let these be proved, *then* let them, &c., if found blameless."

language here quoted by the Professor is the language of "*a fool*," and the Professor very obligingly makes Paul himself the author of it, and thinks he has found "the true key to his language." This would appear to be something more than charging the apostle with being *mistaken*, especially as the Professor is serious in attributing it to him. In § 3, sub-section IV., above, we have fully explained this passage, and have shown that the Professor's view is a sheer perversion from the fact, 1. that the questions here are *one*, the δὲ being used simply to give force to the repetition of the interrogation, and not to connect together two distinct queries. Observe with what force it clothes the repetition of the interrogation in 2 Cor. vi. 14–16. And, then, 2., as we have shown above, the Professor's view cannot be the import of the question of the ἄφρον or *fool*, for, though Paul professes to answer the query, he no where states what bodies the *dead* will have "when they come down from heaven;" and hence, it is clear, that such a question is not here proposed to him. And, *finally*, the Professor makes the question to be, "with what bodies *do the dead* come down from heaven?" It is strange that even the wording of this did not show him its absurdity, according to his theory. For according to the Professor, when the *dead* come down from heaven, they are *not dead*, any more than we are, and not as much; for they have been *raised from the dead*, says he. And to call them *dead*, therefore, is preposterous.

But the Professor is not satisfied with his exposition of this text as he very candidly admits in the following passage, to which we invite the special attention of the reader. He says, "The foregoing interpretation, it will be seen, depends upon the correctness of the idea assumed in the outset, that ἄξει, *will bring*, refers to the *descent* of Christ at the era of the second coming. That this is not a violent supposition we are well persuaded; and yet, at the same time, we are constrained to acknowledge that, taken in the connexion, it does not strike one as quite so natural and obvious as that which is involved in the common rendering, which represents it as a mere continuous announcement of the order of events. There is, perhaps, a more unforced air of probability in the construction, which makes the writer to say that, as God intends to have his people ultimately with him, as well as Christ their head, so one great object of his second

coming might well be represented to be to *gather home* his sleeping and living saints in one united company, the first class to be reclaimed from the power of the grave in which they had been resting, and the other to be translated, which would of course bring them into the same condition with that of the risen dead. Accordingly, in pursuing the thread of the announcement, he may be considered as saying, that the first step will be to raise the sleepers in the dust, and invest them with their resurrection bodies. When this is accomplished, he will immediately proceed (ἔπειτα, *then*) to work that stupendous transformation upon the liviug saints which shall fit them for entering into a spiritual kingdom; and this effected, both classes shall be caught together (ἅμα) in clouds, or vast numbers, to meet the Lord in the air. Our own view of the true doctrine of the resurrection would be better subserved by the other exposition, but we feel not at liberty to put the least constraint upon the out-speaking purport of any text, and therefore do not hesitate to admit that a very high degree of probability marks this latter construction. Consequently we do not refuse to abide by it." pp. 268–9.

This frank and candid acknowledgment is honourable alike to the head and heart of Professor Bush; and it affords encouraging ground to hope that upon a resurvey of his theory, and of the criticisms by which he has attempted to sustain it, he will see it to be utterly untenable, and absurd; and will be no longer willing to stake his well-earned reputation upon an attempt to maintain the illegitimate offspring of a mere wayward fancy, even though they have presented themselves to him, and appealed to his generous sympathies, as the lawfully begotten but needy children of reason and true philosophy.

After an acknowledgment like this, the reader will perhaps wonder what the Professor will do. He "does not refuse to abide by" the common construction of this passage, and consequently, there is but one alternative left:—Professor Bush or the apostle Paul *must be mistaken.* Few men would have the moral courage to acknowledge so formidable a controvertist as Paul to be their antagonist, and hence they generally endeavour to prove that he agrees with them; but not so our author. Apostle or no apostle, if his judgment does not accord with "the inevitable deductions of reason," the Professor is willing to measure swords with him, and to maintain that he is mistaken. And so it is here. He first

repeats the assertion that Christ and his apostles accommodated their teaching to the Jewish errors, and then he repeats the assertion, (which is at direct war with this idea), that the apostles were themselves *mistaken* in their views of the time and events of the second advent. These things have, however, been fully discussed by us already, and we need say but little or nothing of them here. I consider the assertion that the apostles were mistaken, however, to be a dangerous error, and (to adopt the language of Whitby *in loco*,) "highly prejudicial to the Christian faith, and the authority of the apostles; for if the churches of Christ had once received of them the doctrine in question, and afterwards had understood, even from their own confession that it was a mistake, this would have naturally led them to conceive that they might have mistaken also in any other doctrine contained in their epistles, and so suspect the certainty and truth of all that was contained in them." The passage in 2 Thess. ii. 1, 2, plainly imports that in Paul's own judgment, the belief that the apostles had taught the doctrine attributed to them by Professor Bush, would tend to the unsettling of their minds in the faith of the Gospel.

The Professor also thinks that the doctrine of the "New Jerusalem state" "presents an insuperable bar to the adoption of the popular construction of Paul's language;" at the same time that he admits that Paul himself *believed what the popular construction attributes to him.* Now what are we to make of this? The Professor admits that Paul asserted what he thought to be true; and yet presents what he deems "an insuperable bar" to construing the language as Paul meant it! This is in *advance* of even the argument from reason itself. What advantage does the Professor think would accrue from construing the language as Paul *confessedly* did not mean it? But as to the assertion itself that there is any such "bar" furnished by the doctrine of the "New Jerusalem state," I remark that it furnishes no such obstacle whatever. Let the Professor attempt to *prove* his assertion, and we shall then show that it is wholly unfounded.

Thus terminates the Professor's *luminous* exposition of 1 Thess. iv. 13–17; and here we shall close with a reference to a single point that ought not to be overlooked, for it is important in this connexion. The *time* of the occurrence of the events here mentioned by Paul, is what we refer to;

and as the Swedenborgians, Rationalists, Shakers, &c., maintain that the resurrection and final judgment take place at death, this matter ought not to be passed over without notice. In the phrase, (ver. 15,) "for we who are alive and remain until the coming of the Lord shall not (*shall in no way* οὐ μή, *the intensive*,) anticipate them who are sleeping;" the precise point of time is expressed: *just on the day in which Christ will return these things will occur.* There is no evading this consequence. See the rule on this subject presented by *Winer* in his "Idioms," Part III. § 60, 3, in which he applies the principle referred to, in elucidation of this very passage. As his authority in a matter of this kind will not be questioned, it is sufficient here merely to refer to him.*

VI. The next passage quoted by our author is the following: "Who shall change our vile body (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν,) that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able even to subdue all things unto himself." Phil. iii. 21, p. 270. He, however, should have begun the quotation with ver. 20, "For our conversation is in heaven; from whence also we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ: who shall change," &c.; for this states *at what time*, and under what circumstances this change is to take place; and shows conclusively, that it cannot be *at* death.

The Professor does not attempt any exegesis of this passage, for the singular (σῶμα) being clearly used for the plural, presented him with the alternative of either retracting what he had said on Rom. viii. 23, or of calling *the church of the Redeemer* "a vile body," or "the body of our vileness or humiliation," as the phrase means: and he is not very willing to do either. His remarks, however, are very brief, and the only thing requiring specific notice is the following attempt at evasion. He says:

"But, in fact, even if the words be taken as they usually are, as having reference to the change that shall pass upon the bodies of individual believers at the last day, how can it

* An admirable view (in many respects,) of this whole passage may be found in the supplemental volume (Vol. VII.) of the "*Fratres Poloniæ*," p. 213. *Eleutheropolis*, 1692, by the author of the Life of Socinus, and of the critical dissertation on his works, found in those volumes.

be shown that the apostle has not rather in view the *translation of the living*, than the *resurrection of the dead saints?* He expressly says elsewhere, of some whom he denominates 'we,' 'that we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed.' And this is to take place at the time of Christ's second manifestation from heaven, which we have already seen the apostle anticipated as not unlikely to occur in his own day. Now the allusion in the present passage is evidently to the same time; for he says in the preceding verse, 'For our conversation is in heaven; from whence also we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ; who shall change,' &c. How then can it be proved that this 'changing the vile bodies' does not concern the same persons? In other words, that he speaks of *translation*, and not of *resurrection?*" pp. 271–272.

To this I reply that it can be shown very easily and very satisfactorily that "the apostle has not rather in view the *translation of the living*, than the *resurrection of the dead saints.*" 1. It can be shown from Professor Bush himself, who on p. 261, quotes this passage, and refers it directly to the resurrection-state of believers. Speaking of the resurrection of the people of Christ, he says, "not only are their *vile bodies to be fashioned like unto his glorious body*, but as the transition, in his case, from the one into the other was immediate, so likewise is it to be in theirs." That is, as Christ, according to the Professor, entered into the resurrection-state by an immediate transition at death, so will believers at death also enter into that state. Hence, according to our author, the passage does not refer to "the translation of the living, but to the resurrection of the dead saints." 2. We prove it from the fact that Paul asserts in 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52, (as we have shown in our remarks on that passage) that we shall not all sleep, but, whether alive or dead at that time, we shall all be changed: that is, our vile bodies shall be fashioned like the glorious body of Christ. 3. We prove it from the fact that the apostle himself repeatedly announces the expectation that he will arise from the dead; and therefore as he also here declares that his own body of vileness shall be changed, he can refer this only to the resurrection. In 1 Cor. vi. 14, he says, "God hath both raised up the Lord, and will *also raise up us* by his own power." And 2 Cor. iv. 14, "Knowing that he which raised up the Lord Jesus, shall *raise up us also* by Jesus, and shall present us

with you." 4. We prove it also by the text itself. For ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει, *for our citizenship is in heaven*, (ver. 20,) stands in direct relation to the antecedent clause οἱ τὰ ἐπίγεια φρονοῦντες, *who pursue earthly things*.* "They do this," says Paul, "and therefore do not belong to the company of believers who seek the things of heaven, whence (ἐξ οὗ used as an adverb, *unde*,) we, that is, all who are followers of the Lord, look for the Saviour, who will change," &c. If we go to the strictness of the letter, therefore, as the Professor pretends to do in the above criticism, he himself being judge, the text announces that their *vile bodies shall be changed;* the vile bodies of at least all who, in distinction from the worldling, seek heavenly things, *their vile bodies shall be changed*, whether they are then living or dead. And the Professor will hardly say that all who were alive when the apostle wrote; young believers as well as the aged, expected to live to see that event which he assured them was not at hand: and yet all who were then alive, were to have their vile bodies changed at the time referred to. 5. And finally, as a mere offset to the authority of Professor Bush, it may be remarked that the Christian church have ever referred the passage to the change which will take place in the bodies of believers after the resurrection. Irenæus remarks, "It is manifest what is the body of our humility—that it is the body, which is flesh, which is humbled by falling into the earth, and which shall be transformed from a mortal and corruptible, into a body which is immortal and incorruptible." Adv. Hær. lib. V. c. 13. See also *in loco* Calvin, Pareus, Piscator, Osiander, Zanchius, Grotius, Poole (Annot.) and even Crellius, Slichtingius, &c. &c. See also Glassius Philol. Sac. Lib. III. Tract. I. Can. VIII.

VII. The last passage quoted by the Professor is the following:

2 Tim. ii. 16–19: "But shun profane and vain babblings: for they will increase unto more ungodliness. And their word will eat as doth a canker: of whom is Hymeneus

* This whole passage may be beautifully illustrated by a reference to other expressions in the New Testament. The worlding, says Paul, pursues earthly things—earth's treasures and honours; the believer pursues the things above: that is, in the language of our Saviour, he has his *treasures laid up in heaven*. See Matt. vi. 20; Luke xviii. 22, &c. See also Heb. xiii. 14.

and Philetus; who concerning the truth have erred, saying that the resurrection is past already; and overthrow the faith of some. Nevertheless the foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, the Lord knoweth them that are his. And, let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity."

The object of the Professor in referring to this text is to try to show that *he* is not a disciple of Hymeneus and Philetus; and yet it is difficult to know why he should object to this, since it is certain, that *if Paul was mistaken* respecting the resurrection, these gentlemen may certainly have had the correct view of the matter; and my own impression is, that they certainly had pretty much such a view of it as our author himself has.* But why should he object to their entertaining it? He thinks, as we have already seen on a former page, that it was held by the Pharisees; and also by some heretics condemned by Justin Martyr; and we know that it was entertained by the Gnostics, whose views of matter led them to embrace it; and by Manes, in the third century; and by Hierax, also, at the commencement of the fourth; and why must it be denied to poor Hymeneus and Philetus? Is it because Paul condemns their view? But the Professor says, that Paul himself had not the right view of the matter; and how, therefore, does his condemning these men prove that they were mistaken also? In such a case, would it not rather be a presumption that they

* Honest John Bunyan says: "Then I saw in my dream, that in the morning the shepherds called up Christian and Hopeful, to walk with them upon the mountains: so they went forth with them, and walked awhile, having a pleasant prospect on every side. Then said the shepherds one to another: Shall we show these pilgrims some wonders? So, when they had concluded to do it, they had them first to the top of *a hill, called Error*, which was very steep on the furthest side, and bid them look down to the bottom. So Christian and Hopeful looked down, and saw at the bottom several men dashed to pieces by a fall that they had from the top. Then said Christian, What meaneth this? The shepherds answered, Have you not heard of them that were made to err by hearkening to Hymeneus and Philetus, (2 Tim. ii. 17, 18,) *as concerning the faith of the resurrection of the body?* They answered, Yea. Then said the shepherds, Those that you see dashed in pieces at the bottom of this mountain are they; and they have continued to this day unburied, as you see, *for example to others to take heed how they clamber too high, or how they come too near the brink of this mountain.*"—Pilgrim's Progress, chap. xvi.

were right? And will the Professor, after attempting to prove that Paul was mistaken, *now* come over and agree with him? This, certainly, is a strange piece of business, to make the best of it, and it is hard to tell what the Professor here would really be at. I rather suppose that his object, in quoting the passage, was to forestall the obvious and forcible application of it to himself and his theory.

But it is perfectly plain, that the theory of these heresiarchs, and that of our author, must be, substantially, one and the same. In no sense of the word, could they have entertained the idea, that those who in their time had not yet existed, had arisen; and hence their idea of the resurrection being past, could only relate to those who had lived, and not to those who should live thereafter. And in precisely the same sense does Professor Bush hold, *that the resurrection is past already*—not the resurrection of those *who are to live*, (for neither he nor Hymeneus and Philetus could believe, that men are raised from the dead before they are born,) but the resurrection *of those who have lived*. And hence the Professor must be content to trace up his theoretic genealogy to these celebrated characters. Of Philetus we know nothing, save what is here mentioned; but Hymeneus was a blasphemer (Paul perhaps considered him such, in consequence of his denial of the resurrection of the body,) as is mentioned in 1 Tim. i. 20, and manifestly a companion of a marked enemy of Paul, who is mentioned in the same reference. See, also, 2 Tim. iv. 14, 15. That these men asserted that Paul taught errors, and was mistaken, &c., no rational man, I think, can possibly question.

Throughout the whole of our examination of the passages adduced by Professor Bush, we have seen that the sacred writers assert the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. In some places he himself is obliged to confess it, and he attempts to evade their testimony by charging them with being mistaken, or by a resort to the exploded theory of accommodation. Now in the text before us, Paul expressly announces that this doctrine is the foundation of the revelation or truth of God—the θεμέλιος τοῦ Θεοῦ, the fundamental doctrine of the Gospel; for it includes, as we have shown, the resurrection of Christ, which is the corner stone of Christianity. In Heb. vi. 2, he speaks of it in the same style. It is also the faithful saying or the saying *dignus*

fide which in v. 11 and 14, of the chapter before us, he exhorts Timothy to bear in remembrance, and by the denial of which, says he, the Christian faith is overturned, v. 18; and which, though Hymeneus and Philetus have denied, yet this foundation remains steadfast; having the seal of assurance that, as God knoweth who are his, so he will own us, though these men dispute and deny our doctrine. And hence, let every one who nameth the name of Christ depart from these errors and falsehoods—for that ἀδικίας means falsehood, will not be disputed; (see 1 Cor. xiii. 6; also, where it is directly held up in contrast with ἀληθεία, *truth*. See also the LXX. in Exod. xxii. 7; Psalm lxiii. 11; and cvii. 7; and cxix. 29, 69, 78, 86, 118, 128, 163; and cxliv. 11;) and Priscian remarks that "the Greeks and Latins often use injustum pro falso," *injustice for falsehood*. Such is the import of this passage taken in its connexion, and such the solemn admonition which it administers to such theorisers as Professor Bush. Slichtingius sustains this view, and remarks with great force "The firm foundation of God is the gospel or doctrine concerning the future resurrection of the dead; which is called the foundation, because upon it all Christian faith and piety are built." The same view is presented in Pol. Frat. Vol. VII. p. 261; and by Whitby *in loco*. See also Calvin's excellent note *in loco*.

SECTION VIII.

Containing references to a multitude of important passages which Professor Bush has omitted to notice.

In concluding his examination of the foregoing passages, Professor Bush remarks: "We have now gone over *all the important passages* in the Gospels and Epistles, usually cited as proving, either by direct assertion or plain implication, the doctrine of the resurrection of the body;" (p. 273,) and we have accompanied him patiently through his examination of the whole of them. But as Professor Bush has *not* adduced "*all the important passages usually cited as proving*" *this doctrine*, I shall, in conclusion, make a passing reference to a few of those which he has omitted; for an extensive criticism of each, after the preceding lengthened examination, would hardly be in place.

1. The resurrection of the body is clearly implied in Matt.

xii. 41, 42: "The men of Nineveh, and the Queen of the South *shall rise in judgment with this generation and shall condemn it*, ἀναστήσονται ἐν τῇ κρίσει μετὰ τῆς γενεᾶς ταύτης, καὶ κατακρινοῦσιν αὐτήν. (See also chap. xi. 21–24.) Here the *rising up* is future, and of course it has not yet taken place. And if the men of Nineveh are to arise from the dead *with* that generation, it is a plain consequence that all the dead are yet to arise.

2. In Luke xiv. 14, Christ speaking of such as prove themselves to be true receivers of his doctrine, and imitators of his example, says "Thou *shalt be* recompensed at the resurrection of the just." This most clearly defines this resurrection to be *one* event, and not a continued series of events. The word *just* is plural, τῶν δικαίων, *the resurrection of the just ones*, while *resurrection* itself is singular, ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει. Hence it is not a series of *resurrections*, as Professor Bush's theory makes it; but one single event, *hereafter to take place*, ἀνταποδοθήσεται σοι, at which time all the *righteous ones* shall arise.

3. In John v. 21, Jesus says, "For as the Father raiseth the dead, and giveth them life, (ζωοποιεῖ,) so also the Son maketh alive whom he will." Now the word for *dead* here is νεκροὺς, with the article; the same word that is used in ver. 25, and the import of which is explained in ver. 28, 29, by the phrase οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις *who are in their graves*. The word for raiseth is ἐγείρει, the same word which the apostle employs in 1 Cor. xv. 52–54, which can leave no doubt as to its import. In the passage before us, the present tense is put for the future, a common idiom, where the writer or speaker would denote a yet future action as one which will *certainly* take place, see Matt. xxvi. 2; John vii. 42, and xxi. 23, and xiv. 3, &c. The *dead*, here, according to this passage, could not have been raised *at* death, as is plain upon the very face of it, and therefore the theory which asserts that they were, is false. So, too, *in the time of Christ* "Abraham was dead, and the prophets were dead," see John viii. 52, 53. But if they were then *dead*, they had not entered upon the resurrection state or been raised from the dead, as Professor Bush asserts.

4. That Paul taught the literal resurrection of the body, is plain also from Acts xvii. 32: "But when they heard of the resurrection of the dead (ἀνάστασιν νεκρῶν) some mocked," &c. The apostle is speaking of the resurrection of Christ;

but that the Athenians understood ἀνάστασις to be a resurrection of the body (implying also a resurrection of the bodies of the dead who were to be judged, see ver. 31,) is too plain to be doubted. The Greeks fully believed in the immortality of the soul. The doctrines of Plato were familiar to them; see also Cicero's Tusc. Quæst. lib. I., and his De Senectute *sub finem;* see also Augustine Civit. Dei, lib. 13, c. 16. The Athenians, therefore, regarded favourably the doctrine of the soul's immortality; and had Paul taught it, they would not have derided him. But they did deride him, and therefore he did not teach that the resurrection body is eliminated *at death.*

5. The declaration in Acts xxvi. 8, "Why should it be thought a thing incredible, that God should raise the dead?" (νεκροὺς ἐγείρει;) evinces that men do not rise from the dead *at* death. For what *dead* did the apostle mean? Not merely Christ, for the word is plural. It was, therefore, those who were *then dead—dead men.* And if they were *then dead,* they surely had not been raised from the dead.

6. I have also remarked, that in his examination of 1 Cor. xv., Professor Bush omitted all notice of verse 29; "Else what shall they do who are baptized *for the dead, if the dead rise not at all?*" ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν, εἰ ὅλως νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται. The word *dead* is repeated several times in the verse; and, whatever was the rite here referred to, it is clear, that at the *time* referred to, *these dead ones had not yet arisen from the dead.* Of course, therefore, they had not arisen *at* death. Not even a reference to "old Jewish customs" will save the Professor here, for this baptizing for the dead was clearly not a Jewish, but a Christian practice.*

* Perhaps, after all, the best of the views taken of this obscure passage, is that of Chrysostom, in his Hom. in 1 Corinthians, *in loco.* "What, then, is Paul speaking of? First, I wish to remind you, who are initiated, of the response which they who introduce you to the mysteries bid you make, and then I will explain the words of Paul. When we are about to baptize, we bid the candidate say, *I believe in the resurrection of the dead;* and upon this faith we are baptized. After we, together with the rest, have confessed this, we are let down into the fountain of those sacred streams. Reminding them of this, Paul said, *If there be no resurrection, why art thou baptized for the dead?* that is, the dead bodies. For with a view to this art thou baptized, believing the resurrection of the dead body, that it

7. The same view precisely is presented in the words of Christ, in Mark xii. 25, 26; "When they *shall rise* from the dead;" "as touching the dead, *that they rise*." Here Abraham, (agreeably to John viii. 52, 53,) Isaac, and Jacob are clearly represented, (along with the generations who had lived before Christ,) *as being the subjects of a resurrection still future.*

8. In 1 Thess. v. 23, Paul prays that the spirit, and soul, and body, (i. e., *the whole person*,) ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, (the *singular* being used for the *plural* throughout,) might "be preserved blameless unto the com-

shall not remain dead. Thou, by thy words, (of confession,) declarest the resurrection of the dead," &c. Theodoret takes, substantially, the same view, and says: "But if the body, being dead, rises not, why, then, is any one baptized?" So, also, most of the Greek fathers, who regarded it as referring to the resurrection of at least all who "died in faith."

If I might be allowed briefly to suggest an exposition of this *locus vexatissimus criticorum* in this connexion—I regard it as an instance of ellipsis. "Else what shall they do who are baptized ὑπὲρ (τῆς ἀναστάσεως) τῶν νεκρῶν, *for the* (*resurrection of the*) *dead*, if the dead rise not at all? Why are they then baptized for the (resurrection of the) dead?" This view may be illustrated by the foregoing quotations from the Greek fathers: and, I think, it cannot be objected to on grammatical or philological grounds. For ὑπὲρ in such a connexion, certainly does not require to be rendered or to mean "*for the benefit of:*" see 2 Thess. ii. 1; Acts xv. 26; John vi. 51, where the meaning simply is, *because of, on account of.* And though these are examples of the *genitivus rei*, it will be remembered, that if the ellipsis be supplied, as above, the genitive there ceases to be gen. pers., and becomes gen. rei strictly. And then, further, such ellipses are of frequent occurrence in the New Testament. See Luke ix. 55; "Οὐκ οἴδατε οἵου πνεύματός (τέκνα) ἐστε ὑμεῖς. 1 Thess. v. 8; Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἡμέρας (υἱοὶ) ὄντες, &c., &c. And thus the passage would refer to the prospective resurrection of all who had died, as well as of all who should die before Christ's coming.

The reason why Paul employs the third person "*they*," instead of "why are *we* then baptized for the dead," is evident. In Christian baptism, *at first*, there was no direct reference to the resurrection; but when even some *Christians* begun to call that doctrine into question; (see ver. 12,) the apostles, as they considered it, (in connexion with the resurrection of Christ,) the very foundation-stone of Christianity, required of later converts an express admission of their faith in this doctrine; and when they were baptized, reminded them that it was *for the resurrection of the dead*. And as this custom thus commenced after the first converts were baptized, Paul says, not "why are *we*," but "why are *they* baptized for the resurrection of the dead if the dead rise not at all?"

ing of our Lord Jesus Christ." As this is a subject of prayer, (as the former part of the verse shows,) by an inspired apostle, it is a fair inference that, therefore, the body, no less than the soul and spirit, of the dead believer, will exist at the time of Christ's coming.

9. In 1 John iii. 2, there is a clear and invincible testimony in favour of the truth we are defending. "Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but *we know* that *when he shall appear we shall be like him;* for we shall see him as he is." Now if Christians at death were made like Christ, by entering at once upon the resurrection-state, this language would be utterly unmeaning, for it is in direct contradiction, to such a sentiment. Christians are not to be like him therefore, (that is, their bodies are not to be fashioned like unto his glorious body,) until he appears. The *time* of this change, and its direct reference to the period of Christ's coming is clearly expressed in the Greek. Οἰδαμεν δὲ, ὁτι ἐαν φανερωθῇ, ὅμοιοι ἀυτῷ ἐσόμεθα, &c. It cannot admit of a doubt that ἐαν here means *postquam*, or *cùm*, and the sense is therefore, "For we know that *after he* appears we shall be like him." So too in John xiv. 3, καὶ ἐαν πορευθῶ, "*and after I go*, and prepare a place for you, I will come again," &c. The particle is like כִּי of the Hebrews, the import of which is unquestionably *cùm*, or *quando*, or *postquam* in many places. So in Gen. xlvii. 18. "We cannot hide it from our Lord *after that* our money is all expended," and in Gen. xxxviii. 9, "Et fiebat, si veniebat ad uxorem fratris sui," id est, *postquam veniebat dormiturus cum uxore fratris sui*. Also in Prov. iii. 24. "*After that* thou liest down, thou shalt not be afraid." Is. iv. 4, "*After that* the Lord shall have washed away," &c. See also Judg. xxi. 21; Job xiv. 14; Numb. xxxvi. 4; Amos vii. 2. This passage therefore, itself, is sufficient to justify the entire rejection of all Professor Bush's speculations.

10. An overwhelming argument is also found in Rev. xx. 11–15. How Professor Bush could reconcile it with his conscience to overlook this passage in a professed examination of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, is more than I am able to tell. That it cannot be omitted fairly and honestly is certain, for it is one of the *seats* of the doctrine. The fact that he professes to examine it in connexion with the doctrine of the judgment, is no justification of his omis-

sion of it here, as is clear by the fact of his having in this connexion, discussed 2 Cor. v. 10, which bears directly on the judgment: and the fact that the text *is a prophecy*, cannot excuse him, for, if it is on that account too obscure to be discussed in connexion with the resurrection, it is also too obscure to be discussed in connexion with the judgment. And as he has not ventured to offer an excuse for this omission, the reader is left to judge for himself, whether it arose from the fact that Professor Bush could not meet the argument here presented.

The passage is as follows:

"And I saw a great white throne, and him that sat on it, from whose face the earth and the heaven fled away: and there was found no place for them. And I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God; and the books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the book of life: and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books according to their works. And the sea gave up the dead which were in it; and death and hell delivered up the dead which were in them: and they were judged every man according to their works. And death and hell were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death. And whosoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into the lake of fire."

The Professor makes, however, a passing remark that "There is not, that we can perceive, the remotest allusion to *bodies* in the present context," and denies that "the judgment here described is a visible judgment in the natural sphere, the subjects of which are men restored to life and reinvested *with bodies;*" and supposes that the stupendous transactions here described, occur only in "the spiritual world." The heavens and earth, therefore, according to this critic must *be spiritual*, and the great white throne also, and the sea, and hades, and the lake of fire, &c. Such is the amount of this attempt at evasion.

The remark, however, that "*bodies*" are not mentioned in this passage is a most unscholarly remark. Suppose they are not expressly mentioned, and what then? Where is "*body*" mentioned in connexion with the resurrection of Lazarus, or of Jairus' daughter, or of the son of the widow of Nain, or of Dorcas, or of those raised by Elijah and Elisha? They are spoken of as *dead*, just as the *dead* are spoken of in this passage; and they were said to be raised

from the dead without any mention of their *bodies*. And what would Professor Bush say of a man who should decide upon this ground that the resurrection of Lazarus, &c. was a *spiritual resurrection?* He would have the same kind of feeling for such a man, as he has, by this criticism excited in behalf of himself.

As to the *time* in which the events here mentioned are to occur, Storr correctly remarks that "according to Rev. xx. 12, (conf. v. 11,) the resurrection of the dead will fall within the time in which the earth shall vanish before him that sits upon the throne, ἔφυγεν ἡ γῆ. After the resurrection, there will be a new earth, καινὴ γῆ." Theol. B. III. §. 61. The passage itself clearly proclaims this truth, whatever mysterious meaning Professor Bush may try to attach to "earth and heaven" in this connexion. And therefore, as neither the old earth has yet fled away, nor the new one been created, the inference is plain that the resurrection of "the dead, small and great," is yet to occur.

It is equally clear too, that these *dead* were truly *dead*, and had not therefore been *raised from the dead* previous to this event: hence they are yet to be raised.

It is equally clear that it is a resurrection of the bodies of both the righteous and the wicked. A part of them came *from the sea*, and therefore their *bodies* were raised, for Professor Bush himself would hardly say that the *sea* is a receptacle for spirits or *tertium quids*. And then the dead who were raised, were judged out of the books, that is, the book of life, and the other books. Hence the *wicked* are also raised because they are here judged, and the *book of life* pertains only to the righteous. And this further appears from the fact that all of these raised dead who were not found written in the book of life, were cast into the lake of fire. Hence the wicked dead are also raised.

Thus clearly and fully does this passage announce, as the testimony of God the Holy Ghost, the very doctrines, which, it is the express design of Professor Bush, in his *Anastasis*, and more recent works, to impugn.

11. Then there are many *classes* of passages to be found in the New Testament, which either declare or imply the same truths. All those passages, for example, which speak of *quickening the* DEAD, and which of course imply that the quickening does not take place *at* death, but *after* it; for they are not dead until after death. See Rom. iv. 17; 1 Pet.

iii. 18; John v. 21, &c. &c. The very application of this phraseology to the spiritually dead, illustrates its import. The spiritually dead are not quickened *at* their spiritual death, but *after* they have thus died.

12. All those passages also, which speak of *believers being dead*, contradict a theory which asserts that they *are* raised from the dead "even before they are consigned to the tomb." See Rom. vi. 7. Thus says Christ to the Jews, "Your fathers ate manna in the wilderness *and are dead.*" John vi. 49, 58; and viii. 52. Now among these *fathers* were Moses, and Aaron, and Phineas, &c. Moses is also said *to be dead* in Josh. i. 2. And yet Professor Bush says he had entered upon the resurrection state; that is, was no longer dead. Thus too, "righteous Abel" is still declared *to be dead.* Heb. xi. 4. See also Acts ii. 29; Rev. i. 5. Now Professor Bush in so many words asserts that these persons are as truly and properly alive, as Enoch and Elijah, and are as fully raised from the dead as they will ever be. Would it be proper, therefore, to say of Enoch and Elijah that they are dead? Or of the saints after the consummation of all things that they are still dead? And yet according to Professor Bush, they will then be no more raised from the dead than they are now!

13. All those passages which assert that the *dead shall arise*, contradict the theory of Professor Bush, which asserts that man rises *at* death; for all such passages clearly assert that it is only *after* death that the dead arise, because they declare that the present dead *shall* arise. John vi. 40, 44 45; Luke xx. 35, &c.

14. All the passages also which teach that those already dead *shall receive* a recompense in the day of judgment, conflict with this theory; for they announce the judgment to be still future, and therefore the dead are to be raised to receive their recompense. See e. g. Matt. x. 15, and xi. 21–24, and Mark viii. 38. So also Acts x. 42, and 2 Tim. iv. 1, refer to those who will be living *when Christ comes*—and yet at the same time all who *had lived* previously are there called the *dead*, who are to be judged at this same time. And if they are not raised from the dead till Christ comes, they certainly did not arise *at* death, for many of them will have been dead thousands of years. See also 1 Pet. iv. 5.

15. All passages which clearly distinguish between death and the resurrection likewise conflict with a theory which

confounds death and the resurrection as Professor Bush's does. The Professor has not noticed this point in any of the passages which he quotes. See Mark xii. 23; Luke xx. 33; Acts xxiii. 8; 1 Cor. xv. 12; Matt. xxii. 31; Acts iv. 2, &c. In fact the very phrase "*resurrection of the dead*" evinces a distinction between death and the resurrection which is entirely fatal to this theory.

16. Finally. All those passages which speak of men *as dead*, making no distinction in this respect between the righteous and wicked, (i. e. all are alike dead,) evince the falseness of a theory which asserts that one part, to wit, the righteous, are *not dead*, but have been raised from the dead. See Rom. vii. 2, 3, and v. 15; 1 Cor. vii. 39, and xiv. 9. 15, *passim*, and Rom. iv. 17; 2 Cor. i. 9; Luke vii. 15, and xvi. 30, 31; Acts xxvi. 23; Rom. x. 7; Col. i. 18; Heb. xi. 35, &c. &c.

It will be seen from this catalogue of passages that even had Professor Bush succeeded in explaining away the texts which he has cited and criticised, he would have but half completed the work before him. But we have followed him patiently and fully through his long array of passages: and of all that he has examined there is *not one* but gives its testimony directly against him. The evidence of this is before the reader. We have found his attempts at exegesis a full half century at least behind the present advanced state of the science of criticism. And we have not only exposed the fallacy of these attempts, but have disproved his asserted facts *ad nauseam;* while his principles of criticism have been shown to be false in their assumption, neological in their nature, and destructive of all true religion in their tendency. The truth of God requires us to speak thus plainly, and we rejoice to find the great doctrine of the resurrection unharmed by this assault upon it, and still retaining all its long-asserted claims to be regarded as divine.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST CONSIDERED.

THE transcendent importance of the doctrine of Christ's resurrection cannot be overrated, and can scarcely be estimated. "If Christ was raised from the dead," says President Dwight, (Theol. Ser. 61,) "he was certainly the Messiah; or, in other words, whatever he declared himself to be. His doctrines, precepts, and life, were all approved by God; possess Divine authority; and demand, with the obligation of that authority, the faith and obedience of mankind." If he has *not* arisen, he is not the Messiah; his doctrines are not divine; the apostles were deceivers, or deceived; and those who are fallen asleep in Christ, have perished. With whatever allowance we may therefore look upon errors relating to other subjects, there can be no allowance here. To compromise one jot or tittle of what God has said on this subject, is to peril the everlasting well-being of souls, and to prove ourselves apostates from the Gospel which he has revealed. To no subject, more pointedly than to this, does the awful language of the apostle apply, that "should we, or an angel from heaven, announce to you any thing contrary to what we have announced to you, let him be accursed." Gal. i. 8. (See Greek.) And under whatever inducements we may suffer ourselves to be influenced by any such opposing announcement, we thereby enter the path to death, and risk the imminent danger of making eternal shipwreck of the soul. Compare 1 Kings xiii. 17, 18.

The Professor commences his discussion of this subject with the remark that "The resurrection of our Lord is in so many instances and in such a variety of ways, brought into connexion with the resurrection of his people, especially as a *pledge* of theirs, that the consideration of this event is imperatively urged upon us in this part of our discussion. As he in his risen body stands at the head of his risen saints, so the fact of his resurrection occupies a like relation to the fact of theirs. *The fact itself of his emergence from the sepulchre* ON THE THIRD DAY *is of course admitted.* The nature, circumstances, and bearings of the fact, are all with which we at present have to do." p. 151. And he goes on

to admit that if Christ arose in the self-same material body in which he was crucified, "it doubtless affords some countenance to the idea that his people are also to rise in like manner in the bodies which they laid down at death." He attempts also to make a difference between Christ's resurrection being the *pattern* and the *pledge* of the resurrection of his people. As to the term *pattern*, we shall not dispute about it in this connexion: for Professor Bush freely grants all we here ask on this point, that Christ's resurrection is a *pledge* that his people also shall rise. But how, I ask, can his resurrection be such a *pledge*, on the theory of Professor Bush? A *pledge* is something given in security for the performance of any thing: but Professor Bush makes the performance half done before the pledge is given, for he asserts that all believers who died before Christ, were raised from the dead before Christ arose.

The reader will also please to take notice of the Professor's admission that Christ "emerged *from the sepulchre*, (i. e. arose from the dead,) on the third day;" and of his admission, also, that if Christ arose in the body that was crucified, i. e., "the self-same material body," it affords "some countenance to the idea" that his people will arise in their bodies which died. The Professor could not help referring to this last point, for it would have been too gross to omit it; but he has not stated it in its full strength. The argument amounts to perfect demonstration, that if Christ arose *corporeally*, and ascended to heaven *corporeally*, his members shall arise and ascend also in like manner. To prove that Christ's body was raised, therefore, *is to prove the doctrine of the resurrection of the body.*

The Professor saw this and felt it, but, as above remarked, would not state it; and by an absurd evasion has attempted to throw over it an air of uncertainty. He says that Christ's *body did not see corruption*, while the bodies of his people do: and that "there is a heaven-wide difference between the case of a body that is resuscitated on the third day," and one that "has been dissolved to dust." But what has all this to do with the point? In what way does it affect it? If believers enter upon the resurrection state *at* death, this certainly is before the third day after they are dead. And what difference does it make, therefore, on Professor Bush's theory, whether their bodies are subsequently dissolved or not? This whole assented difference, therefore, so far as it

relates to the subject before us is unphilosophical and foolish. Death is death; whether it last a day or a thousand years; and it is no more difficult for God to restore one to life in the latter than in the former case. But as a matter of curiosity, and that it may be seen how far Professor Bush is willing to wander, (for a child can see that if there is any force in his speculations on this subject, it tends to cast doubt over the question as to *whether Jesus was truly dead*,) I will here present an extract from the celebrated *Valentine Smalcius*, (reputed author of the Racovian Catechism,) on the same subject; and let the reader see how much more sound and philosophical is the Socinian than the Orthodox Professor. He speaks as follows: "He is as truly dead, who is dead one hour, as he who has been dead ten thousand years; and truly we are to believe that Jesus Christ, at the time when he was dead, was as truly in the same condition in which all the other dead are, as if he had been dead many years. *For if this is not carefully regarded, our hope cannot be firm and sure: because we do not die to arise the third day, and yet we have hope of our own resurrection from the resurrection of Christ itself.*"*

But let us now attend to the Professor's proofs that the body of Christ did not arise. "1. It is peculiarly worthy of note," says he, "that *it is nowhere explicitly affirmed* in the narrative of the evangelists, or any other part of the Scriptures, *that the identical material body of Christ arose:*" (p. 152,) and he proceeds to remark that the language which refers to this subject may be consistently understood without implying that his material body arose. That is, *Per fas, per nefas; rem, rem, quocumque modo rem.* Professor Bush ought to have taken this for the motto of his book, or at least of that chapter of it which is now under consideration. But I reply to the foregoing allegation. 1. That it is puerile. Suppose it is true that the Bible nowhere mentions that "the identical material body of Christ" arose, and what would it prove? The Bible "nowhere mentions that the identical material body of Lazarus arose, or of Jairus' daughter, or of the young man of Nain, or of Dorcas, or of Eutychus—and what then? Did not their identical material body arise? Mahomet said that Jesus was not crucified, but that the Jews took and crucified a Jew that strongly resembled him. And

* *De Divinitate Jesu Christi*, Parte II., Cap. XIII. Racoviæ, 1608.

where is it said *in so many words* that "they did not take and crucify such a Jew in mistake?" Even if the assertion of Professor Bush were true, therefore, it would amount to no more than the assertion of Mahomet; and it is fit to be put in the same category. 2. But the assertion of Professor Bush is *utterly unfounded;* and the contrary is affirmed in every variety of form of which the subject is susceptible. *First.* In John ii. 18–22, we read as follows: "Then answered the Jews and said unto him, what *sign* showest thou unto us, seeing that thou doest these things? Jesus answered and said unto them, Destroy this temple, and in three days *I will raise it up.* ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις ΕΓΕΡΩ αὐτόν. Then said the Jews, Forty and six years was this temple in building, and wilt thou rear it up in three days? *But he spake of the temple his body.* Ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἔλεγε περὶ τοῦ ναοῦ τοῦ ΣΩΜΑΤΟΣ αὐτοῦ. When therefore he was *risen from the dead, his disciples remembered that he had said this unto them: and they believed the Scripture, and the word which Jesus had said.*" To attempt any elucidation of this clear announcement, would be to hold a candle to the sun to assist it to shine. The "identical material body" of Jesus is here mentioned as *the subject of the resurrection;* the pledge of Jesus is given that he *will* raise it up if destroyed; and when he is risen the disciples not only brought this his pledge to mind, but *believed the Scriptures*, which of course had taught therefore that the body of Jesus should arise. *Secondly.* The Old Testament (as the passage last quoted clearly announces,) declares the same truth. This has been shown already in our examination of Ps. xvi. 9. 10; concerning which Professor Bush is himself compelled to admit that "from the inspired comment of Peter, Acts ii. 29–31, *it is clear that it is a resurrection predicated* OF THE BODY OF CHRIST;" (p. 104,) and as we have remarked *in loco*, the terms בשר in the Psalm, and σὰρξ in Acts can refer to nothing but to his "*identical material body.*" Then *thirdly*, Jesus says in John x. 17, 18, "Therefore doth my Father love me, because *I lay down my life that I may take it again.*" &c. What life did he lay down? Would Professor Bush say on his own theory that it was *the life of his spiritual body?* Pressed as he is for evasions, he would not hazard such a declaration. *Jesus laid down his corporeal life; and he therefore took it again:* and by consequence, his "identical material body" that was slain,

arose. *Fourthly.* After his resurrection he bore the same clear testimony. He had announced repeatedly that he would raise his body if he were slain, and now says he to his disciples, "*Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself:* HANDLE ME AND SEE; FOR *a spirit hath not* FLESH AND BONES AS YE SEE ME HAVE," ὅτι πνεῦμα σάρκα καὶ ὀστέα οὐκ ἔχει, καθὼς ἐμὲ θεωρεῖτε ἔχοντα, *as ye see me having.* Here is the clearest possible assertion, and one made by Jesus himself that he *had flesh and bones*, and of course, then, his "identical material body" arose. *Fifthly.* The testimony of angels is given also in confirmation of the same truth. "I know that ye seek *Jesus that was crucified.* He is not here: he is risen AS HE SAID. *Come, see the place where the Lord lay.*" Matt. xxviii. 6. "Ye seek Jesus of Nazareth who was crucified: *he is risen; he is not here; behold the place where they laid him.*" Mark xvi. 6. What was it that Joseph of Arimathea and Nicodemus had "*laid there?*"—laid in the place pointed to by the angels? It was the body of the crucified Jesus—"the identical material body." Here, then, is the clear and unambiguous testimony of angels that it had arisen. *Finally.* The apostles *after they had received the Holy Spirit* testify to the same. A single extract will suffice. "Him God raised up the third day, and showed him openly; not to all people, but to witnesses chosen before of God, *even to us, who did eat and drink with him after he rose from the dead.*" Acts x. 40, 41. The "adaptation to the outward senses of the apostles," on account of the weakness of their faith, immediately after the resurrection of Christ, (upon which preposterous principle Professor Bush would attempt to evade the evidence from Christ's eating and drinking,) cannot apply to this passage: for the apostles were now weak in faith no longer. They were endowed with the Holy Spirit; and under his influence and guidance thus affirm that Christ arose in his "identical material body," and as a full evidence hereof appeal to the fact that he ate and drank *after* his resurrection as he did before his death.

The second *proof* of Professor Bush is as follows: 2. It seems to be a fair presumption that the same body which arose also ascended. But *the evidence is certainly conclusive*, that it was not a material body which ascended to heaven." p. 153. I fully grant the "presumption that the same body which arose also ascended:" and I demand this

"*conclusive evidence*" that "it was not a material body that ascended." Where is this evidence? Professor Bush has offered none:—and to bring the matter to a fair issue, I affirm *that he has no such evidence.*

The third *proof* of Professor Bush is as follows: "3. The circumstances of his appearance to his disciples, in repeated instances, subsequent to his resurrection, are far more consistent with the idea of his possessing a spiritual body than the reverse." In confirmation of this the Professor quotes John xx. 19, 26; and Luke xxiv. 36, 37; and adds "We have here the evidence of a body divested of the conditions of matter, at least as matter is commonly and philosophically defined. It is one endowed with the power of entering a room when the doors were closed, and all the ordinary avenues of access precluded. *Such a body must be spiritual*," &c. p. 153. But the Professor has hardly gone far enough in the statement of his premises; he ought to have put thereinto the passage in Matt. xiv. 25–30, respecting *walking on the sea*, and so prove that our Saviour (and Peter also) had only a spiritual body *before* his crucifixion; and he might have brought in Matt. xvii. 2; and Luke iv. 1, 2, as confirmatory evidence; for certainly walking on water is as perfect "evidence of a body divested of the conditions of matter," as entering a room whose doors are closed. The same argument would do to prove also that Elisha's borrowed axe was spiritualized iron.

But further: The implication of Professor Bush that Christ must have come *through* closed doors, or through the wall, has no foundation in the words of the texts to which he refers. It is not said that "Jesus came *through the closed doors*," but that he "entered when the disciples had closed the doors," i. e. after they had, for fear of the Jews, barred them. The words are *τῶν θυρῶν κεκλεισμένων*, *when the doors were closed*, which is a very different thing from saying that he entered *through closed doors.* The expression is intended merely to signify that the doors were opened by Jesus, in some extraordinary way unknown to his disciples; that he might enter to them.

The Professor continues, by remarking that it is no refutation of his "*conclusion*" (that "*such a body must be spiritual*,") to refer to the fact that the disciples came and held him by the feet, and of his commanding them to handle him and see that he had flesh and bones, and his commanding

Thomas to put his hands into his wounded side, and of his eating a piece of broiled fish, and an honey-comb—for, says the Professor, "In all this we have no difficulty in recognizing *a miraculous adaptation of the visible phenomena to the outward senses of the disciples*, who were to be fully assured of the great fact of their Lord's resurrection, and of the identity of his person." p. 154. Were we not anxious to dissipate every thing in the shape of objection to the great foundation of our hopes for time and eternity, we should pass this without serious notice. He follows it out with the remark also, that "the act of eating was an optical act, like that of the three angels that came to Abraham," one of which he supposes was Messiah in his pre-existent state. He also quotes Josephus to prove that they did not really eat. As to Abraham and the angels, however, the case can in no way apply here, for we have shown demonstrably that the body of Christ truly arose from the dead. But even this case given by him for illustration, is not so clear as he would seem to think. *He has not proved* that the act of eating predicated of the angels was a mere optical act, or illusion. (See Gen. xviii. 1–8.) Pareus says of it "*Comedisse* angeli dicuntur *non apparenter, sed vere;* non tamen necessitate sed dispensatione quadam," (*in loco.*) Lightfoot, and Theodoret affirm also that they did eat. The same is allowed also by Poole, Osiander, Luther, Cornelius à Lapide, and others; and it might have occurred to Professor Bush that it would not have been very difficult for Abraham to discover whether the provision which he set before his guests was all on the table after they had finished their entertainment. If it was, the *optical* illusion was of little account.

So much for the illustration. But as to the principle itself which Professor Bush has asserted above, if it be allowed, we may safely challenge him to furnish one solitary proof that Jesus Christ ever appeared in the flesh.—Every proof of it is completely enervated by these speculations, if they be granted. As to the testimony of prophecy, why may it not have been merely a merciful *adaptation* to the fears and hopes of men to allure them to obedience. As to the testimony of the apostles why may they not have been *mistaken* on this point as well as on the others mentioned by Professor Bush? Or at least, why may not his incarnation have been only "a miraculous adaptation of the visible phenomena to the outward senses" of mankind, of John the

Baptist, the Jews, &c. Now a principle which would give currency to such speculations cannot be treated as a light andindifferent error. It strikes at the very foundation of our hope of salvation itself.

The aspect in which these speculations present our adorable Redeemer cannot fail to bring upon them the decided reprehension and detestation of the Christian world. They represent him as assuring the disciples of the truth of his resurrection, by—*a falsehood!* He had neither flesh nor bones, says Professor Bush, and yet tells the disciples to handle him and see, assuring them that he has. He asserts before his death that he will raise *his body*, and yet never raises it. To assure his disciples that he had truly arisen, according to his own previous announcements, and those of the Scriptures, he repeatedly eats before them; and yet it was only an "*optical act*," that is, *he pretended to do—and made them believe he was doing, what he did not do.* This truly, as Ullman remarks, (respecting the principle of accommodation,) "would imply that the origin of Jesuitism may be traced back to Jesus himself."* Language fails in the attempt to describe the atrociousness of the mere supposition involved in the assertion of this principle. *Hæc censeo esse verè profunda Satanæ.*

In addition to these considerations, there are two others to which I will briefly refer before passing on.

1. All the appearances of Christ during the forty days subsequent to his resurrection, and his eating, &c., says Professor Bush, were a mere "adaptation of the visible phenomena to the outward senses of the disciples, who were to be fully assured"—of what? Why, that by natural laws his spiritual body had been eliminated, just as the spiritual body of every believer, who had previously died, had been, and just as the spiritual body of every believer who should thereafter die should be! for this is the full amount of all that he has offered on this subject. Christ did all this merely to convince his followers then, and to the end of time, that he had been raised from the dead just as all good men had been since the fall! And what ought to be thought of a theory which presupposes this? But

2. All that is said by prophets and apostles concerning

* "Sinless character of Jesus," see Park's and Edward's "Selections from German Literature," p. 449.

the resurrection of Christ, evinces that his case, whatever it might be, was different from that of every one that had preceded him—that there was something wonderfully remarkable about it. See Luke xxiv. 26; 1 Cor. xv. 4; Matt xii. 40, and xvi. 21, and xvii. 22, 23, and xx. 18, 19, and xxvii. 62–64; Acts ii. 24; 1 Cor. xv. 14, 20; Rom. i. 4; John ii. 18–22, and xx. 26–29; 1 Pet. i. 21; Rom. vi. 4; John x. 18; Acts v. 30; Col. i. 18; Acts xxvi. 2, 3; Rom. xiv. 9, and viii. 11; Acts i. 3, Acts xvii. 30–32. These are some of the passages which announce this event as something wonderful and stupendous. But Professor Bush tells us that he arose in a spiritual body, just as Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob did, and all believers who had died before him. Where then is the ground for any thing thus wonderful and remarkable? What is the fact on which such declarations are predicted concerning his resurrection?

The Professor next propounds a *dilemma* to the effect that if Christ's "risen body was material, *it must have been miraculously rendered spiritual* when he suddenly appeared in a room closed and barred, and when he suddenly vanished from sight. If it was spiritual, it must have been miraculously made to assume material attributes on the same occasion." But the dilemma is very harmless, as any one will see by applying it to the Saviour's walking on the water, which he did without rendering his material body spiritual. As to the other passage referred to respecting his "*vanishing*," (Luke xxiv. 31,) Professor Bush knows very well that the words here employed by the Evangelist convey no such meaning as he would attach to the word "*vanish*." The Greek is *καὶ αὐτὸς ἄφαντος ἐγένετο ἀπ' αὐτῶν*; and simply means that he ceased to be seen by them. And if any one should refuse to admit that *ἀπ' αὐτῶν* in this connexion intimates a change of place performed so quickly that he appeared to them to vanish into air, yet what should hinder that his ceasing to be seen by them was even affected by "their eyes being holden," that they should not see him? as with those mentioned in Gen. xix. 11; and 2 Kings vi. 18, 20. If, therefore, *vanish* may be taken to mean to pass away from the sight, to disappear, there is nothing in the passage to favour the Professor's view, more than the view he opposes: for even on his own theory, if Christ had "a spiritualized body," the *vanishing* could not have been by dissipation,

like vapour, or smoke, but simply by passing away from the sight.

In Section IV., the Professor says also "That there was something miraculous in his several appearances after his resurrection, is to be inferred from Mark xvi. 12; 'After that he appeared *in another form* (*ἐν ἑτέρᾳ μόρφῃ*) unto two of them, as they walked, and went into the country.' This certainly implies *a transformation* of some kind, such *as we may easily conceive to pertain to a spiritualized body.*" p. 156. But our Saviour underwent a greater change of form than that here referred to, on Tabor *before* his death; (See Matt. xvii. 2;) and this, if there be any force in the Professor's argument, would prove that he had "a purely spiritual body" before, as well as after his death. And then as to the phrase *ἐν ἑτέρᾳ μόρφῃ*, it can at furthest mean nothing more than a change of habit, such as Professor Bush witnesses every day in New York, and which according to his argument, would prove that the people of that city all have "spiritualized bodies." In reference to the phrase Piscator remarks after quoting it, "*Id est, alio habitu seu vestitu.*" "*That is, in other apparel or raiment:* for that he had retained the native form of his countenance, is plain from the words in Luke xxiv. 16, where it is said that the eyes of his two disciples were holden that they should not know him." This is decisive. Grotius explains the phrase in the same manner; "Habitu alio quàm quo uti solebat:" and remarks that "the *μεταμορφώθη* or transfiguration in Mark ix. 2, 3, *is referred to the raiment.*"

The Professor for the next six pages enters into a laboured effort to prove that Christ ascended to heaven on the first day of his resurrection. He makes free use of the learned essay of Kinkel, (found in the "Bibliotheca Sacra" for Feb. 1844, p. 152–175,) in which that profound scholar supposes that Christ ascended immediately after the resurrection, and several times during the period of the forty days, and even several times after it, until the generation that had known him in the flesh had all left the earth, and he could no longer be recognized. But he holds to the true resurrection and ascension of Christ's material body: and referring to the neological objections which are urged against the resurrection and ascension of Christ's body, (and by consequence of the bodies of his followers) he remarks, "How this contrariety to mechanical laws is removed by the ascen-

sion is not, indeed, level to our apprehension, but it is promised as future. *The doubt in respect to the possibility is removed by fact. Christ lives in a human body, and still is removed from the earth.* What is true of the first-fruits is a guaranty for the harvest." p. 155. I desire that the reader would take particular notice of this extract for reasons which will appear presently. But so far as the *conclusion* of Kinkel is concerned, that Christ ascended on the first day, or on any day before the fortieth, I dissent from it *in toto.* The view which he has presented is exceedingly ingenious, but it lacks support from the New Testament. See Acts i. 2, 9; Heb. iv. 14; 1 Tim. iii. 16, &c.

As above remarked, however, Professor Bush makes free use of this essay, and with a proper acknowledgment, appropriates whatever he can find in it which may seem to countenance his theory. The point most laboured by him is that Christ ascended directly after his resurrection. This point I need not discuss here, for so far as Professor Bush and his theory are concerned, *I am perfectly willing to grant it:* and admit for the sake of argument that Christ did ascend at that time. But what then? What has all this to do with the subject of the resurrection of Christ's body? Professor Bush will answer. "The inference from all this," says he, "is obvious. If Christ ascended to heaven first immediately after his resurrection, and repeatedly in the forty days subsequent, *he must have ascended in a spiritual body*, (i. e. as he explains it on p. 156, "*a purely spiritual*, or *a spiritualized body.*") If he ascended in a spiritual body, he must have arisen in a spiritual body. *Consequently*, the phenomena indicating a material body to the senses of the disciples must have been miraculously assumed. In other words, they were mere *appearances.* If this *conclusion* can be avoided—how?" p. 162.

The *first* thing peculiarly striking about this conclusion, is its extreme modesty. "If Christ ascended, he must have ascended in a spiritual body," says the Professor. He offers no proof of the assertion, only that "it *must* be so." Now Kinkel, from whose essay Professor Bush obtained what he has offered to prove that Christ ascended immediately after his resurrection, declares that the assertion that Christ did not ascend in a material body "*is disproved by fact:*" but our author after appropriating a goodly portion of what Kinkel has said asserts that the very reverse of this conclu-

sion "*must*" be true; and as he does not state the reasons on which this assertion is based, we are left to infer that it is so plain and "*obvious*," that none would question it. This certainly is modesty in the superlative degree. The *second* thing worthy of remark about this "inference," (although this is by no means peculiar to the present case; it is characteristic of the generality of the Professor's conclusions,) is, that there is not the remotest connexion between the premises and the conclusion. There is a hiatus here across which Euclid could never have passed. A single fact will show it. Paul ascended "to the third heaven;" (2 Cor. xii. 2–4;) and subsequently speaking of it he allows that this ascension might have been while *in* the body as easily as if *out* of the body. Christ therefore need not have ascended in a "spiritualized body." And then *thirdly*, as before remarked, we have furnished irrefragable evidence that Christ's body arose: and the proof is demonstrable, (or as Professor Bush admits on p. 153, "it seems to be a fair presumption") that the same body which rose also ascended. On the evening of the day of the resurrection, as Kinkel remarks, "Christ still ate earthly food; but it is in the highest degree probable that he did this also, in his far later manifestation at the sea of Galilee; at least, the question, 'Children have ye any meat?' the producing of the fish and bread, and finally his concluding invitation, 'Come and dine,' John xxi. 5, 9, 12, seem to involve the supposition that he himself partook." *Biblioth. Sac.* for Feb. 1844, p. 166.

After this effort to prove that Christ ascended immediately after his resurrection, the Professor thus proceeds with his "*catalogue of proofs.*" "The grand purpose for which the Divine Redeemer assumed a body of flesh was accomplished when he expired on the cross. Τετέλεσται, *it is finished*, was his dying exclamation. So also, just upon the eve of his crucifixion, John xvii. 4, 'I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do.' Accordingly, when he had 'accomplished his decease at Jerusalem,' he entered at once into a new state and a new dispensation. He now came into that economy which was to be emphatically *of the Spirit.* The agency of the Spirit is therefore prominent in the scriptural accounts of the resurrection; 'Declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead.' The uses of a material body had now surceased for ever." In the same style the Professor

continues, and remarks that "it was not possible that a spiritual body should be holden in the grave;" that "a fleshly body pertained not to the work of glorification, but to that of his humiliation," and that "the work and the kingdom of Christ were henceforth to be spiritual," &c. p. 163. Here certainly are proofless assertions enough for one page; and as they are so perfectly gratuitous, we should be justified in passing them without remark; yet we shall not do so, but briefly notice them in their order.

The assertion that "the grand purpose for which Christ assumed a body of flesh was accomplished when he expired upon the cross," is directly contradicted by every passage which we have adduced in proof of the resurrection of his body. It is contradicted also by Rom. iv. 25, where Paul says that Jesus "was delivered for our offences, *and was raised again for our justification;*" and by a multitude of similar passages. And to apply as Professor Bush does, "*it is finished*" as a proof of his assertion, is like the skeptic who attempted to prove the abrogation of the Old Testament by asserting that Christ said "Hang all the law and the prophets." Τετέλεσται, refers merely to the work of Christ which was to be accomplished before his death, and in no way applies to his resurrection and subsequent work included in his resurrection and ascension. And then John xvii. 4, which our author quotes, proves too much for him; for Christ had not yet suffered when he uttered those words: and therefore, according to the Professor's own admission, his work was not then all finished. But this passage, like the former, can only refer to the work of Christ before his passion. And this, our author is compelled to allow, for he admits that Christ is still engaged in his work of saving men.

As to the "economy of the Spirit," it is not an economy of *spiritual existence*, as he would pretend; but of the operations of the Spirit. See John vii. 39, and xiv. 17, 26, and xvi. 7–11; Acts ii. 4, 16–18, &c. How truly strange is it that a man possessing intelligence, should confound distinctions like these? And as to the "surceasing of the uses of a material body," I remark that to make such a grave assertion without one particle of proof, is utterly unworthy of my friend the Professor. I meet it with an utter denial of its truth. The single declaration in Phil. iii. 20, 21, refutes it entirely, "Our conversation is *in heaven*, *from whence* also

we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ: who shall change *our vile body*, that it may be fashioned LIKE UNTO HIS GLORIOUS BODY." If the Saviour, therefore, has in heaven a body to the resemblance of which our vile bodies shall be fashioned, then his glorious body is not "purely spiritual," or a *tertium quid:* but a glorified material body. Compare the declarations also in Rev. i. 18, and v. 9–10. Also in John xiv. 2, 3, his going "to prepare *a place* for his followers, that *where* he is *there* they may be also." Such are the assertions (as proofless as the legend of the "Seven Sleepers,") upon the strength of which Professor Bush would claim to change the entire system of Scriptural Eschatology.

There is one remark in this connexion respecting the spiritual body of Christ, which also calls for a brief notice before we pass on. The Professor says that Christ entered upon an endless life "at his resurrection from the grave, *of which it was not possible that a spiritual body should be holden.*" Was his "spiritual body," then, in the grave? If not, what means this language? and what means the assertion on p. 151, that the *fact* itself of *his emergence from the sepulchre on the third day*, is of course admitted." He could not in fact help admitting that this resurrection did occur on the third day, without the plainest contradiction of the Scriptures. See Matt. xvi. 21, and xvii. 23, and xx. 19, and xxvii. 64; Mark ix. 31, and x. 34; Luke ix. 22, and xviii. 33, and xxiv. 7, 21, 46; 1 Cor. xv. 4. And yet if this be so, what means his language only two pages further on, (p. 165,) "And how delightful and interesting the thought," says he, "of so complete an identity of lot awaiting the Head and the members of the redeemed mystical body—that as we are planted in the likeness of his death, so we shall be also *in the likeness of his resurrection—that as he entered* AT ONCE *into a spiritual body*, and so abides, *so shall we also* AT DEATH, *but exchange our present bodies of vileness for our future bodies of glory fashioned like his.*" On p. 178, he says also that this spiritual body goes forth from the body *with the dying breath*, and "before the body is consigned to the dust:" and on p. 179, "It is developed before" the consignment of the body to the earth; and p. 180, it is developed "*at death.*" Here, then, Jesus arose *at death, at once* into a spiritual body; and yet did not "emerge from the sepulchre until the third day:" and still his "mate-

rial body never arose." Thus crude and self-contradictory are my friend's conceptions on the prime point in this whole discussion. Did not these facts contradict us, we should have pronounced it incredible that any man, bearing a title to scholarship, should have ventured before the American public with such an exhibition, coupled with the full announcement, that he expects his views on this subject to be received, and that they cannot fail to effect an entire revolution in the view entertained by us on the subjects to which we attach the highest and most vital importance. But even this is not the strangest feature of the foregoing representations. They present the following dilemma from which escape is absolutely impossible. Either the resurrection of Christ took place *at* his death, or it took place on the third day after. If it took place at his death, then the prophetic Scriptures relating to this subject have never been fulfilled; (see 1 Cor. xv. 4,) and the apostolic testimony, as well as the assurances of Christ, above referred to, are plainly false. If it did take place on the third day, then the spiritual body did not leave the material until that time. Now Professor Bush constantly affirms (as we have shown) that the spiritual body is *the life itself* of the material. If therefore it did not leave the material body until the third day, then our Saviour was not really dead all the time that he was within the sepulchre; and *consequently there is no proof whatever that he did then die.* We are, therefore, left without evidence that Christ *died for our sins*, according to the Scriptures.

After a few additional remarks, fraught with the same inconsistency, and in which he asserts that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob entered the resurrection-state before Christ, and also that Christ's body was "dispersed," he thus proceeds: "We may admit indeed that the disciples *supposed* that the body which they saw and handled was the veritable body of their crucified Lord, and that in their preaching the resurrection of Jesus, they had no other idea than that of the reanimation of his body of flesh." p. 165. And he attributes this their mistake to "those carnal apprehensions which they then cherished;" and says that "it is reasonable to suppose" that afterwards they *may* have arrived at the *correct* view of the matter: but, continues he, "*at any rate, we know no reason why the measure of their intelligence on this point should be the limit of ours.*" Such is the rudeness with which he assails the believer's confidence in the resurrection of our

Saviour. To refute such assertions would be out of place, unless in disputing with skeptics. Yet it may be proper to remark, 1. That after the apostles were endowed with the Spirit, who led them into the knowledge of the truth on this and on all other parts of the Gospel which it was necessary to proclaim, they still asserted (as we have above shown) that the body of Christ arose. Acts x. 40. Christ also asserted it; so did the prophets, and so also did the angels. All this is recorded by the apostles, and yet the measure of their intelligence, comprising that of the prophets, and of the angels, and what Christ also made known, is not to "be the limit" of that of Professor Bush! But, 2; he could not even assert these sentiments without directly contradicting himself. On p. 208, 209, he asserts that the apostles, and even the stupid Sadducees, fully apprehended the premises and conclusion of the Saviour's argument in Matt. xxii. 23–33; and in that argument, says he, Jesus asserts that the resurrection is not *a resurrection of the body*, but a resurrection of the spiritual nature *at death*. And hence, says the Professor, the disciples and others could at once see that the argument of the Sadducees was entirely refuted. Here, then, according to our author, they understood the true nature of the resurrection, before the death of Christ: and yet, when Christ arose, he must, in order to make them believe that he had entered into this resurrection state, make them believe also that his body had arisen! And the disciples (who in the early part of his ministry understood perfectly the true nature of the resurrection) became so dull in proportion as they received the illumination of the Spirit, and were better acquainted with the matter, that Christ had to make them believe that his material body had arisen, before they could comprehend that his spiritual body should have left the material body *at* death.

In the next paragraph he proceeds to answer the question, "If the material body did not rise, or was not the subject of the resurrection, what became of it? for it was not found in the sepulchre, neither did it see corruption." p. 166. And to this he replies, 1, that the difficulty presses the doctrine which he is opposing; "for it is admitted," says he, "that our risen Lord did not enter heaven in a body of flesh and bones." But if by this he means that we admit that Christ did not enter heaven in a material body, he ought to have known that it is an assertion that is entirely unfounded.

The nature of that *change* which his body underwent in ascending to heaven, we cannot pretend to explain; for it does not yet appear even what we ourselves shall be. It may have been, and probably was entirely analogous to that which he underwent on Tabor, while yet retaining full possession of his material body. 2. He next prodeeds to remark that "*it was resolved into its primitive elements* like that of Elijah." I will not follow him into this remark further than to say, that it is not true that the body of either our Saviour or Elijah was thus dissolved. He continues these revolting speculations for a page or two further, but we have said more than sufficient for exposing their deformity.

On this whole subject, therefore, Professor Bush has not been able to adduce a particle of evidence to afford the least countenance to his theory. What he has attempted to produce is in direct conflict therewith; while his assertions have been found to be not only destitute of proof, but to be made in direct contradiction to the plainest facts in the case. We need not prosecute the argument any further, for the doctrine of the resurrection and ascension of the body of Christ is not in the least affected by these "great swelling words of vanity." We shall conclude with a single reflection.

A careful consideration and comparison of the resurrection and glorification of Christ, with the predicted resurrection and change of his people will evince that there is the most beautiful and perfect analogy throughout. For *the resurrection of the body* is not itself the *change* spoken of in Phil. iii. 21; and 1 John iii. 2, &c., and ought not to be confounded with it; for the sacred writers, as we have shown on 1 Cor. xv., make a plain and obvious distinction between them. The resurrection is the raising of the body and reunion of it with the soul. Death and infirmity and sin then reign over the body no more; and it is a spiritual body, that is, a body adapted to spiritual uses: but *as yet* it is not *fashioned* like unto Christ's glorious body. This takes place subsequently. The dead are first raised, and *then* both they and the living are all changed at the same time.

Thus was it strictly with our blessed Redeemer. His body was raised a spiritual body, i. e. a body adapted to the uses of the restored spirit. The divesting himself of the conditions of his mere earthly life, or of bodily necessities took place as Ullman remarks, (and as it will take place

with all his members) "immediately after the resurrection, when the soul was again united with the body and elevated it from earth." *Biblioth. Sacra*, for Feb. 1844. p. 166. Hence it was an immortal body, as Paul remarks, predicating its immortality upon the fact of its simple resurrection from the power of the grave: "Christ *being raised from the dead, dieth no more;* death hath no more dominion over him." Rom. vi. 9. The same is asserted in Acts xiii. 34. And thus shall it be with his members when raised from the dead. His body was not however "*changed*," (in the apostolic import of that term) until his ascension. It was not till then that he was glorified, as the giving of the Spirit itself demonstrates. John vii. 39. At his ascension, his body became the glorious body that it is now, and which is referred to in Rev. i. 13–18; 1 John iii. 2; Phil. iii. 21; and Acts xxii. 6–11; with xxvi. 13–16. After his resurrection, therefore, Jesus ascended to the clouds, ("a cloud received him out of their sight." Acts i. 9,) and then was he glorified. Just so shall his members *first* be raised immortal, and *then* (with the living) be caught up *in the clouds to* MEET *the Lord. Then* shall they be like him (changed, or fashioned like his glorious body,) FOR THEY SHALL THEN SEE HIM AS HE IS.* Thus harmoniously and beautifully is his resurrection and ascension in every respect a pattern of ours. The Lord grant that such a portion may be the happy lot of both the writer and the reader of this work.

* The following singular passage occurs in Quest. 35, of the "*Questions and Answers to the Orthodox*," attributed by some to Justin Martyr. Speaking of the raised saints Matt. xxvii. 50–53, the writer says, "They died not again but continue in immortality, just as Enoch and Elijah, and are with them in Paradise, *still waiting for a change after the manner of the resurrection of Jesus Christ; according to the words of the apostle, 'we shall all be changed.'*" I quote it without comment or endorsement.

CHAPTER V.

THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE OF THE JUDGMENT TO COME.

Professor Bush being perfectly aware that the commonly received doctrine of a future judgment is fatal to his whole theory of the resurrection, has spared no effort to explain in accordance therewith the scriptural representations of that doctrine. In the present chapter we shall therefore present the scriptural view of it, and show how utterly our author has failed to reconcile it with his theory. In Chapter II. of Part I. we have given an account of the Professor's view from the "Anastasis" itself, and have traced it to its original and appropriate sources.

The single proposition, to the demonstration of which Professor Bush bends his energies in the present section of his work, is that "If the anticipated judgment really coincides, according to the true tenor of revelation, in point of time with the resurrection, and the real resurrection ensues immediately at death, then all argument is useless either in support or denial of the fact, that each individual soul must be, in effect, judged as soon as the spirit leaves the body. Our sentence, in truth, is passed before our graves are dug:" (p. 275,) "and that if the resurrection expands itself into an unfolding process, covering the lapse of successive generations, such may be the fact also with respect to the judgment itself. And he asserts also that "*the judgment runs parallel with the kingdom*," upon which Christ entered at his ascension; pp. 280, 287. But as we have divested this argument of its assumed analogical force, by demonstrating that this view of the resurrection is incorrect, it is plain that in this discussion it must stand upon its intrinsic merits alone.

Before entering fully into the argument, however, there are some preliminary considerations to be noticed. Professor Bush has intermingled with his speculations on this subject much that is incorrect with some things that are true, and has endeavoured to involve with the discussion the merits of the millenarian controversy. But it is perfectly obvious that his theory can derive no advantage from that controversy, in whatever way the points in dispute therein may be adjusted

by the parties: for whether the millenarians or anti-millenarians are right, the inference is alike fatal to his speculations, as on either supposition his theory is demonstrated to be false. It is needless therefore for us here to follow him in his attempted discussion of, or references to that subject.

The Professor also in his speculations respecting the judgment not only perpetually confounds things that are distinct, but constantly labours to prove what no one denies. E. g. He perpetually confounds the kingdoms of Providence and Grace; and labours to prove that Christ in his state of exaltation both reigns and judges; pp. 284-288. But who doubts that Jesus formally entered upon his kingdom of righteousness and judgment, at his ascension, and that he has been reigning and judging ever since? This is essential to his kingly office. He is now reigning in the midst of his enemies—Ps. cx., and must thus reign until he hath put all enemies under his feet. 1 Cor. xv. 24–28. But the question whether Christ now as King, is the Judge of the earth, (John v. 22, 23,) and delivers his people, and punishes His and their enemies in the present administration of his kingdom, (Rom. xiv. 9, and Isaiah xxxiii. 22,) and whether this his kingdom will continue until the termination of the dispensation of grace and mercy, is altogether different from the question whether there is to be a general resurrection and judgment at the *close* of this dispensation. We assert the truth of the affirmation in both cases; while Professor Bush admits the former and denies the latter. This, then, presents the true issue between us. For the point is not, whether *a judgment* runs parallel with the kingdom; but whether besides *this* judgment there is not a general judgment at the time when Christ will deliver up the kingdom.

But from our author's confused way of treating the subject it will be necessary here to present the question under still another aspect: and in doing so, we shall continue to discriminate carefully between the points which, in this connexion, necessarily come up for discussion, and those which do not.

1. Professor Bush, in his book, often speaks of the millennium. We cheerfully admit that the Bible teaches the doctrine of a millennium. But we are not called upon here to describe its nature, or distinguish it from "the new Jerusalem state," or tell when it will commence, even if we were competent to do so.

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2. We are also taught, that previous to it, and about the time of its introduction, there will be a time of trouble, and dreadful judgments upon the nations, when God will "overturn, and overturn, and overturn," until his own kingdom of grace is fully established over the whole earth. There will be, at this time, a great crisis of some kind; and to which the term "judgment" may be properly applied, as it occurs during the exercise of the kingly office of the Redeemer. But whatever this crisis is, it is not the general resurrection and judgment of which we speak. We are not called upon, therefore, to discuss here, whether the millennium will be introduced by Christ appearing personally, and raising the martyrs, and reigning a thousand years on earth: for all this has not the remotest bearing on the question, whether there will be a general resurrection and judgment, at the period when he delivers up the kingdom. The question here, is not one between Professor Bush and us, as above remarked; though he sees proper to bring it into the dispute: for if the Bible teaches that Christ will thus appear, and raise the just, it is fatal to our author's theory of the resurrection and judgment occurring at death; and if it does not thus teach, the question still occurs, whether it does announce that at some specific time yet future, Christ will appear, and raise the dead, and judge the world. We repeat it, therefore, that we have nothing to do in this connexion with the question of the pre-millennial advent of Christ. And hence we shall not perplex the subject, by attempting to show that any particular passage can, or cannot, refer to such an event: but assuming that the Bible does infallibly teach that Christ will appear, and raise the dead, and judge the world, at some period yet future, (which, if proved, is fatal to the Professor's theory, at whatever time this event may be supposed to take place,) we shall leave the reader at liberty to apply our proofs either to the pre-millennial or post-millennial appearing of the Saviour, as *he* may judge proper.

3. The point, therefore, which I shall undertake to demonstrate, in opposition to Professor Bush and the Swedenborgians, &c., is the following:—*At some definite period of time*, YET FUTURE, *Christ will appear as the Judge of the world, and judge the living and the dead.* This is the true question, and presents the only true issue.

Having thus stated the question, we shall now attend to

our author's argument. An analysis of it will show that if he even had proved what he has attempted, he would have reason to say with Pyrrhus, "Another such victory and we are undone." He is in a singular predicament, who, whether he gains his cause or loses it, is alike ruined.

The so-called argument which he adduces to prove that the *judgment* formally begun at the destruction of Jerusalem, (p. 286, 304,) and runs parallel with the kingdom ever since; and will do so until the end, affords a singular specimen of this dilemma. For admitting the point to be proved irrefutably, that the dead are judged so soon as they leave the body, the question occurs with respect to those who died before Christ. Were they judged as soon as they left the body? If not, all the Professor's fine-spun philosophy respecting natural laws, &c. &c., and along with it his whole theory is destroyed. But if they were judged so soon as they left the body, then the judgment did not *begin* after Christ's death, but thousands of years before; and consequently the whole argument about the judgment running parallel with the kingdom, and *beginning* at Christ's "*advent*" at the destruction of Jerusalem, (pp. 286–287, 303, 304, 307,) is also overthrown. So that in either way the Professor has "a house divided against itself."

We pass over without remark, his references in this section to the *accommodation* principle, (as we have already fully demonstrated its neological nature,) and proceed with the analysis of his argument.

On pp. 276–278, he makes an effort to prove that the only "judgment" which passes upon man takes place at death, and of course, therefore, the judgment must run parallel with the kingdom, and all idea of a future day of judgment "evaporates." The following extract presents his view of this argument:

"And here, by way of taking off any thing of a startling air that may pertain to this position, let it be remarked, that whatever systematic theory we may have adopted on the subject, it is, nevertheless, certain that the current sentiments of all Christians do, in fact, involve substantially the same belief. No article of any creed in Christendom is more universally or unhesitatingly held than that each individual enters at death upon an eternal state of retribution. According to the prevailing moral character in which he makes his exit from the body, he either soars an angel, or sinks a

fiend. Lazarus died, and was carried by angels to Abraham's bosom. The rich man also died, and in hell lifted up his eyes being in torment. *This is a virtual judgment.* No force of reasoning can rebut, no gloss of rhetoric can sophisticate, the self-evident position, that an act of the divine adjudication which seals to the joys of heaven or the woes of hell a departing spirit, is as truly a sentence of life or death—as real an award of eternal judgment—as would be that which should be pronounced in the thunder-tones of Sinai, from the great white throne visibly set and surrounded by circling myriads of the hosts of heaven. Consequently, no subsequent judicial sentence can be conceived as reversing that which is in effect passed at the instant the soul leaves the body; nor can the object of such a general assize, as is usually understood to be announced under the title of the 'general judgment,' be to enact *de novo* a process which has really been accomplished upon each individual of the race as he entered, in his turn, the world of retribution."

He continues this train of remark through another paragraph or two, and is actually thoughtless enough to insult the whole protestant community by asserting that the universally received doctrine respecting the soul in its separate state awaiting the day of resurrection and final judgment "appears to lead *by very natural, if not inevitable steps*, to some kind of intermediate state *very nearly akin to that of purgatory*, and upon which, in fact, there can be little doubt that the doctrine of *purgatory* has been actually built."

If Professor Bush has made this assertion through ignorance, it is certainly high time that he informed himself of the true state of the case; for no declaration can be more incorrect than that there is any analogy between the doctrine of an intermediate state, and the doctrine of purgatory. But if he knew better, then he has descended to an artifice to which I will not here give a name, but which no advocate of a cause that he believes to be the cause of truth should ever employ. I proceed, however, to consider what he has offered above by way of *argument.*

The same argument which Professor Bush has here offered in support of his notion that the true judgment "runs parallel with the kingdom," is employed by the German neologists, in support of the same notion; for, like our author, they endeavour to explain away the doctrine of a judgment to come. The reader will find full confirmation of this statement by

referring to the *Instit. Theologicæ*, of Wegscheider, Parte IV. cap. I. §. 199, pp. 686–688, and also to the *Summa* of Dr. Ammon, §. 201. But the full admission of the Rationalists *that the Bible does unequivocally announce* that there is to be a day of judgment, when all the dead and living are to be judged, will be found in Bretschneider's *Dogmatik*, §. 171, Vol. II. p. 422, seq.

But as to the Professor's argument itself, nothing can be more unphilosophical than it is, and it is actually impossible to imagine what could have been in his mind when he was framing it. He knows perfectly well that the Protestant church believes in the immortality of the soul, and in an intermediate *state* (not *place*) between death and the resurrection. And with these views, what would he have them to do? The soul, at death, enters the world of spirits, a conscious, accountable agent. As it is either guilty or pardoned, it can occupy no intermediate position—and must, therefore, *in the very nature of the case, be either miserable or happy:* nor is it possible to conceive of it, if it be a conscious moral agent, as being otherwise. This view, therefore, results necessarily from the belief of the separate state of the soul. And yet our author attempts to construe it into a virtual admission that there is some truth in his theory, that the only judgment under which man passes in the future world takes place immediately after death.

Then as to the inference of the Professor that because man's spirit is either happy or miserable immediately after death, therefore there is no necessity for any subsequent judgment, I would recommend to his careful consideration such passages as 2 Pet. ii. 4, "For if God spared not the angels that sinned, *but cast them down to hell*, and delivered them into chains of darkness TO BE RESERVED UNTO JUDGMENT;" and Jude 6. "And the angels which kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, *he hath reserved in everlasting chains*, under darkness, UNTO THE JUDGMENT OF THE GREAT DAY." Now these angels who sinned, were at once adjudged to hell, ("which is a virtual judgment,") and yet besides this sentence, they are to be judged at the great day. And these passages, therefore, may teach the Professor, that though the soul of the sinner is adjudged to hell at death, yet there is, at least, as much propriety in his being again judged at the great day, as that the fallen angels should be thus judged: and that, therefore, the argument by which he

would prove that the judgment of the great day is a judgment that runs parallel with the kingdom, is utterly fallacious.

The next item in the Professor's argument (passing his renewed statement and assertion of "accommodation,") is a most singular confounding of the plainest possible distinctions. See pp. 280–284. This is a point to which we have referred already. He utterly confounds the kingdoms of Providence and Grace; and the future judgment of Christ, with the present administration of his kingdom.

As, however, on p. 285, he draws to a conclusion this part of his argument, and as it is a conclusion to which he afterwards repeatedly appeals, we shall present this conclusion of his argument to the reader. He says:

"Now we deem the evidence decisive, that this economy of 'judgment' was to commence synchronically with that predicted 'coming' of Christ which is so splendidly set forth in the vision of Daniel above referred to, where the Son of man receives his kingdom from the Ancient of days. But let it be borne in mind that this 'coming of the Son of man in the clouds of heaven' announced by Daniel, is *precisely the same coming* with that announced by our Saviour in the Gospels, especially Matt. xvi. 27, 28: 'For the Son of man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his angels; and then he shall reward every man according to his works. Verily I say unto you, there be some standing here which shall not taste of death, till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom.' So again, Matt. xxiv. 34: 'Verily I say unto you, this generation shall not pass till all these things be fulfilled.' So also Matt. x. 23: 'Verily I say unto you, ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel till the Son of man be come.' We hold it to be utterly impossible, upon fair canons of interpretation, to divorce these predictions of Daniel and of Christ from a joint reference to one and the same coming, and that too a coming that was to be realized *in its incipient stages* at the destruction of Jerusalem." And he goes on to remark, that this judgment upon Jerusalem did not, however, *exhaust* the import of the prophesy; but that the great judgment *then commenced*, and has been going on ever since. p. 286. The same is repeatedly affirmed by him. See p. 284.

There are several points to be here noticed. The first is the assertion, that the coming of Christ mentioned in these

passages was a coming which "was to be realized IN ITS INCIPIENT STAGES *at the destruction of Jerusalem.*" Now this coming was forty years *after* his glorification, or ascension, at which time, according to our author, the Saviour "*entered at once* upon that great process of judgment by which his kingdom was to be characterized." p. 340. There is a prodigious confusion in his ideas on this subject; for he repeatedly asserts that Christ entered upon his work of judgment immediately after he ascended, and yet he as often repeats that he did not enter upon it until about forty years after; as, e. g. when quoting 1 Pet. iv. 4, 5, and attempting to explain it away, he says that "the great predicted process of judgment *was just on the eve of being commenced.*" p. 338. But not to remark upon these contradictions I observe that at all events the Professor is compelled to admit that in respect to at least *one* great event, the coming, and judging of Christ do not "run parallel with the kingdom;" for though he entered upon his kingdom forty years before, he now *comes* to execute judgment. The language of the Bible on this subject compels our author to admit, therefore, that in respect to at least one great crisis, the *coming* of Christ is not the same with his *judging* as king —and much less cannot refer to a judgment which passes at death upon every individual. And it is perfectly obvious that if these passages cannot be explained without referring them to some great crisis, some terrific display of God's wrath in which he visits the Jews in judgment; and if this great crisis and the language used in relation to it cannot be resolved into the judgment which passes upon each individual at death, then other passages which speak no less explicitly of another coming of Christ, and which cannot be made in any way to refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, must also refer to another great crisis, or judgment, and one which cannot refer merely to the fact that mankind is judged *at death*.

But as to the passages above-quoted by the Professor, I have already remarked upon Matt. xxiv. 34, and have shown that "*generation*" there means *nation*, by consent of the highest authorities, to whom also Dr. Pareus (in loco) may be added. And as to Matt. xvi. 27, 28, our author commits the mistake of assuming that the events spoken of in both verses are one and the same; whereas they are entirely distinct. And yet, baseless as is this assumption, (and

he has not even pretended to make an effort to prove its truth,) he constantly refers to it through this whole section, as a point of the utmost importance, and one which he has proved, and one which affords him ample aid in ridding himself of the difficulties which other passages referring to the day of judgment, throw in the way of his theory. See pp. 289, 293, 337, &c. But who does not see that the Son of man "coming in the glory of his Father, with his angels, to render to *every man* (not Jews only, but *all men*,) according to his works," is a very different thing from his coming in (ἐν or *with*, or *by*) his kingdom? The very language in which these things are announced, evinces the difference between them. The one is a coming in his kingdom, the other is not. The one may, as Piscator remarks, refer to his coming by the Spirit, (Acts ii.) to establish his kingdom; (or it may refer to his coming to destroy Jerusalem, as many think, though I doubt it,) but the other can only refer to his coming to judge *all* men and to give *to every man* according to his works. But if the Professor had referred to the parallel passages in Luke and Mark, he would have seen that these comings could not be the same. In Luke ix. 23–27, it is said that there were some standing there who should not taste of death, until they should "*see the kingdom of God.*" And in Mark viii. 34 to the last, and the first verse of the next chapter (which contain the parallel passage,) it is said that they should not taste of death until they saw "the kingdom of God coming with power." There is nothing here said about coming with angels, to give to all men according to their deserts; but simply the coming of his kingdom, which is a vastly different thing. Verse 28, (in Matt. xvi.) therefore, does not refer to the event mentioned in v. 27; and the object of their being stated in this close connexion, was, that those persons who should witness the fulfilment of the declaration in v. 28, might receive it as an assurance that the event referred to in v. 27 should be also fulfilled. The inferences, therefore, which Professor Bush deduces from this confounding of things which are entirely different, are of no account whatever.

Now there is no dispute with Professor Bush whether it is proper to designate Christ's judgment against Jerusalem *a coming;* and he cannot but know that the great body of critics and commentators thus employ the term. And his professing therefore to establish the propriety of such an use

of the term is labour thrown away; for it is a point which has ever been conceded.

As to the other passage quoted by the Professor above, (Matt. x. 23,) it doubtless may refer to this coming of Christ to destroy the Jewish city and polity. Commentators now generally so explain it. And we are perfectly willing that he should, if he thinks proper, apply both Matt. xvi. 28, (not 27,) and chap. x. 23, to the coming of Christ to destroy Jerusalem.

After a few remarks on Christ's session at the right hand of God, the Professor on pp. 292, 293, offers the following laboured criticism.

"But our Lord could confidently say to the chief priests and elders, 'I say unto you, hereafter shall ye see the Son of man *sitting on the right hand of power*, and coming in the clouds of heaven.' There are two points involved in this passage especially demanding attention. (1.) The original phrase for *hereafter* is ἀπ' ἄρτι, which, in the parallel passage, Luke xxii. 69, is ἀπό τοῦ νῦν, *from now*, most unequivocally implying the *speedy* and *almost immediate* occurrence of the event announced. Kuinoel remarks that it is tantamount to *non ita multum post, not so long after;* and quotes an ancient scholiast, who expresses it by μετὰ μικρόν, *after a little*. To a competent judge of Greek nothing can be more undoubted than that our Lord here speaks of an event which was *speedily to transpire*, and that it can only be by a violent wresting of the genuine import of the words to make them refer to something that was to occur ages subsequent to the announcement. We insist with an earnestness little short of vehemence upon this sense of the phrase, as we feel at liberty, in maintaining ground that will naturally be vigorously contested, to fortify ourselves by every fair defence. The interpretation we have now proposed will be seen to be a tower of strength to our main position. (2.) The 'sitting on the right hand of power' and the 'coming in the clouds of heaven,' are evidently spoken of as *synchronical*. It is *during* the time of this *session* that our Lord *comes*, and *comes* too, in some sense, *in glory;* for in Matt. xvi. 27, this same *coming* is described as a 'coming in the glory of the Father and with his angels.' The inference therefore is plainly irresistible, that, as this *regal sitting* commenced at the ascension, and as the *judicial prerogative* commences at the same time with the *regal*,

of which it is in fact but another form, they must run on from that point parallel with each other, the interval between the ascension and the destruction of Jerusalem being too small to be of account in the grand scheme."

I have presented this long extract, as our author professes to rely so firmly on the criticism which it contains, and as it is the next in order of his few attempts at thorough criticism, which have the appearance of justifying a departure from the received doctrine of the judgment. The remark about "a competent judge of Greek," which is intended to throw upon the defensive all who will not fall in with the Professor's criticism, will not be considered as having much weight when viewed in connexion with the specimens of his philology and exegesis noticed in the foregoing pages. And as to the "*earnestness*" and "*vehemence*" with which he insists upon his criticism in this instance, the reader will be prepared to appreciate its propriety by attending to what we have to offer in the sequel.

As to the authority of Kuinoel, to whom Professor Bush appeals to sustain him in his criticism of Matt. xxvi. 64, it is of the least worth on the very point to which he refers, to wit, in respect to the Greek particles and idiom. He perpetually mistakes on these subjects, as Winer has shown in instances without number. Professor Stuart will, also, sustain me in this remark, who observes, that, most of all, he fails as a philologist, "in respect to the nice and discriminating use of the particles, and various idiomatic constructions. He shows, in such cases, that he has not read the classics with special attention to these subjects; nor taken much pains minutely to inform himself in regard to such matters, as Winer has often developed in his New Testament Grammar." Biblic. Repos. III., 153. He occupied in philology, in relation to the Old and New School, the transition position, such as was held by Schleiermacher in theology, in relation to the Naturalists and Super-Naturalists; and was a sort of *tertium quid* between them. And though the criticism quoted from him by Professor Bush is one of long standing, it derives no additional weight from the fact that Kuinoel has given it his sanction.

The word ἀπάρτι (which is the same as ἀπ' ἄρτι,) has here simply the force of the adverb ἄρτι itself. It is employed a number of times in the New Testament, and in every one of them is susceptible of this construction. Pro-

fessor Bush certainly knows, that of all the Greek prepositions ἀπό in composition is the one on which he should the least depend as furnishing ground for such an inference as he deduces. In instances without number it does not in the least modify the import of the words with which it is compounded. So ἀπογράφω in Heb. xii. 23, (compare Luke x. 20,) and ἀποδεκατόω, Luke xi. 42, and xviii. 12, and Heb. vii. 5, (with 8, 9;) and ἀποθησαυρίζω, 1 Tim. vi. 19, (and Matt. vi. 20.) And then ἀποδέχομαι is very frequently put for δέχομαι, and ἀποθνήσκω for θνήσκω, and ἀποδίδωμι for δίδωμι, and ἀπολαμβάνω for λαμβάνω, &c., &c.

These remarks will serve, not only to show how baseless is the criticism of Professor Bush, but to justify also the remark of Tholuck on John, (xiii. 19, and xiv. 7,) that it is admissible to take ἀπάρτι in the sense of ἄρτι; and, in fact, in the former of these passages he directly says, that "it has the force of ἄρτι:" and hence to insist on translating the ἀπό is quite inadmissible without more substantial reasons than those offered by Professor Bush. Many commentators have mistaken the force of the word; but this is no justification of one who comes before the public with the highest professions of scientific and philological attainment, and proposes to illustrate, that "the knowledge of revelation is progressive."

There is no evidence, therefore, to prove that the word means to express the idea of "from now," or an "almost immediate occurrence." It means no more than that the occurrence referred to would certainly take place at some future time, and leaves this time wholly indefinite. So the parallel place in Mark xiv. 62, expresses it: "And *ye shall see* the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of Power, and coming in the clouds of heaven." And in Luke xxii. 69, the same idea is expressed. And even ἀπό τοῦ νῦν, (allowing the remark of the scholiast referred to by Kuinoel,) cannot be tortured to express any thing of more speedy occurrence than ταχύ in Rev. xxii. 7, 12, 20, which refers to a coming of Christ which is still future, for the Apocalypse was written *after* the destruction of Jerusalem. This "tower of strength" to the Professor's "main position," therefore, is a tower that sadly lacks a foundation.*

* If the reader wishes to investigate the usage of ἀπάρτι in the New Testament, let him turn to Matt. xxiii. 39, and xxvi. 29, 64;

His next chapter, in which the same subject is continued, he begins with remarking, "We now proceed *to avail ourselves of the principle and results* brought to view in the preceding chapter, by applying them to a passage shrouded in the thickest folds of symbolical darkness, with some hopes to 'pluck out the heart of its mystery.' We allude to the twentieth chapter of the Apocalypse," &c.—p. 300. His remarks, however, on this whole chapter, exhibit only a futile effort to obscure its testimony on the very subject on which the clearness of its testimony has ever been next to universally acknowledged, to wit, the future resurrection of the dead and general judgment. When we come to treat of the passage itself we shall notice what he has said respecting it, as well as what he has offered on a number of other passages, with which his dissertation closes.

There is one point, however, to which I must refer in this connexion, before I proceed with the argument. What will the reader think when I assure him, that notwithstanding all that our author has said to prove his "*main position*" that the "judgment runs parallel with the kingdom," and that there is no such thing as a future *re-judgment* (as he would call it) of the dead, that he yet, before he closes, virtually recalls all this, *and directly contradicts the whole of it*, and yet with his singular *inconsistency* still maintains it all to be true,—that is, he maintains it to be both true and false. The evidence of this will be given to the reader; and it would afford a sufficient justification of our procedure, if we had passed over the whole of the Professor's remarks on this subject, as unworthy of serious notice. We have, preferred, however, to follow him regularly through his lucubrations, and to examine the criticisms and statements on which he professes to rely with the most implicit confidence. But to the point.

The Professor had already inadvertently, though repeatedly admitted the impossibility of making all the passages which speak of Christ's coming, to refer to the mere fact of his being a Judge in the daily administration of his kingdom, or to the destruction of Jerusalem itself. Hence he constantly admits a future great crisis at which Christ will per-

John i. 51, and xiii. 19, and xiv. 7; and Rev. xiv. 13. In this last place, however, the ἀπό should not have been translated; for, as in the other places, it simply means *hereafter*.

sonally appear, and at which all the living saints are to be changed; and which he terms "our Saviour's *final* manifestation;" (see pp. 190 and 266–268,) and therefore Christ is personally to appear, at the period in which the living saints are changed. But the Professor has not seen proper here to state in this immediate connexion what the design of this final manifestation is, other than to effect the change of the living saints, (which is a most imperfect view of this stupendous event,) and yet he has in other parts of his book disclosed another view of the subject, and actually admitted at this time also *a judgment of the dead.*

Speaking of Rev. xx. 11–15, he remarks in relation to it that the *time* of the events there referred to "is certainly not the end of the world, as popularly understood; for the New Jerusalem state, which is gradually to be developed on earth, is yet to ensue. *The precursor to this state* is the sounding of the seventh trumpet, which we have already seen *is synchronical with this judgment of the dead.*" "The chain of disclosures in the Apocalypse lands us, in the 20th chapter, at the Saturday evening of the world's great week, *to which this 'judgment of the dead' is more especially to be referred*, for the next chapter opens with the introduction of the new heavens and the new earth," &c.—p. 325. This, surely, looks like any thing else than the judgment of the dead running parallel with the kingdom, and taking place as each individual dies. And we may return the query of Professor Bush, referred to on a former page, and ask him if the dead are to be judged twice? If they are, then why does he object to the doctrine of the whole Protestant church on this subject, as we have seen that he does? And if not, what then is the meaning of this "judgment of the dead" which immediately precedes the introduction of the New Jerusalem state?

On pp. 334–5, the same sentiment is repeated even more unambiguously still; for he announces his firm conviction that this "*judgment of the dead* takes place at the time of the passing away of the old heavens and the old earth, *and it is the introduction of the new heavens and the new earth, which constitutes the New Jerusalem; and the announcement of this is the closing theme of revelation.* We have no account of a judgment or any thing else consequent to it." Here then is a definite point of time assigned for *this judgment of the dead.* The same idea is still more strongly as-

serted, if possible, on p. 339: "We have shown, we think," says he, "that the only judgment of the dead of which the Scriptures speak as occurring *at any particular epoch, is to be located at the commencement of the New Jerusalem state.*" Surely, then, we may ask, that if these dead are to be judged at a "particular epoch," what becomes of the "main position" that their "sentence is pronounced before their graves are dug;" and that therefore they are judged at no particular epoch, as "the judgment runs parallel with the kingdom?" If these "dead," therefore, are not judged as soon as they leave the body, then the Professor's "main position" is false; but if they *are* thus judged, why are they re-judged? and what becomes of his previous objections to this re-judging? We repeat the question, therefore—Why are these *dead* summoned from "the region in which they abide *after death*," and thus judged, (see pp. 317, 319, 320,) seeing that they are judged immediately on leaving the body? And how is it that there can be no future judgment, and yet be a future judgment when these dead are to be judged?

Nor is this all that the Professor has to offer respecting these dead; for he assures us that they are those who died during the thousand years mentioned in Rev. xx. And as this thousand years begun (according to his treatise on the *Millenium*, pp. 101, 102) about A. D. 450, and ended in A. D. 1453, they either were not judged during that period, as they left the body, or they were judged then, and are yet to be judged again. But in his *Anastasis*, p. 321, he says that they were judged as they died during the thousand years, and he thinks that it is only by a figure that their "judgment is here represented as concentrated to a point." The Professor finds it vastly convenient, at times, to see a *figure* in a passage when he wishes to appropriate it, and also to deny that there is a figure in a passage where an opponent sees one. But even this *convenience* will not assist him here. For though it is only by a figure that their judgment is said to be concentrated to a point, yet their judgment does take place "at a particular epoch" without a figure, for his argument requires that it should occur synchronically with the commencement of the New Jerusalem state; and it is at this time, says he, emphatically, that "this judgment of the dead takes place,"—p. 344. And this is the way in which my friend perpetually contradicts and refutes himself, and then,

with an assurance that is as astonishing as it appears to be *à priori* incredible, asks us to resign our long-cherished views of this and its correlative doctrines, and receive his self-subversive statements as truth; assuring us, at the same time, with a gravity which, viewed in this connexion, is irresistibly ludicrous, that "*no two truths in the universe can be inconsistent with each other.*"

Such then is the amount of what our author has produced for the purpose of impugning the received doctrine of a judgment to come, and of supporting his own theory—if that can be called a theory, the features of which are so glaringly at war with each other that one cannot exist without destroying the other. It is a realization of Horace's boar painted in the sea and a dolphin in the woods. But the reader will be at no loss how to appreciate the Professor's attempts, and we shall now proceed briefly to establish our position stated on a former page, that *at some definite period of time, still future, Christ will personally appear as the Judge of the world, and judge both the living and the dead.*

SECTION II.

Direct arguments for a future General Judgment.

1. There are multitudes of passages in the Bible which speak in general of a great crisis, entirely different from any which have yet occurred in the history of the world, and which is to take place at the conclusion of some great era. We shall here merely refer to a few of these passages, and leave the reader to infer from a comparison of them with other passages which we shall hereafter produce, whether this crisis is not the general judgment itself.

Such an event is clearly referred to in Ps. cii. 25–26, (compare Heb. i. 10–12,) "Of old hast thou laid the foundations of the earth: and the heavens are the work of thy hands. *They shall perish*, but thou shalt endure: *yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed.*" The principal theme of these words is a comparison between God and the creature for the purpose of exhibiting his greatness, and the creature's littleness: and God's immutability is directly contrasted with the mutability of the creation. And in this contrast the express statement is made that the heavens and the

earth shall perish, or be changed. There is a similar passage in Luke xxi. 33: "*Heaven and earth shall pass away*, but my word shall not pass away:" (compare also Matt. v. 18, and 1 John ii. 17.) The word here for *pass away* is παρέρχομαι, the sense of which can hardly be mistaken; see it as used in Matt. v. 18, and xxiv. 34, 35; Luke xvi. 17, and xxi. 32; 2 Pet. iii. 10. The same grand crisis is also undoubtedly referred to in Rom. viii. 19, 23: "For the earnest expectation of the creature (creation) *waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God*. And not only they, but ourselves also, which have the first-fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body." In whatever way κτίσις may be expounded, the argument which the passage furnishes is equally conclusive. See also 2 Pet. iii. 10, 13; Rev. xix. 7, and xx. 11–13; Luke xxi. 27, 28, and Ps. xi. 5–7, and xcvi. 13, and xviii. 8–16, and l. 1–4.

2. The *names* by which this great event is designated clearly establish the truth of our position, and the falseness of the notion of Professor Bush. In Matt. x. 15, and xi. 22, 24, and 1 John iv. 17, it is directly called the "day of Judgment." In Jude 6, "the judgment of the great day." In Luke x. 14, simply "judgment." Rom. ii. 5, "the day of the righteous judgment of God." John vi. 39, "the last day." Matt. vii. 22, "that day." Phil. i. 6, and 1 Cor. i. 8, "day of Jesus Christ." And 1 Thess. v. 2, declares, if accurately construed, that "the day of the Lord so comes as a thief comes in the night," compare ver. 3, 4. Now none of these passages can refer to the mere fact of a judgment taking place at the death of each individual—a process which had been going on ever since the fall.

The coming of Christ to judgment is also called "The revelation of the Lord," 2 Thess. i. 7; 1 Cor. i. 7, and iii. 13; and "The appearing of Jesus Christ," 1 Tim. vi. 14; 2 Tim. iv. 11; Tit. ii. 13; and in 2 Thess. ii. 8, "the appearance of his coming," (see Greek;) and in 1 Cor. xv. 23; 1 John ii. 28; 1 Thess. iii. 13, "coming" simply. In 2 Pet. iii. 12, it is also called "the appearing of the day of God." None of these passages can refer to any past event, much less can they be made to refer to the judgment which takes place at death. We shall again refer to some of these passages, when we come to state more fully the argument which they contain.

3. The events which will then transpire, agreeably to the scripture testimony, demonstrate that their accomplishment is still future. The advent of our Saviour is to be by sound of trumpet which shall wake the dead. 1 Thess. iv. 15, 16; 1 Cor. xv. 52. He is to appear with angels, Jude 14, 15; Matt. xxv. 31, who themselves have then a duty to perform in relation to man, Matt. xiii. 41, 42, 49, 50; Mark xiii. 27; Matt. xxiv. 31; (1 Thess. iv. 17, and Matt. xxv. 32.) All are to appear before the tribunal of Christ, 2 Cor. v. 10; Rom. xiv. 10; Matt. xxv. 32; Jude 15; the living and the dead are then to be judged, Acts x. 42; 1 Thess. iv. 15–17; 2 Tim. iv. 1, and 1 Pet. iv. 5; and angels also, 2 Pet. ii. 4; Jude 6; 1 Cor. vi. 3; Matt. viii. 39, (compare xxv. 41.) And as these events are all to be public and visible, so the coming of our Saviour is not only to be at a specific and appointed time, but visibly. 1 Thess. iv. 14; Matt. xix. 28; Luke xxii. 30; Rev. xix. 11–16.

4. But we shall now proceed to take a brief view of the argument as presented in a few passages, to which I shall refer in the order in which they occur.

There are many declarations in the Old Testament, in relation to this subject, which remain to be fulfilled: as, e. g. Ps. xi. 5–7, "Upon the wicked he shall rain snares, fire and brimstone," &c. See also Ps. xcvi. 13; Is. lxiii. 1–6; Joel iii. 1, 2, 13, 14. Daniel, (vii. 9, 10,) in the most direct manner announces the occurrence of such an event. He describes the Judge as appearing in awful majesty, and attended by myriads, and assembling mankind before him. But to omit other references (for there is scarcely a prophet who has not in some way spoken of it,) the following from Malachi, (iii. 17, and iv. 1, 2,) is decisive, "And they shall be mine, saith the Lord of hosts, *in that day when I make up my jewels;*" &c.—"Behold *the day cometh that shall burn as an oven;* and *all* the proud, yea, and *all* that do wickedly, shall be stubble: and the day that cometh shall burn them up," &c.

The declaration in Matt. vii. 22, "Many shall say unto me *in that day*, Lord, Lord," &c., still remains to be fulfilled, for no such occurrences as are here described took place during the destruction of Jerusalem. In no way, therefore, can the passage be referred to that event: and much less can it be referred to the judgment which takes place at death.

The judgment spoken of in Matt. x. 15, "Verily I say unto you, *it shall be* more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah *in the day of judgment* than for that city,"* has never taken place. It cannot be made to refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, for Sodom and Gomorrah had nothing to do with that event. See, also, chap. xi. 22–24. This day of judgment is, therefore, yet to come.

The distinct announcement in Matt. xii. 41, 42, of a future resurrection and judgment, can refer to nothing but a general resurrection and judgment to come: "The men of Nineveh shall rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it; because they repented at the preaching of Jonas," &c. "The Queen of the South shall rise up in the judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it," &c. In both these passages the article is put before judgment, and hence, Professor Bush being umpire, some future specific time must be referred to. The preposition used in these passages is μετὰ with the genitive, which properly means, *in the midst of, among*, (see Mark ix. 24, and x. 30,) and can leave no doubt as to their clear import. Winer has adduced this text itself in illustration of the force of this preposition; and as his remarks have a direct bearing on the subject under discussion, I will here present them. He says: "Kuinoel, also, in Matt. xii. 41, translates μετὰ with the genitive incorrectly by *contra*. The signification *with* is as appropriate here as elsewhere, (*see* Bengel, *in loco:*) ἄνδρες Νινευῖται ἀναστήσονται ἐν τῇ κρίσει μετὰ τῆς γενεᾶς ταύτης καὶ κατακρινοῦσιν αὐτήν signifies, *the Ninevites will appear at the last judgment* WITH *this generation*, (*i. e.*, as true witnesses against them,) as Grotius rightly interpreted. The interpretation of Fritzsche, *they will rise with them from the dead*, adds to these words a superfluous thought," (WHICH IS SELF-EVIDENT.") *Idioms*, Part III., §. 51, (*h.*)

* Professor Bush, on page 344, makes a futile attempt to invalidate the force of this passage, and several others, on the ground that *day* (ἐν ἡμέρᾳ κρίσεως) is destitute of the article. Such a criticism is unworthy of my friend. Does he not know that the article is frequently omitted, when a noun denoting an object, of which the individual referred to possesses but one, is clearly defined by means of a genitive following it? or when a preposition stands before the noun? Let him turn to Winer's Idioms, Part III., §. 18, for a host of examples, (among which Rom. ii. 5, ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς is given) from both sacred and profane writers.

As the Ninevites and the Queen of the South, therefore, have never been raised from the dead, nor appeared in judgment with the generation referred to, the day of judgment spoken of is yet to come. See also, verse 36 of the same chapter.

The events mentioned in Matt. xiii. 40–43, 49, can only be explained in reference to the same matter: "So shall it be in the end of this world. The Son of man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them which do iniquity; and shall cast them into a furnace of fire: there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth." As to the phrase translated "*end of the world*" here, (ἡ συντελεία τοῦ αἰῶνος) I am willing cheerfully to admit that it refers not to any supposed destruction of the κόσμος (see ver. 38,) but to the closing up of the dispensation of mercy to sinners, which is to take place immediately antecedent to the New Jerusalem state. For the sake of the argument I admit this, for, at that time, the Professor has allowed, (in utter subversion of his theory,) *that there will be a judgment of the dead*, (see pp. 325, 339.) Now this period has not yet arrived, nor have the events transpired to which the text refers. The Son of man has not thus descended, his angels have not gathered out of his kingdom them that do iniquity, and cast them into a furnace of fire, and, therefore, these things are yet to occur.

Matt. xix. 28, refers also to the future coming of Christ, and the day of judgment. And it is self-evident that it has never been fulfilled. We shall not remark upon it, however, but pass on to Matt. xxiv. 36–51, "But of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels of heaven, but my Father only. But as the days of Noe were, so shall also *the coming* of the Son of man be."—"Then shall two be in the field; the one shall be taken, and the other left.—Watch, therefore," &c. Let the reader refer to the whole passage.

I shall not enter into a critical examination of this passage, but merely refer to one or two particulars. The events referred to have never transpired, nor any thing like them. The word for "coming" is παρουσία, a word which is never used metaphorically but always literally in the New Testament. It is important to notice this, as it has often been here explained by commentators of a mere spiritual or invisible coming to destroy or judge Jerusalem. It occurs twenty-four times in the New Testament, and in v. 27, 37, 39 of this chapter.

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In 1 Cor. xvi. 17; 2 Cor. vii. 6, 7, and x. 10; Phil. i. 26, and ii. 12, it denotes the personal coming of Paul and others to the churches. And it is used, according to Wahl (*sub voce*,) in 2 Thess. ii. 1, seq.; Matt. xxiv. 3, 39; 1 Cor. xv. 23; 1 Thess. ii. 19; Jas. v. 7, 8; 2 Pet. i. 16; 1 Jno. ii. 28, to denote the *adventus Jesu Messiæ ad regnum suum gloriose inaugurandum futurus*, which of course can only be a visible and literal coming. See also Bretschneider, *sub voce*. In the LXX. also it is used to denote a literal coming. See 2 Macc. viii. 12, "the coming of Nicanor;" so also in Josephus, Ant. III. cap. 8, §. 4, and De Bell. IV. cap 5, §. 5, and in Vita Josephi, §. 17. Nor is there a place in the whole New Testament where it should not be literally understood. In addition to the places above noted, it occurs 1 Thess. iii. 13, and iv. 15, and v. 23; 2 Pet. iii. 4, 12. Now Christ has never thus appeared, and made a separation among men, &c., and therefore the time of his appearing and of the judgment is still future. Compare also v. 27–31.

The next passage to which we shall refer is Matt. xxv. 31–46. "When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and *all the holy angels* with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory: and before him shall be gathered *all nations:* and he shall *separate them*," &c. (See also the parables in v. 1–30.)

If we had not already given specimens *ad nauseam* of our author's exegesis, in which he piles one huge absurdity on another, as though he expected thus to scale the walls of the citadel of truth, (like the old giants piling Pelion upon Ossa, in order to conquer heaven,) I should here present a full view of his laboured attempt to evade the testimony of this strong passage to the doctrine of Christ's personal appearance at the judgment of the great day: for in this attempt he has even transcended himself in inconsistency. But our discussion has already been too protracted to admit of quoting him in full. He asserts, without any attempt to prove it, that this passage "is a designed explanation of a prophecy which does not refer to *a general judgment*, but to an elongated judicial process which flows on commensurate with the kingly dominion of the Messiah in this world." p. 288. And hence the judgment in Matt. xxv. 31–46, he affirms, "to be a prolonged process of judgment, going on from age to age *in the boundaries of the Christian kingdom* or church," and this he attempts seriously to prove by quoting several clauses

of the passage, and referring to his exploded criticisms on Matt. x. 27, &c. &c.

Curcellæus, I believe, was the first who asserted that the judgment here spoken of, is the future judgment of professors of religion, and not of all men. See his Diss. III. de Necessitate Cognit. Christi, Opp. p. 921. He is, however, refuted by Witsius, Œcon. Fœd. lib. I. c. V. p. 53. Turretine also fell in with the view of Curcellæus, as may be seen by referring to his *Dissertatio de Concord. Pauli et Jacobi*, in his *Tractatus de Satisfactione Christi;* and says that Christ in this passage appears to allude (not to Daniel as Professor Bush so roundly asserts, but) to Ezek. xxxiv. 17. "Ezek. xxxiv. 17, ad quem locum alludere videtur Christus." Dr. Duffield, also supposes that this passage teaches a personal and literal return of Christ to judge the nations antecedent to the millennium. But in no sense do these views, though not in accordance with the commonly received exposition of the passage, involve the theory of Professor Bush. And even his own exposition of the passage conflicts with his doctrine that man is judged at death; for if this were true, then those who died before Christ, must have been thus judged; and if so, of course the judgment which he asserts is taught in this passage, instead of beginning at the time in which he makes Christ here assert, begun thousands of years before. This one consideration is a thorough refutation either of his theory, or of his explanation of this passage; and he is at liberty to make his choice.

But when, we ask, has the Son of man been seen in his glory? ἐν τῇ δοξῇ αὐτοῦ: or as it is in chap. xxiv. 30, with power and great glory? Where has he gathered the nations before him, and separated them? When have his angels appeared—"all the holy angels with him?" Until these, and many other questions of similar import, can be satisfactorily answered, the inference is plain and undeniable that the events here referred to have not yet occurred, and the predictions here uttered have not been accomplished.

As we have already considered Matt. xxvi. 64, we pass it here to notice briefly Mark xiii. 26, 27. "And then shall they see the Son of man coming in the clouds with great power and glory. And then shall he send his angels, and shall gather together his elect from the four winds, from the uttermost part of the earth to the uttermost part of heaven." See also Luke xvii. 34–36. It is impossible to

refer the events here mentioned, to the destruction of Jerusalem, or to the judgment which takes place at death, or to any thing which has yet transpired. Their fulfilment is therefore to come. And if Christ is yet to appear in the clouds, with his angels, and to gather his elect, &c., the day of Judgment is still future.

We have already discussed John v. 28, 29, (which clearly implies the doctrine of a general judgment,) and shall therefore here only refer to it in passing. See also chap. vi. 39; and xiv. 3; which clearly point to the great event of the Saviour's coming and the resurrection as still future.

The testimony of Acts is very full and explicit. We have already discussed several passages herein, which, though they speak primarily of the resurrection, yet clearly imply that the judgment is still future. There are several others which we might discuss, as, e. g. Acts i. 9–12, (compare Dan. vii. 13,) which is still unfulfilled. See also chap. x. 42, and xxiv. 25, but we pass them, and confine our remarks to a single declaration found in chap. xvii. 31. "Because he hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness by that man whom he hath ordained; whereof he hath given assurance to all men, in that he hath raised him from the dead."

In this passage Paul urges upon his Gentile hearers the duty of repentance, from the consideration that God hath determined to judge *the world* (*τὴν οἰκουμενην*, *orbem terrarum*, not each individual simply *as he dies*,) in righteousness, lest they should be found unprepared for that event: and he informs them that God hath given assurance to all that such is his purpose, by having raised from the dead Him whom he hath appointed to be the judge. The phrase *παρασχὼν πίστιν πᾶσι*, is very strong, and means an *argumentum invictum ac irrefragabile, quo sufficienter convinci possent de constitutione illa divina*, a moral demonstration that such is the divine purpose. The resurrection of Christ, therefore, is here affirmed by Paul to be an assurance to all, that God has constituted him to judge the world in righteousness on a day which he has appointed.* It is not an assurance that he does *now* judge the world, as Professor Bush supposes, but that he *will do so* on a certain day—a period

* See this argument excellently stated by Lightfoot, in Works, Vol. II. p. 1101, *folio*.

of time yet future—and not judge the Jewish nation only, (for what had the Athenians to do with them?) but *all mankind:* (compare the word as used in Rev. xii. 9; Matt. xxiv. 14; Acts xi. 28; and xix. 27; and xxiv. 5;) and hence this assurance is given *to all*—Jew and Gentile; and this universal judgment is to be at an appointed day. We have already shown the connexion between Christ's resurrection and ours; and this is the ground of the assurance here spoken of by Paul.—Christ is raised to be the judge, and therefore mankind must be raised in order to be judged. This one passage is therefore of itself, abundantly sufficient to settle the whole controversy, even if the Bible was elsewhere silent on the subject.

Professor Bush seems perfectly aware of this, and has made a prodigious effort, (see p. 340–343) to get rid of its testimony. In the investigation of the passage he has made a discovery, which he takes for granted, (and justly,) will surprise the reader, and which he confesses has greatly surprised himself, (p. 341.) And this extraordinary discovery is that "the established rendering—'hath *appointed* a day'—is *entirely* without proof." Though *Bretschneider* in this very verse gives it the sense of *præfigo;* and *Wahl* gives it *constituo, festsetzen,* (see their Lexicons *sub voce,*) and *Schleusner* defines it in a similar manner, all pronouncing its import here to be, to *fix,* or *appoint, beforehand,* yet it all has no influence to lessen our author's confidence in the greatness and value of his discovery; for he announces that he is "fully prepared to evince" that the word in such a connexion has no such meaning in holy writ. "The original word," says he, "is ἔστησε, which, as every Greek scholar is aware, comes from *the root* ἵστημι, (he means, I suppose, the root στάω,) signifying in its primitive and intransitive sense *to stand,* thence in its active import *to cause to stand, to place, to settle,*" &c. &c. Then after a very laborious effort to establish these meanings of the word, he adds, (p. 343,) as follows: "To what conclusion then are we brought in regard to the passage before us, 'God hath *appointed* (ἔστησε) a day in which he will judge the world?' Is it not inevitable that the sense to be assigned is, that God *established at the present time* such a day?—that it is even now current—that it is *brought in*—and that in this fact lies the great motive to repentance which the apostle urges upon the Athenians? We cannot for ourselves get over the evidence

that the term, in its genuine import, denotes the *establishment in the present time* of the designated day; nor will it of course be possible to convict this view of error except, in the first instance, on *philological* and not on *theological* grounds:" and he concludes by adding a self-complacent remark or two in view of the great effort which he has achieved.

Were I to follow Professor Bush through the whole of his criticism on this passage, it might be supposed that I take delight in exposing his glaring and perpetual errors in philology: but reference to a single point will be amply sufficient to show how shallow is the evasion by means of which he expects to save his theory from the death-blow which this passage cannot but give it. He has written as though he thought that the sense of the whole passage depended upon the import which was attached to ἔστησε; whereas, it is *the connexion in which it is here found*, which has compelled Schleusner, Wahl, Bretschneider, and other lexicographers and critics to attach to that word the unusual signification of *præfigo*, or *constituo*. And yet this is a point, of which Professor Bush has taken no more notice than the sleeping rocks. Did he not know that διότι ἔστησεν ἡμέραν, ἐν ᾗ μέλλει κρίνειν τὴν οἰκουμένην, &c. stands in this connexion? and that μέλλει κρίνειν IS FUTURE? and that therefore, however he might translate ἔστησε, whether *appointed*, or *may or does appoint*, or *now appoints*, still, the WILL JUDGE—μέλλει κρίνειν, *announces the judgment itself to be future?* and this, not a judgment of men *as they die*, but of the οἰκουμένη *the world of mankind?* All this is in no way affected by his criticisms on ἔστησε, and yet these are the things which bear directly against his theory. It would really seem as if the Professor had forgotten the idiomatic use of μέλλω. Let him look at it again as illustrated by Wahl and Bretschneider, or by Glassius, in Philol. Sacra, Lib. III. Tract. III. Can. 38, or by Winer, Idioms of the Greek Language of the New Testament, Part III. §. 45, 8, and I feel assured he will see that it was purely on philological, (and not theological) grounds that Wahl and Bretschneider, &c. &c., have assigned to ἔστησε here the meaning they have. It would have rendered them ridiculous throughout Germany had they attempted to define it otherwise in this passage; for every boy who had been but

a year at the Gymnasium could have told them that in such a connexion it could mean nothing else.

The next important passage, and one which Professor Bush has passed over without remark or allusion, is Rom. ii. 1–16, one of the *sedes* themselves of this doctrine, and contains not only clear announcements that the day of Judgment is future, and that all men are then to be judged, but an exhibition of the principles upon which the world of man is then to be judged. The passage is too long to admit of its being here fully quoted, but that the judgment is to be at an appointed time, and consequently does not take place at death, and that it is to be universal, comprehending both "Jew and Gentile," and that it is still future, is clear from the following extracts: "But after thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up to thyself wrath *against the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God;* who will render to every man according to his deeds." "For as many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law: and as many as have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law;" (and then after a parenthesis, Paul adds,) "*in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men* (Jews and Gentiles) *by Jesus Christ according to my Gospel.*" See also Rom. xiv. 9–12.

In 1 Cor. iv. 3, also, Paul remarks, "But with me it is a very small thing that I should be judged of you, *or of man's judgment;* (ἢ ὑπὸ ἀνθρωπίνης ἡμέρας· *or of man's day;*) yea, I judge not mine own self." He here contrasts man's day, which is *now*, with the day when the Lord *will judge;* and man's judgment with the judgment which the Lord will pronounce when his great day of judgment shall arrive. Crellius (whom I have opened since writing the above,) takes the same view of the passage. "The apostle," says he, "appears to allude to that day of the Lord in which he will pronounce the final judgment; and to oppose the human day or judgment to that day and judgment."

We have already commented on 1 Cor. xv. 23, 51, 52, which fixes these events as synchronical with the coming of Christ, the sounding of the last trump, and the resurrection of the dead: and for the same reason we shall pass over 2 Cor. v. 10, with a single remark. It announces that *all* are to appear before the judgment-seat of Christ to receive according to their deserts: and the phrase τοὺς γὰρ πάντας ἡμᾶς φανερωθῆναι δεῖ, can mean no other than a universal and si-

multaneous arraigning, at which time *each one* (ἕκαστος) is to receive his reward. Nothing of this kind has yet occurred, and therefore the declaration remains yet to be accomplished.

Phil. iii. 20, 21, has already been discussed in relation to the resurrection. It also announces that at the great day of Jesus Christ (see ch. i. 6) he will *descend from heaven.* Of course, therefore, the judgment cannot, any more than the resurrection, take place *while he is in heaven*, as our author imagines.

The testimony in the epistles to the Thessalonians is very full and explicit; we have room, however, only to refer to it briefly in passing. 1 Thess. iv. 16, and its context, has been already noticed in our remarks on the resurrection. It also announces (see context) that the coming of the Lord to judgment is to be with the sound of the trumpet and the raising of the dead in Christ, and the rapture of them and of the living saints. These are the preludes to the judgment: and they are all yet to occur. See also chap. v. 2, and iii. 13; and Col. iii. 4.

The following passage needs no comment; its overwhelming testimony can never be set aside, and Professor Bush has thought it wisest to pass it in silence. Nothing can be more full or decisive of the point under discussion. "And to you who are troubled," says Paul, "rest with us, *when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire, taking vengeance* on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ: who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power; *when he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe* (because our testimony among you was believed) *in that day.*"

Another express affirmation that Christ will come visibly to judgment is found in 2 Thess. ii. 8: "And then shall that wicked be revealed, whom the Lord shall consume with the spirit of his mouth, *and shall destroy with the brightness of his coming:*" ἐπιφάνεια τῆς παρουσίας, *brightness of his* APPEARING. The Greek language has no phrase which can more fully than this convey the idea that Christ will personally and visibly appear at the time here referred to; and this appearance will be *in judgment*, as the text declares.

But the whole context is worthy of consideration in view of Professor Bush's theory. In vs. 1–8, Paul assures the

Thessalonians that the day of judgment was not near at hand. This, of course, cannot refer to the judgment which takes place at death; for such an idea would turn the whole passage into nonsense. Nor can it refer to the destruction of Jerusalem: for, 1. Christ did not visibly and personally appear at that time. 2. The destruction of that city *was* near at hand when Paul wrote, and actually occurred some twelve or fifteen years after this. 3. The Thessalonians had no particular interest in knowing when the Jewish city should be sacked. 4. But v. 3 shows the impossibility of referring this passage to that event. "That day," says Paul, "shall not come unless there be *a falling away first*." What falling away is here referred to? Not a falling away of Christians before the destruction of Jerusalem; for such an apostasy was in no way connected with that event. Nor could it mean a falling away of the Jews: for they had already sufficiently fallen away to insure their destruction; Luke xix. 40, 41. The event of the Saviour's coming, here spoken of, has therefore not yet occurred.

The passage in 2 Tim. iv. 1, is equally explicit: "I charge thee before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, *who shall judge the quick and the dead at his appearing and kingdom.*" The word for *appearing* is here ἐπιφάνεια, and is never employed figuratively in the New Testament; see ver. 8, and 1 Tim. vi. 14; 2 Tim. i. 10; 2 Thess. ii. 8; Tit. ii. 13, which are the only places in which it occurs. Now Christ has not yet personally appeared to judge the living and the dead, and therefore the event here referred to (as well as in most of the texts just named,) is yet to occur.

The next passage to which we shall refer is Heb. ix. 27, 28: "And as it is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the judgment: so Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many; and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time without sin unto salvation." This passage has been often supposed to refer only to the judgment which takes place upon the soul immediately after death, as in the case of Dives and Lazarus, in Luke xvi. This, however, is not in accordance with the text. For οὕτω καὶ in ver. 28, is plainly illative, and refers to the particles of comparison καθ' ὅσον in ver. 27. The argument of the apostle is that "as it is appointed to men once (ἅπαξ) to die, and *after this* (μετὰ τοῦτο) it is appointed that *they should be judged;* so also Christ having died once (ἅπαξ,) will ap-

pear again *to be the Judge.*" The judgment, therefore, to which man is appointed after death, is the judgment of the great day! for which great transaction he awaits either in paradise or hell: and this judgment is to take place when Christ the Judge *appears, the second time* (personally and visibly as he appeared the first time,) not, however, as a sin-offering, but to the saving of those whom he had redeemed with his blood. See also 1 Pet. i. 7, 8, and 1 John iii. 2, (compare Ps. xvii. 15,) and 1 John ii. 28, which last passage clearly implies that some will be "*ashamed* before him at his coming," and who, of course, will receive according to their deserts.

The apostle in 2 Pet. ii. 4, announces that the fallen angels are to be judged at the great day: "For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment," or to "*the judgment of the great day;*" (see Jude 6, compare 1 Cor. vi. 3, and Matt. viii. 29, and xxv. 41.) This protasis, it is true, has no grammatical apodosis; but a reference to the previous verses will show that Peter intended to convey the idea, that "If God did not spare angels, *much less will he spare these false teachers.*" But there can be no mistaking the import of παρέδωκεν εἰς κρίσιν τηρουμένους *he delivered them over as those who* (now) *are kept for* (or *until*) *the judgment*"—even the judgment of the great day. And, as we have remarked already, if angels are thus reserved to judgment, though already confined in hell, the same is doubtless the case with sinners who die impenitent: and if there is to be a day for judging sinful angels, there is also to be a day for judging sinful man. And this judgment in the case of man, can no more be resolved into the sentence which he meets with at death, than the future judgment of angels can be resolved into the sentence which was formerly passed upon them when they fell.

The argument in 2 Pet. iii. 3–17, respecting the "coming of the day of God," ver. 12, and of the "coming" of the judge, (ver. 4,) which the skeptics derided, might be here discussed, did not our limits absolutely forbid. It is a serious consideration, however, that Professor Bush virtually justifies these scoffers, who say, "Where is the promise of his coming?" and who seem to think that Christ will *never come* to judgment: for, as if in answer to this very query

of theirs, his theory replies, that there is no such promise, and that Christ *will not* thus come to judgment, &c.

Omitting other passages, we proceed to Jude 14, 15: "Behold the Lord cometh with ten thousand of his saints, *to execute judgment upon all*," &c. The meaning of this passage cannot be mistaken; for, whatever may be the import of *saints* here, it is evident that the Lord has never appeared thus attended, nor has he ever thus judged the world, or all mankind. The prophecy, therefore, is yet to be fulfilled.

The term saints (ἁγίαις) has occasioned some little discussion; and Dr. Duffield, in his late work on "*Prophecy*," has egregiously misapprehended its import; and to sustain himself, would even translate ἄγγελος by *messenger*, and refer it to *mankind* in Matt. xiii. 39, &c. But this is wholly inadmissible; nor did his argument require any such harsh dealing with the Scriptures; a mode of dealing which must involve the whole doctrine of angels in inextricable confusion. This mode of translation is a discovery claimed by the editors of the "*Improved Version*," who have given us many ludicrous specimens of it; (see *e. g.*, their rendering of Gal. iii. 19; 1 Tim. iii. 16, and v. 21; Heb. i. 4, 5, 7, and ii. 2, and xii. 22; 1 Pet. iii. 22; 2 Pet. ii. 4, &c., and their annotations thereon,) but they have, as yet, left Matt. xiii. 39, 49, &c., undisturbed.

We have already shown that when our Saviour appears in judgment, he will be attended with all the holy angels. Their appearance will characterize his second advent, and, had he wished it, they were ready to attend him during his first. (Matt. xxvi. 53, compare Heb. i. 6.) Ἅγιος is a frequent name for angels; see Matt. xxv. 31; Mark viii. 30, 38; Luke ix. 26; Acts x. 22; Rev. xiv. 10; 1 Thess. iii. 13; (compare 2 Thess. i. 7;) and in the LXX., Dan. iv. 14, 20, and viii. 13; Psalm lxxxix. 5; and Job v. 1. And even in our text, a number of the old authorities read μυριάσιν ἁγίων ἀγγέλων, and μυριάσιν ἁγίαις ἀγγέλων, and μυριάσιν ἀγγέλων. Now Christ has never yet appeared thus attended to judgment, and, therefore, the prophecy is still unfulfilled.

There are a number of passages in Revelation, as for example chap. vi. 12–17, and xix. 11–16, which might be made the subject of remark in this connexion; but we omit them, in order to refer to Rev. xx. 11–15, in conclusion.

The passage has been already quoted on a former page, and we therefore need not quote it here. Professor Bush, as we may easily suppose, has been exceedingly perplexed by it; but a few observations will be sufficient to show how utterly he has failed in his attempt to set aside its testimony.

His remark, that "bodies" are not here spoken of, we have already considered; and a single quotation will serve to show the nature of his attempts at evasion. Says he, in relation to this passage: "The true doctrine of the resurrection affords the true key to the symbolic problems before us." p. 317. We have seen what his "true doctrine of the resurrection" is—that man rises from the dead at death—and the fact that he attempts to explain this passage in accordance with this notion, will, of itself, evince what must be the nature of his attempts at exposition. And it is while making this effort, that he contradicts himself so strangely, by first asserting that the judgment spoken of occurs at a stated and definite period, and then that it occurs at no such period, but merely takes place at death. He asserts, that "the judgment here described is *not* a *visible* judgment in the natural sphere," and, of course, the great white throne, and the heavens and earth, and the sea, are not "visible in the natural sphere." The sea giving up its dead "occurs," says he, "prior *to the act of adjudication* just mentioned above," i. e., prior to this *judgment* of the dead, which he speaks of; and, of course, if this "act of adjudication" is the one which takes place at death, then the sea must have given up her dead before the first of Adam's race died. But to pursue this subject would be to trifle with the patience of the reader. I may remark, however, that the reason why the sea is here specifically mentioned as giving up its dead, appears to be, because, as the resurrection of *all who are in their graves*, or in *the dust of the earth*, had been spoken of by the Spirit of inspiration, the resurrection of those in the sea is here expressly mentioned, that all may perceive that the resurrection of the whole human family will be complete, and that even the dissolution of the body which takes place in the waters, will present no impediment in the way of him who is the resurrection and the life. So that even though through Adam all die, yet through Christ shall all be made alive.

CONCLUSION.

THUS I have completed my investigation of the views of the resurrection and judgment asserted by Professor Bush, in common with Swedenborgians and others. I have carefully examined every position which he has advanced, and every attempt which he has made to impugn the received doctrine, or to sustain his own. He has in the last chapters of his book attempted to criticise at great length Acts iii. 19–21, and 1 Cor. xv. 24–28; but as these passages have but an incidental reference to the main issue, I shall not follow him therein. I am not sorry that there is no necessity for doing so; for in his attempts to criticise them, he has fallen into not a few grievous philological errors, affecting, too, the very core of his exposition; and it would afford me no pleasure to expose them, as they do not seriously affect the fundamental doctrines of the Gospel.

Yet crude and inconsistent with scarce a parallel, as are the Professor's views, he cannot, without the highest degree of self-complacency, survey his efforts to establish them. In the conclusion of his remarks on the resurrection and judgment, he exclaims, with no little transport—"What then becomes of the scriptural evidence of the *resurrection of the body? Does it not evaporate in the crucible of logical and philological deduction?* And is it not *inevitable* that a *great change must* come over our estimate of the doctrine, viewed as a disclosure of holy writ? *Can it hereafter present the same aspect to the reflecting mind as formerly*, when conceived to involve the averment of the requickening of the inhumed relics of the corporeal structure? *Especially, are we not presented with a new and all-important view of the central fact, our Saviour's resurrection?* Can the evidence be resisted?"—p. 347. I have sometimes half doubted whether the Professor could have been really serious when he wrote this—for of all things in the world it appears the most unaccountably strange that a man should soberly expect to effect an entire revolution in the views entertained by the Christian church on the most momentous subjects, by means of such efforts as this of Professor Bush. He has

offered not a single objection to the doctrine he opposes, but has been a thousand times refuted before he was born; not a new fact or principle has he adduced from science or philosophy; not a single text has he been able to produce which in any way countenances his theory; and not only this, but his views are crude and unformed on many of the most important points which he has attempted to discuss, and in multitudes of places they are totally and irreconcilably discordant and subversive of each other; and to crown all, they are wholly destitute even of the attraction of novelty, as we have shown at the commencement of this treatise: and yet, notwithstanding all this, our author announces that he seriously expects the Christian church will, by virtue of what he has presented, abandon the views which she has ever entertained, and the truth of which her sons have demonstrated ten thousand times twice told, and around which cluster her dearest hopes for time and eternity; and receive as truth some of the wildest chimeras which ever entered the mind of man!

The work of Professor Bush has excited much interest in many minds, particularly the young and inquiring; and no small degree of apprehension among some of the friends of evangelical religion. Yet I cannot doubt he will deeply regret ever having written it. His bold sanction of the neological principles of hermeneutics, will be hailed with joy by those in our country who are endeavouring to clothe themselves in the cast-off garments of the German school of Semler; his effort to explain away the doctrine of a judgment to come, will find favour among our Universalists; and the Swedenborgians, Shakers and Rationalists will rejoice in the support and countenance of one who, with no small amount of reputation as a biblical expositor, has come to their assistance with such a parade of learning and science: but the ark of God will still remain unshaken. In this country, truth cannot suffer in its conflict with error.

Professor Bush has, in this discussion, spoken plainly, and, occasionally, with no little contempt of the doctrines he impugns. I too have spoken plainly, under the firm persuasion that "these are not the times to concede any thing either to timid integrity among ourselves, or fluctuating doubts and scruples among our milder opponents. It is necessary that the truth should be spoken, not only out, but aloud."* Of

* British Critic for January, 1800.

the author himself, I have endeavoured to speak, as I truly feel, kindly: but such errors as he has advocated cannot be treated in a way which would lead the reader to infer that the writer deemed them to be at best but trivial, without a clear compromise of fundamental truth. I am not the one who can, without the utterance of stern rebuke, permit a brother (however highly valued) to charge the apostles with mistake, and the Saviour with direct connivance at gross and grievous errors. The man who asserts these things under whatever pretence, *has* openly taken sides with the declared enemies of Christ and his religion. Still, he may not design it so, and the error may be one of the head and not of the heart. But this in no way cancels our obligations to assert, plainly and fearlessly, the radical difference between truth and error. Nor can one particle of this difference be compromised, should ten thousand such men as Professor Bush assume the position which he has taken. I should still say, amicus Socrates, amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas, and should feel bound to declare that they had *clearly made a compromise with the enemy.* I am aware that this is "bigotry" in our modern vocabulary, nor am I unwilling that on such grounds it should be so regarded.

I can truly say (if I may be pardoned for speaking so often in the first person,) that I always rejoice when any doctrine of revelation becomes the subject of more than special attention and inquiry, whether it be by means of believer, errorist, or infidel. Let these doctrines be "interrogated"—and the severer the scrutiny the better; but let the principles upon which this is attempted be reasonable and philosophical. Revelation cannot be injured thereby. But the man who will attempt such a scrutiny on false principles, or on those which are wholly arbitrary, or even preposterous in their application to any other subject, had better present his lucubrations to other readers than the people of our American republic, if he calculates upon either profit or lasting fame. Error may appear to triumph for a season on American soil, but that moment her triumph has appeared to be the proudest, has ever proved to be the signal for her overthrow.

The contemplation of the momentous themes which form the subject of this discourse, cannot but force upon the mind the impressive reflection that both writer and reader are rapidly passing onward to the world where the character

we have formed in our present state will receive the impress of eternal immutability. May we be prepared for the scenes which will then open upon our view, and for that awful assize to which reference has been made so frequently on the preceding pages, and at which *we* are not to be mere spectators; but where our principles and feelings and actions must all undergo the severest scrutiny! And Oh, thou glorious Redeemer, who art ordained to be the Judge of the living and the dead! mercifully pardon the imperfections of this book, which was written for the promotion of thy glory; and grant that its perusal may be attended with thy blessing in leading souls to prepare for thy coming! Look down upon thy Zion in this land, (for she is thy blood-purchased possession!) and save her from those errors which have retarded thy triumph, and desolated thy inheritance in other lands. Let her still prosper under thy protecting and nurturing hand; and may thy people become more like thee, and possess more sympathy with thee in thine efforts to recover this apostate world to thy sway.

THE END.

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*** We have appended to the PARISH PSALMODY the Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church, and the Shorter Catechism. Congregations choosing to dispense with these, can be supplied with copies in which they are omitted.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

BY THE SYNOD OF PENNSYLVANIA.

Resolved, That the Parish Psalmody, which has already been adopted extensively by the churches in our connexion, is a Book of Psalms and Hymns of great excellence. The collection is large, various, and evangelical, replete with lyric beauty, and admirably adapted to the wants and spirit of the age. Embracing also the Confession of Faith and Shorter Catechism, it supplies a desideratum, which has been wanting heretofore in the Hymn Books in use in the Presbyterian Church.

Resolved, That we recommend its adoption, as speedily as possible, by all the churches in our care.

BY THE SYNOD OF WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA.

Resolved, That we recommend its adoption, (Parish Psalmody) by all the churches under our care.

BY THE PRESBYTERY OF PITTSBURGH, PA.

Resolved, That the Parish Psalmody, which has been adopted by two of our churches, is a collection of Psalms and Hymns of great excellence; and we recommend its use in all the churches under our care.

Resolved, That we consider it a strong recommendation of the Parish Psalmody, that appended to it, are the Confession of Faith, and the Shorter Catechism; thus giving a wide circulation to those venerated standards of Presbyterianism, and making all our members familiar with the system of doctrine, held and taught in our church.

Resolved, That we overture the Synod to take action on this subject, so that we may, if possible, secure uniformity of Psalmody throughout the churches.

Extract from the Minutes of the Third Presbytery, Philadelphia.

The committee appointed to examine the "Parish Psalmody," published by Messrs. Perkins & Purves, of Philadelphia, respectfully report,

That they have given due attention to the book, and find it to possess more excellencies, and fewer defects, than usually attach to works of this character.

It contains the Psalms of Dr. Watts entire from the original copy, except in a few instances of national allusion, together with a versification of the Psalms of David which he omitted, by other and approved authors.

Most of the Hymns of Watts also are given with sparing and judicious alterations. To these are added about five hundred of the most choice hymns in the English language, adapted to every variety of occasion.

The index of subjects is full and well arranged, and one also of Scripture passages on which the hymns are founded, is added.

The book is truly Presbyterian in its character, containing the Confession of Faith and Shorter Catechism. The execution of the work is admirable, both for appearance and durability.

They would recommend the following resolution for adoption:—

Resolved, That the Presbytery recommend to the churches under its care the "Parish Psalmody," published by Messrs. Perkins & Purves, of Philadelphia, as admirably adapted to interest and edify our churches and congregations, in this department of public worship.

The foregoing is a true extract from the minutes of the Presbytery.

Attest, ROBERT ADAIR, *Stated Clerk.*

Extract from the Minutes of the Presbytery of Bethlehem.

Resolved, That we highly approve the collection of Psalms and Hymns, entitled "Parish Psalmody," published by Perkins & Purves, and regard it as decidedly the most judicious selection with which we are acquainted. HENRY B. ELLIOT, *Clerk.*

From the New York Evangelist.

This is a work evidently prepared with care, and by one who is a theologian and a man of taste, though we are not informed who he is. It has some distinguishing features, which will probably commend it to the favour of many of the churches. * * * * * * * *

The alterations and abridgments of those hymns of Watts which are given, are sparingly but judiciously and tastefully made. They are by no means too frequent; in our opinion, they might have been more frequent, without injury to the cause of good psalmody. The selection from other authors is copious, varied, and in good taste. The whole number of hymns is little less than seven hundred; and those adapted to special occasions and subjects are quite as numerous as in any collection we are acquainted with. The classification of subjects is more minute than usual, and is methodical, easy, and corresponding with the best arrangement of systematic theology. Some may think it carried to far, but it gives the work an appearance of symmetry and order which is pleasing and desirable.

It is very handsomely printed, with fair, open type, and fine paper —has convenient indexes of subjects, first lines, &c., is well bound, and sold at a moderate price. We doubt not it will strike a large portion of the religious public with favour, and find its way to the acceptable use of many churches.

The following recommendation has been received from several of the Pastors of the city of Philadelphia, who have adopted the Parish Psalmody:

The undersigned have introduced into their respective churches the "Parish Psalmody," recently published by Perkins & Purves, of this city, and which has received the approval of the Third Presbytery of Philadelphia, and other ecclesiastical bodies. The following are some of its excellencies, viz:

1. It contains Dr. Watts's versification of the Psalms, entire: and the Hymns by the same author are retained, with sparing and judicious alterations. To the Hymns by Dr. Watts are added about five hundred of the best in the English language.

2. The classification and the index of subjects are full and well arranged: and an index of Scripture passages, upon which the hymns are founded; and (in the large size) an index of the first line of every stanza, give it a completeness which is seldom to be met with in similar collections.

3. It includes the Confession of Faith and the Shorter Catechism of the Presbyterian Church, which gives the book much additional value.

We cordially recommend the "Parish Psalmody" to our brethren in the ministry and the churches in our connexion, for their adoption, believing it to be the best collection of Psalmody now in use.

John L. Grant,
Pastor of the 11th Presbyterian Church, Phila.
Charles Brown,
Pastor of 1st Presb. Church, Fairmount, Phila.
Ezra Stiles Ely, D. D.
Pastor Elect of 1st Presb. Church, N. L. Phila.
Robert Adair,
Pastor of 1st Presb. Church, Southwark, Phila.
William Ramsey,
Minister of Cedar street Presb. Church, Phila.
M. La Rue P. Thompson,
Pastor of the 5th Presbyterian Church, Phila.
George Chandler,
Pastor of 1st Presb. Church, Kensington, Phila.

From the New York Observer.

We have examined this book with some attention, and we are pleased with all that we have yet seen in it; the selection appears to be made with taste, and the variety is so great that songs suitable for any occasion, and adapted to almost any subject, may be readily found.

Another feature we admire much in this book—the Confession of Faith and the Shorter Catechism of the Presbyterian Church are added in an appendix. The propriety and usefulness of this addition will be very apparent. For other than Presbyterian churches, which adopt his book, an edition is published without the appendix.

Specimens of Style p. 196.

Specimens of Logic p. 193-4. 195. 201

Specimens of modesty. 196, 198.

Specimens of swaggering.

Specimens of Courtesy p. 194.

Specimens of perversion p. 195 (bot)

Prof. D. Objection in making Ancestors mean
ning, future life up to death. Mr Sanders
to understanding it only a manner of the Soul
body at the Last Day—

Suggestion of the Soul in the body—Subsequ
of the restored to the presence of God at death,
& exaltation & heavenly throne at the Jud-
gement &. Intermediate of a higher
body—

At Twelve the Professor, - having [illegible]
[illegible] the Accountant's Assignment, [illegible]
Consultant's Cabin & handed [illegible]

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